0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/945 Thanks! 1 00:00:15,200 --> 00:00:16,200 Good morning, everyone. 2 00:00:18,990 --> 00:00:20,729 Imagine you're in a position where you 3 00:00:20,730 --> 00:00:22,769 decide that, well, you want to know the 4 00:00:22,770 --> 00:00:24,359 surveillance capabilities of your 5 00:00:24,360 --> 00:00:25,360 government. 6 00:00:26,370 --> 00:00:28,619 This is nice. Well, everyone wants 7 00:00:28,620 --> 00:00:29,519 to know that. 8 00:00:29,520 --> 00:00:31,769 But now imagine that if you 9 00:00:31,770 --> 00:00:34,259 ask questions and they are required 10 00:00:34,260 --> 00:00:36,329 to be answered, that would be even 11 00:00:36,330 --> 00:00:37,319 nicer. 12 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:38,969 That's what Freedom of Information 13 00:00:38,970 --> 00:00:40,559 requests are for. 14 00:00:40,560 --> 00:00:42,809 And here to tell you about how this 15 00:00:42,810 --> 00:00:45,179 can be applied in Italy to 16 00:00:45,180 --> 00:00:47,909 determine what the Italian government has 17 00:00:47,910 --> 00:00:50,519 capability wise is Ricardo 18 00:00:50,520 --> 00:00:51,520 Colini. 19 00:00:59,810 --> 00:01:00,799 OK. 20 00:01:00,800 --> 00:01:02,719 Hi. Hi, everyone, I'm 21 00:01:03,860 --> 00:01:06,049 I'm a freelance journalist in Italy, 22 00:01:06,050 --> 00:01:08,299 writing mainly for Italy 23 00:01:08,300 --> 00:01:10,129 and also a member of the Army's Center 24 00:01:10,130 --> 00:01:12,499 for Transparency and Human Rights. 25 00:01:12,500 --> 00:01:14,029 What I'm about to introduce you today, 26 00:01:14,030 --> 00:01:15,949 it's a project for monitoring government 27 00:01:15,950 --> 00:01:18,379 surveillance capabilities via means 28 00:01:18,380 --> 00:01:20,090 of transparency towards. 29 00:01:22,530 --> 00:01:23,530 Some background, 30 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:28,079 the Italian history is peculiar due to 31 00:01:28,080 --> 00:01:30,239 organized crime and mafia, 32 00:01:30,240 --> 00:01:32,369 there are specific transparency 33 00:01:32,370 --> 00:01:33,720 and anti-corruption laws 34 00:01:34,860 --> 00:01:37,379 that can help to understand 35 00:01:37,380 --> 00:01:39,599 better what is going on for 36 00:01:39,600 --> 00:01:41,399 this kind of project. 37 00:01:41,400 --> 00:01:43,260 But so when we talk about surveillance, 38 00:01:44,400 --> 00:01:47,189 Italian surveillance are well known 39 00:01:47,190 --> 00:01:49,589 abroad, worldwide due to some companies 40 00:01:49,590 --> 00:01:52,499 such as area and hacking team. 41 00:01:52,500 --> 00:01:54,029 They are well known for exporting 42 00:01:54,030 --> 00:01:55,859 surveillance technologies to 43 00:01:55,860 --> 00:01:58,229 authoritarian regimes all over the world 44 00:01:58,230 --> 00:02:00,749 and also accounting for 45 00:02:00,750 --> 00:02:02,999 the huge hacked which suffers. 46 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:05,309 And my 47 00:02:05,310 --> 00:02:08,849 question was, OK, 48 00:02:08,850 --> 00:02:10,679 the surveillance technology developed in 49 00:02:10,680 --> 00:02:12,749 Italy are famous abroad, but 50 00:02:12,750 --> 00:02:14,729 what is going on in Italy? 51 00:02:14,730 --> 00:02:16,139 What are the technologies that the 52 00:02:16,140 --> 00:02:18,269 government is using to 53 00:02:18,270 --> 00:02:20,459 intercept and surveil its own 54 00:02:20,460 --> 00:02:21,460 citizens? 55 00:02:22,740 --> 00:02:25,199 What is it? It's basically starting 56 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:27,329 from some open source intel 57 00:02:27,330 --> 00:02:29,729 available online, starting from two great 58 00:02:29,730 --> 00:02:32,099 websites like the Surveillance Industry 59 00:02:32,100 --> 00:02:35,099 Index and Backplane Dot info, 60 00:02:35,100 --> 00:02:37,739 which gathers some information on 61 00:02:37,740 --> 00:02:40,199 several surveillance companies 62 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:41,759 from all over the world. 63 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:43,979 And specifically, I looked for 64 00:02:43,980 --> 00:02:45,719 the Italian one, the main Italian ones. 65 00:02:46,830 --> 00:02:48,989 Starting from that, I 66 00:02:48,990 --> 00:02:51,269 turn to Google searching 67 00:02:51,270 --> 00:02:54,329 for the value added tax numbers, 68 00:02:54,330 --> 00:02:56,639 which gave me some interesting 69 00:02:56,640 --> 00:02:58,019 results. 70 00:02:58,020 --> 00:03:00,299 What I got were 71 00:03:00,300 --> 00:03:02,399 some spreadsheets detailing the 72 00:03:02,400 --> 00:03:04,559 payments, but the minister of interior 73 00:03:04,560 --> 00:03:06,629 to each companies 74 00:03:06,630 --> 00:03:09,389 why this happened, because due to 75 00:03:09,390 --> 00:03:11,879 transparency law number 53 76 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:13,229 of 2013, 77 00:03:14,610 --> 00:03:17,729 the public sector is obliged to publish 78 00:03:17,730 --> 00:03:19,799 their payments from 79 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:22,289 the spreadsheets. What I got also 80 00:03:22,290 --> 00:03:24,389 of the money, the 81 00:03:25,500 --> 00:03:27,599 there was also the subject, the 82 00:03:27,600 --> 00:03:29,939 tender identification code 83 00:03:29,940 --> 00:03:32,129 of what there were paying for 84 00:03:32,130 --> 00:03:33,569 using the information. 85 00:03:33,570 --> 00:03:36,509 Could I turn back to Google again? 86 00:03:36,510 --> 00:03:37,499 Google it. 87 00:03:37,500 --> 00:03:40,079 And what I found were some 88 00:03:40,080 --> 00:03:41,399 XML files. 89 00:03:43,310 --> 00:03:45,379 In which it was the all 90 00:03:45,380 --> 00:03:47,120 the public procurement data sets 91 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:50,569 of the public sectors, these, again, 92 00:03:50,570 --> 00:03:53,059 due to anti-corruption law, 93 00:03:53,060 --> 00:03:54,169 each public sector. 94 00:03:54,170 --> 00:03:55,879 So the minister of interior, for example, 95 00:03:55,880 --> 00:03:57,349 the minister of defense, the minister of 96 00:03:57,350 --> 00:03:59,659 justice and all other public office 97 00:03:59,660 --> 00:04:01,999 are obliged to publish on 98 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:04,549 this XML format 99 00:04:04,550 --> 00:04:06,739 the information regarding their public 100 00:04:06,740 --> 00:04:07,779 procurement data sets. 101 00:04:07,780 --> 00:04:08,780 So 102 00:04:09,980 --> 00:04:11,509 whatever they are interested in buying 103 00:04:11,510 --> 00:04:13,279 and there is a public tender is going to 104 00:04:13,280 --> 00:04:14,479 be published online. 105 00:04:14,480 --> 00:04:15,799 This is the format. 106 00:04:15,800 --> 00:04:18,199 And given 107 00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:20,898 this data, this was my reaction. 108 00:04:20,899 --> 00:04:23,299 I had all the ingredients 109 00:04:23,300 --> 00:04:25,489 to start monitoring exactly 110 00:04:25,490 --> 00:04:27,559 what the government was buying, how 111 00:04:27,560 --> 00:04:29,779 much was paying for it, and 112 00:04:29,780 --> 00:04:31,589 which were the companies involved. 113 00:04:32,660 --> 00:04:35,209 So I constructed this workflow, 114 00:04:35,210 --> 00:04:36,949 which is basically starting from the 115 00:04:36,950 --> 00:04:39,169 public procurement data set XML files. 116 00:04:40,220 --> 00:04:43,339 I can get the tender ID code 117 00:04:43,340 --> 00:04:45,439 and the list of companies participating 118 00:04:45,440 --> 00:04:47,539 in the tenders. It's not only the company 119 00:04:47,540 --> 00:04:49,189 that won the tender, there are all the 120 00:04:49,190 --> 00:04:51,319 participants, which is pretty interesting 121 00:04:51,320 --> 00:04:53,929 because you can discover new companies 122 00:04:53,930 --> 00:04:55,820 that you weren't aware of before. 123 00:04:57,300 --> 00:04:59,669 Given this data, then the intensification 124 00:04:59,670 --> 00:05:02,069 and the list of companies, thanks 125 00:05:02,070 --> 00:05:04,289 to the Freedom of Information 126 00:05:04,290 --> 00:05:06,719 access law recently introduced in Italy 127 00:05:06,720 --> 00:05:09,749 at the beginning of 2017, 128 00:05:09,750 --> 00:05:12,209 I can ask for documents regarding 129 00:05:12,210 --> 00:05:14,339 invoices issued 130 00:05:14,340 --> 00:05:16,529 by the several companies and 131 00:05:16,530 --> 00:05:18,839 technical and economic offers 132 00:05:18,840 --> 00:05:20,429 of the public tenders. 133 00:05:20,430 --> 00:05:21,959 In this way, I can monitor the 134 00:05:21,960 --> 00:05:24,329 expenditures and I can get information 135 00:05:24,330 --> 00:05:26,579 on the software, the technologies and 136 00:05:26,580 --> 00:05:28,469 the devices that these companies are 137 00:05:28,470 --> 00:05:29,729 selling to the government. 138 00:05:32,200 --> 00:05:33,699 So let's start with some of the results 139 00:05:33,700 --> 00:05:35,919 of this monitoring the table on 140 00:05:35,920 --> 00:05:38,079 the right, where the companies, 141 00:05:38,080 --> 00:05:40,169 which I gather from the open source 142 00:05:40,170 --> 00:05:41,560 intel websites, so. 143 00:05:43,050 --> 00:05:45,269 I was able to more than double the number 144 00:05:45,270 --> 00:05:47,379 of companies. There are more to 145 00:05:47,380 --> 00:05:50,129 add to the United Hour, like 146 00:05:50,130 --> 00:05:51,179 some peculiar one. 147 00:05:51,180 --> 00:05:53,609 There's one which is called NSA Italia, 148 00:05:53,610 --> 00:05:55,769 which is pretty far name for a company. 149 00:05:56,790 --> 00:05:59,309 And there's also Telecom 150 00:05:59,310 --> 00:06:01,739 Italia, which is 151 00:06:01,740 --> 00:06:04,079 the second most large 152 00:06:04,080 --> 00:06:06,209 telecommunication company in Italy, 153 00:06:06,210 --> 00:06:08,279 which is well known, which is big and 154 00:06:08,280 --> 00:06:10,509 which is weird to find in 155 00:06:10,510 --> 00:06:12,689 a database of companies selling 156 00:06:12,690 --> 00:06:15,179 surveillance technologies and devices. 157 00:06:15,180 --> 00:06:17,339 But we see later why not want 158 00:06:17,340 --> 00:06:20,049 to focus better on two other companies? 159 00:06:20,050 --> 00:06:22,559 The first one is I forget suffragan. 160 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:24,959 It's a pretty recent new company. 161 00:06:24,960 --> 00:06:27,239 It belongs to the group of electronica 162 00:06:27,240 --> 00:06:28,949 and an Italian company. 163 00:06:28,950 --> 00:06:31,619 And among their products, 164 00:06:31,620 --> 00:06:34,349 two of them are the Wi-Fi catcher, 165 00:06:34,350 --> 00:06:36,899 which is basically a Wi-Fi network 166 00:06:36,900 --> 00:06:38,999 monitoring system, able to 167 00:06:39,000 --> 00:06:41,309 localize and identify the nodes 168 00:06:41,310 --> 00:06:43,679 and provide some traffic flow 169 00:06:43,680 --> 00:06:46,589 analysis, the instead 170 00:06:46,590 --> 00:06:49,529 the net. And it's basically 171 00:06:49,530 --> 00:06:51,959 an integrated platform which provides 172 00:06:51,960 --> 00:06:54,599 you the possibility to surveil 173 00:06:54,600 --> 00:06:56,069 phone calls. 174 00:06:56,070 --> 00:06:58,699 Instant messaging chats posted 175 00:06:58,700 --> 00:07:00,779 remain on social media and 176 00:07:00,780 --> 00:07:02,760 even voice over IP calls. 177 00:07:06,090 --> 00:07:07,449 Go and have a look on their Twitter 178 00:07:07,450 --> 00:07:09,789 account. It's interesting, there are some 179 00:07:09,790 --> 00:07:10,790 interesting pictures 180 00:07:11,850 --> 00:07:14,379 in that a company is KPM 181 00:07:14,380 --> 00:07:16,119 This one basically sells 182 00:07:17,140 --> 00:07:19,989 jammers, drones, jammers also. 183 00:07:19,990 --> 00:07:23,259 But look into the tender's. 184 00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:24,819 There was a tender regarding IMSA, 185 00:07:24,820 --> 00:07:26,440 Sketchers and 186 00:07:27,670 --> 00:07:29,949 CPM. Electronica is said 187 00:07:29,950 --> 00:07:32,139 to be the official reseller of the 188 00:07:32,140 --> 00:07:33,550 cell phone company, which is 189 00:07:34,750 --> 00:07:37,089 an English company selling 190 00:07:37,090 --> 00:07:38,259 in Sketchers. 191 00:07:38,260 --> 00:07:39,999 So this is one of the results that we can 192 00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:41,439 get with this approach. 193 00:07:41,440 --> 00:07:43,609 We can discover also official 194 00:07:43,610 --> 00:07:45,669 sellers of companies that are 195 00:07:45,670 --> 00:07:47,979 based abroad and somehow are selling 196 00:07:47,980 --> 00:07:49,929 devices that the government, the Italian 197 00:07:49,930 --> 00:07:51,269 government is interested in. 198 00:07:53,220 --> 00:07:55,529 Still remaining on the topic 199 00:07:55,530 --> 00:07:57,749 of Sketchers, this is the 200 00:07:57,750 --> 00:07:59,939 XML data that you get 201 00:07:59,940 --> 00:08:02,159 regarding the 10 or so on top of 202 00:08:02,160 --> 00:08:04,709 the subject, the providing a mnemonic 203 00:08:04,710 --> 00:08:06,269 system, then there are the list of 204 00:08:06,270 --> 00:08:07,920 participants. There are some 205 00:08:09,120 --> 00:08:11,009 well known names, and there's also 206 00:08:11,010 --> 00:08:11,939 Telecom Italia. 207 00:08:11,940 --> 00:08:14,819 So Telecom Italia, our telecommunication 208 00:08:14,820 --> 00:08:17,099 company, mentioned company 209 00:08:17,100 --> 00:08:19,919 participated in Tender in 2015 210 00:08:19,920 --> 00:08:21,869 for an e-mail to get your system. 211 00:08:21,870 --> 00:08:24,149 They didn't win the company that won 212 00:08:24,150 --> 00:08:26,339 at the time was it alarms 213 00:08:26,340 --> 00:08:28,190 the the first one on top. 214 00:08:30,470 --> 00:08:32,749 Regarding him, Sketchers, still, you 215 00:08:32,750 --> 00:08:35,449 can get some information from the 216 00:08:35,450 --> 00:08:36,889 technical specification that the 217 00:08:36,890 --> 00:08:38,149 government is requesting for these 218 00:08:38,150 --> 00:08:40,459 companies. So, yeah, 219 00:08:40,460 --> 00:08:42,619 they're asking for the downgrade. 220 00:08:42,620 --> 00:08:45,409 So pasturing from 3G to 2G, 221 00:08:45,410 --> 00:08:47,659 from 4G of terrorists or to 222 00:08:47,660 --> 00:08:48,659 weaken the security of the 223 00:08:48,660 --> 00:08:49,969 communications. 224 00:08:49,970 --> 00:08:52,339 And they're provided also a scheme 225 00:08:52,340 --> 00:08:54,709 of what it would like their 226 00:08:54,710 --> 00:08:56,869 names to capture, to provide to to 227 00:08:56,870 --> 00:08:59,159 the authorities. So you see to basically 228 00:08:59,160 --> 00:09:01,399 to try and provide some location 229 00:09:01,400 --> 00:09:04,159 targeting, following around 230 00:09:04,160 --> 00:09:06,349 the specific target collecting, as 231 00:09:06,350 --> 00:09:08,539 you see at the center, the 232 00:09:08,540 --> 00:09:10,610 emcee and Imane numbers. 233 00:09:13,620 --> 00:09:15,809 This is regarding him, Sketchers, so 234 00:09:15,810 --> 00:09:18,359 let's try to build the real the proper 235 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:20,489 toolbox of what 236 00:09:20,490 --> 00:09:22,829 they are interested in. 237 00:09:22,830 --> 00:09:24,929 What about Internet surveillance and 238 00:09:24,930 --> 00:09:25,930 interception? 239 00:09:26,820 --> 00:09:28,979 What I found there was 240 00:09:28,980 --> 00:09:31,079 a project which belongs 241 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:33,449 to the National Imperative Plan, 242 00:09:33,450 --> 00:09:34,450 which is 243 00:09:35,810 --> 00:09:38,259 a plan to to foster the 244 00:09:38,260 --> 00:09:40,139 development of companies in south of 245 00:09:40,140 --> 00:09:42,599 Italy, which is using European 246 00:09:42,600 --> 00:09:45,029 money and Italian public money 247 00:09:45,030 --> 00:09:46,649 to fund these kind of projects. 248 00:09:46,650 --> 00:09:49,979 This project, which was 249 00:09:49,980 --> 00:09:52,139 held by the company R6, which is another 250 00:09:52,140 --> 00:09:55,139 well-known surveillance company 251 00:09:55,140 --> 00:09:57,209 in Italy from Italy, 252 00:09:57,210 --> 00:09:59,729 was basically to provide some 253 00:09:59,730 --> 00:10:02,459 Internet probes to 254 00:10:02,460 --> 00:10:05,069 provide lawful interception of data 255 00:10:05,070 --> 00:10:07,739 traffic interception regarding a specific 256 00:10:07,740 --> 00:10:09,869 user or even 257 00:10:09,870 --> 00:10:11,939 intercepting traffic from 258 00:10:11,940 --> 00:10:14,579 or to or towards specific site. 259 00:10:14,580 --> 00:10:16,859 What was weird is 260 00:10:16,860 --> 00:10:18,989 that the tag of 261 00:10:18,990 --> 00:10:21,089 this project highlighted 262 00:10:21,090 --> 00:10:23,159 in yellow, it's for cultural 263 00:10:23,160 --> 00:10:25,739 activities. So they basically said 264 00:10:25,740 --> 00:10:28,139 this project regards to the culture 265 00:10:28,140 --> 00:10:29,159 sphere. 266 00:10:29,160 --> 00:10:31,379 But there are it's not 267 00:10:31,380 --> 00:10:33,119 it's an Internet problem for 268 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:34,019 interception. 269 00:10:34,020 --> 00:10:36,089 There's a cost of this project was 270 00:10:36,090 --> 00:10:38,309 a little bit more than 100000 euros. 271 00:10:40,020 --> 00:10:42,209 It was approved in 2006 272 00:10:42,210 --> 00:10:44,579 and it received one hundred 273 00:10:44,580 --> 00:10:47,339 thirty three thousand euros of public 274 00:10:47,340 --> 00:10:48,509 funding. 275 00:10:48,510 --> 00:10:51,479 And the last payment was due on 276 00:10:51,480 --> 00:10:52,919 January 2015. 277 00:10:53,990 --> 00:10:56,299 I filed a request for information request 278 00:10:56,300 --> 00:10:58,399 to receive and obtain all the 279 00:10:58,400 --> 00:11:00,139 documents regarding this project. 280 00:11:00,140 --> 00:11:02,719 This was funded with public money. 281 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:04,969 But the answer I got was no, 282 00:11:04,970 --> 00:11:06,499 you know, due to 283 00:11:07,760 --> 00:11:10,219 intellectual property issues 284 00:11:10,220 --> 00:11:13,729 for the company and to 285 00:11:13,730 --> 00:11:16,130 the secrecy of the technology itself. 286 00:11:17,570 --> 00:11:19,940 For a national security standpoint. 287 00:11:21,380 --> 00:11:22,380 Which is a. 288 00:11:23,560 --> 00:11:25,869 Next, let's think about 289 00:11:25,870 --> 00:11:28,059 the social media and 290 00:11:28,060 --> 00:11:30,279 the all the positive we do 291 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:31,280 online. 292 00:11:32,950 --> 00:11:35,229 The Ministry of Interior has bought 293 00:11:35,230 --> 00:11:37,849 a system for social media intelligence, 294 00:11:37,850 --> 00:11:40,029 the project, the codenamed Project, 295 00:11:40,030 --> 00:11:42,039 its crime, which is. 296 00:11:45,470 --> 00:11:46,639 What does this system do? 297 00:11:46,640 --> 00:11:47,640 It's basically 298 00:11:48,980 --> 00:11:50,059 its aim is to 299 00:11:51,530 --> 00:11:53,689 provide immediate monitoring 300 00:11:53,690 --> 00:11:56,119 system to gather all 301 00:11:56,120 --> 00:11:58,309 audio files available online from 302 00:11:58,310 --> 00:11:59,299 social media. 303 00:11:59,300 --> 00:12:01,369 So Facebook, Google, YouTube and 304 00:12:01,370 --> 00:12:03,349 everything is basically doing that. 305 00:12:03,350 --> 00:12:05,599 We are crawling, scraping these these 306 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:07,789 web pages, transcribe 307 00:12:07,790 --> 00:12:10,369 the audio file and get identify 308 00:12:10,370 --> 00:12:12,739 the speakers and store 309 00:12:12,740 --> 00:12:14,600 a database of voice fingerprints. 310 00:12:17,310 --> 00:12:19,789 Which are pretty concerning the 311 00:12:19,790 --> 00:12:21,299 Digital Protection Authority, the Talent 312 00:12:21,300 --> 00:12:23,519 Protection Authority has opened an 313 00:12:23,520 --> 00:12:25,529 investigation into this and it has 314 00:12:25,530 --> 00:12:28,079 requested more documents and information 315 00:12:28,080 --> 00:12:30,539 to the minister of interior because 316 00:12:30,540 --> 00:12:33,269 this specific system 317 00:12:33,270 --> 00:12:35,519 would have to be implemented to fight 318 00:12:35,520 --> 00:12:36,520 terrorism. 319 00:12:37,710 --> 00:12:38,999 But the. 320 00:12:40,830 --> 00:12:42,739 The power of these instruments regarding 321 00:12:42,740 --> 00:12:44,939 the disability, Krall's creep and also 322 00:12:44,940 --> 00:12:48,029 how are these voice fingerprints 323 00:12:48,030 --> 00:12:49,499 stored in the database? 324 00:12:49,500 --> 00:12:50,879 What are the safeguards? 325 00:12:50,880 --> 00:12:51,899 What is going to happen? 326 00:12:51,900 --> 00:12:52,900 This is not clear. 327 00:12:55,680 --> 00:12:58,119 Luckily, I fallowfield information 328 00:12:58,120 --> 00:13:00,069 request access, which was granted 329 00:13:00,070 --> 00:13:02,259 partially what happened, the 330 00:13:02,260 --> 00:13:04,059 ilma with company, the one on top, on the 331 00:13:04,060 --> 00:13:06,279 right one, the tender, 332 00:13:06,280 --> 00:13:07,839 but they refused to provide their 333 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:09,849 technical offers due to intellectual 334 00:13:09,850 --> 00:13:11,139 property issues. 335 00:13:11,140 --> 00:13:12,519 But they received some other, for 336 00:13:12,520 --> 00:13:14,629 example, from ISIS, which she 337 00:13:14,630 --> 00:13:16,269 said are well known companies. 338 00:13:16,270 --> 00:13:18,789 And this is an excerpt from 339 00:13:18,790 --> 00:13:21,159 the witnesses of technical 340 00:13:21,160 --> 00:13:23,379 offers. And you see on the left 341 00:13:23,380 --> 00:13:25,719 side all the public 342 00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:27,550 channels, including Da, 343 00:13:29,290 --> 00:13:31,479 Yahoo, Google, Reddit and 344 00:13:31,480 --> 00:13:33,609 basically how they would 345 00:13:33,610 --> 00:13:34,809 like to stream so. 346 00:13:35,850 --> 00:13:38,639 No, who was there then to pass through, 347 00:13:38,640 --> 00:13:40,389 because you also have a knowledge, 348 00:13:40,390 --> 00:13:42,389 understanding of what the meaning and the 349 00:13:42,390 --> 00:13:44,489 system also translates to get soldiers 350 00:13:44,490 --> 00:13:45,690 from several languages. 351 00:13:47,780 --> 00:13:49,519 All these documents that we obtained will 352 00:13:49,520 --> 00:13:52,159 be published probably 353 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:54,319 the beginning of the 2018 there in 354 00:13:54,320 --> 00:13:56,449 Italian, so we have to understand how 355 00:13:56,450 --> 00:13:58,669 to properly translate them or made 356 00:13:58,670 --> 00:14:00,169 them available to all the community. 357 00:14:01,900 --> 00:14:03,969 Well, let's move on recently here in 358 00:14:03,970 --> 00:14:06,339 Germany, I read an article on the Berlin 359 00:14:06,340 --> 00:14:09,159 train station, they're going to test the 360 00:14:09,160 --> 00:14:11,169 facial recognition system. 361 00:14:11,170 --> 00:14:13,329 Well, Italy wants 362 00:14:13,330 --> 00:14:15,429 to do the same or actually 363 00:14:15,430 --> 00:14:16,629 maybe a little bit more. 364 00:14:16,630 --> 00:14:18,789 What they did is, uh, at the beginning 365 00:14:18,790 --> 00:14:20,979 of this year, 366 00:14:20,980 --> 00:14:22,329 they've bought the system of face 367 00:14:22,330 --> 00:14:23,979 recognition system for a project called 368 00:14:23,980 --> 00:14:26,199 Saray, which is basically 369 00:14:26,200 --> 00:14:27,309 a face recognition system. 370 00:14:27,310 --> 00:14:29,709 This is the architecture, uh, a picture 371 00:14:29,710 --> 00:14:31,899 taken from their, uh, 372 00:14:31,900 --> 00:14:33,759 technical specs requires. 373 00:14:33,760 --> 00:14:35,629 So you have these basically on the right 374 00:14:35,630 --> 00:14:38,169 DFI. Yes, it's the 375 00:14:38,170 --> 00:14:40,239 database of, uh, let's say the 376 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:41,769 mug shots, the all the image that they 377 00:14:41,770 --> 00:14:44,859 already have of criminals. 378 00:14:44,860 --> 00:14:47,089 They would like to have this server 379 00:14:47,090 --> 00:14:49,119 application with several engines using 380 00:14:49,120 --> 00:14:51,669 several face recognition 381 00:14:51,670 --> 00:14:54,279 algorithms to find 382 00:14:54,280 --> 00:14:56,739 the specific person 383 00:14:56,740 --> 00:14:57,789 containing the image. 384 00:14:59,100 --> 00:15:01,169 The system is split into two different 385 00:15:01,170 --> 00:15:01,469 parts. 386 00:15:01,470 --> 00:15:04,439 There's an enterprise version which 387 00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:06,899 has to deal with 10 million 388 00:15:08,340 --> 00:15:10,469 images and which is basically a static 389 00:15:10,470 --> 00:15:12,509 version. So you you have I mean, you have 390 00:15:12,510 --> 00:15:14,009 an image you would like to know if the 391 00:15:14,010 --> 00:15:16,199 person on that image is present 392 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:17,339 in your database. 393 00:15:17,340 --> 00:15:19,619 The other one is a real time one 394 00:15:19,620 --> 00:15:21,839 which needs to 395 00:15:21,840 --> 00:15:24,179 work together with 10 396 00:15:24,180 --> 00:15:26,339 CCTV cameras that they put in 397 00:15:26,340 --> 00:15:28,469 the standard as well to be 398 00:15:28,470 --> 00:15:30,539 deployed according 399 00:15:30,540 --> 00:15:33,639 to their necessities around Italy. 400 00:15:33,640 --> 00:15:36,119 Uh, the system 401 00:15:36,120 --> 00:15:38,219 will spot the the 402 00:15:38,220 --> 00:15:40,439 person in real time comparing to 403 00:15:40,440 --> 00:15:42,869 a watch list of 10000 images, 404 00:15:42,870 --> 00:15:45,149 which are almost 405 00:15:45,150 --> 00:15:47,019 concerning numbers, both on 406 00:15:48,210 --> 00:15:49,949 for the 10 million images and the ten 407 00:15:49,950 --> 00:15:51,089 thousands. 408 00:15:51,090 --> 00:15:52,139 Um. 409 00:16:00,180 --> 00:16:02,429 We we filed a Freedom 410 00:16:02,430 --> 00:16:04,919 of Information request also for those 411 00:16:04,920 --> 00:16:07,499 technical offers, and we 412 00:16:07,500 --> 00:16:10,559 had some issues because 413 00:16:10,560 --> 00:16:12,809 they only provided the technical 414 00:16:12,810 --> 00:16:14,969 affairs of the company 415 00:16:14,970 --> 00:16:17,969 that won the tender but 416 00:16:17,970 --> 00:16:20,279 obscure. They redacted some 417 00:16:20,280 --> 00:16:22,349 some passages. So it's not completely 418 00:16:22,350 --> 00:16:24,119 clear what the engineers. 419 00:16:24,120 --> 00:16:26,219 But again, also for the system, 420 00:16:26,220 --> 00:16:27,749 the Italian Data Protection Authority 421 00:16:27,750 --> 00:16:29,879 opened an investigation asking for more 422 00:16:29,880 --> 00:16:31,619 information to go to the minister of 423 00:16:31,620 --> 00:16:32,620 interior. 424 00:16:34,510 --> 00:16:36,999 But let's move on what we can request 425 00:16:37,000 --> 00:16:38,949 with our freedom of information law in 426 00:16:38,950 --> 00:16:40,079 Italy. 427 00:16:40,080 --> 00:16:41,359 We wanted to request invoices. 428 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:43,509 So this is an example of the of 429 00:16:43,510 --> 00:16:45,879 invoices that I request for, the company 430 00:16:45,880 --> 00:16:47,839 area that you see in the camera redacted. 431 00:16:47,840 --> 00:16:49,569 So they wanted to remove some specific 432 00:16:49,570 --> 00:16:52,659 detail regarding investigations, 433 00:16:52,660 --> 00:16:54,849 but they basically provided us 434 00:16:54,850 --> 00:16:56,049 with documents. So this is 435 00:16:57,430 --> 00:16:59,199 this is good. This is leverage because we 436 00:16:59,200 --> 00:17:01,119 have a precedent. They provided us some 437 00:17:01,120 --> 00:17:03,399 invoices I'm keeping 438 00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:05,229 asking new invoices. 439 00:17:05,230 --> 00:17:06,249 So they're coming. 440 00:17:06,250 --> 00:17:07,449 We are collecting them. 441 00:17:07,450 --> 00:17:10,239 We would like to understand how much they 442 00:17:10,240 --> 00:17:11,829 spend on these technologies. 443 00:17:15,490 --> 00:17:17,049 So far, we've been talking about the 444 00:17:17,050 --> 00:17:19,239 Ministry of Interior, the this 445 00:17:19,240 --> 00:17:21,098 project can be applied to the Ministry of 446 00:17:21,099 --> 00:17:22,779 Defense and the Ministry of Justice 447 00:17:24,310 --> 00:17:25,959 with the Ministry of Interior, though 448 00:17:25,960 --> 00:17:27,639 there are some caveats because the 449 00:17:27,640 --> 00:17:30,309 transparency laws differ, 450 00:17:30,310 --> 00:17:32,799 are not so powerful as in other cases. 451 00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:35,259 But still we can get some information. 452 00:17:35,260 --> 00:17:36,260 This is a. 453 00:17:38,280 --> 00:17:40,439 The PDF documents detailing the 454 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:42,749 expenditures of the arm of the defense 455 00:17:42,750 --> 00:17:44,369 regarding some some communication 456 00:17:44,370 --> 00:17:46,499 intelligence that the empowerment of 457 00:17:46,500 --> 00:17:47,789 women in communication intelligence 458 00:17:47,790 --> 00:17:50,129 systems, a pretty interesting 459 00:17:50,130 --> 00:17:52,589 one is the one I like to do, which is 460 00:17:52,590 --> 00:17:54,929 a legal system developed by the company 461 00:17:54,930 --> 00:17:56,039 expert system. 462 00:17:56,040 --> 00:17:58,349 And this legal system, it's 463 00:17:58,350 --> 00:18:00,599 it's used to select the intercept 464 00:18:00,600 --> 00:18:03,299 the traffic and to 465 00:18:04,560 --> 00:18:06,959 provide a sort of speech to text 466 00:18:06,960 --> 00:18:09,659 translation, so to transcribe it. 467 00:18:09,660 --> 00:18:11,639 And here you can see more details. 468 00:18:11,640 --> 00:18:12,929 Yeah, we would like to think about this 469 00:18:12,930 --> 00:18:15,599 as some sort of weaker 470 00:18:15,600 --> 00:18:17,159 version of this code. 471 00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:19,289 But yeah, because basically you have some 472 00:18:19,290 --> 00:18:20,729 research criteria, criteria's parameters 473 00:18:20,730 --> 00:18:22,859 you can search to connect and provide 474 00:18:22,860 --> 00:18:25,169 a comprehensive understanding of 475 00:18:25,170 --> 00:18:27,660 the target of your target. 476 00:18:31,270 --> 00:18:32,270 So. 477 00:18:34,140 --> 00:18:35,879 What was my initial question, what are 478 00:18:35,880 --> 00:18:37,979 the to what's inside 479 00:18:37,980 --> 00:18:40,759 the toolbox of Italian government? 480 00:18:40,760 --> 00:18:43,049 Looks like the Italian government 481 00:18:43,050 --> 00:18:45,269 has acquired everything that 482 00:18:45,270 --> 00:18:47,489 it needs, everything that other bigger 483 00:18:47,490 --> 00:18:48,490 nations use. 484 00:18:49,580 --> 00:18:51,889 Such as physical recognition, social 485 00:18:51,890 --> 00:18:53,999 media, intelligence and Internet 486 00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:55,470 interception and signatures. 487 00:18:56,840 --> 00:18:57,840 But what's next? 488 00:18:59,000 --> 00:19:01,399 We would like to keep following 489 00:19:01,400 --> 00:19:03,379 this Freedom of Information request to 490 00:19:03,380 --> 00:19:05,029 get all the invoices and technical 491 00:19:05,030 --> 00:19:06,829 economic offers. 492 00:19:06,830 --> 00:19:08,449 We would like to expand the database of 493 00:19:08,450 --> 00:19:10,939 companies because there are some 494 00:19:10,940 --> 00:19:13,129 missing companies, for example, hacking 495 00:19:13,130 --> 00:19:14,130 team. 496 00:19:14,490 --> 00:19:16,889 There was no information 497 00:19:16,890 --> 00:19:19,559 regarding that, but we are trying to find 498 00:19:19,560 --> 00:19:21,959 companies connecting to them 499 00:19:21,960 --> 00:19:24,059 and this would be really helpful because. 500 00:19:25,480 --> 00:19:26,889 If we find the companies that are 501 00:19:26,890 --> 00:19:29,199 participating in the tenders, 502 00:19:29,200 --> 00:19:31,239 we know more companies that are trying to 503 00:19:31,240 --> 00:19:33,099 sell these kind of technologies and we 504 00:19:33,100 --> 00:19:35,259 can somehow linked them 505 00:19:35,260 --> 00:19:37,479 to our team or other more important 506 00:19:37,480 --> 00:19:38,889 companies. And I have pointed an 507 00:19:38,890 --> 00:19:40,989 interesting point is to push 508 00:19:40,990 --> 00:19:43,089 the government on the expenditures. 509 00:19:43,090 --> 00:19:44,619 So how much is it spending? 510 00:19:45,870 --> 00:19:48,059 Not only on our privacy 511 00:19:48,060 --> 00:19:50,009 concerning point of view, but also on the 512 00:19:50,010 --> 00:19:51,839 expenditures point of view, how much does 513 00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:54,059 it cost to surveil your 514 00:19:54,060 --> 00:19:55,469 citizens? 515 00:19:55,470 --> 00:19:57,719 And this in this way, we can 516 00:19:57,720 --> 00:19:58,950 somehow understand it. 517 00:20:00,650 --> 00:20:02,269 What is missing so far is 518 00:20:03,680 --> 00:20:05,480 to analyze the legal framework 519 00:20:07,910 --> 00:20:10,099 that lets the government 520 00:20:10,100 --> 00:20:11,419 use such technologies. 521 00:20:11,420 --> 00:20:13,309 So far it's quite blurred. 522 00:20:13,310 --> 00:20:15,889 There's no for the recognition 523 00:20:15,890 --> 00:20:18,139 there was not even a mention of terrorism 524 00:20:18,140 --> 00:20:20,299 threat. It was like, yeah, we want to buy 525 00:20:20,300 --> 00:20:22,339 this recognition system and use it in 526 00:20:22,340 --> 00:20:24,739 public events, which is concerning, 527 00:20:24,740 --> 00:20:26,719 which is not even like the social media 528 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:29,059 intelligence system only for 529 00:20:29,060 --> 00:20:30,729 terrorism related issues. 530 00:20:32,740 --> 00:20:35,319 And something more, we would like to 531 00:20:35,320 --> 00:20:37,389 involve activists from other 532 00:20:37,390 --> 00:20:39,489 countries, because we think that 533 00:20:39,490 --> 00:20:41,739 this framework could be 534 00:20:41,740 --> 00:20:43,179 could be applied, could be exported to 535 00:20:43,180 --> 00:20:44,229 other countries. 536 00:20:44,230 --> 00:20:46,390 And to do that specifically, 537 00:20:47,450 --> 00:20:49,479 there's going to be a workshop right 538 00:20:49,480 --> 00:20:51,549 after the start at 2pm at the 539 00:20:51,550 --> 00:20:52,660 Rights and Freedoms Assembly. 540 00:20:54,580 --> 00:20:56,140 I was going to work. There is a. 541 00:20:57,270 --> 00:20:59,579 Uh, Horizon 2020 funded 542 00:20:59,580 --> 00:21:01,879 project, which is called deju with 543 00:21:01,880 --> 00:21:04,229 the whistle blower, which is 544 00:21:04,230 --> 00:21:06,299 providing a platform 545 00:21:06,300 --> 00:21:09,119 for accountability mechanism 546 00:21:09,120 --> 00:21:11,099 to understand what the situation of the 547 00:21:11,100 --> 00:21:13,619 nations in Europe. 548 00:21:13,620 --> 00:21:15,719 But then the workshop is, if anyone 549 00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:18,389 is interested, we can discuss where other 550 00:21:18,390 --> 00:21:21,059 nations and 551 00:21:21,060 --> 00:21:23,369 from this coming 552 00:21:23,370 --> 00:21:25,889 to the workshop, we can see how 553 00:21:25,890 --> 00:21:27,269 the public procurement datasets are 554 00:21:27,270 --> 00:21:29,669 available, how which laws provides 555 00:21:29,670 --> 00:21:32,069 in the country's ability 556 00:21:32,070 --> 00:21:34,229 the possibility to apply this 557 00:21:34,230 --> 00:21:36,419 same framework to understand how 558 00:21:36,420 --> 00:21:38,939 your country is acquiring 559 00:21:38,940 --> 00:21:40,279 such technologies and techniques. 560 00:21:40,280 --> 00:21:42,419 So I invite you 561 00:21:42,420 --> 00:21:43,979 to, if you're interested, to come to the 562 00:21:43,980 --> 00:21:45,480 workshop leader. 563 00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:49,650 Yeah, that was it. 564 00:21:59,810 --> 00:22:01,759 Thank you very much, Ricardo. 565 00:22:01,760 --> 00:22:03,979 We have four microphones here 566 00:22:03,980 --> 00:22:06,469 in the hall that you can line up behind 567 00:22:06,470 --> 00:22:08,629 for questions, and we also have plenty 568 00:22:08,630 --> 00:22:09,529 of time for questions. 569 00:22:09,530 --> 00:22:11,209 Are there questions from the Internet? 570 00:22:13,150 --> 00:22:15,279 No questions in that case, microphone 571 00:22:15,280 --> 00:22:16,899 number one, please. 572 00:22:16,900 --> 00:22:19,299 Hi, sir. 573 00:22:19,300 --> 00:22:20,289 When you were starting out your 574 00:22:20,290 --> 00:22:22,119 investigation, you said you looked at Bug 575 00:22:22,120 --> 00:22:24,819 Planet and the other website for Italian 576 00:22:24,820 --> 00:22:26,679 companies providing surveillance 577 00:22:26,680 --> 00:22:28,869 equipment of 578 00:22:30,130 --> 00:22:33,609 other laws in Italy, specifying 579 00:22:33,610 --> 00:22:35,499 that the surveillance technologies have 580 00:22:35,500 --> 00:22:37,779 to come from domestic suppliers or why 581 00:22:37,780 --> 00:22:39,849 was there a door chose to focus solely 582 00:22:39,850 --> 00:22:42,039 on specifically Italian companies. 583 00:22:45,560 --> 00:22:47,779 Not sure on the laws regarding 584 00:22:47,780 --> 00:22:50,359 the domestic supplies for 585 00:22:50,360 --> 00:22:52,809 at least I don't think that for 586 00:22:52,810 --> 00:22:54,919 the Ministry of Interior 587 00:22:54,920 --> 00:22:56,869 there are any constraints, such kind of 588 00:22:56,870 --> 00:22:57,769 constraints. 589 00:22:57,770 --> 00:22:59,000 What I wanted to know was like 590 00:23:00,230 --> 00:23:01,849 I basically started from that because 591 00:23:01,850 --> 00:23:03,589 they were like the there were no 592 00:23:03,590 --> 00:23:05,049 companies. 593 00:23:05,050 --> 00:23:07,329 And then I found that in 594 00:23:07,330 --> 00:23:09,399 my hands, so basically my hands and 595 00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:11,289 I was like, OK, let's start digging 596 00:23:11,290 --> 00:23:13,509 deeper. So it's yeah, I 597 00:23:13,510 --> 00:23:14,739 don't want to focus only on Italian 598 00:23:14,740 --> 00:23:16,839 companies, see if any foreign 599 00:23:16,840 --> 00:23:19,299 companies pop ups in the tenders. 600 00:23:19,300 --> 00:23:21,519 I will surely follow the trail 601 00:23:21,520 --> 00:23:23,649 for sure. So, yeah, there was no specific 602 00:23:23,650 --> 00:23:25,600 reason why I didn't. 603 00:23:26,930 --> 00:23:29,089 OK, one question from the Internet 604 00:23:29,090 --> 00:23:31,039 via a little signal, please. 605 00:23:31,040 --> 00:23:32,029 Yes. 606 00:23:32,030 --> 00:23:34,249 Are these tools 607 00:23:34,250 --> 00:23:35,250 under secrecy? 608 00:23:40,800 --> 00:23:41,950 Under secrecy. 609 00:23:43,170 --> 00:23:44,170 Well. 610 00:23:44,750 --> 00:23:46,939 When I requested information 611 00:23:46,940 --> 00:23:49,069 to the police, if these technologies 612 00:23:49,070 --> 00:23:51,329 were being used, how 613 00:23:51,330 --> 00:23:53,569 how many times, how often the stuff, 614 00:23:53,570 --> 00:23:55,699 they didn't reply, they 615 00:23:55,700 --> 00:23:57,919 didn't say anything. 616 00:23:57,920 --> 00:24:00,469 So I hope that 617 00:24:00,470 --> 00:24:02,809 the data protection authority can 618 00:24:02,810 --> 00:24:05,329 understand better what is going on. 619 00:24:05,330 --> 00:24:07,999 And, of course, I will try to 620 00:24:08,000 --> 00:24:10,279 to see if there's been any event, 621 00:24:10,280 --> 00:24:11,659 if it's already been used. 622 00:24:11,660 --> 00:24:14,149 So, yeah, not probably under secrecy, 623 00:24:14,150 --> 00:24:16,729 but kind of microphone 624 00:24:16,730 --> 00:24:18,139 number two, please. 625 00:24:18,140 --> 00:24:20,239 Hello. Did you ask the ministry 626 00:24:20,240 --> 00:24:22,519 what is relation between the culture 627 00:24:22,520 --> 00:24:23,930 and IP surveillance? 628 00:24:26,770 --> 00:24:29,439 I requested that in the Freedom 629 00:24:29,440 --> 00:24:32,139 of Information request, I mean, to 630 00:24:32,140 --> 00:24:34,449 I did that to the Ministry of Economic 631 00:24:34,450 --> 00:24:36,609 Development because it was the 632 00:24:36,610 --> 00:24:38,889 one on holding that 633 00:24:38,890 --> 00:24:39,699 the kind of project. 634 00:24:39,700 --> 00:24:41,649 But they didn't reply in that. 635 00:24:41,650 --> 00:24:43,869 So microphone number 636 00:24:43,870 --> 00:24:45,339 four, please. 637 00:24:45,340 --> 00:24:46,340 Dowrick are 638 00:24:48,370 --> 00:24:50,499 tendering in Italy, if I'm 639 00:24:50,500 --> 00:24:52,659 right, is something limited to 640 00:24:52,660 --> 00:24:55,059 offers higher than 80 or 100000 641 00:24:55,060 --> 00:24:56,019 euros. 642 00:24:56,020 --> 00:24:58,209 So do you do you know do you have 643 00:24:58,210 --> 00:25:00,279 the feeling that there is some. 644 00:25:01,900 --> 00:25:03,969 Obfuscation by going 645 00:25:03,970 --> 00:25:06,099 below the tender line in order to not 646 00:25:06,100 --> 00:25:08,469 go into the public for into 647 00:25:08,470 --> 00:25:10,749 those databases, i.e., I 648 00:25:10,750 --> 00:25:12,729 didn't specifically check on that, but 649 00:25:12,730 --> 00:25:13,869 that's certainly a point. 650 00:25:13,870 --> 00:25:17,079 I mean, from this study. 651 00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:19,629 Clearly, there is something missing. 652 00:25:19,630 --> 00:25:22,869 For example, the Russians 653 00:25:22,870 --> 00:25:24,129 are not appearing. 654 00:25:24,130 --> 00:25:25,149 They're not there. 655 00:25:25,150 --> 00:25:27,249 But this also because probably I 656 00:25:27,250 --> 00:25:29,049 need to dig deeper into the Ministry of 657 00:25:29,050 --> 00:25:30,429 Justice because it's. 658 00:25:31,990 --> 00:25:34,179 They are buying this 659 00:25:34,180 --> 00:25:36,609 technology, so, 660 00:25:36,610 --> 00:25:38,709 yeah, not sure if they're doing that 661 00:25:38,710 --> 00:25:41,259 on purpose, like lowering the 662 00:25:41,260 --> 00:25:43,599 amount of the defenders, but definitely 663 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:44,799 there is something missing. So this is 664 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:46,599 not comprehensive. It's still an ongoing 665 00:25:46,600 --> 00:25:47,859 effort to search more. 666 00:25:50,260 --> 00:25:52,329 Another question from the Internet. 667 00:25:52,330 --> 00:25:54,699 This is a three part question are 668 00:25:54,700 --> 00:25:56,949 there any big newspapers in Italy 669 00:25:56,950 --> 00:25:59,439 interested in your research results 670 00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:01,839 and are the Italians conscious 671 00:26:01,840 --> 00:26:03,099 of the surveillance? 672 00:26:03,100 --> 00:26:05,439 And is there a public debate about 673 00:26:05,440 --> 00:26:06,440 it? 674 00:26:06,940 --> 00:26:07,940 Well. 675 00:26:10,790 --> 00:26:13,009 It depends the 676 00:26:13,010 --> 00:26:15,139 defense recognition system 677 00:26:15,140 --> 00:26:17,749 got some attention, uh, 678 00:26:17,750 --> 00:26:19,219 since I'm a freelance journalist running 679 00:26:19,220 --> 00:26:21,229 from Italy, I basically wrote some 680 00:26:21,230 --> 00:26:23,359 articles on that. 681 00:26:23,360 --> 00:26:25,579 But, uh, 682 00:26:25,580 --> 00:26:26,580 the media 683 00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:30,199 not so they didn't take on this, uh, 684 00:26:30,200 --> 00:26:31,879 on this kind of research yet. 685 00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:34,219 I hope they I hope they will, because 686 00:26:34,220 --> 00:26:35,239 I need help for sure. 687 00:26:35,240 --> 00:26:37,309 If anyone wants to dig deeper to find 688 00:26:37,310 --> 00:26:39,649 something else, we will provide the data 689 00:26:39,650 --> 00:26:41,029 and it's going to be public available 690 00:26:41,030 --> 00:26:43,249 online. So, yeah, the 691 00:26:43,250 --> 00:26:45,799 public debate on privacy, 692 00:26:45,800 --> 00:26:47,659 it's quite tough because we recently 693 00:26:47,660 --> 00:26:49,759 introduced a new data retention 694 00:26:49,760 --> 00:26:52,659 law which strikes the 695 00:26:52,660 --> 00:26:54,739 the time of retention up to 696 00:26:54,740 --> 00:26:57,199 six years, which is 697 00:26:57,200 --> 00:26:59,599 a lot and which doesn't make completely 698 00:26:59,600 --> 00:27:01,709 sense regarding to what are 699 00:27:01,710 --> 00:27:04,099 the principles at the European level. 700 00:27:04,100 --> 00:27:05,100 So, 701 00:27:06,350 --> 00:27:08,599 yeah, Italian people 702 00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:11,149 are concerned about this, but probably 703 00:27:11,150 --> 00:27:12,150 not enough. 704 00:27:14,200 --> 00:27:15,990 Do we have any more questions? 705 00:27:17,300 --> 00:27:19,039 It does not look like it. 706 00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:21,499 So a very warm and 707 00:27:21,500 --> 00:27:22,759 pleasant workshop. 708 00:27:22,760 --> 00:27:23,839 Thank you, Ricardo.