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Now we have Mandy here from
Port put Essen, and he's going
to show us how we can hide
our data when we really need
to hide.
So have fun with bandy.
Hi, I'm speaking
about my project and panic.
It's about nine months old now.
And you know,
I tell you what I'm
speaking about today.
I'm speaking about a very old problem,
how this project tries to solve this
problem in some way.
And in a crash course about not
this encryption system in
Linux and
Pumpernickel in Texas looks
how it might help you in some
situations that can't help you.
And also a lifetime or how
to configure it and
destroy a
we
saw this problem is
us being the security
hole.
You might know this scarcity comic,
which shows exactly this,
but the question here is how do
we get out of this situation
for Linux?
I had some ideas
getting out of it, some great
unknown and wouldn't.
Maybe you should know Pam
is the authentication
module thing which asks
for your username and password.
And yeah, I
put my my
little project in there to
fact with links
with the authentication things.
So how do we get out of it?
We should make some assumptions
about the environment, and
we have to live in the constitutional
states because
then we have the ability
to deny things
because this project is if
it builds on the vulnerability.
Also, you should encrypt
your system if you use a bunch of,
for example, you just
take the encrypt
system, tick the box
for system encryption and you've got to
look in
your pathetic offers
to set two passwords and
all it not to end
or to zip it informative
devices as it's
in the USB dongle or SD cards,
if you wish.
And those are used as authentication
and yeah, Christmas is way too
cute and they can read and
one that's for authentication, though
the other one is to destroy
the key slots in looks.
What is a key slot in looks?
I met this
nice thing, and
we've got the big master key.
It's the big one,
and we've
got the lots of the rainbow
colored things you
weave.
And yeah, those
are used, those
key slots for the
user. So the user uses
its key, maybe
a person, maybe it's something else.
If you're at once, you know how to
configure it.
This used to unlock
the encrypted master key, which
is then used to decrypt
the locks container.
Yeah, that's how it works.
So this is how it looks
or looks looks like on the hard
drive.
We've got the petition header
here,
and there is some information
about how the market
is what what
moats are used for the master
key.
So far, most appealing and some other
stuff, and also some
key Microsoft information.
There's the the the
the the
the keys for the user and
they say how to keep the master
key also.
And
also, we've got the key because
that's what I said.
The user slots.
And you can have two eight,
as I said, and we've got the bug data
that is the
yeah, the
the
container with all those
encrypted stuff the system is in.
And yeah, that's
that's that's how it works.
So.
When we have one to look out
the back, does Pumpernickel
execute crypts that have not erase
which I looked up in
the source code? It actually
put some.
It makes some random data
and makes it makes it makes sure that is
not that you can't
get those keys back.
And that's a good
thing, and that's what the company is
using.
And yeah, if you want
to be sure that you can and
can pick up those things, you shouldn't
make a looks, heather, because maybe
it's about two megabytes of
of data
and doesn't fit on the floppy disk.
But
yeah, what
might help
me? I'm quoting the
fetta from from earlier talk
and where the police tried
to stress the rate at once,
saying Give up the password
of your encrypted
system or, yeah,
the forensics will get it anyway.
So we'll give it
a nice try.
Also being the forced being
forced to Typekit tell your password like
on borders have never been to the
U.S., but that's
common practice that
won't help if
caput attacks people
making your device
without any electricity and
put some of freezing
stuff in there.
And have you know the attack?
I guess, and
that's the part of the
of my
presentation. I will not
make the
lieutenant.
That.
My password is a stiff, so,
you know.
Well, I've installed panic
wire and the event of pay
on.
You've got the fancy logo, which is not
that fancy.
And I've got this
configuration program using
this menu and
configure the dialog, and
so you have the ability to
use a media device or password.
And I will do media devices because
to show you
how the media device things work,
I fix it a few days ago
because it didn't work after
another fix, I did.
So, yeah, and
so I've got to
write it.
Asleep,
so I've got this in the
configuration Cashner
put in the panic device I've
thought I've got, here's the device for
authentication, and
here's a device for
the panic vision of the panic.
So
this question is
about destroying the
thing you could also say
Don't Destroy Trust report.
And we were destroyed.
We don't make a backup because
we don't need it here in this fashion.
And also, I would
issue a two
strict mode is like if
the the company configuration
is corrupt, it doesn't
let you in.
It doesn't let you in lock into
your system.
So here are some
hints to integrate
it in the open config.
So we need another term in the
in the one I
have this coming autumn coming the
account thing.
Come on. All.
Just put it here.
Oops, shows include, of course.
And the current talks,
I don't know why they
they put those things apart and.
So now we
have a of configuration that's active.
So the first thing
you will see, it's the question
after the key.
If you use a password, the levels of
it will say password.
So using the the key
for authentication,
of course, I've got to put it through
the rim again,
which is very annoying, to be honest.
And I would present
and it doesn't work because it's not
there yet. No, it's there.
So it's different.
I mean, I do
it again, and then the
wind will have this corruption
thing and
you will see.
So I put in the pen the key,
the Penticton presenter.
Oh, I should
again.
But this Trojan.
So it seems
to work now, and it puts.
A.
And I successfully
destroyed my swim, and I'm done.
So this was.
This was it.
There's some time left for Q&A if you
have some questions.
Thank you, Andy.
Have some gloves again.
So if you have any questions,
please come to the microphones
in the room.
Yes, please.
Thank you for this.
What do you think would be
a more advanced method
to secure
your system against
a cold start?
Because this is like the middle solution?
Yeah, it's been somehow
securing it and not securing it at
all.
Hmm.
That's a way to put some
some links and
yeah, some some arguments
to it to let
the system make some
of its memory poisoning.
Let's put some stuff
in the memory which
bit of secures your
system to
put out the worm and to read it.
So, so it will
make some,
yeah, some random data
into the realm of and
make sure and not readable to
to cope with attacks that at
least. And if you don't, if
you don't pull your
device away, of course.
Next, I would ask the Signal Angel, do we
have questions from the internet?
The internet is not stressed and has
no questions.
If pollsters
leave, OK, then to my left,
hello, thank you for your talk,
which has been very nicely
presented, but in your
system, the attacker knows
that you gave him wrong information
because after votes, the information is
gone. He gets a very obvious,
a very obvious error message that no
data is present anymore.
What do you suggest?
How much work would it be to
after destroying the original
partition?
Have a decoy partition with some
not so sensitive data on it?
You know you could.
You could do such
things. Of course, you also
have the ability to
to configure looks
that way, but you have to do it manually
that you have a petition
for your system is unencrypted,
for example, or
you have encrypted,
but it doesn't matter.
So, for example,
you have a root file
system in the home system.
You can configure a pin
panic that way that you can
just destroy the home partition put
something so
that that's
an example of how it could work.
OK, then another one.
Although it is this forensically,
do they see what you've done?
Is either written like a random new
key that you do not know?
Or is it like just random that
it is forensic?
Lee determined
that you don't know the key or that
you've actually messed with the system,
and therefore it might have tampered
with evidence.
Yeah.
You mean the
destruction part?
Well, it's part of the of looks
itself, so
it's just put some random data
in the small
lacks key thing
that's I read about some special.
Disk destruction parts and not
sure about this, but
it's well, I as
I understand it and as I've
read the source code, it's OK
and secure. I don't know if it
answers your question.
Not really. Is it like, is it this thing
too distinguishable from a normal
kid? It would have been in there?
And is it distinguishable
from a normal killer that would be in
the legs header the random
data?
No.
And so, yeah,
that was my question. Thank you.
So if one of them?
Well, you you saw.
And if if
the destruction
was done, there was
a lot sadder.
It's Caesar that said.
OK, I've got to look here and
it doesn't.
It can't be the case anymore.
So and that's the part
of it.
Yeah.
OK, any other questions?
I don't see any so let's
have some take your applause again.