1 00:00:00,099 --> 00:00:15,064 *34c3 preroll music* 2 00:00:15,064 --> 00:00:19,240 Herald Angel (H): OK, probably a couple years ago you realize that a lot of the 3 00:00:19,240 --> 00:00:25,650 refugees coming up from Syria and North Africa where we're communicating. We're 4 00:00:25,650 --> 00:00:29,916 using technology in an interesting way to find their way around a lot of the Border 5 00:00:29,916 --> 00:00:36,999 Patrol's. A lot of the hurdles that were put up in their way. In the US we have a 6 00:00:36,999 --> 00:00:41,780 similar issue but it's different in many ways with illegal immigrants trying to 7 00:00:41,780 --> 00:00:47,909 stay underneath the radar. Allison McDonald from the University of Michigan 8 00:00:47,909 --> 00:00:54,059 is, has been studying how immigrants in the States deal with technology and it's 9 00:00:54,059 --> 00:00:59,739 very different from here. Her interests are in technology, privacy, society and 10 00:00:59,739 --> 00:01:03,839 human rights and I think we're gonna have an awesome talk from her. So, well, please 11 00:01:03,839 --> 00:01:16,335 welcome her and we'll get moving. *Applause* 12 00:01:16,335 --> 00:01:19,909 Allision McDonald: OK, thanks for coming. I'm Allison from the University of 13 00:01:19,909 --> 00:01:26,049 Michigan. I'm talking today primarily about technology in immigration 14 00:01:26,049 --> 00:01:30,469 enforcement and specifically about how the immigrant community in the United States 15 00:01:30,469 --> 00:01:36,170 is responding to those changes and especially the undocumented community. 16 00:01:36,170 --> 00:01:40,159 Before we get too far into the details I just wanted to tell a little bit of a 17 00:01:40,159 --> 00:01:45,479 story. This is Anna Maria she is not a real person she is sort of a compositive 18 00:01:45,479 --> 00:01:49,890 of many people that we spoke to but her story is really representative of a lot of 19 00:01:49,890 --> 00:01:56,249 people that we know are living in the United States today. She and her 20 00:01:56,249 --> 00:02:02,519 husband emigrated from Mexico about 12 years ago into the United States. She 21 00:02:02,519 --> 00:02:06,370 really wanted to have children, but couldn't get the fertility support that 22 00:02:06,370 --> 00:02:10,560 she needed in Mexico so she came to the United States. And now she and her husband 23 00:02:10,560 --> 00:02:17,530 have two children who are attending US public schools. She and her husband are 24 00:02:17,530 --> 00:02:22,507 both working and saving up to buy a house. They pay taxes; they attend church 25 00:02:22,507 --> 00:02:27,070 every Sunday. They're involved in a lot of community events and are really integrated 26 00:02:27,070 --> 00:02:33,750 into the local community. One difference from Anna Maria and a lot of 27 00:02:33,750 --> 00:02:39,930 other people is that she's in the United States as an undocumented immigrant. What 28 00:02:39,930 --> 00:02:45,190 this means is that she either entered the United States without legal authorization 29 00:02:45,190 --> 00:02:56,090 or she came on a Visa and overstayed the allotted time. That means that day to day 30 00:02:56,090 --> 00:03:03,290 she has to worry about being found and deported back to Mexico, removed from her 31 00:03:03,290 --> 00:03:11,370 home and this puts her in quite a precarious situation trying to live a 32 00:03:11,370 --> 00:03:17,070 normal life, a life similar to a lot of other people in our communities. But with 33 00:03:17,070 --> 00:03:21,490 this constant concern that this life could be taken away from her if she's 34 00:03:21,490 --> 00:03:28,160 detected. Other than this this one point she really lives this immigration story 35 00:03:28,160 --> 00:03:34,200 that the United States loves to tell. We love to have this narrative of people 36 00:03:34,200 --> 00:03:37,830 being able to come to the United States and build lives for themselves that they 37 00:03:37,830 --> 00:03:42,500 might not be able to build in their origin countries. And that's exactly 38 00:03:42,500 --> 00:03:51,200 what she's done. But just as natural to this immigration story is a history of a 39 00:03:51,200 --> 00:03:58,650 lot of discrimination, racism and xenophobia. All the way back in the 1700s 40 00:03:58,650 --> 00:04:03,780 we've had legislation that prevents people from becoming citizens based on their 41 00:04:03,780 --> 00:04:11,020 origin country. We've had, for example, the Chinese Exclusion Act preventing 42 00:04:11,020 --> 00:04:16,798 people from China laborers coming to the United States entirely. The Asiatic barred 43 00:04:16,798 --> 00:04:21,048 zone a couple years later just drew a box on a map and said the people in this 44 00:04:21,048 --> 00:04:25,910 region can't immigrate to the United States. We've also seen things like the 45 00:04:25,910 --> 00:04:32,530 Johnson Reed Immigration Act in the 1900s where the the US took census data from 46 00:04:32,530 --> 00:04:38,750 before a big wave of immigration putting a quota system in place that essentially 47 00:04:38,750 --> 00:04:44,630 prevented people from eastern and southern Europe from coming to the United States. 48 00:04:44,630 --> 00:04:51,770 This history of discrimination and racism continues to today. Many of you, I'm sure 49 00:04:51,770 --> 00:04:57,480 have heard of what's happening now with the so-called Muslim ban where a list of 50 00:04:57,480 --> 00:05:01,840 seven countries are now blacklisted. Immigrants are unable to enter the 51 00:05:01,840 --> 00:05:11,590 country. And this is just another data point to show the trend that our discourse 52 00:05:11,590 --> 00:05:20,789 and immigration policy in the United States is often racialized. I want to talk 53 00:05:20,789 --> 00:05:23,220 a little bit about what immigration enforcement actually looks like in the 54 00:05:23,220 --> 00:05:30,050 United States. The agency that manages enforcement is called the US Immigration 55 00:05:30,050 --> 00:05:39,639 and Customs Enforcement or ICE. They're in charge of enforcing within the borders 56 00:05:39,639 --> 00:05:44,270 once people have already entered the country, finding people without 57 00:05:44,270 --> 00:05:50,140 documentation or managing immigration cases. Over the last couple of decades 58 00:05:50,140 --> 00:05:56,220 they've really been gaining in size and power. This is anything from the removal 59 00:05:56,220 --> 00:06:03,330 of privacy restrictions on sharing data between federal agencies to an increase in 60 00:06:03,330 --> 00:06:10,530 financial resources after 9/11. And this is happening even today. President Trump 61 00:06:10,530 --> 00:06:16,360 back in January had an executive order that is looking to add another 5,000 62 00:06:16,360 --> 00:06:21,420 agents to their current 20,000 over the next couple of years. So this is an agency 63 00:06:21,420 --> 00:06:26,710 that's continuing should be bolstered. And another way that they're changing, 64 00:06:26,710 --> 00:06:32,870 recently, is the way that they're integrating technology into their jobs. 65 00:06:32,870 --> 00:06:37,560 This photo in particular shows a fingerprint scanner. The collection of 66 00:06:37,560 --> 00:06:42,865 biometric data is becoming really common in immigration enforcements. And it's not 67 00:06:42,865 --> 00:06:48,310 just when someone's taken into an immigration office but mobile fingerprint 68 00:06:48,310 --> 00:06:52,480 scanners are being taken into communities. There are stories of people having their 69 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:58,440 biometric data taken, even without arrest. Being stopped in the street or being near 70 00:06:58,440 --> 00:07:03,310 someone who's being detained for a particular reason. Everyone in the area or 71 00:07:03,310 --> 00:07:09,370 everyone in the household having their biometric data taken. We've also seen the 72 00:07:09,370 --> 00:07:13,370 removal of some restrictions on how this data can be shared between federal 73 00:07:13,370 --> 00:07:21,820 agencies. In particular President Trump has reinstated the Secure Communities 74 00:07:21,820 --> 00:07:27,230 Program which allows local police officers when they're booking people for local 75 00:07:27,230 --> 00:07:33,300 crimes or in local jails to take biometric data and cross-check it against federal 76 00:07:33,300 --> 00:07:47,220 immigration databases and crime databases. We're also seeing evidence that,... So 77 00:07:47,220 --> 00:07:50,530 DHS, is the Department of Homeland Security the umbrella organization over 78 00:07:50,530 --> 00:07:59,340 ICE. We have recently seen through a Freedom of Information request that this 79 00:07:59,340 --> 00:08:05,430 organization has used cell-site simulators or stingrays over 1,800 times in the last 80 00:08:05,430 --> 00:08:11,960 five years. We don't know all of the cases where these have been used. And we really 81 00:08:11,960 --> 00:08:16,650 can't speculate these cases are shrouded in secrecy and we don't know when and how 82 00:08:16,650 --> 00:08:20,620 they're being used. But we do have one case, it's actually close to my home in 83 00:08:20,620 --> 00:08:27,580 Detroit Michigan where an undocumented man, ICE was able to send a warrant to 84 00:08:27,580 --> 00:08:32,948 Facebook to get his phone number and then use that phone number with a cell site 85 00:08:32,948 --> 00:08:41,729 simulator to track him to his home and ended up deporting him to El Salvador. 86 00:08:41,729 --> 00:08:46,939 We're also seeing this move to start collecting social media data at the 87 00:08:46,939 --> 00:08:52,439 borders. This isn't just for people on temporary visas but also nationlised 88 00:08:52,439 --> 00:09:00,379 citizens and people with permanent residency cards. This might not be so 89 00:09:00,379 --> 00:09:03,790 relevant to people who are already in the country because they're not crossing the 90 00:09:03,790 --> 00:09:09,249 border regularly, but this might be impactful if they have friends and family 91 00:09:09,249 --> 00:09:14,660 crossing borders to visit them. And new immigrants as well. This is a database 92 00:09:14,660 --> 00:09:21,130 that we don't really know what it's being used for yet. But there are some hints in 93 00:09:21,130 --> 00:09:27,500 the way that, for example, ICE has been soliciting contracts from big data 94 00:09:27,500 --> 00:09:32,610 companies to create algorithms to do this extreme vetting to be able to find 95 00:09:32,610 --> 00:09:40,419 suspicious activity or suspicious people from troves of social media data. In fact 96 00:09:40,419 --> 00:09:44,519 we have already seen some of these contracts being awarded. There was a 3 97 00:09:44,519 --> 00:09:50,980 million contract recently given to a company called Giant Oak who claims to 98 00:09:50,980 --> 00:09:57,550 take big data and find bad guys. Their creepy slogans, "We see the people behind 99 00:09:57,550 --> 00:10:07,269 the data" 'trademark'. And this is just another example of the way that technology 100 00:10:07,269 --> 00:10:13,629 is being used to... in ways that are sort of unpredictable at this point but 101 00:10:13,629 --> 00:10:21,610 we have many examples where this style of research can often be 102 00:10:21,610 --> 00:10:29,660 discriminatory. And it might be expected that at this point in time technologies 103 00:10:29,660 --> 00:10:34,040 ending up integrated into law enforcement in the way that it's being integrated into 104 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:38,129 a lot of different parts of our lives. But there's a reason that this moment in 105 00:10:38,129 --> 00:10:44,240 particular is so frightening. This administration's making it abundantly 106 00:10:44,240 --> 00:10:50,139 clear what they think of immigration. Just in less than a year so far we've seen the 107 00:10:50,139 --> 00:10:54,470 repeal of the deferred action for Childhood Arrivals Program which you might 108 00:10:54,470 --> 00:11:00,839 also hear as the DREAM Act or people here talking about Dreamers. This is a program 109 00:11:00,839 --> 00:11:05,220 that allowed people who entered the country under the age of 16 to get work 110 00:11:05,220 --> 00:11:11,820 permits and driver licenses and attend university and have their immigration 111 00:11:11,820 --> 00:11:18,639 cases delayed so long as they're meeting educational goals. We've seen the 112 00:11:18,639 --> 00:11:27,869 elimination of privacy protections from sharing data between federal agencies. And 113 00:11:27,869 --> 00:11:31,790 in addition to the actual concrete policy changes, we're hearing a lot of really 114 00:11:31,790 --> 00:11:37,079 nasty rhetoric around immigrants and immigration. That's causing a lot of 115 00:11:37,079 --> 00:11:41,790 concern among people who are in the immigrant community or who are allies to 116 00:11:41,790 --> 00:11:46,790 the immigrant community about what this means in terms of harassment and hatred 117 00:11:46,790 --> 00:11:55,350 even beyond the the legal changes. We're also seeing a change in deportation 118 00:11:55,350 --> 00:12:04,990 practices while Obama was prolific in deportations. He had a very explicit 119 00:12:04,990 --> 00:12:10,429 policy in place that the priority deportations would be people who were 120 00:12:10,429 --> 00:12:14,089 national security threats whatever that might mean, or people with serious 121 00:12:14,089 --> 00:12:19,535 criminal records, or people who had just recently entered the United States. That 122 00:12:19,535 --> 00:12:23,209 policy is being removed and we're seeing more and more people who are deported 123 00:12:23,209 --> 00:12:31,350 after living in the United States for a long time with family and friends and 124 00:12:31,350 --> 00:12:36,199 lives built in the communities; who might have family or children who are US 125 00:12:36,199 --> 00:12:47,039 citizens who don't have criminal records. So what does this mean for Anna Maria? For 126 00:12:47,039 --> 00:12:51,269 one without a criminal record. She previously might have been able to have 127 00:12:51,269 --> 00:12:54,739 some high amount of confidence that she wouldn't be a priority target and that 128 00:12:54,739 --> 00:13:02,399 confidence is being eroded. We're seeing lots of people who previously 129 00:13:02,399 --> 00:13:10,709 wouldn't have been targeted be deported regardless of their clean record, and lack 130 00:13:10,709 --> 00:13:17,420 of action that really makes them more visible than they have been in the past. 131 00:13:17,420 --> 00:13:21,259 She and her husband are starting to think about, what happens to their children if 132 00:13:21,259 --> 00:13:25,119 they're deported. They have to make the decision because the children were born in 133 00:13:25,119 --> 00:13:29,949 the United States, they're US citizens. They have to decide whether they should 134 00:13:29,949 --> 00:13:33,939 give custody to friends and family who can stay in the United States, or if they 135 00:13:33,939 --> 00:13:38,430 should take them back to Mexico, rather than letting them stay and get the US 136 00:13:38,430 --> 00:13:44,000 education that they want to have. She has to be concerned about ICE being in her 137 00:13:44,000 --> 00:13:48,589 community and outside of her home. Possibly having her fingerprints taken if 138 00:13:48,589 --> 00:13:53,029 she's in the wrong place at the wrong time. She might have to worry about 139 00:13:53,029 --> 00:13:57,730 friends and family from Mexico visiting, and crossing the border, and having social 140 00:13:57,730 --> 00:14:04,249 media data taken from them. That, I mean, as we all know, might indicate a lot more 141 00:14:04,249 --> 00:14:10,649 than just about the person who's crossing the border. Our social media lives give a 142 00:14:10,649 --> 00:14:17,000 lot of information about her networks that might expose information about her. It's 143 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:20,459 also worth noting that Anna Maria is far from alone. There are as many as 11 144 00:14:20,459 --> 00:14:25,049 million undocumented immigrants in the United States today. Over 2/3 of them have 145 00:14:25,049 --> 00:14:29,000 been in the United States for more than 10 years which means they're integrated into 146 00:14:29,000 --> 00:14:35,059 our communities, they own houses, they have jobs, they pay taxes, they live 147 00:14:35,059 --> 00:14:40,410 really normal lives to the extent that they can in the United States. They've 148 00:14:40,410 --> 00:14:48,629 built their lives here. So with this context in mind, I and some of my 149 00:14:48,629 --> 00:14:53,809 collaborators were wondering, how this is really changing the way that people use 150 00:14:53,809 --> 00:15:00,629 technology? Or if it is, given the sort of objectively heightened risk that they're 151 00:15:00,629 --> 00:15:04,899 facing day to day. We wanted to know whether or not there's any sort of 152 00:15:04,899 --> 00:15:14,549 reaction to those changes happening in their daily lives. We reached out to some 153 00:15:14,549 --> 00:15:18,879 immigration support organizations, so immigrant rights and activist's 154 00:15:18,879 --> 00:15:25,820 organizations and worked with them to be able to communicate with this community. 155 00:15:25,820 --> 00:15:31,179 In the end, we were able to talk to 17 undocumented immigrants in the Midwest. We 156 00:15:31,179 --> 00:15:37,129 were primarily asking them about how they manage risk in their daily lives offline, 157 00:15:37,129 --> 00:15:42,529 as well as online. And whether or not that's changing over the last year or two 158 00:15:42,529 --> 00:15:46,499 years, when this discourse around immigration is really changing, and then 159 00:15:46,499 --> 00:15:53,980 whether these changes that we're seeing, are causing them to maybe react in the way 160 00:15:53,980 --> 00:16:00,570 that they're using technology. I can tell you a little bit about who we spoke to. 161 00:16:00,570 --> 00:16:07,039 The majority were women, 14 of our 17 participants were women. Most of them were 162 00:16:07,039 --> 00:16:12,809 in their mid 30s, average age 35. And lots of them had children. So it was a lot of 163 00:16:12,809 --> 00:16:17,470 parents. Everyone that we spoke to, had been in the United States for more than 10 164 00:16:17,470 --> 00:16:23,189 years. So they really had their lives and their communities here. And most of them 165 00:16:23,189 --> 00:16:26,999 were also from Mexico. That's about consistent with the immigrant community in 166 00:16:26,999 --> 00:16:33,684 the United States, especially from Latin America. The majority are from Mexico. And 167 00:16:33,684 --> 00:16:37,239 then there was a mix of immigration stories. Some of the people we spoke to 168 00:16:37,239 --> 00:16:43,209 had crossed the southern border by foot or otherwise. And some people had overstayed 169 00:16:43,209 --> 00:16:53,120 visas, had flown to the United States and stayed. So we wanted to first get an idea 170 00:16:53,120 --> 00:16:57,290 of how they're managing and sort of thinking about risk in their daily lives 171 00:16:57,290 --> 00:17:05,409 offline to get a sense of how deeply it impacts the way that they're living. What 172 00:17:05,409 --> 00:17:10,410 we found across the board is that immigration is a really sort of looming 173 00:17:10,410 --> 00:17:15,609 presence in their lives. They think a lot about how they're exposing themselves, and 174 00:17:15,609 --> 00:17:22,199 that possibly exposing their status to authority figures. And they put like a lot 175 00:17:22,199 --> 00:17:29,980 of careful consideration into how to keep a low profile. Driving is one really good 176 00:17:29,980 --> 00:17:37,950 example of this cost-risk cost-benefit analysis that they're doing. Most people 177 00:17:37,950 --> 00:17:40,809 we spoke to you talked about driving one way or another, and about half chose to 178 00:17:40,809 --> 00:17:47,210 drive and half chose not to. Most of the people don't have driver's licenses for 179 00:17:47,210 --> 00:17:51,510 the United States because it's difficult to get them without legal immigration 180 00:17:51,510 --> 00:17:57,940 papers. So the risk with driving is that if you're stopped, if you're pulled over, 181 00:17:57,940 --> 00:18:02,100 even if you didn't have a traffic violation, if you stop for a taillight or 182 00:18:02,100 --> 00:18:06,428 something. The routine is to ask for a documentation of your license. And if you 183 00:18:06,428 --> 00:18:09,149 don't have that there might be more questions, and in the end, you could 184 00:18:09,149 --> 00:18:17,179 expose yourself to immigration or other legal law enforcement. Some people really 185 00:18:17,179 --> 00:18:23,300 thought that the risk was worth it. To live their lives how they want to. They're 186 00:18:23,300 --> 00:18:26,679 going to try to just not think about the risk and do what they need to do day to 187 00:18:26,679 --> 00:18:33,269 day. Other people felt that the risk was too great and chose not to drive at all. 188 00:18:33,269 --> 00:18:36,600 And that's a significant sacrifice, especially in the United States where our 189 00:18:36,600 --> 00:18:40,950 public transportation systems aren't fantastic. This might mean that they can't 190 00:18:40,950 --> 00:18:44,121 set their own work schedules, or they can't take their kids to school if they 191 00:18:44,121 --> 00:18:49,750 miss the bus. So it's a significant risk. But it's also a big sacrifice if they 192 00:18:49,750 --> 00:18:56,769 choose not to drive. People also think a lot about how they're exposing themselves 193 00:18:56,769 --> 00:19:03,835 to authority figures. As one example, the decision to file taxes or not is a big 194 00:19:03,835 --> 00:19:09,980 risk. So in the United States, you don't need to have any sort of government ID to 195 00:19:09,980 --> 00:19:17,309 file taxes, you just need a tax ID. So a lot of these people are filing taxes. But 196 00:19:17,309 --> 00:19:21,769 in order to do that, they are giving up to the federal government their names, their 197 00:19:21,769 --> 00:19:27,410 addresses, their employment history, contact information. And some people think 198 00:19:27,410 --> 00:19:32,880 that that risk is worth it, right. Because this person for example feels like, by 199 00:19:32,880 --> 00:19:40,980 paying taxes every year they're able to establish a good history of upstanding 200 00:19:40,980 --> 00:19:45,389 behavior. They can maybe have a better case for getting a legal status if the 201 00:19:45,389 --> 00:19:56,950 time comes, when that's an option. And another example of, you know, exposing 202 00:19:56,950 --> 00:20:02,409 information to authorities, might be filing for benefits for US born children, 203 00:20:02,409 --> 00:20:09,019 or even library cards, or local ID cards. And the risk is going to be different in 204 00:20:09,019 --> 00:20:13,840 each case depending on what they're exposing. Some people chose to forego 205 00:20:13,840 --> 00:20:20,519 significant benefits to avoid giving that information to authorities. This person is 206 00:20:20,519 --> 00:20:25,997 talking about DACA, the deferred action for childhood arrival program. This would 207 00:20:25,997 --> 00:20:30,661 make it much easier for their son to go to college, give their son hopefully if they 208 00:20:30,661 --> 00:20:36,282 trust the program, a much more reliable immigration status. They wouldn't 209 00:20:36,282 --> 00:20:41,210 technically have a legal immigration status but they would be sort of assured 210 00:20:41,210 --> 00:20:45,882 that their status, or rather their immigration case is a low priority. They 211 00:20:45,882 --> 00:20:49,600 wouldn't be targeted. And as long as they're attending universities, they could 212 00:20:49,600 --> 00:20:56,180 have confidence. So the program says that they wouldn't be targeted. These people 213 00:20:56,180 --> 00:21:00,669 were concerned because in order to file that paperwork for their son, they had to 214 00:21:00,669 --> 00:21:03,564 give up a lot of information about themselves: their phone numbers, their 215 00:21:03,564 --> 00:21:09,780 names, their addresses. And in the end, they decided not to do it. And 216 00:21:09,780 --> 00:21:14,333 unfortunately, only weeks after we spoke to this person, the DACA program was 217 00:21:14,333 --> 00:21:19,240 repealed. This has led a lot of people to be concerned because the people who did 218 00:21:19,240 --> 00:21:23,130 apply for the program, have given that information to the government, to the 219 00:21:23,130 --> 00:21:27,889 Immigration services in particular. And at this point in time, we have no assurances 220 00:21:27,889 --> 00:21:32,930 that that information won't be used in immigration cases. At the moment, there's 221 00:21:32,930 --> 00:21:38,690 just a sort of FAQ page that says, we don't use this information now but we 222 00:21:38,690 --> 00:21:47,390 reserve the right to change that at any time without telling anyone. People are 223 00:21:47,390 --> 00:21:51,639 also really feeling the changes that are happening in the last couple of months. 224 00:21:51,639 --> 00:21:57,539 Well, it's been too many months, the last year and a half. They're feeling the 225 00:21:57,539 --> 00:22:02,691 pressure in their communities for immigration services being, or immigration 226 00:22:02,691 --> 00:22:09,679 enforcement being more present and less predictable. Of one person described 227 00:22:09,679 --> 00:22:13,399 feeling like, instead of coming to take a particular person, they're just coming and 228 00:22:13,399 --> 00:22:19,020 looking for anyone who might be undocumented. Many people that we spoke 229 00:22:19,020 --> 00:22:24,269 to, had negative experiences with ICE. Including,... if it weren't,... if they 230 00:22:24,269 --> 00:22:27,559 hadn't had to experience themselves, lots of people had friends and family who had 231 00:22:27,559 --> 00:22:32,669 negative experiences. And they're feeling this increase in presence of enforcement 232 00:22:32,669 --> 00:22:38,070 in their communities. And this is leading them to make significant changes to the 233 00:22:38,070 --> 00:22:43,080 way that they're living their lives. For example, one person we spoke to talked 234 00:22:43,080 --> 00:22:47,080 about how they won't leave their child at home alone anymore because they're worried 235 00:22:47,080 --> 00:22:51,559 that, while they're out, their child; if they're picked up while they're out, and 236 00:22:51,559 --> 00:22:56,220 the child's at home alone, they might be left there. Or ICE might even show up at 237 00:22:56,220 --> 00:22:58,963 the house while the child's there alone. They don't want either of those things to 238 00:22:58,963 --> 00:23:07,030 happen. So people are changing a lot of the ways that they live day to day. And 239 00:23:07,030 --> 00:23:12,690 this is a very present concern, in the way that they talk about their daily lives. So 240 00:23:12,690 --> 00:23:15,590 we were wondering if this is true when they think about the way that they use 241 00:23:15,590 --> 00:23:22,480 technology and what they're doing online. First, let me just give you an overview of 242 00:23:22,480 --> 00:23:27,270 what sort of technologies they primarily use. This community is really mobile 243 00:23:27,270 --> 00:23:31,889 heavy. Some people had computers in the home. A lot of people had access to 244 00:23:31,889 --> 00:23:35,380 computers through local libraries and things. But everyone had a smartphone and 245 00:23:35,380 --> 00:23:40,460 they were very dependent on it. Some people used email but when they spoke 246 00:23:40,460 --> 00:23:47,590 about email, it was mostly to do with communicating with their kids schools or 247 00:23:47,590 --> 00:23:51,350 doctor's appointments. It wasn't really a social thing. So the majority of what we 248 00:23:51,350 --> 00:23:57,080 spoke to people about, were social media tools. In particular, all but one of our 249 00:23:57,080 --> 00:24:03,429 participants were active users of Facebook. Most people were using WhatsApp 250 00:24:03,429 --> 00:24:09,520 and Facebook Messenger, as well. These are the three primary tools that people had 251 00:24:09,520 --> 00:24:16,120 the most to say about. There were some other tools that they were on: Instagram, 252 00:24:16,120 --> 00:24:23,070 Twitter, and Snapchat. But really, the overarching, sort of a sense that people 253 00:24:23,070 --> 00:24:26,289 had about these tools is that it's bringing significant benefits to their 254 00:24:26,289 --> 00:24:31,200 daily lives. Especially, when you think about this community being separated 255 00:24:31,200 --> 00:24:36,610 permanently from a lot of their friends and family back home, or their former 256 00:24:36,610 --> 00:24:42,500 home, their origin country. What they had to do before, maybe sending photos in the 257 00:24:42,500 --> 00:24:46,610 mail or through post cards, buying international calling cards, being able to 258 00:24:46,610 --> 00:24:50,779 call people with video chat now is a significant improvement to their ability 259 00:24:50,779 --> 00:24:56,450 to keep in touch with people back in Mexico or in wherever their... the origin 260 00:24:56,450 --> 00:25:02,990 country is. People also talked about, how it's improving their lives in other ways. 261 00:25:02,990 --> 00:25:06,750 For example, being able to organize their own work schedules, and have more control 262 00:25:06,750 --> 00:25:12,179 over the way that they're employed. The benefits go on and on, and it's a lot of 263 00:25:12,179 --> 00:25:15,429 the same things that we've experienced over the last decade, and the way that our 264 00:25:15,429 --> 00:25:21,440 lives have changed for the better. Because we're able to use these technologies. When 265 00:25:21,440 --> 00:25:26,162 we ask people about risk, the things that really pop into their heads first, are 266 00:25:26,162 --> 00:25:32,581 hackers. They're really concerned about fraud and identity theft. And they think a 267 00:25:32,581 --> 00:25:37,700 lot about their children contacting strangers on the internet, or accessing 268 00:25:37,700 --> 00:25:47,679 inappropriate content. But that's not to say that concerns related to their status, 269 00:25:47,679 --> 00:25:57,620 their illegal status were absent. They're just much less certain. You know, it's 270 00:25:57,620 --> 00:26:03,539 easy to think about the consequences of identity theft. That's sort of concrete. 271 00:26:03,539 --> 00:26:12,379 But a lot of these status related concerns were less concrete. People talked about 272 00:26:12,379 --> 00:26:17,399 harassment as well, being something that's increasing in the real world, as well as 273 00:26:17,399 --> 00:26:28,049 online. In particular participating in communities, or in conversations online 274 00:26:28,049 --> 00:26:33,639 that may be expose their immigration status. This harassment has moved online. 275 00:26:33,639 --> 00:26:38,620 They're experiencing it in the real world, as well, but they're hearing stories or 276 00:26:38,620 --> 00:26:42,039 having stories themselves about people threatening them with immigration 277 00:26:42,039 --> 00:26:54,049 enforcement. That's increasing over the last year or so. There are a couple of 278 00:26:54,049 --> 00:27:00,860 ways that people manage these risks. Primarily, what we found people really 279 00:27:00,860 --> 00:27:07,029 thought about, is their concrete steps to managing their privacy online were fairly 280 00:27:07,029 --> 00:27:11,671 basic things like, making sure that they only accept friends and family on 281 00:27:11,671 --> 00:27:19,580 Facebook. They might have set their profile to private. But they're really not 282 00:27:19,580 --> 00:27:24,159 fiddling with these more fine-grained privacy settings. They're not, you know, 283 00:27:24,159 --> 00:27:27,942 sharing particular posts only to particular people, or using that. They 284 00:27:27,942 --> 00:27:30,789 were talking about, they didn't tell us about using these, like private groups or 285 00:27:30,789 --> 00:27:40,419 anything like that to sort of create separate spheres of friends and family. 286 00:27:40,419 --> 00:27:45,179 And channel management, just in the sense that like, even though they think about 287 00:27:45,179 --> 00:27:49,309 curating this, like close network of friends and family, they're still really 288 00:27:49,309 --> 00:27:55,280 thoughtful about what they post in which channel. Whether like it's safe to put a 289 00:27:55,280 --> 00:27:59,159 photo, for example on their wall, or you know, in their timeline versus sending it 290 00:27:59,159 --> 00:28:07,210 directly to family. This person, for example, even after they post something 291 00:28:07,210 --> 00:28:13,710 publicly, publicly being, you know. within their Facebook wall, they'll still go back 292 00:28:13,710 --> 00:28:16,789 to a couple days later and just delete everything because they're not totally 293 00:28:16,789 --> 00:28:27,820 confident that that's private. Another really interesting thing is that in all of 294 00:28:27,820 --> 00:28:32,150 this, the conversations we had, no one really expressed the sense that they 295 00:28:32,150 --> 00:28:39,259 understood that they're really living on Facebook. The tools that they're using 296 00:28:39,259 --> 00:28:46,679 like almost exclusively, are all owned by the same company. No one also express any 297 00:28:46,679 --> 00:28:51,429 sort of sense that these companies are entities in themselves that might have 298 00:28:51,429 --> 00:28:56,950 interest in access to their data. Much less one that cooperates with law 299 00:28:56,950 --> 00:29:05,190 enforcement. That concern didn't appear in any of our conversations. They tend to 300 00:29:05,190 --> 00:29:09,789 think about these platforms as being sort of a medium to communicate with other 301 00:29:09,789 --> 00:29:17,340 people. You know, the way that they use it, is to talk to other individuals, or 302 00:29:17,340 --> 00:29:21,300 groups of individuals. But the platform doesn't seem to be like a repository for 303 00:29:21,300 --> 00:29:28,409 data. In fact, they are expressing significant trust in Facebook, Facebook in 304 00:29:28,409 --> 00:29:32,510 particular. A lot of people were grateful for the changes that Facebook's made over 305 00:29:32,510 --> 00:29:40,289 the last year or two, in terms of account management. So they're grateful that if 306 00:29:40,289 --> 00:29:44,169 there's a suspicious login attempt, they'll be able to stop it. That's helped 307 00:29:44,169 --> 00:29:48,659 a lot of people. And that sort of generates trust in these platforms. And 308 00:29:48,659 --> 00:30:01,370 the sense that Facebook really has their back. In addition to sort of managing the 309 00:30:01,370 --> 00:30:06,129 way that they're sharing information, we did see some people choosing to abstain 310 00:30:06,129 --> 00:30:12,049 from sharing. Especially, when it came to topics around immigration. Some people 311 00:30:12,049 --> 00:30:18,320 chose to not join, you know, public Facebook groups, or get information from 312 00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:22,040 certain places because they were afraid that by associating with these groups, 313 00:30:22,040 --> 00:30:32,529 they might indicate something publicly about their status. And that's frustrating 314 00:30:32,529 --> 00:30:35,080 for a lot of people who want to participate in these conversations, and 315 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:38,830 especially, because the discourse around immigration is so toxic in the United 316 00:30:38,830 --> 00:30:45,750 States. Some people express this feeling that they have to just sit there and take 317 00:30:45,750 --> 00:30:51,010 this discourse happening around them without participating, because they're 318 00:30:51,010 --> 00:30:57,019 worried about being targeted, or harassed, or maybe even like having physical 319 00:30:57,019 --> 00:31:00,529 consequences: being followed, or having immigration sent to their house if someone 320 00:31:00,529 --> 00:31:09,129 were to find them. Some people expressed the opposite, though, which is 321 00:31:09,129 --> 00:31:16,240 encouraging, right? Some people felt that, even though the risk is there, it's more 322 00:31:16,240 --> 00:31:20,399 important for them to share their thoughts than it is for them to be tiptoeing around 323 00:31:20,399 --> 00:31:27,929 immigration enforcement. This is also really interesting because this sort of 324 00:31:27,929 --> 00:31:34,289 exposes sometimes family tensions about these topics. This is a really, it's a 325 00:31:34,289 --> 00:31:37,720 mixed status community, meaning that sometimes parents will be undocumented and 326 00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:42,690 children will be US citizens. Or lots of people have friends and family who have a 327 00:31:42,690 --> 00:31:47,652 different legal status than they do. So risk is really distributed. You know, it's 328 00:31:47,652 --> 00:31:52,410 not just individual, it's within families and within communities. And there can be a 329 00:31:52,410 --> 00:31:57,049 lot of tension between, you know, children and parents, or friends, you know, 330 00:31:57,049 --> 00:32:01,210 siblings, about how they share information on these platforms. Some people are much 331 00:32:01,210 --> 00:32:09,889 more conservative with what they share. And this quote also reveals something else 332 00:32:09,889 --> 00:32:17,340 kind of interesting. When we talk to people about concerns about immigration, 333 00:32:17,340 --> 00:32:21,679 it's very rarely that they talk about whether immigration will be able to 334 00:32:21,679 --> 00:32:27,980 investigate them, as much as it is about when, which is this final point that 335 00:32:27,980 --> 00:32:33,809 there's really this sense of resignation in the community about what information 336 00:32:33,809 --> 00:32:43,919 immigration enforcement has about them. Lots of people feel like, it doesn't 337 00:32:43,919 --> 00:32:50,600 really matter what they do. Immigration can know where they are and what they're 338 00:32:50,600 --> 00:32:55,230 doing. They can find them if they just decide to. It's just a matter of whether 339 00:32:55,230 --> 00:32:59,269 immigration enforcement is going to choose to come after them, rather than whether 340 00:32:59,269 --> 00:33:08,670 they can. This is also true with the way that they think about technology. They 341 00:33:08,670 --> 00:33:15,639 have a sense that there's really no privacy. If immigration decided to, they 342 00:33:15,639 --> 00:33:20,389 would be able to see the messages on Facebook, they could see what was 343 00:33:20,389 --> 00:33:25,559 physically on their phones, that they have this sort of all-powerful, you know, 344 00:33:25,559 --> 00:33:31,539 toolkit to access their digital information. And honestly, this story in 345 00:33:31,539 --> 00:33:39,178 particular, this sense of surveillance comes from experience often. This person 346 00:33:39,178 --> 00:33:44,190 had a really negative experience with ICE, you know, coming and talking to her 347 00:33:44,190 --> 00:33:49,309 family. And ICE knowing things that they hadn't told anyone. Somehow ICE had known 348 00:33:49,309 --> 00:33:53,110 things that they were keeping very private. And so there's this assumption 349 00:33:53,110 --> 00:33:56,570 that, well, it's happened to me before, I've seen it happen to my friends, they 350 00:33:56,570 --> 00:34:08,139 probably could know anything they want to. But it's not all negative, it's not all 351 00:34:08,139 --> 00:34:14,000 resignation. Another thing that we saw, many people, not everyone, but maybe half 352 00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:16,389 of the people we spoke to, had this really strong sense that there was this 353 00:34:16,389 --> 00:34:21,230 responsibility to share things in the community to help each other. There's this 354 00:34:21,230 --> 00:34:29,290 growing sense of community identity. And this might mean sharing information about 355 00:34:29,290 --> 00:34:34,650 resources for the immigrant community or sharing information about workshops, or 356 00:34:34,650 --> 00:34:41,440 events, vigils, but also information about immigration enforcement. If ICE is in a 357 00:34:41,440 --> 00:34:45,800 particular community, they might tell their friends and family, avoid this area 358 00:34:45,800 --> 00:34:50,440 until further notice. They're helping each other, they're sending information. So, it 359 00:34:50,440 --> 00:34:54,210 can't be total resignation. There's still this sort of beam of hope that they're 360 00:34:54,210 --> 00:34:57,600 helping each other. And they must have hope that they can do something because 361 00:34:57,600 --> 00:35:03,260 they are. And this has been something that has become faster and easier with 362 00:35:03,260 --> 00:35:08,680 technology, too, right? It's much easier to send a message than it is to call, or 363 00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:17,270 to spread information before we had, you know, smartphones. But all of this really 364 00:35:17,270 --> 00:35:20,650 leads to the question: Considering how much they inconvenience themselves in 365 00:35:20,650 --> 00:35:25,200 their daily lives offline, why are they doing comparatively little online to 366 00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:32,700 change their practices, or to reduce their visibility? I don't think it's enough 367 00:35:32,700 --> 00:35:38,510 that, although lots of people expressed this sense that they're like relatively 368 00:35:38,510 --> 00:35:46,370 low-tech literate. That in and of itself isn't really enough of an explanation, 369 00:35:46,370 --> 00:35:50,490 right? There are so many different factors into the way that they're making these 370 00:35:50,490 --> 00:35:55,600 decisions, and they're thinking carefully about the decisions they do make. So we 371 00:35:55,600 --> 00:36:00,660 have some thoughts on this. It really can't be understated how much of a benefit 372 00:36:00,660 --> 00:36:05,540 technology is to this community. It's making a significant difference in the way 373 00:36:05,540 --> 00:36:14,869 that they live their lives. So the choice to abstain is not trivial. The risk that 374 00:36:14,869 --> 00:36:19,080 they're facing by using like Facebook, by putting phone numbers on Facebook, or 375 00:36:19,080 --> 00:36:23,760 sharing photos of their family and friends, and like, building these online 376 00:36:23,760 --> 00:36:29,650 networks, is, really the risk involved in that is uncertain, right? At this point we 377 00:36:29,650 --> 00:36:34,580 have really sparse data about direct connections between the use of technology, 378 00:36:34,580 --> 00:36:39,670 or the use of social media and immigration enforcement, and consequences. Maybe that 379 00:36:39,670 --> 00:36:43,640 will change, but at this point it's unclear which changes might be actually 380 00:36:43,640 --> 00:36:48,860 beneficial, right? Because there's not a direct connection between using this tool, 381 00:36:48,860 --> 00:36:55,500 putting this information online, and immigration enforcement showing up. 382 00:36:55,500 --> 00:37:00,770 There's also the significant trust in the platforms that they're using and their 383 00:37:00,770 --> 00:37:08,080 peers are using as well and there just tends to be less critical thought about 384 00:37:08,080 --> 00:37:13,620 the safety of using platforms when there's already this component of trust. Facebook 385 00:37:13,620 --> 00:37:18,830 has done a lot for account security for example over the last couple of years and 386 00:37:18,830 --> 00:37:25,470 has built trust in this community. And as well as having you know all of your 387 00:37:25,470 --> 00:37:30,470 community on a tool when they're all there together there's like less of a, less 388 00:37:30,470 --> 00:37:36,930 critical thought about whether they're it's safe to be there. And there is this 389 00:37:36,930 --> 00:37:41,730 component of resignation when we've sort of pushed people to think really 390 00:37:41,730 --> 00:37:46,900 explicitly about the risk with immigration enforcement, being in sharing information 391 00:37:46,900 --> 00:37:53,840 on social media using technology there was the sense that if they wanted to - they 392 00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:57,130 could have the information, I mean, they already have it in a lot of ways when 393 00:37:57,130 --> 00:38:04,160 they're filing taxes or just you know it's accessible to authorities is the general 394 00:38:04,160 --> 00:38:08,970 sense of regardless of what they do online. So this kind of in combination 395 00:38:08,970 --> 00:38:13,850 with the uncertain risk it makes it really hard to make concrete steps towards 396 00:38:13,850 --> 00:38:25,060 changes that might be helpful. So finally, I just wanted to share a couple of things 397 00:38:25,060 --> 00:38:34,390 that I learned especially as a digital security trainer and doing this study. 398 00:38:34,390 --> 00:38:41,970 Most importantly everyone that we spoke to was really excited to learn. That's just 399 00:38:41,970 --> 00:38:47,100 general like tech literacy but also security and privacy. People really care 400 00:38:47,100 --> 00:38:52,310 and they're excited. And everyone expressed gratitude that we were talking 401 00:38:52,310 --> 00:39:00,340 to them about this topic. They care a lot. But so what was difficult for me having a 402 00:39:00,340 --> 00:39:06,570 background in trainings was still being surprised by things that in these 403 00:39:06,570 --> 00:39:12,670 conversations that thinking I knew what they wanted or what they needed and that 404 00:39:12,670 --> 00:39:17,400 not being the case. So one thing I would say is you know don't assume that you know 405 00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:22,770 what's best for them or even what they want or need. Go and talk to people 406 00:39:22,770 --> 00:39:27,020 they're really you'll learn a lot from talking to people about what they think 407 00:39:27,020 --> 00:39:32,870 their risk is versus what they're doing. For example something that I was surprised 408 00:39:32,870 --> 00:39:37,180 to learn is that they're really not using online resources when they have concerns 409 00:39:37,180 --> 00:39:42,240 about online privacy. They're talking to their kids and they're talking to their 410 00:39:42,240 --> 00:39:47,570 neighbors and their friends. So for this community in particular it would be really 411 00:39:47,570 --> 00:39:53,170 much more effective to go into an in- person training. A training in Spanish in 412 00:39:53,170 --> 00:39:59,070 this case. In the language that they're naturally speaking and have like in-person 413 00:39:59,070 --> 00:40:05,180 resources that will get you much further than you know compiling lists of ideas or 414 00:40:05,180 --> 00:40:14,660 tools or strategies, that'll probably never be accessed. And as a vehicle to do 415 00:40:14,660 --> 00:40:18,090 this, when we had a really positive experience working with support 416 00:40:18,090 --> 00:40:23,720 organizations, on the front end that allowed us to build trust with the 417 00:40:23,720 --> 00:40:28,050 community, so by working with people who they already trusted and who already knew 418 00:40:28,050 --> 00:40:33,140 them well I really think we were able to talk to people much more openly and much... 419 00:40:33,140 --> 00:40:37,200 with much more trust than they would have otherwise. Whether they would have spoken 420 00:40:37,200 --> 00:40:43,370 to us at all is a question. They also were a great resource for us as we were 421 00:40:43,370 --> 00:40:50,290 developing interview materials and also like training materials afterwards when we 422 00:40:50,290 --> 00:41:00,020 went back to communities and conducted digital trainings. They helped us develop, 423 00:41:00,020 --> 00:41:05,700 you know, culturally sensitive language and we were able to just ask, you know, is 424 00:41:05,700 --> 00:41:10,370 this location is this style of presentation, is this length, is this time 425 00:41:10,370 --> 00:41:14,290 what should we do you know they were a resource to us to make sure that the 426 00:41:14,290 --> 00:41:16,900 things that we were developing were most accessible to the people that we're 427 00:41:16,900 --> 00:41:25,260 talking to. And, they also themselves from what I've seen have a lot of questions 428 00:41:25,260 --> 00:41:30,180 about the way that they're using technology. That's a great place to go and 429 00:41:30,180 --> 00:41:35,950 talk to people about, you know, organizational practices. And you might 430 00:41:35,950 --> 00:41:38,700 find that it's a lot easier to get people to change their practices if they're in 431 00:41:38,700 --> 00:41:42,580 sort of an organizational setting where there's peer pressure or maybe some 432 00:41:42,580 --> 00:41:48,950 hierarchy of people who are really encouraging them to use more secure tools 433 00:41:48,950 --> 00:41:53,670 or to think carefully about data they're collecting about people that they 434 00:41:53,670 --> 00:41:59,490 contact. So working with these organizations also might be an opportunity 435 00:41:59,490 --> 00:42:05,440 to do trainings with activists and with lawyers and with other people who are 436 00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:18,410 working alongside this community. Finally, which is always a difficult thing to hear 437 00:42:18,410 --> 00:42:24,230 as a trainer, the people we spoke to probably aren't going to be adopting new 438 00:42:24,230 --> 00:42:32,130 tools for one it might not be safe, it's hard to make that calculus right, but a 439 00:42:32,130 --> 00:42:38,390 tool that's specifically designed for a community at risk or in order to do a 440 00:42:38,390 --> 00:42:42,570 particular function that would be of interest to, for example, the undocumented 441 00:42:42,570 --> 00:42:45,800 community or some other vulnerable community might increase visibility 442 00:42:45,800 --> 00:42:50,230 depending on the threat model. If they're found with a particular app or if the app 443 00:42:50,230 --> 00:42:57,670 is like exposing number of users or location of users, for example. And it's 444 00:42:57,670 --> 00:43:00,790 not to say that we should stop developing new tools we should always think about 445 00:43:00,790 --> 00:43:06,840 ways to make better and safer and more private resources. But it's worth thinking 446 00:43:06,840 --> 00:43:10,780 especially if you're going to be working with communities or building resources for 447 00:43:10,780 --> 00:43:15,560 communities that we should think also about how to make sure that they're using 448 00:43:15,560 --> 00:43:21,040 the tools they are already used more effectively and more safely. That might 449 00:43:21,040 --> 00:43:24,840 mean sitting down with someone for a while and going to their privacy settings on 450 00:43:24,840 --> 00:43:30,200 Facebook or, you know, making sure that their settings on Whatsapp, make don't 451 00:43:30,200 --> 00:43:38,450 back up data to the cloud or expose phone numbers to people they don't know. But 452 00:43:38,450 --> 00:43:48,750 there's a lot to do in both of these directions. And especially if you're going 453 00:43:48,750 --> 00:43:53,960 to be moving into working with these communities, this is something to keep in 454 00:43:53,960 --> 00:44:04,920 mind, that I thought was especially poignant. For that I can take questions. 455 00:44:04,920 --> 00:44:16,890 *applause* Herald angel (H): So we have four 456 00:44:16,890 --> 00:44:21,930 microphones in this room. I see one is already occupied with somebody. May I 457 00:44:21,930 --> 00:44:25,290 remind you that a question is typically one to two sentence and ends with a 458 00:44:25,290 --> 00:44:30,640 question mark. And with that I will take microphone 4. 459 00:44:30,640 --> 00:44:36,800 Mic4: Hi, thanks! You mentioned that these communities are reluctant to adopt new 460 00:44:36,800 --> 00:44:41,500 tools. Were there any exceptions to that or were there any like attributes of new 461 00:44:41,500 --> 00:44:45,830 tools that you think they would be more likely to adopt? 462 00:44:45,830 --> 00:44:52,560 Allison: Yeah that's a good question! I I've been thinking about this. I would say 463 00:44:52,560 --> 00:44:57,200 that this is absolutely true what I said about reluctance to adopt new tools when 464 00:44:57,200 --> 00:45:00,660 it's when we're talking about social media. So it's difficult to like move 465 00:45:00,660 --> 00:45:05,330 people to Signal for example from Whatsapp or Facebook Messenger because the people 466 00:45:05,330 --> 00:45:08,890 they talk to are already on these tools and it's not just moving one person but 467 00:45:08,890 --> 00:45:16,680 like a community. If we start to think about tools that might be special-purpose 468 00:45:16,680 --> 00:45:21,180 we didn't talk to anyone who mentioned this app but I know in the past there have 469 00:45:21,180 --> 00:45:26,410 been discussions about ways being used it's like a crowd-sourced map system being 470 00:45:26,410 --> 00:45:33,680 used to like track law enforcement. Like I said we didn't talk to anyone who used 471 00:45:33,680 --> 00:45:40,020 that app but possibly if there's like a specific utility in it there could be some 472 00:45:40,020 --> 00:45:46,630 critical mass of people who spread the word in a smaller community. Yeah it's 473 00:45:46,630 --> 00:45:50,440 something to think about. I don't think it's impossible but I would say it would 474 00:45:50,440 --> 00:45:55,880 be challenging. H: I assume that the baby doesn't want to 475 00:45:55,880 --> 00:46:00,852 speak on microphone 1 so I'm gonna go to a microphone 3. 476 00:46:00,852 --> 00:46:03,410 Mic3: I have two questions is that okay? Allison: Yeah. 477 00:46:03,410 --> 00:46:07,780 Mic3: Thank you. The first one is kind of a nitty-gritty academic question and that 478 00:46:07,780 --> 00:46:12,100 is: can you tell us anything about your IRB approval process, what you're doing to 479 00:46:12,100 --> 00:46:16,360 protect subjects data? Because this is very sensitive and I'm curious how you've 480 00:46:16,360 --> 00:46:19,360 approached that. Allison: Yeah absolutely. So we didn't 481 00:46:19,360 --> 00:46:28,310 have IRB approval before we spoke to anyone. We actually got an exemption for 482 00:46:28,310 --> 00:46:32,940 collecting data about participants. So we compensated for each interview that we 483 00:46:32,940 --> 00:46:42,170 did, we gave participants $20. We were not required to collect any proof of payment 484 00:46:42,170 --> 00:46:48,600 we recorded the interviews and encrypted them locally. They were translated by 485 00:46:48,600 --> 00:46:55,330 people in our research group and then transcribed with all identifying location 486 00:46:55,330 --> 00:47:01,950 and name data redacted. And, that those were all stored encrypted on our personal 487 00:47:01,950 --> 00:47:07,660 drives and then in a University Drive. All the data has been deleted now all of the 488 00:47:07,660 --> 00:47:12,538 original data as well. Mic3: Awesome! Thanks. The other one is a 489 00:47:12,538 --> 00:47:17,050 big picture scatterbrain question: which is about how this is a technological 490 00:47:17,050 --> 00:47:23,830 solution to a political problem. Do you feel that directing or helping immigrants 491 00:47:23,830 --> 00:47:29,400 understand how to protect themselves technologically, is the answer or 492 00:47:29,400 --> 00:47:34,090 necessarily part of the answer or do you feel like maybe eventually our community 493 00:47:34,090 --> 00:47:37,520 needs to be helping people exit places like the U.S. that are increasingly 494 00:47:37,520 --> 00:47:43,384 hostile to immigrants? Allison: That's a good question. I don't 495 00:47:43,384 --> 00:47:49,630 think that helping people be more safe online is really a solution. I mean the 496 00:47:49,630 --> 00:47:55,061 solutions gonna be in policy and in law. I think this is a utility really in the 497 00:47:55,061 --> 00:47:58,660 short term is like making sure people feel safe and like have more control over 498 00:47:58,660 --> 00:48:03,440 disclosure to the extent that they can. But I don't think that's going to,... I 499 00:48:03,440 --> 00:48:09,070 don't think that's a winning, you know, single pronged battle. As for leaving the 500 00:48:09,070 --> 00:48:14,080 United States that's kind of a funny question considering how much people have 501 00:48:14,080 --> 00:48:17,850 sacrificed to come to the U.S. and especially having integrated into 502 00:48:17,850 --> 00:48:23,000 communities already. A lot of the people I spoke about today were long-term residents 503 00:48:23,000 --> 00:48:26,190 I mean everyone was a long-term resident. So they've sort of built their lives in 504 00:48:26,190 --> 00:48:29,600 the U.S. But there has been a significant decrease in the number of people 505 00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:35,260 immigrating to the U.S. without authorization that's thanks to Obama era 506 00:48:35,260 --> 00:48:41,110 policies of like, you know, return immediately at the border so whether 507 00:48:41,110 --> 00:48:44,560 people are now moving to other countries is a good question and whether we should 508 00:48:44,560 --> 00:48:48,480 encourage that is... I don't know, interesting. 509 00:48:48,480 --> 00:48:54,543 Mic3: Thank you H: Microphone 2. 510 00:48:54,543 --> 00:49:02,100 Mic2: Hi, so I have a questions: Are there any initiatives to help the people in a 511 00:49:02,100 --> 00:49:11,910 way that so,.. The fact that they don't... they feel that they are less risk online 512 00:49:11,910 --> 00:49:16,650 and they don't perceive the risk as much and do you feel that helping them 513 00:49:16,650 --> 00:49:21,270 understanding those risk and maybe trying to be more secure online will actually 514 00:49:21,270 --> 00:49:27,160 help them or is there a resignation towards the government accurate? 515 00:49:27,160 --> 00:49:41,970 Allison: If you're thinking about specific people I think,... Maybe when individual's 516 00:49:41,970 --> 00:49:47,470 information is going to be accessible in the long run if immigration enforcement 517 00:49:47,470 --> 00:49:51,940 really chooses to maybe that sense of resignation to some extent is accurate but 518 00:49:51,940 --> 00:49:58,220 lots of people aren't necessarily on the radar. And I think what's most beneficial 519 00:49:58,220 --> 00:50:03,590 about helping people understand how to use technology more effectively and like 520 00:50:03,590 --> 00:50:08,960 that's really just increasing confidence. It's this uncertainty and like choosing to 521 00:50:08,960 --> 00:50:11,560 abstain from participating in conversations because they just don't 522 00:50:11,560 --> 00:50:15,211 trust that they can be secure, like private enough. You know or that their 523 00:50:15,211 --> 00:50:18,860 personal information, their home addresses that they they're still at risk of this 524 00:50:18,860 --> 00:50:23,660 harassment like that's... That lack of confidence and privacy is really what I 525 00:50:23,660 --> 00:50:40,210 think can be helped and... Sorry I had another point. Yeah, but if it's worthwhile 526 00:50:40,210 --> 00:50:44,230 you know thinking about how you can contribute to helping. I mean even 527 00:50:44,230 --> 00:50:50,980 outside of like privacy work, a lot of people really just are eager to learn more 528 00:50:50,980 --> 00:50:58,880 about how to use technology like to help their lives. Right, so the other thing I 529 00:50:58,880 --> 00:51:04,150 was going to say was, we also put significant thought into whether or not, 530 00:51:04,150 --> 00:51:06,880 you know, how to have these conversations with people and like how to ask questions 531 00:51:06,880 --> 00:51:12,960 about, you know, the risks online without really freaking them out. Because we 532 00:51:12,960 --> 00:51:15,930 didn't really have solutions. It's not like at the end of an interview we could 533 00:51:15,930 --> 00:51:20,560 say like well we have a solution for you just install this app and you'll be safe. 534 00:51:20,560 --> 00:51:25,390 So, it's sort of this balance between making sure that people still, you know, 535 00:51:25,390 --> 00:51:30,600 use tools in the way that's so helpful for their lives. Right like we don't want them 536 00:51:30,600 --> 00:51:33,920 to stop using Facebook if it means that they stop talking to their parents back in 537 00:51:33,920 --> 00:51:37,640 Mexico. We don't want them to stop using email if it means that they can't talk to 538 00:51:37,640 --> 00:51:42,730 their kid's teachers anymore. So it's this balance between like being aware of the 539 00:51:42,730 --> 00:51:45,900 risk and being confident that you're doing as much as you can while not choosing to 540 00:51:45,900 --> 00:51:50,060 abstain. H: So I'm hiding here in the corner 541 00:51:50,060 --> 00:51:53,630 because I'm trying to see whether somebody's at number four? There's 542 00:51:53,630 --> 00:51:58,890 somebody there yes. So Mic4 please. Mic4: Thanks. Hi, so I was wondering since 543 00:51:58,890 --> 00:52:04,810 Facebook is the most popular tool that they use and they probably won't change 544 00:52:04,810 --> 00:52:10,760 it, did you find anything that the people at Facebook could do to help undocumented 545 00:52:10,760 --> 00:52:15,020 immigrants more? Allison: Yeah, I think the things that 546 00:52:15,020 --> 00:52:18,570 Facebook can think about are really generalizable to a lot of vulnerable 547 00:52:18,570 --> 00:52:25,131 communities. People, there were a few things in particular that some people are 548 00:52:25,131 --> 00:52:31,180 really uncomfortable with, for example, Whatsapp if you're added to like a group 549 00:52:31,180 --> 00:52:35,620 of people your phone number is exposed to everyone else in the group, without your 550 00:52:35,620 --> 00:52:39,730 consent and that might be the case with like group SMS and things. But like, the 551 00:52:39,730 --> 00:52:44,250 fact that Whatsup even uses a phone number is kind of something that we should 552 00:52:44,250 --> 00:52:50,650 migrate out of, right. Facebook collecting phone numbers and collecting, you know, 553 00:52:50,650 --> 00:52:59,330 location data regardless of how easy it is to opt in and out. And so, this is 554 00:52:59,330 --> 00:53:05,680 primarily an academic work that's going to appear at the HCI, a human-computer 555 00:53:05,680 --> 00:53:11,140 interaction conference, and we talk a lot in the paper about what these bigger 556 00:53:11,140 --> 00:53:18,990 services can do. And really like we as a community can advocate for Facebook 557 00:53:18,990 --> 00:53:23,240 resisting cooperating with law enforcement right. I mean it shouldn't really matter 558 00:53:23,240 --> 00:53:28,380 to Facebook where you live or or how you got there. They're a social media platform 559 00:53:28,380 --> 00:53:33,750 they shouldn't be, you know, helping immigration move people around physical 560 00:53:33,750 --> 00:53:42,060 borders. They should be totally you know border agnostic. So advocating for that 561 00:53:42,060 --> 00:53:49,790 kind of attitude shift would be helpful H: Microphone 2 562 00:53:49,790 --> 00:53:54,290 Mic2: So thank you for the very interesting talk. And I have a question 563 00:53:54,290 --> 00:54:00,410 that sort of picks up on the previous one. And because it's, you talk about it 564 00:54:00,410 --> 00:54:06,230 Facebook has become such an important sort of a political actor in this arena. I'm 565 00:54:06,230 --> 00:54:10,440 wondering if you've been following up on that as a survey research problem like 566 00:54:10,440 --> 00:54:15,220 what's, what is there, what is it that they are doing and is this something 567 00:54:15,220 --> 00:54:23,190 that's happening unwittingly or is there something about the general strategy of 568 00:54:23,190 --> 00:54:29,380 Facebook that surf helps create this kind of trust. And I'm also wondering, going, 569 00:54:29,380 --> 00:54:35,870 taking that question further, sorry it's more than a sentence that, 570 00:54:35,870 --> 00:54:40,220 if you've been thinking about is if you see anything sort of suddenly eroding that 571 00:54:40,220 --> 00:54:45,030 trust in the future, and I'm specifically thinking about this now, this question 572 00:54:45,030 --> 00:54:52,880 about how it was possible for all this Russian money to go into Facebook 573 00:54:52,880 --> 00:54:59,910 advertisements and that served, that's kind of point in the direction of pressure 574 00:54:59,910 --> 00:55:08,350 for Facebook to be less serve general in their trust and picking up on certain, on 575 00:55:08,350 --> 00:55:15,650 specific political issues which could also be immigration and disclosing some 576 00:55:15,650 --> 00:55:21,340 information that they already have? A: Your question about whether there could 577 00:55:21,340 --> 00:55:26,640 be a shift in trust in the future if something could trigger that. The example 578 00:55:26,640 --> 00:55:31,030 in Detroit right where law enforcement was able to get a phone number from Facebook 579 00:55:31,030 --> 00:55:36,530 with a warrant and then track the person with this phone number. If there are more 580 00:55:36,530 --> 00:55:41,780 and more cases of social media data being used in immigration cases and there's 581 00:55:41,780 --> 00:55:48,370 evidence to think that that might happen. It's possible that narrative might 582 00:55:48,370 --> 00:55:52,430 overtake this sense that people have right now that Facebook's looking out for them 583 00:55:52,430 --> 00:56:00,750 by keeping their account, you know, there's that letting them control it. In 584 00:56:00,750 --> 00:56:08,070 terms of Facebook picking up immigration as a sort of an activist or a political 585 00:56:08,070 --> 00:56:15,200 topic that they're interested in, I would now hold my breath on that one, but we'll 586 00:56:15,200 --> 00:56:19,350 see. Yeah. H: So we have time for exactly one more 587 00:56:19,350 --> 00:56:26,160 question and that is on Mic 1. Mic1: Hi, did you collect any information 588 00:56:26,160 --> 00:56:32,260 or study anything about how these people were using financial services and such 589 00:56:32,260 --> 00:56:36,720 things like online payments? Did they have bank accounts, were they concerned about 590 00:56:36,720 --> 00:56:44,920 their financial privacy? A: Yeah, actually people, the concerns 591 00:56:44,920 --> 00:56:49,050 they have with privacy and in terms of the way that they were using like online 592 00:56:49,050 --> 00:56:53,540 banking because people were I mean using credit cards and online banking and paying 593 00:56:53,540 --> 00:56:59,050 rent, you know, or utilities online. They didn't talk about privacy much in that 594 00:56:59,050 --> 00:57:03,110 context except that they have this concern about their financial information being 595 00:57:03,110 --> 00:57:07,700 stolen by hackers. Right, like the concern is for other people rather than the 596 00:57:07,700 --> 00:57:15,930 entities that are providing these services. And I think a lot of the concern 597 00:57:15,930 --> 00:57:19,370 there is coming from the fact that they have a lot to lose and very few legal 598 00:57:19,370 --> 00:57:27,350 protections should something bad happened to them. But, yeah, so just generally like 599 00:57:27,350 --> 00:57:32,690 people were using online banking and had bank accounts and were using these online 600 00:57:32,690 --> 00:57:36,280 financials services. Some people were opting out but it wasn't due to privacy 601 00:57:36,280 --> 00:57:39,710 concerns it was because they were worried about using their credit card on the 602 00:57:39,710 --> 00:57:45,240 Internet. H: So with that I'd like you to help me to 603 00:57:45,240 --> 00:57:47,844 thank our speaker Allison for this wonderful talk. 604 00:57:47,844 --> 00:57:53,545 *Applause* 605 00:57:53,545 --> 00:58:03,257 *34C3 postroll music* 606 00:58:03,257 --> 00:58:15,000 subtitles created by c3subtitles.de in the year 2020. Join, and help us!