0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/342 Thanks! 1 00:00:09,770 --> 00:00:11,719 All right, so thank you for being here to 2 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:12,859 begin with. 3 00:00:12,860 --> 00:00:15,379 We're going to talk today about divisive 4 00:00:15,380 --> 00:00:17,539 people and this 5 00:00:17,540 --> 00:00:19,669 really almost every device 6 00:00:19,670 --> 00:00:21,259 that you use from mobile phone to your 7 00:00:21,260 --> 00:00:23,629 personal computer to wearable 8 00:00:23,630 --> 00:00:25,710 devices and the list goes on. 9 00:00:27,200 --> 00:00:29,179 You can send me an email if you have 10 00:00:29,180 --> 00:00:31,249 questions or you can use 11 00:00:31,250 --> 00:00:33,229 the question and answer a lot to ask me a 12 00:00:33,230 --> 00:00:34,549 question after the talk. 13 00:00:34,550 --> 00:00:36,079 And you can follow me on Twitter if you 14 00:00:36,080 --> 00:00:37,080 want. 15 00:00:39,020 --> 00:00:40,399 So my name is Sylvia. 16 00:00:40,400 --> 00:00:42,229 I am a software engineer and the 17 00:00:42,230 --> 00:00:44,449 candidate in Barcelona in 18 00:00:44,450 --> 00:00:46,429 telecommunications engineering. 19 00:00:46,430 --> 00:00:48,759 I research mostly 20 00:00:48,760 --> 00:00:50,320 on privacy and website. 21 00:00:51,680 --> 00:00:53,869 And I wanted to talk about the real 22 00:00:53,870 --> 00:00:55,999 dark web and what 23 00:00:56,000 --> 00:00:57,000 I mean by that. 24 00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:00,769 So what is what is this all about? 25 00:01:00,770 --> 00:01:02,779 I'm going to talk about marketing to 26 00:01:02,780 --> 00:01:05,329 begin with privacy use talking 27 00:01:05,330 --> 00:01:07,810 online footprint, identity and control. 28 00:01:08,870 --> 00:01:09,919 Why marketing? 29 00:01:09,920 --> 00:01:12,019 We going to find out in the 30 00:01:12,020 --> 00:01:13,020 next few slides. 31 00:01:14,510 --> 00:01:16,669 So if you think about 32 00:01:16,670 --> 00:01:18,769 the company that started since 33 00:01:18,770 --> 00:01:20,869 the 90s with the new economy and so on to 34 00:01:20,870 --> 00:01:22,939 base the business to begin with, they 35 00:01:22,940 --> 00:01:25,189 sustained a business for a while only on 36 00:01:25,190 --> 00:01:26,809 advertising. 37 00:01:26,810 --> 00:01:29,119 And so we think 38 00:01:29,120 --> 00:01:31,309 of Facebook, if we think of Google, 39 00:01:31,310 --> 00:01:33,679 if we think of Twitter and Instagram 40 00:01:33,680 --> 00:01:35,839 and so on, they let you know in the very 41 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:38,209 fine print in the agreement 42 00:01:38,210 --> 00:01:39,769 that you signed, that they sell your data 43 00:01:39,770 --> 00:01:40,770 in a way or another. 44 00:01:43,220 --> 00:01:45,469 So the 45 00:01:45,470 --> 00:01:47,599 scope of this is kind of massive. 46 00:01:47,600 --> 00:01:49,729 And the actual objective of 47 00:01:49,730 --> 00:01:51,859 advertising is for you to buy product 48 00:01:51,860 --> 00:01:53,059 and for you to buy products. 49 00:01:53,060 --> 00:01:54,589 They need to suggest your products that 50 00:01:54,590 --> 00:01:56,329 you might be interested in. 51 00:01:56,330 --> 00:01:58,579 And so they want to know 52 00:01:58,580 --> 00:02:01,579 as much as they can about you and 53 00:02:01,580 --> 00:02:03,499 so that they can recommend your product 54 00:02:03,500 --> 00:02:04,969 that they're more likely to buy because 55 00:02:04,970 --> 00:02:07,069 you're already in those things. 56 00:02:07,070 --> 00:02:09,228 And the thing 57 00:02:09,229 --> 00:02:10,519 is that they collect a lot of thought 58 00:02:10,520 --> 00:02:12,889 about people. And this 59 00:02:12,890 --> 00:02:14,959 is personal data and sometimes it's very 60 00:02:14,960 --> 00:02:18,169 personal and very sensitive information. 61 00:02:18,170 --> 00:02:19,170 So 62 00:02:20,420 --> 00:02:22,429 the way this happened is that they 63 00:02:22,430 --> 00:02:24,949 basically track things that you do. 64 00:02:24,950 --> 00:02:26,929 So these are your online activities. 65 00:02:26,930 --> 00:02:28,579 But since the online activity are so 66 00:02:28,580 --> 00:02:29,999 linked with the offline activity, 67 00:02:30,000 --> 00:02:32,179 sometimes also it's offline activities. 68 00:02:32,180 --> 00:02:34,249 So when you subscribe for a 69 00:02:34,250 --> 00:02:36,439 meet up that you like, they know 70 00:02:36,440 --> 00:02:38,899 the D.A. 71 00:02:38,900 --> 00:02:40,339 the topic of that meetup, it can be 72 00:02:40,340 --> 00:02:42,079 technology, can be skateboarding, it can 73 00:02:42,080 --> 00:02:44,209 be theater, literature, whatever it is 74 00:02:44,210 --> 00:02:46,279 they know about it, for example. 75 00:02:46,280 --> 00:02:48,499 So it's not something 76 00:02:48,500 --> 00:02:50,569 that goes into the online world, but 77 00:02:50,570 --> 00:02:52,279 it goes into the offline world. 78 00:02:52,280 --> 00:02:54,469 So your real lives and 79 00:02:54,470 --> 00:02:56,999 this information is analyzed 80 00:02:58,020 --> 00:03:00,439 is induction and it's always available 81 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:01,759 to the companies that collected. 82 00:03:03,570 --> 00:03:05,679 So what about online privacy, 83 00:03:05,680 --> 00:03:09,059 then, do we have online privacy 84 00:03:09,060 --> 00:03:10,429 to have to speak close? 85 00:03:10,430 --> 00:03:11,430 Yes, 86 00:03:13,510 --> 00:03:14,510 well. 87 00:03:15,980 --> 00:03:18,199 OK, so if 88 00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:20,299 we always aren't tracked and 89 00:03:20,300 --> 00:03:22,459 ruction locked doesn't mean that 90 00:03:22,460 --> 00:03:25,039 we are always controlled under some 91 00:03:25,040 --> 00:03:27,229 entities to always know what we do. 92 00:03:27,230 --> 00:03:29,329 And do we have the right to be 93 00:03:29,330 --> 00:03:30,540 anonymous when we want to? 94 00:03:32,540 --> 00:03:34,460 So the thing is that 95 00:03:36,170 --> 00:03:37,849 I always have to do it. 96 00:03:37,850 --> 00:03:39,949 When I talk about privacy with friends or 97 00:03:39,950 --> 00:03:41,749 family of people that are not concerned 98 00:03:41,750 --> 00:03:43,250 about privacy, they always taught me 99 00:03:44,780 --> 00:03:46,999 there is nothing that I am afraid 100 00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:48,319 that people can know about me. 101 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:50,419 Is this like I'm not interesting enough 102 00:03:50,420 --> 00:03:52,879 for them to look at me or 103 00:03:52,880 --> 00:03:54,289 I have nothing to hide? 104 00:03:54,290 --> 00:03:56,299 And this is not true because privacy is a 105 00:03:56,300 --> 00:03:58,249 fundamental human right and it's 106 00:03:58,250 --> 00:04:00,469 documented in untaught 107 00:04:00,470 --> 00:04:02,719 and it's kind 108 00:04:02,720 --> 00:04:04,789 of controversial because up to now, 109 00:04:04,790 --> 00:04:06,829 the right to privacy is the right to 110 00:04:06,830 --> 00:04:08,329 information, self determination. 111 00:04:08,330 --> 00:04:10,669 This means that if I give you my data 112 00:04:10,670 --> 00:04:12,829 and I give your consent to use 113 00:04:12,830 --> 00:04:13,849 my data, that is fine. 114 00:04:13,850 --> 00:04:15,319 And you can use them. 115 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:17,569 But we don't line 116 00:04:17,570 --> 00:04:19,249 data. The thing is that I can give you 117 00:04:19,250 --> 00:04:21,528 access to my location, for example, with 118 00:04:21,529 --> 00:04:23,779 one application. But, you know, when the 119 00:04:23,780 --> 00:04:25,759 location information is used and to do 120 00:04:25,760 --> 00:04:26,779 what? 121 00:04:26,780 --> 00:04:27,780 So 122 00:04:29,330 --> 00:04:30,589 if I don't know what to use this 123 00:04:30,590 --> 00:04:32,269 information for, it doesn't mean I gave 124 00:04:32,270 --> 00:04:33,800 you my consent to use it. 125 00:04:36,600 --> 00:04:38,699 So there is also 126 00:04:38,700 --> 00:04:41,229 another thing that sometimes 127 00:04:41,230 --> 00:04:43,229 he said that privacy is a right to be 128 00:04:43,230 --> 00:04:45,449 forgotten because people 129 00:04:45,450 --> 00:04:47,189 don't care about privacy and people want 130 00:04:47,190 --> 00:04:48,659 to share their lives and they want to put 131 00:04:48,660 --> 00:04:49,949 the photos of the food they eat on 132 00:04:49,950 --> 00:04:50,950 Instagram. 133 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:54,269 So the information that is shared 134 00:04:54,270 --> 00:04:56,519 online, it's actually 135 00:04:56,520 --> 00:04:56,999 a lot. 136 00:04:57,000 --> 00:04:59,459 And in 2001, it was estimated 137 00:04:59,460 --> 00:05:01,619 that it's 75 percent 138 00:05:01,620 --> 00:05:03,569 of the information that there is on the 139 00:05:03,570 --> 00:05:05,729 Internet that is user created and that 140 00:05:05,730 --> 00:05:06,809 personal information. 141 00:05:09,160 --> 00:05:11,019 So there was some kind of 142 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:14,379 comic strip a while ago, I think it was 143 00:05:14,380 --> 00:05:16,569 in the 90s on The New Yorker, and he says 144 00:05:16,570 --> 00:05:19,029 it said on the Internet, nobody knows 145 00:05:19,030 --> 00:05:20,409 you're a dog. 146 00:05:20,410 --> 00:05:22,719 But actually it is not true at the moment 147 00:05:22,720 --> 00:05:24,819 because they know 148 00:05:24,820 --> 00:05:25,820 everything about you. 149 00:05:27,580 --> 00:05:28,580 So 150 00:05:30,550 --> 00:05:32,739 sometimes this is the 151 00:05:32,740 --> 00:05:34,809 idea that is presented about the dark 152 00:05:34,810 --> 00:05:36,939 web. That is the Web that is hidden 153 00:05:36,940 --> 00:05:38,859 by search engines. 154 00:05:38,860 --> 00:05:39,860 And 155 00:05:41,080 --> 00:05:43,179 there is scary and it's 156 00:05:43,180 --> 00:05:45,819 not known. And this is usually associated 157 00:05:45,820 --> 00:05:47,949 with TOR, but it's actually 158 00:05:47,950 --> 00:05:50,109 the dark web is any pages 159 00:05:50,110 --> 00:05:51,579 that cannot be crossed because it's 160 00:05:51,580 --> 00:05:53,709 protected by a password, for example. 161 00:05:53,710 --> 00:05:54,970 And that is kind of 162 00:05:56,770 --> 00:05:58,449 strange that they mention the dark web 163 00:05:58,450 --> 00:06:00,879 also because also Facebook is protected 164 00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:02,949 by password and not all before it can be 165 00:06:02,950 --> 00:06:04,449 crowded. But it's not part of the dark 166 00:06:04,450 --> 00:06:05,450 web for some reasons. 167 00:06:09,250 --> 00:06:11,499 So the Dark Web is 168 00:06:11,500 --> 00:06:13,659 the web that companies cannot reach 169 00:06:13,660 --> 00:06:15,789 a controller. They cannot track data on 170 00:06:15,790 --> 00:06:17,409 it, basically because they don't have 171 00:06:17,410 --> 00:06:19,089 access to it in order to crawl it 172 00:06:20,260 --> 00:06:22,329 up. But if we if we think about 173 00:06:22,330 --> 00:06:25,359 this picture in a different way, 174 00:06:25,360 --> 00:06:27,519 we can see that the Web 175 00:06:27,520 --> 00:06:29,769 is the service that everyone uses, 176 00:06:29,770 --> 00:06:31,899 like cloud services, email 177 00:06:31,900 --> 00:06:34,479 shopping, music, maps, 178 00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:35,469 whatever. 179 00:06:35,470 --> 00:06:37,239 And then there is the data. 180 00:06:37,240 --> 00:06:39,129 There are crowded. And I shared these 181 00:06:39,130 --> 00:06:40,130 services. 182 00:06:42,430 --> 00:06:44,649 So this can be called 183 00:06:44,650 --> 00:06:47,289 the dark web of marketing, and 184 00:06:47,290 --> 00:06:49,329 we don't know about this, and we think 185 00:06:49,330 --> 00:06:52,119 this I think this is because 186 00:06:52,120 --> 00:06:54,219 it's it's something we 187 00:06:54,220 --> 00:06:56,139 don't know about it. We cannot control 188 00:06:56,140 --> 00:06:58,059 opinions on devices on which we have no 189 00:06:58,060 --> 00:06:59,829 idea what you're doing. 190 00:06:59,830 --> 00:07:02,139 And the thing is that we are perfectly 191 00:07:02,140 --> 00:07:04,629 fine with it because 192 00:07:04,630 --> 00:07:06,459 we are OK with using these devices and we 193 00:07:06,460 --> 00:07:08,409 don't question the way they access our 194 00:07:08,410 --> 00:07:09,410 information. 195 00:07:11,290 --> 00:07:13,479 So this takes 196 00:07:13,480 --> 00:07:16,449 us to the the 197 00:07:16,450 --> 00:07:18,609 idea of metadata and what 198 00:07:18,610 --> 00:07:19,029 they are. 199 00:07:19,030 --> 00:07:21,189 So there was a lot talk about it 200 00:07:21,190 --> 00:07:23,259 last year and 201 00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:24,999 metadata that basically structured 202 00:07:25,000 --> 00:07:27,369 information and 203 00:07:27,370 --> 00:07:29,169 they can be collected about online 204 00:07:29,170 --> 00:07:30,759 content, offline content, telephone 205 00:07:30,760 --> 00:07:32,889 calls, whatever you 206 00:07:32,890 --> 00:07:35,019 think about it, you can have learned 207 00:07:35,020 --> 00:07:37,119 about it because especially if 208 00:07:37,120 --> 00:07:38,939 you're a programmer, it's not something 209 00:07:38,940 --> 00:07:41,439 different from having 210 00:07:41,440 --> 00:07:43,419 an object and having something that 211 00:07:43,420 --> 00:07:45,489 described this. Just like a car can 212 00:07:45,490 --> 00:07:47,709 be discovered by the part of the mod 213 00:07:47,710 --> 00:07:49,599 or the part of the shell of the car or 214 00:07:49,600 --> 00:07:50,919 whatever. 215 00:07:50,920 --> 00:07:51,920 So 216 00:07:54,040 --> 00:07:56,229 they're always been used by website 217 00:07:56,230 --> 00:07:58,489 in different formats and not only 218 00:07:58,490 --> 00:08:01,029 the website, but by any application. 219 00:08:01,030 --> 00:08:03,669 Basically, like XtremIO 220 00:08:03,670 --> 00:08:05,349 is a very odd format. 221 00:08:05,350 --> 00:08:07,509 And it's it's not it's 222 00:08:07,510 --> 00:08:09,579 not new or it was not invented 223 00:08:09,580 --> 00:08:12,279 by the NSA or anyone. 224 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:13,299 So it was Jason. 225 00:08:14,770 --> 00:08:17,139 And to make an example 226 00:08:17,140 --> 00:08:20,739 of how this is embedded into a website, 227 00:08:20,740 --> 00:08:22,309 I thought of the Google convention 228 00:08:22,310 --> 00:08:24,729 talking. So basically it's 229 00:08:24,730 --> 00:08:27,189 a set of tools that Google website 230 00:08:27,190 --> 00:08:29,349 to install so that if 231 00:08:29,350 --> 00:08:31,449 you have a campaign on AdWords and 232 00:08:31,450 --> 00:08:33,279 you want to know how many people you have 233 00:08:33,280 --> 00:08:35,349 converting to potential customers, 234 00:08:35,350 --> 00:08:37,298 you don't use your telephone number on 235 00:08:37,299 --> 00:08:38,288 the ads on the page. 236 00:08:38,289 --> 00:08:40,359 But to use a Google Voice number so 237 00:08:40,360 --> 00:08:42,879 that you actually know that those 238 00:08:42,880 --> 00:08:45,399 calls were routed 239 00:08:45,400 --> 00:08:47,679 by an advertiser 240 00:08:47,680 --> 00:08:49,960 and that basically and 241 00:08:50,980 --> 00:08:53,109 when I think about this, I, I think 242 00:08:53,110 --> 00:08:55,209 always at the Yellow Pages, 243 00:08:55,210 --> 00:08:57,339 like maybe 15 years ago 244 00:08:57,340 --> 00:08:59,559 or more, companies used to put 245 00:08:59,560 --> 00:09:01,959 ads on the Web, on the Yellow Pages, and 246 00:09:01,960 --> 00:09:03,639 they might use a different number so that 247 00:09:03,640 --> 00:09:05,799 they knew that the 248 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:07,629 calls to that number were coming from the 249 00:09:07,630 --> 00:09:09,369 yellow page. 250 00:09:09,370 --> 00:09:11,709 And that was fine 251 00:09:11,710 --> 00:09:14,259 because the information between the 252 00:09:14,260 --> 00:09:16,179 the people, the call the company and the 253 00:09:16,180 --> 00:09:18,399 company itself was contained between 254 00:09:18,400 --> 00:09:21,009 these two entities. 255 00:09:21,010 --> 00:09:23,139 But in this case, if you want if you have 256 00:09:23,140 --> 00:09:25,059 a if you're calling something that you 257 00:09:25,060 --> 00:09:27,459 think it's kind of personal, like 258 00:09:27,460 --> 00:09:29,769 some doctor or something related 259 00:09:29,770 --> 00:09:31,329 to your health or to your personal 260 00:09:31,330 --> 00:09:33,519 belief, that information is also 261 00:09:33,520 --> 00:09:34,929 shared with Google, which is a third 262 00:09:34,930 --> 00:09:37,069 party of with Facebook or 263 00:09:37,070 --> 00:09:38,070 with someone else. 264 00:09:43,170 --> 00:09:45,179 So there was an explanation, basically, 265 00:09:45,180 --> 00:09:46,180 and how it works. 266 00:09:50,860 --> 00:09:52,659 Then there is another kind of metadata, 267 00:09:52,660 --> 00:09:54,519 and for example, I was looking at my 268 00:09:54,520 --> 00:09:56,769 phone network logs 269 00:09:56,770 --> 00:09:59,049 and every 270 00:09:59,050 --> 00:10:01,179 couple of minutes there are some things 271 00:10:01,180 --> 00:10:02,709 that are sent to a 272 00:10:03,910 --> 00:10:06,129 remote server through HGP 273 00:10:06,130 --> 00:10:08,589 call, and these include the network 274 00:10:08,590 --> 00:10:10,479 location, for example, or push of my 275 00:10:10,480 --> 00:10:12,069 contacts and so on. 276 00:10:12,070 --> 00:10:14,259 And I 277 00:10:14,260 --> 00:10:16,389 do not mean only the service 278 00:10:16,390 --> 00:10:18,489 that I have directly authorized, like, 279 00:10:18,490 --> 00:10:20,409 for example, Gmail, Bush, my contacts 280 00:10:20,410 --> 00:10:22,749 into my Gmail contacts. 281 00:10:22,750 --> 00:10:24,879 There are also push, for 282 00:10:24,880 --> 00:10:26,589 example, some some days or other 283 00:10:26,590 --> 00:10:27,730 applications. And 284 00:10:28,930 --> 00:10:31,449 the thing about it is that because 285 00:10:31,450 --> 00:10:33,969 this actually data goes encrypted 286 00:10:33,970 --> 00:10:36,069 now, you have no idea of what 287 00:10:36,070 --> 00:10:38,109 is actually being sent, because in order 288 00:10:38,110 --> 00:10:40,209 to look at this data, you have to 289 00:10:40,210 --> 00:10:42,759 go through a very complex procedure of 290 00:10:42,760 --> 00:10:44,289 doing some kind of a man in the middle 291 00:10:44,290 --> 00:10:46,389 attack onto the data 292 00:10:46,390 --> 00:10:48,489 and see what your device is 293 00:10:48,490 --> 00:10:50,049 sending on your behalf. 294 00:10:52,300 --> 00:10:54,579 And then there is also like other 295 00:10:54,580 --> 00:10:56,179 kind of devices to send data. 296 00:10:56,180 --> 00:10:57,180 And these are like 297 00:10:58,690 --> 00:11:00,399 wearable devices. 298 00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:02,529 They track your weight the amount of 299 00:11:02,530 --> 00:11:04,869 time you're walking every day in your 300 00:11:04,870 --> 00:11:06,549 sleep, for example. 301 00:11:06,550 --> 00:11:08,619 And I 302 00:11:08,620 --> 00:11:10,539 have I have a lot of friends. 303 00:11:10,540 --> 00:11:12,909 There are technical and 304 00:11:12,910 --> 00:11:15,519 they like using these devices, but 305 00:11:15,520 --> 00:11:17,679 they never think that there is a company 306 00:11:17,680 --> 00:11:19,779 that knows how many hours per day you 307 00:11:19,780 --> 00:11:21,729 sleep. And if you've been drinking, your 308 00:11:21,730 --> 00:11:23,950 sleeping partner patterns are kind of 309 00:11:25,570 --> 00:11:28,119 different or whatever. 310 00:11:28,120 --> 00:11:30,879 And there are starting I 311 00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,429 have started to read articles about how 312 00:11:33,430 --> 00:11:35,349 this information can be used, for 313 00:11:35,350 --> 00:11:36,350 example, from 314 00:11:38,320 --> 00:11:40,449 health insurance companies to say, 315 00:11:40,450 --> 00:11:42,579 OK, you have cancer or you have you have 316 00:11:42,580 --> 00:11:43,629 had a heart attack. 317 00:11:43,630 --> 00:11:46,089 But we are not going to pay for your 318 00:11:46,090 --> 00:11:48,249 care because you haven't worked enough 319 00:11:48,250 --> 00:11:50,369 in the last five years, things like 320 00:11:50,370 --> 00:11:51,370 this. 321 00:11:52,510 --> 00:11:54,979 And now and then there is stuff, 322 00:11:54,980 --> 00:11:56,919 productivity that says that boost 323 00:11:56,920 --> 00:11:59,139 productivity and therefore they they're 324 00:11:59,140 --> 00:12:01,869 starting to find out all about it. 325 00:12:01,870 --> 00:12:03,999 And and then there is glass, 326 00:12:04,000 --> 00:12:05,200 of course. And 327 00:12:07,240 --> 00:12:09,429 I mean, glass is basically 328 00:12:09,430 --> 00:12:11,709 a come streaming 329 00:12:11,710 --> 00:12:13,779 constantly on the Internet because 330 00:12:13,780 --> 00:12:15,579 you don't know if that is the new video 331 00:12:15,580 --> 00:12:17,319 stuff. I mean, in theory, you know that 332 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:19,449 it's not. But how do you really know that 333 00:12:19,450 --> 00:12:20,439 is not? 334 00:12:20,440 --> 00:12:22,569 And they also have information about your 335 00:12:22,570 --> 00:12:24,879 blood pressure, for example, or if 336 00:12:24,880 --> 00:12:27,219 you if you're looking at a shop window 337 00:12:27,220 --> 00:12:29,409 or not, and they actually want to do 338 00:12:29,410 --> 00:12:31,329 that, they really want to do that. 339 00:12:31,330 --> 00:12:33,549 I was not tech talk a while 340 00:12:33,550 --> 00:12:35,559 ago in Google and they were explaining 341 00:12:35,560 --> 00:12:38,259 how this can be important to 342 00:12:38,260 --> 00:12:41,139 to push a new kind of advertising 343 00:12:41,140 --> 00:12:43,449 in which if you if they if a shopper 344 00:12:43,450 --> 00:12:45,759 changed their windows, they kind 345 00:12:45,760 --> 00:12:46,959 of know if people liked it. 346 00:12:46,960 --> 00:12:49,089 But if they stopped it and the way they 347 00:12:49,090 --> 00:12:51,419 reacted it by looking at the 348 00:12:51,420 --> 00:12:54,309 the way they are basically 349 00:12:54,310 --> 00:12:55,310 and I mean, 350 00:12:56,620 --> 00:12:58,509 I wouldn't like that. 351 00:12:58,510 --> 00:12:59,919 And then it was 352 00:13:01,000 --> 00:13:02,000 like 353 00:13:05,950 --> 00:13:06,879 there on the market. 354 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:09,100 I mean, and it just the beginning 355 00:13:11,170 --> 00:13:13,599 and then the website advertising 356 00:13:13,600 --> 00:13:14,409 again. 357 00:13:14,410 --> 00:13:16,209 And this is just 358 00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:21,249 a call to DoubleClick. 359 00:13:21,250 --> 00:13:24,069 And he has embedded some keywords. 360 00:13:24,070 --> 00:13:25,070 For example, 361 00:13:26,710 --> 00:13:29,739 if you look at it, this like neurology 362 00:13:29,740 --> 00:13:31,239 or psychology, 363 00:13:32,350 --> 00:13:33,579 anxiety. 364 00:13:33,580 --> 00:13:35,799 I mean, I'm 365 00:13:35,800 --> 00:13:37,299 looking at the website because maybe I 366 00:13:37,300 --> 00:13:38,919 have a health condition or something or 367 00:13:38,920 --> 00:13:40,749 something, someone in my family or not. 368 00:13:40,750 --> 00:13:42,070 And this is recorded 369 00:13:43,240 --> 00:13:45,549 and it's also recorded 370 00:13:45,550 --> 00:13:47,589 through the keywords that the website 371 00:13:47,590 --> 00:13:49,629 embeds and as has always been this way. 372 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:55,069 And so because 373 00:13:55,070 --> 00:13:57,259 this happened with a connection, 374 00:13:57,260 --> 00:13:59,749 every connection that you may make 375 00:13:59,750 --> 00:14:01,999 in the browser as some selecter 376 00:14:02,000 --> 00:14:04,429 associated with it, the picture 377 00:14:04,430 --> 00:14:07,159 kind of small, but basically 378 00:14:09,110 --> 00:14:11,270 see if we can zoom for. 379 00:14:23,190 --> 00:14:24,509 No, no. 380 00:14:24,510 --> 00:14:26,669 Well, it's so it says, for 381 00:14:26,670 --> 00:14:28,859 example, that disconnection goes from 382 00:14:28,860 --> 00:14:31,439 Gaetane Forum to Google Analytics 383 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:33,629 and they track a couple of things 384 00:14:33,630 --> 00:14:34,739 about you. 385 00:14:34,740 --> 00:14:36,869 So, for example, here there is 386 00:14:36,870 --> 00:14:39,189 the screen 387 00:14:39,190 --> 00:14:41,669 resolution and the screen resolution, 388 00:14:41,670 --> 00:14:43,989 for example, use without a combination 389 00:14:43,990 --> 00:14:46,229 of things can be used to uniquely 390 00:14:46,230 --> 00:14:48,359 identify your browser on the 391 00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:50,609 Internet, for example, because 392 00:14:52,140 --> 00:14:54,389 if you if you match that with the browser 393 00:14:54,390 --> 00:14:56,549 plugin you're running and so on, it 394 00:14:56,550 --> 00:14:58,859 can be used to create a unique 395 00:14:58,860 --> 00:15:00,539 identifier of your browser, even if 396 00:15:00,540 --> 00:15:02,849 you're not logged in and any service 397 00:15:02,850 --> 00:15:04,290 that we shouldn't have it 398 00:15:05,820 --> 00:15:08,039 on. So these things of 399 00:15:08,040 --> 00:15:10,259 connected data and metadata takes us 400 00:15:10,260 --> 00:15:12,389 to something that is being 401 00:15:12,390 --> 00:15:15,209 discussed mostly in the API community, 402 00:15:15,210 --> 00:15:17,549 and it's about either data and 403 00:15:17,550 --> 00:15:18,239 hypermedia. 404 00:15:18,240 --> 00:15:19,240 And 405 00:15:20,760 --> 00:15:22,889 so when the Web started, 406 00:15:22,890 --> 00:15:24,989 basically it was about this 407 00:15:24,990 --> 00:15:27,599 concept of the text 408 00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:29,729 and the text was linking to other 409 00:15:29,730 --> 00:15:30,629 text. 410 00:15:30,630 --> 00:15:31,769 Yes, exactly. 411 00:15:31,770 --> 00:15:33,929 And there was 412 00:15:33,930 --> 00:15:35,939 a relationship that the link kind of 413 00:15:35,940 --> 00:15:37,499 expressed between two pages that were 414 00:15:37,500 --> 00:15:38,499 connected. 415 00:15:38,500 --> 00:15:39,500 And this 416 00:15:40,980 --> 00:15:43,199 was used, for example, by search engines 417 00:15:43,200 --> 00:15:45,629 and so on to kind of build 418 00:15:45,630 --> 00:15:47,969 a model of Web pages. 419 00:15:47,970 --> 00:15:50,399 And this 420 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:52,529 concept is actually evolving 421 00:15:52,530 --> 00:15:54,689 from the web of Web pages 422 00:15:54,690 --> 00:15:56,489 and text to the web of data and 423 00:15:56,490 --> 00:15:58,289 interconnected data. 424 00:15:58,290 --> 00:15:59,290 And 425 00:16:00,870 --> 00:16:03,539 this data is basically anything, 426 00:16:03,540 --> 00:16:05,759 and it can be used also 427 00:16:05,760 --> 00:16:07,439 for personal data. 428 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:08,730 And this is what 429 00:16:09,990 --> 00:16:12,269 happens, actually, restful architecture 430 00:16:12,270 --> 00:16:15,389 and restful architecture, basically the 431 00:16:15,390 --> 00:16:17,129 architecture of the Web. 432 00:16:17,130 --> 00:16:18,130 And 433 00:16:19,770 --> 00:16:21,839 it's actually a way to represent 434 00:16:21,840 --> 00:16:24,599 Web pages in a way that 435 00:16:24,600 --> 00:16:26,279 you can abstract over them. 436 00:16:26,280 --> 00:16:28,049 And they're not Web pages anymore, but 437 00:16:28,050 --> 00:16:29,039 they are a resource. 438 00:16:29,040 --> 00:16:31,469 And you are you and I that 439 00:16:31,470 --> 00:16:34,019 identified that resource and 440 00:16:38,280 --> 00:16:40,739 the representation of 441 00:16:40,740 --> 00:16:42,929 completely on the protocols that I use or 442 00:16:42,930 --> 00:16:44,249 on the service that I used. 443 00:16:44,250 --> 00:16:46,359 So it's actually only the resource and 444 00:16:46,360 --> 00:16:48,209 that this representation of the resource 445 00:16:48,210 --> 00:16:50,399 that can be any way to represent data 446 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:52,679 and the way to identify 447 00:16:52,680 --> 00:16:54,839 these resources that you are really you 448 00:16:54,840 --> 00:16:55,840 are right. 449 00:16:56,730 --> 00:16:59,279 And whatever is behind this, 450 00:16:59,280 --> 00:17:01,469 it's kind of connected through the 451 00:17:01,470 --> 00:17:03,599 server with the rest connector so 452 00:17:03,600 --> 00:17:05,879 that the client doesn't know about 453 00:17:05,880 --> 00:17:08,608 it. And this is actually 454 00:17:08,609 --> 00:17:10,999 what happens when we 455 00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:13,139 we interact with data basically on the 456 00:17:13,140 --> 00:17:14,999 Web at this moment. 457 00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:17,639 We have an interface that is uniform 458 00:17:17,640 --> 00:17:19,828 and we request the resource 459 00:17:19,829 --> 00:17:22,139 through the right and 460 00:17:22,140 --> 00:17:23,969 we have the representation of the 461 00:17:23,970 --> 00:17:25,559 resource. You can be a page, you can be 462 00:17:25,560 --> 00:17:27,419 adjacent can be Zemo. 463 00:17:27,420 --> 00:17:30,029 And we use that and we 464 00:17:30,030 --> 00:17:32,219 we have the resources link to 465 00:17:32,220 --> 00:17:33,689 other resource and we search through 466 00:17:33,690 --> 00:17:35,309 them. We have starting this with 467 00:17:35,310 --> 00:17:36,750 hypermedia API and so on. 468 00:17:39,270 --> 00:17:41,729 And so what is motive for privacy 469 00:17:41,730 --> 00:17:43,410 and why is this interesting, 470 00:17:44,460 --> 00:17:46,589 so because up to 471 00:17:46,590 --> 00:17:48,689 no information about 472 00:17:48,690 --> 00:17:50,859 user users that were tracked, well, 473 00:17:50,860 --> 00:17:53,789 does a record in a database, 474 00:17:53,790 --> 00:17:56,399 for example, it was just a log message. 475 00:17:56,400 --> 00:17:58,739 OK, user one has done this 476 00:17:58,740 --> 00:18:01,049 on this page, but now everything 477 00:18:01,050 --> 00:18:02,669 is starting to restructure. 478 00:18:02,670 --> 00:18:05,639 And the way the information can be mined, 479 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:08,009 it's a lot more efficient and 480 00:18:08,010 --> 00:18:10,529 it's a lot easier basically to 481 00:18:10,530 --> 00:18:11,429 to track users. 482 00:18:11,430 --> 00:18:14,369 Follow the principle in which you would 483 00:18:14,370 --> 00:18:15,899 analyze Web pages. 484 00:18:15,900 --> 00:18:17,369 That is something that, for example, 485 00:18:17,370 --> 00:18:19,289 search engines have been doing for the 486 00:18:19,290 --> 00:18:21,449 last 10 years or more, 15 years 487 00:18:21,450 --> 00:18:22,450 probably. 488 00:18:23,910 --> 00:18:27,059 So if we look at the graph again, 489 00:18:27,060 --> 00:18:29,249 we see that every 490 00:18:29,250 --> 00:18:30,909 action has a selector. 491 00:18:30,910 --> 00:18:32,159 It can be a keyword. 492 00:18:32,160 --> 00:18:34,439 It can be the resource where the 493 00:18:34,440 --> 00:18:36,719 the action has started or 494 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:39,149 it can be anything about it, really. 495 00:18:39,150 --> 00:18:41,369 And this everything 496 00:18:41,370 --> 00:18:42,370 makes 497 00:18:43,590 --> 00:18:45,809 that action more unique because it can 498 00:18:45,810 --> 00:18:48,329 be search more efficiently, it can be 499 00:18:48,330 --> 00:18:49,949 analyzed more efficiently. 500 00:18:49,950 --> 00:18:52,109 And it takes out this 501 00:18:52,110 --> 00:18:54,239 idea that everything that we do 502 00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:56,609 is connected in a hydrograph. 503 00:18:56,610 --> 00:18:58,799 And it's just an no go for 504 00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:00,269 just a graph. 505 00:19:00,270 --> 00:19:02,699 And where every node is connected 506 00:19:02,700 --> 00:19:05,099 with a set of edges, 507 00:19:05,100 --> 00:19:07,439 there are the links to other entities. 508 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:09,569 And this is what happens with Web pages 509 00:19:09,570 --> 00:19:11,819 and what happens with the personal 510 00:19:11,820 --> 00:19:13,289 data at this point. 511 00:19:13,290 --> 00:19:16,049 So you have your identity 512 00:19:16,050 --> 00:19:17,790 and you have. 513 00:19:19,000 --> 00:19:21,279 The webpages and the action that you that 514 00:19:21,280 --> 00:19:23,289 you visited, the action that have been 515 00:19:25,690 --> 00:19:27,819 taken on those pages and 516 00:19:27,820 --> 00:19:29,979 you have your post on Twitter, 517 00:19:29,980 --> 00:19:32,109 your post on Facebook, your friends, 518 00:19:32,110 --> 00:19:35,019 your connection and 519 00:19:35,020 --> 00:19:37,419 everything is connected to you basically. 520 00:19:37,420 --> 00:19:39,400 And it's very easy to anodized. 521 00:19:40,750 --> 00:19:42,939 And this is an example 522 00:19:42,940 --> 00:19:45,069 of how it was analyzed, but it 523 00:19:45,070 --> 00:19:47,109 was some document that were leaked on The 524 00:19:47,110 --> 00:19:49,409 Washington Post a few days ago, I think 525 00:19:49,410 --> 00:19:51,489 weeks, and they use 526 00:19:51,490 --> 00:19:53,979 the the Google 527 00:19:53,980 --> 00:19:55,029 Previdi. 528 00:19:55,030 --> 00:19:56,170 They set on a cookie 529 00:19:57,340 --> 00:19:59,889 to actually identify Target 530 00:19:59,890 --> 00:20:00,890 online. 531 00:20:02,370 --> 00:20:03,370 And. 532 00:20:05,870 --> 00:20:08,479 So that's that's how 533 00:20:08,480 --> 00:20:10,849 easy it is, and 534 00:20:10,850 --> 00:20:13,099 I mean, if if everyone 535 00:20:13,100 --> 00:20:15,109 can analyze data every time you visit the 536 00:20:15,110 --> 00:20:17,869 website and it's 537 00:20:17,870 --> 00:20:20,749 at the moment it's happening online, 538 00:20:20,750 --> 00:20:22,549 mostly in JavaScript. 539 00:20:22,550 --> 00:20:24,769 But if one of you worked with 540 00:20:24,770 --> 00:20:26,929 Web application or mobile application, 541 00:20:26,930 --> 00:20:29,239 you might use a set of tools like 542 00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:30,319 third party tools like, 543 00:20:31,700 --> 00:20:33,889 I don't know, the there are like 544 00:20:33,890 --> 00:20:35,910 Google Analytics or other 545 00:20:37,890 --> 00:20:39,979 neurally, for example, McSporran and 546 00:20:39,980 --> 00:20:42,109 so on, used to to track 547 00:20:42,110 --> 00:20:43,279 events. 548 00:20:43,280 --> 00:20:45,379 And this happens in the back end of an 549 00:20:45,380 --> 00:20:45,979 application. 550 00:20:45,980 --> 00:20:48,649 So in this case, you 551 00:20:48,650 --> 00:20:50,719 in this case, you cannot you cannot 552 00:20:50,720 --> 00:20:52,789 know what the application 553 00:20:52,790 --> 00:20:54,349 is actually tracking because Hopkins' in 554 00:20:54,350 --> 00:20:56,899 the back and once you're logged in, 555 00:20:56,900 --> 00:20:59,029 so you're not even able to look at it 556 00:20:59,030 --> 00:21:01,069 as you do with JavaScript HGP calls 557 00:21:01,070 --> 00:21:02,689 because it's the server that does those 558 00:21:02,690 --> 00:21:04,429 calls to send the data that they want to 559 00:21:04,430 --> 00:21:05,430 talk. 560 00:21:09,870 --> 00:21:10,870 Yes, 561 00:21:12,750 --> 00:21:15,149 so I was I was suggesting this 562 00:21:15,150 --> 00:21:17,249 this link, because it's a study from 563 00:21:17,250 --> 00:21:17,559 yes. 564 00:21:17,560 --> 00:21:19,749 Have done in 2011, I think 565 00:21:19,750 --> 00:21:21,569 quite a long time ago before this started 566 00:21:21,570 --> 00:21:23,969 to be mainstream, about how 567 00:21:23,970 --> 00:21:25,560 you can use some statistical 568 00:21:26,610 --> 00:21:28,469 measurement of how your browser is 569 00:21:28,470 --> 00:21:29,470 actually unique. 570 00:21:32,190 --> 00:21:34,289 So to answer the question, how 571 00:21:34,290 --> 00:21:35,549 unique is a footprint? 572 00:21:37,020 --> 00:21:39,239 We can look at a set 573 00:21:39,240 --> 00:21:41,039 of different things. 574 00:21:41,040 --> 00:21:43,169 You can start profiling your activity 575 00:21:43,170 --> 00:21:45,449 and see what kind 576 00:21:45,450 --> 00:21:47,789 of profile 577 00:21:47,790 --> 00:21:50,229 you're sending through the network. 578 00:21:50,230 --> 00:21:51,869 What kinds of keywords you're sending. 579 00:21:53,740 --> 00:21:56,669 For example, you can calculate how many 580 00:21:56,670 --> 00:21:58,619 bits of information you introduce every 581 00:21:58,620 --> 00:22:00,779 time you add something unique to, 582 00:22:00,780 --> 00:22:02,279 for example, your browser 583 00:22:03,480 --> 00:22:06,089 profile on. 584 00:22:06,090 --> 00:22:08,399 Or you can start analyzing how many 585 00:22:08,400 --> 00:22:10,499 unique features you are sharing 586 00:22:10,500 --> 00:22:11,500 across the network. 587 00:22:12,840 --> 00:22:15,389 There are studies, for example, that by 588 00:22:15,390 --> 00:22:17,579 looking at your Twitter profile 589 00:22:17,580 --> 00:22:19,799 and your tweet 590 00:22:19,800 --> 00:22:22,019 frequency across the week 591 00:22:22,020 --> 00:22:23,699 or across the hours, they can know if 592 00:22:23,700 --> 00:22:25,469 you're tweeting more at work or tweeting 593 00:22:25,470 --> 00:22:26,819 more at home or tweeting more in the 594 00:22:26,820 --> 00:22:28,169 weekend and so on. 595 00:22:28,170 --> 00:22:30,479 An application 596 00:22:30,480 --> 00:22:31,529 there are like that. 597 00:22:31,530 --> 00:22:33,659 They know that that 598 00:22:33,660 --> 00:22:35,849 they custom are more likely 599 00:22:35,850 --> 00:22:37,979 to use the application in the weekends. 600 00:22:37,980 --> 00:22:39,839 They increase, for example, advertising 601 00:22:39,840 --> 00:22:41,439 during the weekends or they promote 602 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:43,409 special offer. And so these are, for 603 00:22:43,410 --> 00:22:45,629 example, applications that 604 00:22:45,630 --> 00:22:47,969 are selling 605 00:22:47,970 --> 00:22:50,069 video streaming services like movies 606 00:22:50,070 --> 00:22:52,289 or magazines, books and so on. 607 00:22:52,290 --> 00:22:53,789 They know that because you're busy, 608 00:22:53,790 --> 00:22:56,579 you're probably likely to do these things 609 00:22:56,580 --> 00:22:58,919 during the night or during the weekend. 610 00:22:58,920 --> 00:23:01,799 So they kind of change their strategy 611 00:23:01,800 --> 00:23:02,969 following these patterns. 612 00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:08,909 So when you profile 613 00:23:08,910 --> 00:23:10,829 over a set of categories, what you are, 614 00:23:10,830 --> 00:23:13,259 you basically count every time 615 00:23:13,260 --> 00:23:14,699 that categories express it. 616 00:23:14,700 --> 00:23:16,469 And you put that in a histogram. 617 00:23:16,470 --> 00:23:18,809 It's it's kind of I mean, it's nothing 618 00:23:18,810 --> 00:23:20,219 very statistical advance. 619 00:23:20,220 --> 00:23:21,749 You just can't and you divide by the 620 00:23:21,750 --> 00:23:24,179 total and you have this diagram 621 00:23:24,180 --> 00:23:26,099 and you can do it to it. 622 00:23:26,100 --> 00:23:29,259 Like I did this for myself and 623 00:23:29,260 --> 00:23:30,359 I was looking at stuff. 624 00:23:30,360 --> 00:23:32,679 And you have yeah. 625 00:23:32,680 --> 00:23:34,979 You have the spike in computers, but 626 00:23:34,980 --> 00:23:37,589 somebody else can have a spike on health, 627 00:23:37,590 --> 00:23:39,569 for example, and. 628 00:23:40,890 --> 00:23:43,109 That might be used for any particular 629 00:23:43,110 --> 00:23:44,110 reason. 630 00:23:47,940 --> 00:23:50,759 So this was a study that is done by 631 00:23:50,760 --> 00:23:52,679 DFS a while ago and I mentioned it 632 00:23:52,680 --> 00:23:54,000 before, and it use 633 00:23:55,470 --> 00:23:57,149 things like the user agent in the 634 00:23:57,150 --> 00:23:59,369 browser, the headers that you send every 635 00:23:59,370 --> 00:24:01,439 time you visit a 636 00:24:01,440 --> 00:24:03,539 Web page in 637 00:24:03,540 --> 00:24:06,179 the time zone and so on and calculate 638 00:24:06,180 --> 00:24:08,249 the actual you 639 00:24:08,250 --> 00:24:10,319 unique is that feature in our set 640 00:24:10,320 --> 00:24:12,539 of what I mean, the cloud 641 00:24:12,540 --> 00:24:14,729 is just a collection of data centers 642 00:24:14,730 --> 00:24:16,140 belonging to some companies. 643 00:24:17,760 --> 00:24:18,760 And 644 00:24:20,730 --> 00:24:21,730 I mean. 645 00:24:23,820 --> 00:24:24,820 OK, 646 00:24:25,890 --> 00:24:27,989 so when we think about this, we think, 647 00:24:27,990 --> 00:24:30,149 OK, we 648 00:24:30,150 --> 00:24:32,339 are giving our data to somebody else 649 00:24:32,340 --> 00:24:34,589 and all the data is safe 650 00:24:34,590 --> 00:24:35,590 basically. 651 00:24:36,240 --> 00:24:38,489 And but I mean, who 652 00:24:38,490 --> 00:24:40,559 owns the cloud? I mean, even if 653 00:24:40,560 --> 00:24:42,839 we use different services, sometimes 654 00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:45,419 the infrastructure behind the cloud 655 00:24:45,420 --> 00:24:47,579 is by somebody else. 656 00:24:47,580 --> 00:24:49,979 So these are the biggest players 657 00:24:49,980 --> 00:24:52,889 in cloud computing infrastructure. 658 00:24:52,890 --> 00:24:54,839 And it's only five, even though, for 659 00:24:54,840 --> 00:24:56,189 example, there are a lot of services. 660 00:24:56,190 --> 00:24:57,779 They use Amazon, for example, but they're 661 00:24:57,780 --> 00:24:58,780 still on Amazon. 662 00:25:01,440 --> 00:25:03,049 Yeah, and it is like 663 00:25:04,700 --> 00:25:07,039 basically for the the revenue for 664 00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:09,449 2013 and 665 00:25:09,450 --> 00:25:11,479 still the players, there are very small 666 00:25:11,480 --> 00:25:12,479 number of them. 667 00:25:12,480 --> 00:25:14,219 They actually have cloud infrastructure, 668 00:25:14,220 --> 00:25:15,650 not that they are selling services. 669 00:25:17,210 --> 00:25:20,099 And if we go beyond cloud providers, 670 00:25:20,100 --> 00:25:21,140 this is like 671 00:25:22,890 --> 00:25:24,979 the cable, the the website that 672 00:25:24,980 --> 00:25:27,379 shows cable up for 673 00:25:27,380 --> 00:25:29,479 submarine cables and all these 674 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:31,939 cables. They're not public. 675 00:25:31,940 --> 00:25:34,819 They are owned by other companies. 676 00:25:34,820 --> 00:25:37,069 And the way the data 677 00:25:37,070 --> 00:25:39,619 that travels on these cables is so 678 00:25:39,620 --> 00:25:42,019 is treated, we actually have no control 679 00:25:42,020 --> 00:25:43,910 about it because we don't know. 680 00:25:46,190 --> 00:25:48,379 So I started thinking about mobile 681 00:25:48,380 --> 00:25:50,569 communication providers because 682 00:25:52,340 --> 00:25:55,009 sometimes mobile infrastructure 683 00:25:55,010 --> 00:25:57,109 is deployed, especially in Europe, 684 00:25:57,110 --> 00:26:00,229 is deployed with public funds, 685 00:26:00,230 --> 00:26:02,179 with a lot of help from from public 686 00:26:02,180 --> 00:26:03,619 governments. But then they're used by the 687 00:26:03,620 --> 00:26:05,779 companies that they actually can share 688 00:26:05,780 --> 00:26:08,629 those those infrastructure. 689 00:26:08,630 --> 00:26:09,630 And 690 00:26:11,600 --> 00:26:12,770 but so if 691 00:26:14,390 --> 00:26:16,489 if they share the infrastructure 692 00:26:16,490 --> 00:26:18,439 and they actually haven't deployed it, 693 00:26:18,440 --> 00:26:20,479 who owns the infrastructure at the end or 694 00:26:20,480 --> 00:26:21,649 who has done it? 695 00:26:21,650 --> 00:26:24,079 And I mean, like build it. 696 00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:26,209 And the number of companies, again, that 697 00:26:26,210 --> 00:26:28,579 build telecommunication infrastructure 698 00:26:28,580 --> 00:26:30,829 on the market is not the I I 699 00:26:30,830 --> 00:26:33,079 it's actually free and it's 700 00:26:33,080 --> 00:26:35,089 what way ZTE and 701 00:26:38,030 --> 00:26:39,459 Ericsson is OK. 702 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:43,220 And so it's again, three free companies 703 00:26:44,420 --> 00:26:45,949 mostly. 704 00:26:45,950 --> 00:26:46,950 So 705 00:26:48,770 --> 00:26:50,419 there was this quote that I read a while 706 00:26:50,420 --> 00:26:52,429 ago about Snowden and this idea that the 707 00:26:52,430 --> 00:26:54,619 Internet was free and then it wasn't free 708 00:26:54,620 --> 00:26:55,789 anymore. 709 00:26:55,790 --> 00:26:58,249 And the thing is that the infrastructure 710 00:26:58,250 --> 00:27:00,499 that we have been using, 711 00:27:00,500 --> 00:27:02,599 and that's always 712 00:27:02,600 --> 00:27:04,369 been the same. I mean, the Internet was 713 00:27:04,370 --> 00:27:06,529 built centralized 714 00:27:06,530 --> 00:27:08,719 with a series of layers 715 00:27:08,720 --> 00:27:10,939 of control that are like they're 716 00:27:10,940 --> 00:27:12,109 by design. I mean, 717 00:27:13,550 --> 00:27:15,439 if we look at the protocols, if we look 718 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:18,009 at the way there is, it was built, 719 00:27:18,010 --> 00:27:20,389 it was built with the idea that was 720 00:27:20,390 --> 00:27:21,390 someone 721 00:27:23,660 --> 00:27:25,609 routing information or controlling the 722 00:27:25,610 --> 00:27:27,259 information, providing the 723 00:27:27,260 --> 00:27:29,239 infrastructure. It was it was top down in 724 00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:31,609 a way. And that is understandable 725 00:27:31,610 --> 00:27:33,889 thinking about how 726 00:27:33,890 --> 00:27:35,479 electronic systems were built a while 727 00:27:35,480 --> 00:27:36,439 ago. 728 00:27:36,440 --> 00:27:38,689 But if we want that 729 00:27:38,690 --> 00:27:41,479 freedom back, the idea was that 730 00:27:41,480 --> 00:27:43,639 I think we be starting 731 00:27:43,640 --> 00:27:45,649 to research and open data and we'd be 732 00:27:45,650 --> 00:27:48,349 starting to do research and open 733 00:27:48,350 --> 00:27:49,699 open source software. 734 00:27:49,700 --> 00:27:52,009 But we haven't to research in open 735 00:27:52,010 --> 00:27:53,299 infrastructure yet. 736 00:27:53,300 --> 00:27:55,429 And I think that's 737 00:27:55,430 --> 00:27:57,619 where we should go in order to 738 00:27:57,620 --> 00:27:58,859 have more and 739 00:28:00,100 --> 00:28:01,909 more access and more control on the 740 00:28:01,910 --> 00:28:03,799 infrastructure that we use, actually. 741 00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:04,800 And 742 00:28:06,050 --> 00:28:08,089 another thing that I think we should do 743 00:28:08,090 --> 00:28:10,609 is also collaborate with researchers 744 00:28:10,610 --> 00:28:12,529 outside of the telecommunication 745 00:28:12,530 --> 00:28:14,629 industry, because there are a lot 746 00:28:14,630 --> 00:28:16,869 of people that want to 747 00:28:16,870 --> 00:28:18,979 to do stuff for privacy from 748 00:28:18,980 --> 00:28:20,899 the political point of view, from the 749 00:28:20,900 --> 00:28:22,729 social point of view, from the point of 750 00:28:22,730 --> 00:28:24,529 view of the law, and I don't know 751 00:28:24,530 --> 00:28:25,969 sometimes where to start. 752 00:28:25,970 --> 00:28:28,039 I don't have all the information. 753 00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:30,409 And the last thing that I suggest 754 00:28:30,410 --> 00:28:32,299 is to be mindful about your footprint. 755 00:28:33,980 --> 00:28:36,049 Like if if 756 00:28:36,050 --> 00:28:37,279 an application wants to know your 757 00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:39,679 sleeping patterns, I mean, you should 758 00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:40,680 question that. 759 00:28:41,390 --> 00:28:42,390 And it. 760 00:28:58,420 --> 00:29:00,909 Thank you, sir. Well, I think 761 00:29:00,910 --> 00:29:02,219 a lot of people have appreciated your 762 00:29:02,220 --> 00:29:04,539 talk. Other questions, 763 00:29:04,540 --> 00:29:06,929 we have some more questions left 764 00:29:06,930 --> 00:29:08,179 of one. 765 00:29:08,180 --> 00:29:10,419 Well, actually, I'm 766 00:29:10,420 --> 00:29:12,909 two interesting points that 767 00:29:12,910 --> 00:29:14,619 you brought up that I'd like to explore a 768 00:29:14,620 --> 00:29:15,620 little further. 769 00:29:16,510 --> 00:29:18,369 You mentioned, of course, people tracking 770 00:29:18,370 --> 00:29:19,719 fitness and sleep. 771 00:29:19,720 --> 00:29:21,069 Are you aware that in the U.S. 772 00:29:21,070 --> 00:29:23,289 right now, there are three court cases 773 00:29:23,290 --> 00:29:25,479 that are using the Fitbit as 774 00:29:25,480 --> 00:29:27,939 part of their subpoenaed evidence? 775 00:29:27,940 --> 00:29:30,429 One of them is for an injury case. 776 00:29:30,430 --> 00:29:32,439 They want to to demonstrate that the 777 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:34,659 person was as injured as they say 778 00:29:34,660 --> 00:29:36,249 they are by using the fact that they can 779 00:29:36,250 --> 00:29:37,380 no longer exercise. 780 00:29:38,410 --> 00:29:40,869 But the other two are divorce cases 781 00:29:40,870 --> 00:29:42,759 where someone is trying to claim that a 782 00:29:42,760 --> 00:29:44,229 person is not where they said they would 783 00:29:44,230 --> 00:29:45,849 be using the Fitbit tracker. 784 00:29:47,320 --> 00:29:49,449 I actually read something about it. 785 00:29:49,450 --> 00:29:51,659 I, I 786 00:29:51,660 --> 00:29:53,109 read I was using court case. 787 00:29:53,110 --> 00:29:55,269 I didn't know the actual cases. 788 00:29:55,270 --> 00:29:57,489 And the thing that I read mostly was 789 00:29:57,490 --> 00:29:59,769 about health insurance companies. 790 00:29:59,770 --> 00:30:00,970 And yes, 791 00:30:03,010 --> 00:30:05,919 the second thing was regarding 792 00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:07,329 the mobile phone. 793 00:30:08,890 --> 00:30:11,169 It was recently revealed that 794 00:30:11,170 --> 00:30:13,269 both Verizon and AT&T in 795 00:30:13,270 --> 00:30:15,369 the US were adding an 796 00:30:15,370 --> 00:30:17,979 additional tracking 797 00:30:17,980 --> 00:30:20,139 signature to everyone who 798 00:30:20,140 --> 00:30:22,689 used the browser on their mobile phones 799 00:30:22,690 --> 00:30:24,219 so that they could then get a complete 800 00:30:24,220 --> 00:30:25,989 record of every site that you've gone to 801 00:30:25,990 --> 00:30:28,329 once you leave their connection 802 00:30:28,330 --> 00:30:30,609 and has 803 00:30:30,610 --> 00:30:32,019 claimed that they are no longer going to 804 00:30:32,020 --> 00:30:34,269 use it. But Verizon has made no claim 805 00:30:34,270 --> 00:30:36,159 at all that they're going to continue to 806 00:30:36,160 --> 00:30:37,160 collect that information. 807 00:30:38,320 --> 00:30:40,839 But the thing is, that is 808 00:30:40,840 --> 00:30:42,549 I mean, it's very easy to add the 809 00:30:42,550 --> 00:30:43,569 parameter to where you are. 810 00:30:45,310 --> 00:30:47,589 I mean, once the the call goes 811 00:30:47,590 --> 00:30:48,579 through their servers, they can do 812 00:30:48,580 --> 00:30:49,569 whatever they want with it. 813 00:30:49,570 --> 00:30:51,459 And they have that information only. 814 00:30:51,460 --> 00:30:52,899 And it's very difficult for us to find 815 00:30:52,900 --> 00:30:54,569 out that they're actually doing it. 816 00:30:54,570 --> 00:30:56,349 OK, thank you for the work you're doing 817 00:30:56,350 --> 00:30:57,999 is great thing. 818 00:30:58,000 --> 00:30:59,619 Oh, yes. No question. 819 00:30:59,620 --> 00:31:00,620 Yeah, thanks. 820 00:31:01,630 --> 00:31:03,969 My question is what we could do to 821 00:31:03,970 --> 00:31:06,249 redress our web 822 00:31:06,250 --> 00:31:07,689 footprint now? 823 00:31:07,690 --> 00:31:09,849 I mean, we should use all 824 00:31:09,850 --> 00:31:12,129 the time. That was a bundle 825 00:31:12,130 --> 00:31:14,499 we have I mean, in a virtual 826 00:31:14,500 --> 00:31:15,500 machine. 827 00:31:17,620 --> 00:31:19,749 The question is what we can 828 00:31:19,750 --> 00:31:22,129 do about the footprint. 829 00:31:22,130 --> 00:31:23,979 If we can use we can mitigate that we 830 00:31:23,980 --> 00:31:25,299 talk. 831 00:31:25,300 --> 00:31:27,489 Yeah. I mean, tourism is 832 00:31:27,490 --> 00:31:29,769 like I recognizable. 833 00:31:29,770 --> 00:31:32,229 I mean, I actually run the 834 00:31:32,230 --> 00:31:35,259 panoptic, like with Tor 835 00:31:35,260 --> 00:31:36,260 and 836 00:31:37,360 --> 00:31:39,669 OK, so with my usual 837 00:31:39,670 --> 00:31:41,739 setup, the the bit of information 838 00:31:41,740 --> 00:31:42,759 we're about 22 839 00:31:43,900 --> 00:31:45,849 that we're sending and we thought it was 840 00:31:45,850 --> 00:31:48,099 getting down to 12 841 00:31:48,100 --> 00:31:50,199 using our little bundle. 842 00:31:50,200 --> 00:31:52,449 So if you're, if you keep browsing 843 00:31:52,450 --> 00:31:54,699 with the same bundle, although 844 00:31:54,700 --> 00:31:57,199 your location might change and so on, 845 00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:59,259 the information that you you send, 846 00:31:59,260 --> 00:32:00,280 for example, about 847 00:32:01,900 --> 00:32:03,859 the cookies that you store or you decide 848 00:32:03,860 --> 00:32:06,789 not to if you need to, and 849 00:32:06,790 --> 00:32:09,249 DM your profile, 850 00:32:09,250 --> 00:32:10,599 basically the things that you've been 851 00:32:10,600 --> 00:32:12,849 surfing, I mean, after a while, 852 00:32:12,850 --> 00:32:14,949 your problem becomes part 853 00:32:14,950 --> 00:32:17,439 of your footprint. So that's 854 00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:18,440 that's the thing. 855 00:32:19,690 --> 00:32:21,849 Thanks. Thank you so much 856 00:32:21,850 --> 00:32:23,200 for your question, please. 857 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:25,400 So 858 00:32:26,890 --> 00:32:28,299 sometimes it's not practical to use the 859 00:32:28,300 --> 00:32:30,159 Taubira the bundle because it's just not 860 00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:32,619 fast enough with the routing. 861 00:32:32,620 --> 00:32:34,719 Do you have any other recommendations one 862 00:32:34,720 --> 00:32:36,849 could use to say it's not like 863 00:32:36,850 --> 00:32:37,850 low profile? 864 00:32:39,140 --> 00:32:40,159 Um, 865 00:32:41,830 --> 00:32:43,989 the thing is that once you log in or you 866 00:32:43,990 --> 00:32:44,990 accept cookies, 867 00:32:46,540 --> 00:32:48,729 there isn't much you can do. 868 00:32:48,730 --> 00:32:50,979 I mean, you can you can 869 00:32:50,980 --> 00:32:53,199 stop any JavaScript 870 00:32:53,200 --> 00:32:55,269 calls, for example, to third party, 871 00:32:55,270 --> 00:32:57,549 and you can do that with a number of 872 00:32:57,550 --> 00:32:58,869 browser extension. 873 00:32:58,870 --> 00:33:00,879 But if it is something that it's been 874 00:33:00,880 --> 00:33:02,979 doing, it happens in the 875 00:33:02,980 --> 00:33:04,809 back end of an application. 876 00:33:04,810 --> 00:33:07,859 You have no way to know what information 877 00:33:07,860 --> 00:33:09,759 have been collected. 878 00:33:09,760 --> 00:33:12,189 And we mobile phones is semenovich 879 00:33:12,190 --> 00:33:13,689 because even if you don't use the browser 880 00:33:13,690 --> 00:33:14,860 and use applications 881 00:33:15,970 --> 00:33:18,069 that you if even when you do 882 00:33:18,070 --> 00:33:20,619 not login into anything into an account, 883 00:33:20,620 --> 00:33:22,809 then use the device ID 884 00:33:22,810 --> 00:33:25,209 or the generate an idea for that device 885 00:33:25,210 --> 00:33:28,029 in order to use it to talk to you. 886 00:33:28,030 --> 00:33:30,249 So maybe 887 00:33:30,250 --> 00:33:31,329 a follow up on that one. 888 00:33:31,330 --> 00:33:33,609 Like how 889 00:33:33,610 --> 00:33:35,319 would a like a Web browser, how would it 890 00:33:35,320 --> 00:33:37,779 have to be designed to 891 00:33:37,780 --> 00:33:39,849 actually, you know, prevent 892 00:33:39,850 --> 00:33:40,900 this kind of things happening? 893 00:33:43,030 --> 00:33:44,559 Or is it or maybe is it possible to 894 00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:46,959 design a Web browser the way that so it's 895 00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:47,980 much harder to track you. 896 00:33:51,610 --> 00:33:53,429 So the question is if it's possible to. 897 00:33:53,430 --> 00:33:55,009 The sign up process that is harder to 898 00:33:55,010 --> 00:33:56,010 track. 899 00:33:57,710 --> 00:33:59,869 There are privacy extension 900 00:33:59,870 --> 00:34:02,509 that can help to block calls 901 00:34:02,510 --> 00:34:04,609 and can help you say, OK, 902 00:34:04,610 --> 00:34:06,469 every time I visit, for example, The New 903 00:34:06,470 --> 00:34:08,658 York Times, I make these 904 00:34:08,659 --> 00:34:11,029 calls to these servers and these servers 905 00:34:11,030 --> 00:34:12,948 are located in this location and are 906 00:34:12,949 --> 00:34:13,879 sending this data. 907 00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:16,099 And I could say block this and you're 908 00:34:16,100 --> 00:34:18,109 probably blocking some out and so on. 909 00:34:19,670 --> 00:34:22,009 But again, it's 910 00:34:22,010 --> 00:34:24,079 it's not like everything needs to happen 911 00:34:24,080 --> 00:34:26,689 in the in the client 912 00:34:26,690 --> 00:34:27,658 as a client. 913 00:34:27,659 --> 00:34:29,269 You when you use a client and you can 914 00:34:29,270 --> 00:34:30,649 protect yourself. 915 00:34:30,650 --> 00:34:33,109 But as soon as that goes into the server 916 00:34:33,110 --> 00:34:35,448 and unless you always 917 00:34:35,449 --> 00:34:37,849 kind of send forward information 918 00:34:37,850 --> 00:34:40,309 like you always change the location 919 00:34:40,310 --> 00:34:42,619 through a proxy, you and you always send 920 00:34:42,620 --> 00:34:44,689 like bogus keywords to say 921 00:34:44,690 --> 00:34:47,059 that if I'm searching for something, 922 00:34:47,060 --> 00:34:49,269 for example, basketball, 923 00:34:49,270 --> 00:34:51,408 I'm sending like a set of keywords 924 00:34:51,409 --> 00:34:52,999 through other websites like, 925 00:34:54,050 --> 00:34:56,509 I don't know, a business, economics and 926 00:34:56,510 --> 00:34:58,879 religion or whatever, unless 927 00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:00,529 you do this all the time. 928 00:35:00,530 --> 00:35:02,119 There is always a way that they can talk 929 00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:03,439 to you, because the web, the 930 00:35:03,440 --> 00:35:05,569 infrastructure, the infrastructure 931 00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:07,909 is designed is to collect data. 932 00:35:07,910 --> 00:35:10,309 And the the development 933 00:35:10,310 --> 00:35:13,129 of big data is about data points 934 00:35:13,130 --> 00:35:15,409 that users have generated 935 00:35:15,410 --> 00:35:17,539 and they can help them analyze 936 00:35:17,540 --> 00:35:17,989 stuff. 937 00:35:17,990 --> 00:35:20,899 I don't know from from 938 00:35:20,900 --> 00:35:23,179 if the application is used more from 939 00:35:23,180 --> 00:35:25,879 London or New York or from if 940 00:35:25,880 --> 00:35:28,099 I don't know what magazine is read more 941 00:35:28,100 --> 00:35:30,019 than another one on one article in The 942 00:35:30,020 --> 00:35:31,849 New York Times is more interesting that 943 00:35:31,850 --> 00:35:32,850 another one, 944 00:35:34,550 --> 00:35:36,710 you name it, you can do it, basically. 945 00:35:37,990 --> 00:35:38,990 Thank you. 946 00:35:39,910 --> 00:35:41,979 OK, then there's one question from the 947 00:35:41,980 --> 00:35:44,299 Internet. Another in the room, 948 00:35:44,300 --> 00:35:46,629 the first one from the Internet. 949 00:35:46,630 --> 00:35:49,329 OK. Would it be any hope to randomize 950 00:35:49,330 --> 00:35:51,579 all possible tracking variables, maybe 951 00:35:51,580 --> 00:35:54,059 and by proxy that modifies 952 00:35:54,060 --> 00:35:55,349 so relevant content? 953 00:35:56,950 --> 00:35:59,079 So the question is, if you can use 954 00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:01,029 talking about it and it should be proxy 955 00:36:01,030 --> 00:36:02,880 to to avoid this, 956 00:36:04,030 --> 00:36:06,279 you can certainly use it. 957 00:36:06,280 --> 00:36:08,499 But you are also 958 00:36:08,500 --> 00:36:10,839 aware that your online 959 00:36:10,840 --> 00:36:12,459 experience changes. 960 00:36:12,460 --> 00:36:13,460 And 961 00:36:15,220 --> 00:36:17,469 again, you can use some 962 00:36:17,470 --> 00:36:19,389 you cannot use that all the time when you 963 00:36:19,390 --> 00:36:21,789 use, for example, your mobile 964 00:36:21,790 --> 00:36:24,159 or things like that. 965 00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:26,709 So tracking 966 00:36:26,710 --> 00:36:28,789 and tracking technology exist and 967 00:36:28,790 --> 00:36:30,609 they're starting to be developed. 968 00:36:30,610 --> 00:36:32,559 But in my opinion, they're only in the 969 00:36:32,560 --> 00:36:34,059 client. 970 00:36:34,060 --> 00:36:36,219 And they also need to 971 00:36:36,220 --> 00:36:36,729 be. 972 00:36:36,730 --> 00:36:40,449 We also need an effort for the 973 00:36:40,450 --> 00:36:41,989 from the social point of view, from the 974 00:36:41,990 --> 00:36:44,169 political point of view to to say there 975 00:36:44,170 --> 00:36:46,389 is so much you can do with personal data. 976 00:36:48,040 --> 00:36:48,789 Thank you. 977 00:36:48,790 --> 00:36:50,079 Thanks. 978 00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:52,359 OK, then, that's the last question 979 00:36:52,360 --> 00:36:53,219 there. 980 00:36:53,220 --> 00:36:55,689 I think you have a question concerning 981 00:36:55,690 --> 00:36:58,029 the identity hypergrowth and 982 00:36:58,030 --> 00:36:59,679 if you have any information, if there's 983 00:36:59,680 --> 00:37:01,869 any debate on the strategic value of 984 00:37:01,870 --> 00:37:02,870 that, 985 00:37:04,450 --> 00:37:06,579 since there's the US at 986 00:37:06,580 --> 00:37:08,349 least, is process called a national 987 00:37:08,350 --> 00:37:10,449 strategy for secure transactions 988 00:37:10,450 --> 00:37:12,579 on in cyberspace, where they 989 00:37:12,580 --> 00:37:14,259 basically want to create a marketplace 990 00:37:14,260 --> 00:37:16,299 for identity services? 991 00:37:16,300 --> 00:37:18,459 And I wonder if 992 00:37:18,460 --> 00:37:21,519 the windows that you have knowledge about 993 00:37:21,520 --> 00:37:23,769 participate in that discussion and what 994 00:37:23,770 --> 00:37:25,689 will the hypergrowth place in that? 995 00:37:27,160 --> 00:37:29,259 So the question is 996 00:37:29,260 --> 00:37:31,509 about the ideograph and security 997 00:37:31,510 --> 00:37:33,609 services, the political 998 00:37:33,610 --> 00:37:35,439 value or the strategic value of that. 999 00:37:35,440 --> 00:37:37,149 If you're aware of any discussions or if 1000 00:37:37,150 --> 00:37:39,339 you have seen anything that points 1001 00:37:39,340 --> 00:37:39,799 to. 1002 00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:42,669 OK, and thanks 1003 00:37:42,670 --> 00:37:44,979 to the the idea about the 1004 00:37:44,980 --> 00:37:46,750 a graph that is part of my 1005 00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:49,959 research and thesis and I use it to 1006 00:37:49,960 --> 00:37:52,059 analyze data and to not to have 1007 00:37:52,060 --> 00:37:54,129 just to carry a database, but to be able 1008 00:37:54,130 --> 00:37:56,469 to say, OK, if 1009 00:37:56,470 --> 00:37:58,599 this person was interested in 1010 00:37:58,600 --> 00:37:59,979 psychology, maybe there are some 1011 00:37:59,980 --> 00:38:01,839 interesting anxiety or they also did 1012 00:38:01,840 --> 00:38:03,339 something with that. 1013 00:38:03,340 --> 00:38:04,340 And 1014 00:38:05,950 --> 00:38:08,829 political idea behind this is that 1015 00:38:08,830 --> 00:38:11,079 if you know what you're being targeted 1016 00:38:11,080 --> 00:38:13,389 for or if you know what information 1017 00:38:13,390 --> 00:38:15,609 you're sending on the Internet, 1018 00:38:15,610 --> 00:38:17,679 you'll be able to say, OK, I want 1019 00:38:17,680 --> 00:38:19,299 to do something about this. 1020 00:38:19,300 --> 00:38:21,459 So the idea is that if you posted, 1021 00:38:21,460 --> 00:38:24,009 for example, something 1022 00:38:24,010 --> 00:38:26,169 on Twitter, Facebook or whatever 1023 00:38:26,170 --> 00:38:28,149 that says something that you want about 1024 00:38:28,150 --> 00:38:30,699 you, like you, 1025 00:38:30,700 --> 00:38:33,759 whatever, you accidentally post something 1026 00:38:33,760 --> 00:38:35,889 like Xanax or something 1027 00:38:35,890 --> 00:38:38,109 like this, you are able to remove it 1028 00:38:38,110 --> 00:38:40,569 and to know that you actually did it. 1029 00:38:40,570 --> 00:38:41,570 And 1030 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:45,039 for example, if you know that because 1031 00:38:45,040 --> 00:38:47,319 of a number of connections that you have 1032 00:38:47,320 --> 00:38:49,569 on on Facebook 1033 00:38:49,570 --> 00:38:51,429 or on Twitter, you are actually more 1034 00:38:51,430 --> 00:38:53,529 likely to appear of one 1035 00:38:53,530 --> 00:38:55,899 or the religion as opposed to another, 1036 00:38:55,900 --> 00:38:57,609 or you put your you're more likely to 1037 00:38:57,610 --> 00:39:00,009 appear gay or straight or whatever. 1038 00:39:00,010 --> 00:39:02,079 You might not want that to be shown. 1039 00:39:02,080 --> 00:39:04,209 And you might want you might want to 1040 00:39:04,210 --> 00:39:06,459 recognize what is actually being revealed 1041 00:39:06,460 --> 00:39:08,169 about you, but your activity. 1042 00:39:08,170 --> 00:39:09,699 So the idea of the epigraph that I had 1043 00:39:09,700 --> 00:39:11,570 was that that I might 1044 00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:14,199 be analyzing the information that I 1045 00:39:14,200 --> 00:39:16,359 share. I'm able to know, OK, I need to 1046 00:39:16,360 --> 00:39:17,349 delete this. 1047 00:39:17,350 --> 00:39:19,659 And if I did it this no, I also 1048 00:39:19,660 --> 00:39:21,489 delete all this information about me 1049 00:39:24,040 --> 00:39:24,879 politically. 1050 00:39:24,880 --> 00:39:26,889 I don't know if this discussion is 1051 00:39:26,890 --> 00:39:28,149 happening. I know that. 1052 00:39:28,150 --> 00:39:30,710 I mean, the thing is, that is the way the 1053 00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:33,790 NSA and the 1054 00:39:36,730 --> 00:39:39,009 did the leaked documents talked 1055 00:39:39,010 --> 00:39:39,819 about metadata. 1056 00:39:39,820 --> 00:39:41,889 There was something about a node 1057 00:39:41,890 --> 00:39:44,079 and selectors and that 1058 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:45,909 reminded me of a graph structure and a 1059 00:39:45,910 --> 00:39:48,219 link actually went to say, select a 1060 00:39:48,220 --> 00:39:49,220 link. And there was it. 1061 00:39:51,170 --> 00:39:52,500 I don't know if I answered the question, 1062 00:39:53,570 --> 00:39:55,009 thanks, OK? 1063 00:39:55,010 --> 00:39:56,569 I don't see any more questions at the 1064 00:39:56,570 --> 00:39:58,859 moment. If anybody has another question, 1065 00:39:58,860 --> 00:40:01,479 you can just slough off now or 1066 00:40:01,480 --> 00:40:03,589 wave doesn't 1067 00:40:03,590 --> 00:40:04,789 seem to be the case. 1068 00:40:04,790 --> 00:40:07,159 So thank you again for those talk and.