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*Applause*

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So, good morning everyone

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my name is Arne and today

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I'll be hoping to entertain you

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a bit with some GPG usability issues.

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thanks for being here this early in the morning.

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I know, some of you have had a short night

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In short for the impatient ones:

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Why is GnuPG damn near unusable?

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Well, actually, I don’t know

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*Laughter*

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So more research is needed … as always.

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Because it's not like using a thermometer.

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We're doing something between social science and security

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But I will present some interesting perspectives

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or at least what I hope you'll find interesting perspectives.

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This talk is about some possible explanations

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that usable security research can offer to the question

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Now some context, something about myself,

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so you have a bit of an idea where I'm coming from

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and what coloured glassed I have on.

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So pretty much my background is in Mathematics,

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Computer science, and—strangely enough—International relations

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My professional background is that I've been doing

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embedded system security evaluations and training

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and I've also been a PhD student, studying the usability of security.

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Currently, I teach the new generation,

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hoping to bring some new blood into the security world.

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I want to do some expectation setting

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I want to say, what this talk is not about.

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I will also give some helpful pointers for

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those of you that are interested in these other areas.

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I will not go into too much detail about the issue of truth

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in security science.

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Here are some links to some interesting papers that cover this

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in a lot of detail.

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Neither will I be giving a security primer.

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There are some nice links to books on the slide.

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I'll also not be giving a cryptography primer or a history lesson.

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Neither will I be giving an introduction to PGP

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And, interestingly enough, even though the talk is titled

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“why is GPG damn near unusable”, I will

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not really be doing much PGP bashing

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I think it's quite, actually, a wonderful effort and other people

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have pretty much done the PGP/GnuPG bashing for me.

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And, as I've already mentioned, I will not be giving any definite answers

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and a lot of “it depends.”

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But then you might ask “well, it depends. What does it depend on?”

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Well, for one: What users you’re looking at

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which goals they have in mind and

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in what context, what environment they’re doing these things.

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So, instead I want to kindle your inspiration

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I want to offer you a new view on the security environment

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and I'll also give you some concrete exercises that you can try out

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at home or at the office.

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Some “do’s” and “don’t’s” and pointers for further exploration:

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This is a short overview of the talk

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I'll start with the background story to why I’m giving this talk

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then an overview over usable security research area,

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some principles and methods for usablity,

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some case studies, then some open questions remain

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So, the story. Well. It all started with this book.

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When I was reading about the Snowden revelations,

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I read, how Snowden tried to contact Glenn Greenwald.

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On December, 1st, he sent an email, saying, well, writing to Glenn:

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“If you don’t use PGP, some people will never be able to contact you.”

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“Please install this helpful tool and if you need any help,

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please request so.”

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Three days later, Glenn Greenwald says: “Sorry, I don’t

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know how to do that, but I’ll look into it.”

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and Snowden writes back: “Okay, well, sure. And again:

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If you need any help, I can facilitate contact.”

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Now, a mere seven weeks later,

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*Laughter*

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Glenn is like “okay, well, I’ll do it within the next days or so.”

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Okay, sure …

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Snowden’s like “my sincerest thanks”.

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But actually in the meantime, Snowden was growing a bit impatient

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’cause, okay, “why are you not encrypting?”

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So he sent an email to Micah Lee, saying, “okay, well, hello,

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I’m a friend, can you help me getting contact with Laura Poitras?”

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In addition to that, he made a ten-minute video for Glenn Greenwald

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*Laughter*

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… describing how to use GPG.

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And actually I have quite a lot of screenshots of that video

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and it's quite entertaining.

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’cause, of course, Snowden was getting increasingly

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bothered by the whole situation.

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Now, this is the video that Snowden made

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“GPG for Journalists. For Windows.”

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*Laughter*

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I’ll just click through it, because I think,

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the slides speak for themselves.

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Take notes of all the usability issues you can identify.

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So just click through the wizard, generate a new key,

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enable “expert settings”, ’cause we want 3000-bit keys

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We want a very long password, etc.

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And now, of course, we also wanna go and find keys

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on the keyserver.

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And we need to make sure that we shouldn’t

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write our draft messages in GMail

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or Thunderbird and enigmail, for that matter.

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Although that issue has been solved.

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So, I think you can start seeing

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why Glenn Greenwald
—even if he did open this video—

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was like
“okay, well, I’m not gonna bother.”

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And Snowden is so kind to say, after 12 minutes,

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“if you have any remaining questions, please contact me.”

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At this year’s HOPE conference,

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Snowden actually did a call for arms and he said

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“Okay, we need people to evaluate our security systems.

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we need people to go and do red team. But in addition to that,

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we also need to look at the user experience issue.”

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So this is a transcript of his kind of manifesto

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and he says: “GPG is really damn near unusable”

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because, well, of course, you might know command line

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and then, okay, you might be okay

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but “Gam Gam at the home”, she is never going to be able

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to use GnuPG.

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And he also notes that, okay, we were part of a technical elite

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and he calls on us to work on the technical literacy of people

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because what he explicitly warns against is

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a high priesthood of technology.

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Okay, that’s a nice call to arms

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but are we actually up for a new dawn?

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Well, I wanna go into the background of usable security

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and I wanna show you that we’ve actually been

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in a pretty dark time.

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So, back in 1999, there was this paper:
“Why Johnny can’t encrypt”

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which described mostly the same broken interface

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so if you remember, if you go back to the video of which

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I showed some screenshots, then, well, if you look at

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these screenshots from 1999, well,
is there a lot of difference?

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Not really! Nothing much has changed.

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There are still the same

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conceptual barriers,
and same crappy defaults.

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And most astonishingly, in the paper there

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is a description of a user study where

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users were given 90 minutes to encrypt an email

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and most were unable to do so.

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I think, that pretty much describes “damn near unusable.”

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A timeline from, well, before 1999 to now

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of the usable security research.

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So, quite a lot has happened

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although it is still a growing field.

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It started—the idea of usable security,
it was explicitly defined first—

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in 1975, but it was only until
… only in … 1989 that

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the first usability tests were carried out.

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And only in 1996 that

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the concept of “user-centered security”
was described.

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An interesting paper, also from 1999, shows how

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contary to the general description of users as lazy

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and basically as the weakest chain in security

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this paper describes users as pretty rational beings

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who see security as an overhead and …
where they don't

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understand the usefulness of what they’re doing.

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The study of PGP 5.0, I’ve talked about that already,

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and there was also a study of the
Kazaa network in 2002.

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And it was found out that a lot of users were

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accidentally sharing files from personal pictures,

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who knows, maybe credit-card details,
you never know, right?

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In 2002, a lot of the knowledge of usable security design

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was concretised in ten key principles

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and if you’re interested,

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I do recommend you to look at the paper.

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A solution to the PGP problem was proposed in

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2004, well, actually,

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it was proposed earlier 
but it was tested in 2005.

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And it was found that actually
if we automate encryption

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and if we automate key exchange then, well,

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things are pretty workable, except that

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users still fall for
phishing attacks, of course.

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But last year, another research
identified that, well,

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making security transparent is all nice and well

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but it's also dangerous because users no longer

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are less likely to trust the system and

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are less likely to really understand
what’s really happening.

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So a paper this year also identified another issue:

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Users generally have very bad understanding

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of the email architecture.

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An email goes from point A to point B.

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And what happens in-between is unknown.

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So, before I go on to general usability principles

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from the founding pillar of the usable security field

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I wanna give some exaples of usability failures.

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You might be familiar with project VENONA.

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This was an effort by the US intelligence agencies

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to try and decrypt soviet communication.

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And they actually were pretty successful.

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They encovered a lot of spying and, well,

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how did they do this?

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The soviets were using one-time pads and,

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well, if you reuse a one-time pad,

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then you leak a lot of information about plain-text.

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Well, what we also see happening a lot is

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low password entropy.

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We have people choosing password “123456”, etc.

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And what I just described, the study looking into

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the mental models of users,

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of the email architecture and how it works

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well, at the top you have

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still a pretty simplified description of how things work

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and at the bottom we have an actual drawing

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of a research participant when asked:

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“Can you draw how an email
goes from point A to point B?”

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And it’s like:
“Well, it goes from one place to the other.”

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Okay …

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*clicking sounds*

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Okay, so this died.

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So, these are two screenshots of enigmail

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Well, if I wouldn’t have marked them

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as the plaintext and encrypted email that would be sent

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you probably wouldn’t have spotted which was which

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this is a pretty big failure in

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the visibility of the system.

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You don’t see anything? Ah.

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Audience: “That’s the point!”
That's the point, yes!

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*laughter*
*applause*

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On the left we have a screenshot of GPG and

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as I’ve already described,

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command line people, we like command lines

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but normal people don’t.

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And what we also see is a lot of the jargon that is

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currently being used even in GUI applications

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so on the right there is PGP 10.0.

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Now I wanna close these examples with

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well, you might be wondering: “what is this?”

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This is actually an example of a security device

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from, I think it’s around 4000 years ago.

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Like, People could use this.

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Why can’t we get it right today?

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Something that you should,

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this is a little homework exercise,

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take a laptop to your grandma, show her PGP,

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can she use it—yes or no?

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Probably not, but who knows?

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Now I wanna go into

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the usability cornerstones of usable security.

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I wanna start with heuristics

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some people call them “rules of thumb,” other people

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call them “the ten holy commandments”

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For example, the ten commandments of Dieter Rams,

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there is ten commandments of Jakob Nielsen,

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of Don Norman

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and it really depends on who you believe in, etc.

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But at the cornerstone of all of these is that

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design is made for people.

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And, well, actually, Google says it quite well

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in their guiding mission:

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“Focus on the user and all else will follow.”

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Or, as a usability maxim:

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“thou shalt test with thy user”

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00:18:57,350 --> 00:19:01,209
Don’t just give them the thing.

254
00:19:01,209 --> 00:19:03,200
But there is one problem with these heuristics

255
00:19:03,200 --> 00:19:06,510
and with this advice going just with your user.

256
00:19:06,510 --> 00:19:10,889
Because it’s a pretty abstract advice.

257
00:19:10,889 --> 00:19:12,090
What do you do?

258
00:19:12,090 --> 00:19:13,940
You go out into the world to get practice.

259
00:19:13,940 --> 00:19:17,870
You start observing people.

260
00:19:17,870 --> 00:19:20,169
One nice exercise to try is:

261
00:19:20,169 --> 00:19:21,289
go to the vending machine,

262
00:19:21,289 --> 00:19:24,539
for example the ones at the S-Bahn.

263
00:19:24,539 --> 00:19:26,049
Just stand next to it

264
00:19:26,049 --> 00:19:28,269
and observe people buying tickets.

265
00:19:28,269 --> 00:19:30,860
It’s quite entertaining, actually.

266
00:19:30,860 --> 00:19:33,500
*Laughter*

267
00:19:33,500 --> 00:19:36,010
And something you can also do is

268
00:19:36,010 --> 00:19:37,890
search for usability failures.

269
00:19:37,890 --> 00:19:39,750
This is what you already do when

270
00:19:39,750 --> 00:19:41,269
you’re observing people.

271
00:19:41,269 --> 00:19:45,320
But even just google for “usability failure”,

272
00:19:45,320 --> 00:19:47,870
“GUI fail”, etc., and you will find

273
00:19:47,870 --> 00:19:53,400
lots of entertaining stuff.

274
00:19:53,400 --> 00:19:54,950
Those were some heuristics

275
00:19:54,950 --> 00:19:56,250
but what about the princpiles

276
00:19:56,250 --> 00:20:01,740
that lie behind those?

277
00:20:01,740 --> 00:20:05,799
Usability or interaction design

278
00:20:05,799 --> 00:20:09,299
is a cycle between the user and the system.

279
00:20:09,299 --> 00:20:10,470
The user and the world.

280
00:20:10,470 --> 00:20:12,090
The user acts on the world

281
00:20:12,090 --> 00:20:13,590
and gets feedback.

282
00:20:13,590 --> 00:20:17,000
They interpret that.

283
00:20:17,000 --> 00:20:18,480
One important concept is

284
00:20:18,480 --> 00:20:20,070
for things to be visible.

285
00:20:20,070 --> 00:20:21,110
For the underlying system state

286
00:20:21,110 --> 00:20:22,320
to be visible and

287
00:20:22,320 --> 00:20:23,760
you get appropriate feedback

288
00:20:23,760 --> 00:20:26,169
from the system.

289
00:20:26,169 --> 00:20:31,230
So these are Don Norman’s gulfs
of execution and evaluation

290
00:20:31,230 --> 00:20:34,940
sort of yin and yang.

291
00:20:34,940 --> 00:20:38,549
And there is two concrete problems

292
00:20:38,549 --> 00:20:39,830
to illustrate.

293
00:20:39,830 --> 00:20:41,850
For example, the button problem

294
00:20:41,850 --> 00:20:45,840
that “how do you know what happens
when you push the button?”

295
00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:50,620
and “how do you know how to push it?”

296
00:20:50,620 --> 00:20:52,750
I unforunately don’t have a picture of it

297
00:20:52,750 --> 00:20:58,360
but at Oxford station, the tabs in the bathrooms

298
00:20:58,360 --> 00:21:01,550
they say “push” and you need to turn.

299
00:21:01,550 --> 00:21:05,439
*Laughter*

300
00:21:05,439 --> 00:21:08,510
Then there is the toilet door problem.

301
00:21:08,510 --> 00:21:11,740
The problem of “how do you know
what state a system is in”.

302
00:21:11,740 --> 00:21:15,730
How do you know whether an email will be encrypted?

303
00:21:15,730 --> 00:21:20,269
This is a picture …

304
00:21:20,269 --> 00:21:21,980
basically there is two locks.

305
00:21:21,980 --> 00:21:26,120
One is actually broken and it’s …
when pushing the button that's on the

306
00:21:26,120 --> 00:21:29,049
door handle, you usually lock the door.

307
00:21:29,049 --> 00:21:31,620
But … well … it broke. So that must have been

308
00:21:31,620 --> 00:21:36,200
an entertaining accident.

309
00:21:36,200 --> 00:21:39,080
Another, as I’ve already described,

310
00:21:39,080 --> 00:21:44,339
another important concept is that of mental models.

311
00:21:44,339 --> 00:21:47,860
It’s a question of what idea does the user have

312
00:21:47,860 --> 00:21:52,589
of the system by interacting with it?

313
00:21:52,589 --> 00:21:55,880
How do they acquire knowledge?

314
00:21:55,880 --> 00:21:59,250
For example, how to achieve discoverability

315
00:21:59,250 --> 00:22:00,769
of the system?

316
00:22:00,769 --> 00:22:05,710
And how to ensure that while
a user is discovering the system

317
00:22:05,710 --> 00:22:09,480
that they are less likely to make mistakes?

318
00:22:09,480 --> 00:22:13,880
So this is the concept of poka-yoke

319
00:22:13,880 --> 00:22:18,429
and it’s … here is an example
you also see with floppy disks,

320
00:22:18,429 --> 00:22:22,089
with USB sticks, etc.

321
00:22:22,089 --> 00:22:24,309
It’s engineered such that users are

322
00:22:24,309 --> 00:22:27,020
less likely to make a mistake.

323
00:22:27,020 --> 00:22:30,720
Then there’s also the idea
of enabling knowledge transfer

324
00:22:30,720 --> 00:22:33,339
So how can we do this?

325
00:22:33,339 --> 00:22:35,480
One thing is metaphors.

326
00:22:35,480 --> 00:22:39,919
And I’m not sure how many of you recognise this,

327
00:22:39,919 --> 00:22:44,030
this is Microsoft BOB.

328
00:22:44,030 --> 00:22:46,399
Traditionally, PC systems have been built

329
00:22:46,399 --> 00:22:51,909
on the desktop metaphor.

330
00:22:51,909 --> 00:22:58,169
*Laughter*
Microsoft BOB had a little too much.

331
00:22:58,169 --> 00:23:04,510
To enable knowledge transfer,
you can also standardise systems.

332
00:23:04,510 --> 00:23:08,519
And one important tool for this is design languages

333
00:23:08,519 --> 00:23:12,159
so if you’re designing for iOS, go look at

334
00:23:12,159 --> 00:23:15,970
the design language, the Human
Interface Guidelines of iOS.

335
00:23:15,970 --> 00:23:19,690
The same for Windows – go look
at the Metro Design Guidelines.

336
00:23:19,690 --> 00:23:26,159
As for Android, look at Material Design.

337
00:23:26,159 --> 00:23:30,409
Because, another interesting exercise
to try out

338
00:23:30,409 --> 00:23:33,230
relating to design languages

339
00:23:33,230 --> 00:23:38,250
and also to get familiar with how designers try to

340
00:23:38,250 --> 00:23:40,519
communicate with users is to

341
00:23:40,519 --> 00:23:44,639
look at an interface and trying to decode

342
00:23:44,639 --> 00:23:48,599
what the designer is trying to say to the user.

343
00:23:48,599 --> 00:23:53,669
And another interesting exercise is to look at

344
00:23:53,669 --> 00:23:58,840
not usability but UNusability.

345
00:23:58,840 --> 00:24:00,909
So there is this pretty interesting book

346
00:24:00,909 --> 00:24:04,940
called “evil by design” and it goes into

347
00:24:04,940 --> 00:24:08,450
all the various techniques that designers use

348
00:24:08,450 --> 00:24:16,760
to fool users, to get them to buy an extra hotel, car, etc.

349
00:24:16,760 --> 00:24:21,750
and, well, RyanAir is pretty much the worst offender

350
00:24:21,750 --> 00:24:24,970
so a good example to study.

351
00:24:24,970 --> 00:24:30,519
*Applause*

352
00:24:30,519 --> 00:24:34,480
So, what if you wanna go out into the world

353
00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:40,220
and are gonna apply these princpiles, these heuristics?

354
00:24:40,220 --> 00:24:42,350
The first thing to know is that

355
00:24:42,350 --> 00:24:45,219
design has to be a process

356
00:24:45,219 --> 00:24:50,739
whereby, first part is actually defining your problem.

357
00:24:50,739 --> 00:24:53,729
You first brain-storm

358
00:24:53,729 --> 00:24:58,230
then you try to narrow down to concrete requirements

359
00:24:58,230 --> 00:25:02,870
after which you go and try out
the various approaches

360
00:25:02,870 --> 00:25:05,850
and test these.

361
00:25:05,850 --> 00:25:09,279
What materials do usability experts actually use?

362
00:25:09,279 --> 00:25:15,630
Well, of course there’s expensive tools, Axure, etc.

363
00:25:15,630 --> 00:25:19,220
but I think one of the most used materials

364
00:25:19,220 --> 00:25:25,490
is still the post-it note. Just paper and pens.

365
00:25:25,490 --> 00:25:28,980
And, okay, where do you wanna go and test?

366
00:25:28,980 --> 00:25:32,090
Well, actually, go out into the field.

367
00:25:32,090 --> 00:25:35,950
Go to the ticket machine of the S-Bahn.

368
00:25:35,950 --> 00:25:39,019
But also go and test in the lab, so that you have

369
00:25:39,019 --> 00:25:42,179
a controlled environment.

370
00:25:42,179 --> 00:25:45,309
And then you ask “okay, how do I test?”

371
00:25:45,309 --> 00:25:49,919
Well, first thing is: Go and get some real people.

372
00:25:49,919 --> 00:25:54,630
Of course, it’s … it can be difficult to actually

373
00:25:54,630 --> 00:26:00,620
get people into the lab but it’s not impossible.

374
00:26:00,620 --> 00:26:02,429
So once you have people in the lab,

375
00:26:02,429 --> 00:26:05,020
here are some methods.

376
00:26:05,020 --> 00:26:07,279
There are so many usability evaluation methods

377
00:26:07,279 --> 00:26:09,409
that I’m not gonna list them all and

378
00:26:09,409 --> 00:26:13,200
I encourage you to go and look them up yourself

379
00:26:13,200 --> 00:26:15,360
’cause it’s also very personal what works for you

380
00:26:15,360 --> 00:26:20,500
and what works in your situation.

381
00:26:20,500 --> 00:26:23,050
When using these methods you wanna

382
00:26:23,050 --> 00:26:25,780
evaluate how well a solution works

383
00:26:25,780 --> 00:26:29,809
So you’re gonna look at some matrix

384
00:26:29,809 --> 00:26:31,409
so that at the end of your evaluation

385
00:26:31,409 --> 00:26:35,100
you can say “okay, we’ve done a good job”,

386
00:26:35,100 --> 00:26:40,100
“this can go better”,
“Okay, maybe we can move that”, …

387
00:26:40,100 --> 00:26:44,069
So these are the standardised ones, so

388
00:26:44,069 --> 00:26:47,690
how effective are people, or etc.

389
00:26:47,690 --> 00:26:52,909
You can read …

390
00:26:52,909 --> 00:26:55,759
For a quick start guide on how to

391
00:26:55,759 --> 00:26:59,159
perform usability studies, this is quite a nice one.

392
00:26:59,159 --> 00:27:00,480
And the most important thing to remember

393
00:27:00,480 --> 00:27:04,529
is that preparation is half the work.

394
00:27:04,529 --> 00:27:08,120
First thing to check that everything is working,

395
00:27:08,120 --> 00:27:17,180
make sure that you have everyone
you need in the room, etc.

396
00:27:17,180 --> 00:27:23,249
And maybe most importantly,
usability and usable security,

397
00:27:23,249 --> 00:27:26,380
well, usable security is still a growing field, but

398
00:27:26,380 --> 00:27:30,630
usability is a very large field and most likely

399
00:27:30,630 --> 00:27:34,720
all the problems that you are going to face

400
00:27:34,720 --> 00:27:36,970
or at least a large percentage, other people

401
00:27:36,970 --> 00:27:39,080
have faced before.

402
00:27:39,080 --> 00:27:43,529
So this book is, well, it describes a lot of the stories

403
00:27:43,529 --> 00:27:47,529
of user experience professionals and the things

404
00:27:47,529 --> 00:27:52,040
that they’ve come up against.

405
00:27:52,040 --> 00:27:56,189
A homework exerciese if you feel like it

406
00:27:56,189 --> 00:28:00,990
is looking at basically analysing who is your user

407
00:28:00,990 --> 00:28:06,760
and where they’re going to use the application.

408
00:28:06,760 --> 00:28:10,409
And also something to think about is

409
00:28:10,409 --> 00:28:12,649
how might you involve your user?

410
00:28:12,649 --> 00:28:16,889
Not just during the usability testing,

411
00:28:16,889 --> 00:28:21,070
but also afterwards.

412
00:28:21,070 --> 00:28:28,450
Now I wanna go into some case
studies of encryption systems.

413
00:28:28,450 --> 00:28:30,230
Now there’s quite a lot, and these are not all,

414
00:28:30,230 --> 00:28:34,769
it’s just a small selection but I wanna focus on three.

415
00:28:34,769 --> 00:28:40,229
I wanna focus at the OpenPGP standard,
Cryptocat and TextSecure.

416
00:28:40,229 --> 00:28:42,769
So, OpenPGP, well …

417
00:28:42,769 --> 00:28:46,230
email is now almost 50 years old,

418
00:28:46,230 --> 00:28:52,190
we have an encryption standard—S/MIME,
it is widely used

419
00:28:52,190 --> 00:28:56,039
well, it’s widely usable but it’s not widely used …

420
00:28:56,039 --> 00:29:03,679
and GnuPG is used widely but is not installed by default

421
00:29:03,679 --> 00:29:09,939
and when usability teaches us one thing

422
00:29:09,939 --> 00:29:14,129
it’s that defaults rule.

423
00:29:14,129 --> 00:29:18,190
Because users don’t change defaults.

424
00:29:18,190 --> 00:29:23,360
Now you might ask “Okay,
PGP is not installed by default,

425
00:29:23,360 --> 00:29:26,560
so is there actually still a future for OpenPGP?”

426
00:29:26,560 --> 00:29:30,179
Well, I’d argue: Yes.
We have browser plug-ins

427
00:29:30,179 --> 00:29:33,059
which make it easier for users

428
00:29:33,059 --> 00:29:37,850
JavaScript crypto … I’ll come back to that later …

429
00:29:37,850 --> 00:29:43,420
But when we look at Mailvelope, we see, well,

430
00:29:43,420 --> 00:29:48,040
the EFF scorecard, it has a pretty decent rating

431
00:29:48,040 --> 00:29:55,790
at least compared to that of native PGP implementations.

432
00:29:55,790 --> 00:29:58,629
And also Google has announced and has been working

433
00:29:58,629 --> 00:30:01,409
for quite some time on their own plug-in for

434
00:30:01,409 --> 00:30:03,379
end-to-end encryption.

435
00:30:03,379 --> 00:30:07,950
And Yahoo! is also involved in that.

436
00:30:07,950 --> 00:30:11,389
And after the Snowden revelations there has been

437
00:30:11,389 --> 00:30:15,009
a widespread search in the interest

438
00:30:15,009 --> 00:30:18,460
in encrypted communications

439
00:30:18,460 --> 00:30:23,320
and this is one website where a lot of these are listed.

440
00:30:23,320 --> 00:30:27,889
And one project that I’d especially like to emphasise

441
00:30:27,889 --> 00:30:31,910
is mailpile because I think it looks

442
00:30:31,910 --> 00:30:35,300
like a very interesting approach

443
00:30:35,300 --> 00:30:37,820
whereby the question is:

444
00:30:37,820 --> 00:30:41,080
Can we use OpenPGP as a stepping stone?

445
00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:46,620
OpenPGP is not perfect, meta-data is not protected,

446
00:30:46,620 --> 00:30:48,299
header is not protected, etc.

447
00:30:48,299 --> 00:30:51,870
But maybe when we get people into the ecosystem,

448
00:30:51,870 --> 00:30:56,169
we can try and gradually move
them to more secure options.

449
00:30:56,169 --> 00:30:58,899
Now, what about Cryptocat?

450
00:30:58,899 --> 00:31:04,070
So, Cryptocat’s online chat platform

451
00:31:04,070 --> 00:31:06,900
that … yes … uses JavaScript.

452
00:31:06,900 --> 00:31:10,909
And of course, JavaScript crypto is bad

453
00:31:10,909 --> 00:31:14,620
but it can be made better.

454
00:31:14,620 --> 00:31:20,160
And I think JavaScript crypto is not the worst problem.

455
00:31:20,160 --> 00:31:22,860
Cryptocat had a pretty disastrous problem

456
00:31:22,860 --> 00:31:26,809
whereby all messages that were sent

457
00:31:26,809 --> 00:31:30,610
were pretty easily decryptable.

458
00:31:30,610 --> 00:31:33,169
But actually, this is just history repeating itself

459
00:31:33,169 --> 00:31:39,090
’cause PGP 1.0 used something called BassOmatic,

460
00:31:39,090 --> 00:31:44,620
the BassOmatic cypher which is also pretty weak.

461
00:31:44,620 --> 00:31:49,509
And Cryptocat is improving, which is the important thing.

462
00:31:49,509 --> 00:31:51,179
There is now a browser plug-in and

463
00:31:51,179 --> 00:31:53,890
of course, there’s an app for that and

464
00:31:53,890 --> 00:31:56,570
actually, Cryptocat is doing really, really well

465
00:31:56,570 --> 00:31:59,280
in the EFF benchmarks.

466
00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:04,539
And Cryptocat is asking the one question that a lot

467
00:32:04,539 --> 00:32:06,659
of other applications are not asking, which is:

468
00:32:06,659 --> 00:32:09,459
“How can we actually make crypto fun?”

469
00:32:09,459 --> 00:32:12,429
When you start Cryptocat, there’s noises

470
00:32:12,429 --> 00:32:15,340
and there’s interesting facts about cats

471
00:32:15,340 --> 00:32:18,759
*Laughter*

472
00:32:18,759 --> 00:32:21,249
… depends on whether you like cats, but still!

473
00:32:21,249 --> 00:32:23,450
Keeps you busy!

474
00:32:23,450 --> 00:32:28,989
Now, the last case: TextSecure
also has pretty good markings

475
00:32:28,989 --> 00:32:32,299
and actually just like CryptoCat,

476
00:32:32,299 --> 00:32:35,860
the App store distribution model is something that

477
00:32:35,860 --> 00:32:38,820
I think is a valuable one for usability.

478
00:32:38,820 --> 00:32:41,910
It makes it easy to install.

479
00:32:41,910 --> 00:32:46,049
And something that TextSecure is also looking at is

480
00:32:46,049 --> 00:32:52,180
synchronisation options for your address book.

481
00:32:52,180 --> 00:32:56,980
And I think the most interesting development is

482
00:32:56,980 --> 00:33:00,490
on the one side, the CyanogenMod integration,

483
00:33:00,490 --> 00:33:05,029
so that people will have encryption enabled by default.

484
00:33:05,029 --> 00:33:09,879
’Cause as I mentioned: People don’t change defaults.

485
00:33:09,879 --> 00:33:14,709
And this one is a bit more contoversial, but

486
00:33:14,709 --> 00:33:18,180
there’s also the WhatsApp partnership.

487
00:33:18,180 --> 00:33:21,130
And of course people will say “it’s not secure”,

488
00:33:21,130 --> 00:33:22,960
we know, we know,

489
00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:24,389
EFF knows!

490
00:33:24,389 --> 00:33:28,740
But at least, it’s more secure than nothing at all.

491
00:33:28,740 --> 00:33:31,330
Because: Doesn’t every little bit help?

492
00:33:31,330 --> 00:33:32,680
Well, I’d say: yes.

493
00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:35,590
And at least, it’s one stepping stone.

494
00:33:35,590 --> 00:33:40,110
And, well, all of these are open-source,

495
00:33:40,110 --> 00:33:41,639
so you can think for yourself:

496
00:33:41,639 --> 00:33:45,120
How can I improve these?

497
00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:50,450
Now, there’s still some open questions remaining

498
00:33:50,450 --> 00:33:52,620
in the usable security field and in the

499
00:33:52,620 --> 00:33:56,320
wider security field as well.

500
00:33:56,320 --> 00:33:58,860
I won’t go into all of these,

501
00:33:58,860 --> 00:34:03,210
I wanna focus on the issues that developers have,

502
00:34:03,210 --> 00:34:05,730
issues of end user understanding

503
00:34:05,730 --> 00:34:09,459
and of identitiy management.

504
00:34:09,459 --> 00:34:14,059
Because the development environment

505
00:34:14,059 --> 00:34:18,179
there’s the crypto-plumbing problem, some people call it.

506
00:34:18,179 --> 00:34:20,820
How do we standardise on a cryptographic algorithm?

507
00:34:20,820 --> 00:34:25,250
How do we make everyone use the same system?

508
00:34:25,250 --> 00:34:29,179
Because, again, it’s history repeating itself.

509
00:34:29,179 --> 00:34:35,668
With PGP, we had RSA, changed for
DSA because of patent issues

510
00:34:35,668 --> 00:34:39,540
IDEA changed for CAST5 because of patent issues

511
00:34:39,540 --> 00:34:41,729
and now we have something similar:

512
00:34:41,729 --> 00:34:43,599
’cause for PGP the question is:

513
00:34:43,599 --> 00:34:45,619
Which curve do we choose?

514
00:34:45,619 --> 00:34:51,089
’cause this is from Bernstein, who has got a whole list

515
00:34:51,089 --> 00:34:56,229
of, well not all the curves,
but a large selection of them

516
00:34:56,229 --> 00:34:57,920
analysing the security

517
00:34:57,920 --> 00:35:01,210
but how do you make, well, pretty much

518
00:35:01,210 --> 00:35:06,460
the whole world agree on a single standard?

519
00:35:06,460 --> 00:35:11,110
And also, can we move toward safer languages?

520
00:35:11,110 --> 00:35:18,270
And I’ve been talking about the
usability of encryption systems

521
00:35:18,270 --> 00:35:21,770
for users, but what about for developers?

522
00:35:21,770 --> 00:35:25,770
So, API usability, and as I’ve mentioned:

523
00:35:25,770 --> 00:35:28,000
Language usability.

524
00:35:28,000 --> 00:35:31,640
And on top of that, it is not just a technical issue,

525
00:35:31,640 --> 00:35:34,959
because, of course, we secure microchips,

526
00:35:34,959 --> 00:35:41,560
but we also wanna secure social systems.

527
00:35:41,560 --> 00:35:45,000
Because, in principal, we live in an open system,

528
00:35:45,000 --> 00:35:51,230
in an open society and a system cannot audit itself.

529
00:35:51,230 --> 00:35:55,709
So, okay, what do we do, right?
I don’t know.

530
00:35:55,709 --> 00:35:58,489
I mean, that’s why it’s an open question!

531
00:35:58,489 --> 00:36:00,970
’Cause how de we ensure the authenticity of,

532
00:36:00,970 --> 00:36:06,300
I don’t know, my Intel processor in my lapotp?

533
00:36:06,300 --> 00:36:07,000
How do I know that the

534
00:36:07,000 --> 00:36:09,089
random number generator isn’t bogus?

535
00:36:09,089 --> 00:36:13,589
Well, I know it is, but …
*laughter*

536
00:36:13,589 --> 00:36:17,140
Then, there’s the issue of identity management

537
00:36:17,140 --> 00:36:19,309
related to key management, like

538
00:36:19,309 --> 00:36:25,329
who has the keys to the kingdom?

539
00:36:25,329 --> 00:36:27,160
One approach, as I’ve already mentioned, is

540
00:36:27,160 --> 00:36:28,760
key continuity management.

541
00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:32,400
Whereby we automate both key exchange and

542
00:36:32,400 --> 00:36:35,520
whereby we automate encryption.

543
00:36:35,520 --> 00:36:38,289
So one principle is trust on first use,

544
00:36:38,289 --> 00:36:43,569
whereby, well, one approach will be to attach your key

545
00:36:43,569 --> 00:36:46,010
to any email you send out and anyone who receives

546
00:36:46,010 --> 00:36:50,020
this email just assumes it’s the proper key.

547
00:36:50,020 --> 00:36:52,819
Of course, it’s not fully secure,

548
00:36:52,819 --> 00:36:56,319
but at least, it’s something.

549
00:36:56,319 --> 00:36:59,109
And this is really, I think, the major question

550
00:36:59,109 --> 00:37:00,809
in interoperability:

551
00:37:00,809 --> 00:37:05,210
How do you ensure that you can access your email

552
00:37:05,210 --> 00:37:08,690
from multiple devices?

553
00:37:08,690 --> 00:37:10,880
Now, of course, there is meta-data leakage,

554
00:37:10,880 --> 00:37:14,230
PGP doesn’t protect meta-data,

555
00:37:14,230 --> 00:37:16,890
and, you know, your friendly security agency knows

556
00:37:16,890 --> 00:37:18,319
where you went last summer …

557
00:37:18,319 --> 00:37:19,300
So, what do we do?

558
00:37:19,300 --> 00:37:23,649
We do anonymous routing, we send over tor, but

559
00:37:23,649 --> 00:37:26,150
I mean, how do we roll that out?

560
00:37:26,150 --> 00:37:27,500
I think the approach that

561
00:37:27,500 --> 00:37:30,240
mailpile is trying to do is interesting

562
00:37:30,240 --> 00:37:33,000
and, of course still an open question, but

563
00:37:33,000 --> 00:37:36,800
interesting research nonetheless.

564
00:37:36,800 --> 00:37:39,049
Then there’s the introduction problem of

565
00:37:39,049 --> 00:37:43,730
okay, how, I meet someone here, after the talk,

566
00:37:43,730 --> 00:37:45,990
they tell me who they are,

567
00:37:45,990 --> 00:37:49,829
but either I get their card—which is nice—or

568
00:37:49,829 --> 00:37:52,260
they say what their name is.

569
00:37:52,260 --> 00:37:55,869
But they’re not gonna tell me, they’re not gonna spell out

570
00:37:55,869 --> 00:37:57,820
their fingerprint.

571
00:37:57,820 --> 00:38:02,400
So the idea of Zooko’s triangle is that identifiers

572
00:38:02,400 --> 00:38:07,630
are either human-meaningful,
secure or decentralised.

573
00:38:07,630 --> 00:38:09,270
Pick two.

574
00:38:09,270 --> 00:38:13,140
So here’s some examples of identifiers,

575
00:38:13,140 --> 00:38:16,270
so for Bitcoin: Lots of random garbage.

576
00:38:16,270 --> 00:38:19,009
For OpenPGP: Lots of random garbage

577
00:38:19,009 --> 00:38:22,330
For miniLock: Lots of random garbage

578
00:38:22,330 --> 00:38:26,390
So, I think an interesting research problem is:

579
00:38:26,390 --> 00:38:29,719
Can we actually make these things memorable?

580
00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:32,200
You know, I can memorise email addresses,

581
00:38:32,200 --> 00:38:34,359
I can memorise phone numbers,

582
00:38:34,359 --> 00:38:39,839
I can not memorise these. I can try, but …

583
00:38:39,839 --> 00:38:45,390
Then, the last open question I wanna focus on

584
00:38:45,390 --> 00:38:48,780
is that of end-user understanding.

585
00:38:48,780 --> 00:38:53,599
So of course, we’ll know that all devices are monitored.

586
00:38:53,599 --> 00:39:00,420
But does the average user?

587
00:39:00,420 --> 00:39:04,750
Do they know what worms can do?

588
00:39:04,750 --> 00:39:09,280
Have they read these books?

589
00:39:09,280 --> 00:39:15,089
Do they know where GCHQ is?

590
00:39:15,089 --> 00:39:20,970
Do they know that Cupertino has
pretty much the same powers?

591
00:39:20,970 --> 00:39:23,880
*Laughter*

592
00:39:23,880 --> 00:39:28,980
Do they know they’re living in a panopticon to come?

593
00:39:28,980 --> 00:39:32,160
*Laughter*

594
00:39:32,160 --> 00:39:37,800
Do they know that people are
killed based on meta-data?

595
00:39:37,800 --> 00:39:40,829
Well, I think not.

596
00:39:40,829 --> 00:39:45,550
And actually this is a poster from the university

597
00:39:45,550 --> 00:39:47,069
where I did my Master’s

598
00:39:47,069 --> 00:39:50,940
and interestingly enough, it was founded by a guy

599
00:39:50,940 --> 00:39:56,279
who made a fortune selling sugar pills.

600
00:39:56,279 --> 00:40:02,649
You know, snake oil, we also have this in crypto.

601
00:40:02,649 --> 00:40:06,079
And how is the user to know

602
00:40:06,079 --> 00:40:08,130
whether something is secure or not?

603
00:40:08,130 --> 00:40:10,609
Of course, we have the secure messaging scorecard

604
00:40:10,609 --> 00:40:15,210
but can users find these?

605
00:40:15,210 --> 00:40:21,190
Well, I think, there’s three aspects
to end-user understanding

606
00:40:21,190 --> 00:40:24,250
which is knowledge acquisition,
knowledge transfer,

607
00:40:24,250 --> 00:40:27,220
and the verification updating of this knowledge.

608
00:40:27,220 --> 00:40:30,950
So, as I’ve already mentioned,
we can do dummy-proofing

609
00:40:30,950 --> 00:40:38,110
and we can create transparent systems.

610
00:40:38,110 --> 00:40:41,160
For knowledge transfer, we can

611
00:40:41,160 --> 00:40:44,400
look at appropriate metaphors and design languages.

612
00:40:44,400 --> 00:40:46,829
And for verification we can

613
00:40:46,829 --> 00:40:50,590
try an approach: Choose an advertising.

614
00:40:50,590 --> 00:40:56,500
And, last but not least, we can do user-testing.

615
00:40:56,500 --> 00:41:02,770
Because all these open questions that I’ve described

616
00:41:02,770 --> 00:41:05,549
and all this research that has been done,

617
00:41:05,549 --> 00:41:11,089
I think it’s missing one key issue, which is that

618
00:41:11,089 --> 00:41:13,640
the usability people and the security people

619
00:41:13,640 --> 00:41:17,480
tend not to really talk to one another.

620
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:21,440
The open-source developers and the users:

621
00:41:21,440 --> 00:41:23,490
Are they talking enough?

622
00:41:23,490 --> 00:41:26,760
I think that’s something, if we want a new dawn,

623
00:41:26,760 --> 00:41:30,970
that’s something that I think we should approach.

624
00:41:30,970 --> 00:41:35,110
Yeah, so, from my side, that’s it.

625
00:41:35,110 --> 00:41:37,490
I’m open for any questions.

626
00:41:37,490 --> 00:41:49,320
*Applause*

627
00:41:49,320 --> 00:41:52,270
Herald: Arne, thank you very much for your brilliant talk

628
00:41:52,270 --> 00:41:55,030
Now, if you have any questions to ask, would you please

629
00:41:55,030 --> 00:41:57,920
line up at the microphones in the aisles?!

630
00:41:57,920 --> 00:42:00,470
The others who’d like to leave now,

631
00:42:00,470 --> 00:42:04,240
I’d ask you kindly to please leave very quietly

632
00:42:04,240 --> 00:42:09,270
so we can hear what the people
asking questions will tell us.

633
00:42:09,270 --> 00:42:14,279
And those at the microphones,
if you could talk slowly,

634
00:42:14,279 --> 00:42:19,099
then those translating have no problems in translating

635
00:42:19,099 --> 00:42:21,490
what is being asked. Thank you very much.

636
00:42:21,490 --> 00:42:27,460
And I think we’ll start with mic #4 on the left-hand side.

637
00:42:27,460 --> 00:42:32,000
Mic#4: Yes, so, if you’ve been to any successful

638
00:42:32,000 --> 00:42:36,500
crypto party, you know that crypto parties very quickly

639
00:42:36,500 --> 00:42:41,430
turn into not about discussing software,
how to use software,

640
00:42:41,430 --> 00:42:43,780
but into threat model discussions.

641
00:42:43,780 --> 00:42:46,930
And to actually get users
to think about what they’re

642
00:42:46,930 --> 00:42:49,420
trying to protect themselves for and if a certain

643
00:42:49,420 --> 00:42:52,710
messaging app is secure, that still means nothing.

644
00:42:52,710 --> 00:42:55,810
’Cause there is lots of other stuff that’s going on.

645
00:42:55,810 --> 00:42:57,240
Can you talk a little bit about that and

646
00:42:57,240 --> 00:43:00,130
how that runs into this model about, you know,

647
00:43:00,130 --> 00:43:02,260
how we need to educate users and, while we’re at it,

648
00:43:02,260 --> 00:43:03,640
what we want to educated about.

649
00:43:03,640 --> 00:43:05,930
And what they actually need to be using.

650
00:43:05,930 --> 00:43:09,640
Arne: Well, I think that’s an interesting point

651
00:43:09,640 --> 00:43:14,210
and I think, one issue, one big issue is:

652
00:43:14,210 --> 00:43:17,180
okay, we can throw lots of crypto parties

653
00:43:17,180 --> 00:43:20,809
but we’re never gonna be able to throw enough parties.

654
00:43:20,809 --> 00:43:22,970
I … with one party you’re very lucky

655
00:43:22,970 --> 00:43:24,609
you’re gonna educate 100 people.

656
00:43:24,609 --> 00:43:28,950
I mean, just imagine how many parties
you’d need to throw. Right?

657
00:43:28,950 --> 00:43:32,980
I mean, it’s gonna be a heck of party, but … yeah.

658
00:43:32,980 --> 00:43:38,730
And I think, secondly, the question of threat modeling,

659
00:43:38,730 --> 00:43:43,000
I think, sure, that’s helpful to do, but

660
00:43:43,000 --> 00:43:47,760
I think, users do first need an understanding of,

661
00:43:47,760 --> 00:43:49,290
for example, the email architecture.

662
00:43:49,290 --> 00:43:51,520
Cause, how can they do threat
modeling when they think

663
00:43:51,520 --> 00:43:55,260
that an email magically pops
from one computer to the next?

664
00:43:55,260 --> 00:43:59,250
I think, that is pretty much impossible.

665
00:43:59,250 --> 00:44:01,250
I hope that …

666
00:44:01,250 --> 00:44:04,890
Herald: Thank you very much, so …
Microphone #3, please.

667
00:44:04,890 --> 00:44:07,439
Mic#3: Arne, thank you very much for your talk.

668
00:44:07,439 --> 00:44:10,430
There’s one aspect that I didn’t see in your slides.

669
00:44:10,430 --> 00:44:13,049
And that is the aspect of the language that we use

670
00:44:13,049 --> 00:44:16,940
to describe concepts in PGP—and GPG, for that matter.

671
00:44:16,940 --> 00:44:19,510
And I know that there was a paper last year

672
00:44:19,510 --> 00:44:21,890
about why King George can’t encrypt and

673
00:44:21,890 --> 00:44:23,960
they were trying to propose a new language.

674
00:44:23,960 --> 00:44:26,109
Do you think that such initiatives are worthwile

675
00:44:26,109 --> 00:44:28,650
or are we stuck with this language and should we make

676
00:44:28,650 --> 00:44:31,720
as good use of it as we can?

677
00:44:31,720 --> 00:44:37,849
Arne: I think that’s a good point
and actually the question

678
00:44:37,849 --> 00:44:44,649
of “okay, what metaphors do you wanna use?” … I think

679
00:44:44,649 --> 00:44:46,799
we’re pretty much stuck with the language

680
00:44:46,799 --> 00:44:49,710
that we’re using for the moment but

681
00:44:49,710 --> 00:44:54,130
I think it does make sense
to go and look into the future

682
00:44:54,130 --> 00:44:58,289
at alternatives models.

683
00:44:58,289 --> 00:45:00,990
Yeah, so I actually wrote a paper that also

684
00:45:00,990 --> 00:45:04,970
goes into that a bit, looking at

685
00:45:04,970 --> 00:45:08,630
the metaphor of handshakes to exchange keys.

686
00:45:08,630 --> 00:45:09,790
So, for example, you could have

687
00:45:09,790 --> 00:45:15,520
an embedded device as a ring or wristband,

688
00:45:15,520 --> 00:45:19,000
it could even be a smartwatch, for that matter.

689
00:45:19,000 --> 00:45:21,569
Could you use that shaking of hands to

690
00:45:21,569 --> 00:45:24,470
build trust-relationships?

691
00:45:24,470 --> 00:45:29,740
And that might be a better
metaphor than key-signing,

692
00:45:29,740 --> 00:45:31,469
webs of trust, etc.

693
00:45:31,469 --> 00:45:34,559
’Cause I think, that is horribly broken

694
00:45:34,559 --> 00:45:39,990
for I mean the concept, trying
to explain that to users.

695
00:45:39,990 --> 00:45:43,430
Herald: Thank you. And … at the back in the middle.

696
00:45:43,430 --> 00:45:44,980
Signal angel: Thanks. A question from the internet:

697
00:45:44,980 --> 00:45:47,000
[username?] from the Internet wants to know if you’re

698
00:45:47,000 --> 00:45:51,839
aware of the PEP project, the “pretty easy privacy”

699
00:45:51,839 --> 00:45:53,059
and your opinions on that.

700
00:45:53,059 --> 00:45:54,710
And another question is:

701
00:45:54,710 --> 00:46:01,520
How important is the trust level of the crypto to you?

702
00:46:01,520 --> 00:46:04,420
Arne: Well, yes, actually, there’s this screenshot

703
00:46:04,420 --> 00:46:09,729
of the PEP project in the slides

704
00:46:09,729 --> 00:46:15,149
… in the why WhatsApp is horribly insecure and

705
00:46:15,149 --> 00:46:18,720
of course, I agree, and yeah.

706
00:46:18,720 --> 00:46:21,680
I’ve looked into the PEP project for a bit

707
00:46:21,680 --> 00:46:24,549
and I think, yeah, I think it’s an interesting

708
00:46:24,549 --> 00:46:28,480
approach but I still have to read up on it a bit more.

709
00:46:28,480 --> 00:46:31,369
Then, for the second question,

710
00:46:31,369 --> 00:46:38,039
“how important is the rust in the crypto?”:

711
00:46:38,039 --> 00:46:41,749
I think that’s an important one.

712
00:46:41,749 --> 00:46:43,220
Especially the question of

713
00:46:43,220 --> 00:46:52,780
“how do we build social systems
to ensure reliable cryptography?”

714
00:46:52,780 --> 00:46:56,830
So one example is the Advanced
Encryption Standard competition.

715
00:46:56,830 --> 00:46:59,559
Everyone was free to send in entries,

716
00:46:59,559 --> 00:47:01,990
their design princpiles were open

717
00:47:01,990 --> 00:47:06,219
and this is in complete contrast
to the Data Encryption Standard

718
00:47:06,219 --> 00:47:11,920
which, I think, the design princpiles are still Top Secret.

719
00:47:11,920 --> 00:47:16,290
So yeah, I think, the crypto is
something we need to build on

720
00:47:16,290 --> 00:47:22,059
but, well, actually, the crypto is
again built on other systems

721
00:47:22,059 --> 00:47:28,040
where the trust in these systems
is even more important.

722
00:47:28,040 --> 00:47:30,720
Herald: Okay, thank you, microphone #2, please.

723
00:47:30,720 --> 00:47:34,270
Mic#2: Yes, Arne, thank you very
much for your excellent talk.

724
00:47:34,270 --> 00:47:37,710
I wonder how about what to do with feedback

725
00:47:37,710 --> 00:47:40,899
on usability in open-source software.

726
00:47:40,899 --> 00:47:42,329
So, you publish something on GitHub

727
00:47:42,329 --> 00:47:44,049
and you’re with a group of people

728
00:47:44,049 --> 00:47:45,450
who don’t know each other and

729
00:47:45,450 --> 00:47:48,089
one publishes something,
the other publishes something,

730
00:47:48,089 --> 00:47:51,349
and then: How do we know
this software is usable?

731
00:47:51,349 --> 00:47:53,660
In commercial software, there’s all kind of hooks

732
00:47:53,660 --> 00:47:55,780
on the website, on the app,

733
00:47:55,780 --> 00:47:59,059
to send feedback to the commercial vendor.

734
00:47:59,059 --> 00:48:02,270
But in open-source software,
how do you gather this information?

735
00:48:02,270 --> 00:48:04,630
How do you use it, is there any way to do this

736
00:48:04,630 --> 00:48:05,890
in an anonymised way?

737
00:48:05,890 --> 00:48:08,589
I haven’t seen anything related to this.

738
00:48:08,589 --> 00:48:11,480
Is this one of the reasons why
open-source software is maybe

739
00:48:11,480 --> 00:48:15,249
less usable than commercial software?

740
00:48:15,249 --> 00:48:19,889
Arne: It might be. It might be.

741
00:48:19,889 --> 00:48:22,599
But regarding your question, like, how do you know

742
00:48:22,599 --> 00:48:29,559
whether a commercial software is usable, well,

743
00:48:29,559 --> 00:48:32,279
you … one way is looking at:

744
00:48:32,279 --> 00:48:34,840
Okay, what kind of statistics do you get back?

745
00:48:34,840 --> 00:48:37,720
But if you push out something totally unusable

746
00:48:37,720 --> 00:48:39,920
and then, I mean, you’re going to expect

747
00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:44,599
that the statistics come back looking like shit.

748
00:48:44,599 --> 00:48:49,829
So, the best approach is to
design usability in from the start.

749
00:48:49,829 --> 00:48:51,230
The same with security.

750
00:48:51,230 --> 00:48:54,950
And I think, that is also …
so even if you have …

751
00:48:54,950 --> 00:48:58,670
you want privacy for end users, I think it’s still possible

752
00:48:58,670 --> 00:49:01,530
to get people into their lab and look at:

753
00:49:01,530 --> 00:49:03,270
Okay, how are they using the system?

754
00:49:03,270 --> 00:49:05,760
What things can we improve?

755
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:08,289
And what things are working well?

756
00:49:08,289 --> 00:49:10,740
Mic#2: So you’re saying, you should only publish

757
00:49:10,740 --> 00:49:19,010
open-source software for users
if you also tested in a lab?

758
00:49:19,010 --> 00:49:22,599
Arne: Well, I think, this is a bit of a discussion of:

759
00:49:22,599 --> 00:49:25,740
Do we just allow people to build
houses however they want to

760
00:49:25,740 --> 00:49:28,410
or do we have building codes?

761
00:49:28,410 --> 00:49:32,130
And … I think … well, actually, this proposal of holding

762
00:49:32,130 --> 00:49:35,730
software developers responsible for what they produce,

763
00:49:35,730 --> 00:49:40,299
if it’s commercial software, I mean,
that proposal has been

764
00:49:40,299 --> 00:49:41,970
made a long time ago.

765
00:49:41,970 --> 00:49:43,130
And the question is:

766
00:49:43,130 --> 00:49:47,950
How would that work in an
open-source software community?

767
00:49:47,950 --> 00:49:50,460
Well, actually, I don’t have an answer to that.

768
00:49:50,460 --> 00:49:52,660
But I think, it’s an interesting question.

769
00:49:52,660 --> 00:49:54,490
Mic#2: Thank you.

770
00:49:54,490 --> 00:49:57,990
Herald: Thank you very much. #1, please.

771
00:49:57,990 --> 00:50:01,130
Mic#1: You said that every little bit helps,

772
00:50:01,130 --> 00:50:04,039
so if we have systems that
don’t provide a lot of … well …

773
00:50:04,039 --> 00:50:06,680
are almost insecure, they
provide just a bit of security, than

774
00:50:06,680 --> 00:50:09,869
that is still better than no security.

775
00:50:09,869 --> 00:50:12,970
My question is: Isn’t that actually worse because

776
00:50:12,970 --> 00:50:15,150
this promotes a false sense of security and

777
00:50:15,150 --> 00:50:19,920
that makes people just use
the insecure broken systems

778
00:50:19,920 --> 00:50:23,559
just to say “we have some security with us”?

779
00:50:23,559 --> 00:50:26,210
Arne: I completely agree but

780
00:50:26,210 --> 00:50:29,339
I think that currently people … I mean …

781
00:50:29,339 --> 00:50:30,920
when you think an email goes

782
00:50:30,920 --> 00:50:33,680
from one system to the other directly

783
00:50:33,680 --> 00:50:40,920
and I mean … from these studies
that I’ve done, I’ve met

784
00:50:40,920 --> 00:50:46,060
quite some people who still think email is secure.

785
00:50:46,060 --> 00:50:49,589
So, of course, you might give
them a false sense of security

786
00:50:49,589 --> 00:50:52,640
when you give them a
more secure program but

787
00:50:52,640 --> 00:50:54,480
at least it’s more secure than email—right?

788
00:50:54,480 --> 00:50:56,070
I mean …

789
00:50:56,070 --> 00:50:57,339
Mic#1: Thank you.

790
00:50:57,339 --> 00:50:59,520
Herald: Thank you. There’s another
question on the Internet.

791
00:50:59,520 --> 00:51:02,559
Signal angel: Yes, thank you. Question from the Internet:

792
00:51:02,559 --> 00:51:06,199
What crypto would you finally
recommend your grandma to use?

793
00:51:06,199 --> 00:51:10,260
Arne: *laughs*

794
00:51:10,260 --> 00:51:15,500
Well … Unfortunately, my grandma
has already passed away.

795
00:51:15,500 --> 00:51:19,520
I mean … her secrets will be safe …

796
00:51:27,420 --> 00:51:32,030
Actually, I think something like where

797
00:51:32,030 --> 00:51:37,349
Crypto is enabled by default, say …
iMessage, I mean

798
00:51:37,349 --> 00:51:42,059
of course, there’s backdoors,
etc., but at least

799
00:51:42,059 --> 00:51:45,339
it is more secure than plain SMS.

800
00:51:45,339 --> 00:51:53,249
So I would advise my grandma
to use … well, to look at …

801
00:51:53,249 --> 00:51:56,289
actually I’d first analyse
what does she have available

802
00:51:56,289 --> 00:51:58,880
and then I would look at okay
which is the most secure

803
00:51:58,880 --> 00:52:03,680
and still usable?

804
00:52:03,680 --> 00:52:07,339
Herald: Thank you very much, so mic #3, please.

805
00:52:07,339 --> 00:52:10,880
Mic#3: So, just wondering:

806
00:52:10,880 --> 00:52:14,950
You told that there is
a problem with the missing

807
00:52:14,950 --> 00:52:20,329
default installation of GPG
on operating systems but

808
00:52:20,329 --> 00:52:24,890
I think, this is more of a
problem of which OS you choose

809
00:52:24,890 --> 00:52:28,220
because at least I don’t
know any Linux system which

810
00:52:28,220 --> 00:52:33,599
doesn’t have GPG installed today by default.

811
00:52:33,599 --> 00:52:39,539
If you use … at least I’ve used
the normal workstation setup.

812
00:52:39,539 --> 00:52:42,550
Arne: Yes, I think you already
answered your own question:

813
00:52:42,550 --> 00:52:47,230
Linux.
*Laughter*

814
00:52:47,230 --> 00:52:50,690
Unfortunately, Linux is not yet widely default.

815
00:52:50,690 --> 00:52:53,270
I mean, I’d love it to be, but … yeah.

816
00:52:53,270 --> 00:52:57,730
Mic#3: But if I send an email to Microsoft and say:

817
00:52:57,730 --> 00:53:02,539
Well, install GPG by default, they’re not gonna

818
00:53:02,539 --> 00:53:04,150
listen to me.

819
00:53:04,150 --> 00:53:07,530
And I think, for all of us, we should do

820
00:53:07,530 --> 00:53:08,740
a lot more of that.

821
00:53:08,740 --> 00:53:13,780
Even if Microsoft is the devil for most of us.

822
00:53:13,780 --> 00:53:15,609
Thank you.

823
00:53:15,609 --> 00:53:19,599
Arne: Well … We should be doing more of what?

824
00:53:19,599 --> 00:53:26,430
Mic#3: Making more demands
to integrate GPG by default

825
00:53:26,430 --> 00:53:29,210
in Microsoft products, for example.

826
00:53:29,210 --> 00:53:31,059
Arne: Yes, I completely agree.

827
00:53:31,059 --> 00:53:33,869
Well, what you already see happening …

828
00:53:33,869 --> 00:53:36,140
or I mean, it’s not very high-profile yet,

829
00:53:36,140 --> 00:53:39,020
but for example I mean … I’ve refered to

830
00:53:39,020 --> 00:53:42,700
the EFF scorecard a couple of times but

831
00:53:42,700 --> 00:53:49,750
that is some pressure to encourage developers

832
00:53:49,750 --> 00:53:53,010
to include security by default.

833
00:53:53,010 --> 00:53:56,940
But, I think I’ve also mentioned, one of the big problems

834
00:53:56,940 --> 00:54:01,049
is: users at the moment … I mean …

835
00:54:01,049 --> 00:54:04,079
developers might say: my system is secure.

836
00:54:04,079 --> 00:54:06,549
I mean … what does that mean?

837
00:54:06,549 --> 00:54:09,510
Do we hold developers and
commercial entities …

838
00:54:09,510 --> 00:54:12,339
do we hold them to, well,

839
00:54:12,339 --> 00:54:14,039
truthful advertisting standards or not?

840
00:54:14,039 --> 00:54:17,200
I mean, I would say: Let’s gonna look at

841
00:54:17,200 --> 00:54:21,289
what are companies claiming and

842
00:54:21,289 --> 00:54:22,849
do they actually stand up to that?

843
00:54:22,849 --> 00:54:26,079
And if not: Can we actually sue them?

844
00:54:26,079 --> 00:54:27,720
Can we make them tell the truth about

845
00:54:27,720 --> 00:54:30,759
what is happening and what is not?

846
00:54:30,759 --> 00:54:32,960
Herald: So, we’ve got about 2 more minutes left …

847
00:54:32,960 --> 00:54:37,049
So it’s a maximum of two more questions, #2, please.

848
00:54:37,049 --> 00:54:43,440
Mic#2: Yeah, so … Every security system fails.

849
00:54:43,440 --> 00:54:50,010
So I’m interested in what sort of work has been done on

850
00:54:50,010 --> 00:54:56,999
how do users recover from failure?

851
00:54:56,999 --> 00:55:00,660
Everything will get subverted,

852
00:55:00,660 --> 00:55:04,190
your best firend will sneak
your key off your computer,

853
00:55:04,190 --> 00:55:06,099
something will go wrong with that, you know …

854
00:55:06,099 --> 00:55:09,510
your kids will grab it …

855
00:55:09,510 --> 00:55:13,450
and just, is there, in general, has somebody looked at

856
00:55:13,450 --> 00:55:17,000
these sorts of issues?

857
00:55:17,000 --> 00:55:18,559
Is there research on it?

858
00:55:18,559 --> 00:55:21,930
Arne: Of various aspects of the problem but

859
00:55:21,930 --> 00:55:25,640
as far as I’m aware not for the general issue

860
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:30,170
and not any field studies specifically looking at

861
00:55:30,170 --> 00:55:34,269
“Okay, what happens when a key is compromised, etc.”

862
00:55:34,269 --> 00:55:37,520
I mean, we do have certain cases of things happening

863
00:55:37,520 --> 00:55:41,789
but nothing structured.

864
00:55:41,789 --> 00:55:44,720
No structured studies, as far as I’m aware.

865
00:55:44,720 --> 00:55:46,810
Herald: Thank you. #3?

866
00:55:46,810 --> 00:55:51,539
Mic#3: Yeah, you mentioned
mailpile as a stepping stone

867
00:55:51,539 --> 00:55:56,380
for people to start using GnuPG and stuff, but

868
00:55:56,380 --> 00:56:04,820
you also talked about an
average user seeing mail as just

869
00:56:04,820 --> 00:56:08,789
coming from one place and
then ending up in another place.

870
00:56:08,789 --> 00:56:12,250
Shouldn’t we actually talk about

871
00:56:12,250 --> 00:56:17,880
how to make encryption transparent for the users?

872
00:56:17,880 --> 00:56:21,430
Why should they actually care about these things?

873
00:56:21,430 --> 00:56:24,980
Shouldn’t it be embedded in the protocols?

874
00:56:24,980 --> 00:56:28,869
Shouldn’t we actually talk about
embedding them in the protocols,

875
00:56:28,869 --> 00:56:31,510
stop using unsecure protocols

876
00:56:31,510 --> 00:56:36,109
and having all of these,
you talked a little bit about it,

877
00:56:36,109 --> 00:56:38,720
as putting it in the defaults.

878
00:56:38,720 --> 00:56:42,549
But shouldn’t we emphasise that a lot more?

879
00:56:42,549 --> 00:56:46,730
Arne: Yeah, I think we should
certainly be working towards

880
00:56:46,730 --> 00:56:50,200
“How do we get security by default?”

881
00:56:50,200 --> 00:56:54,270
But I think … I’ve mentioned it shortly that

882
00:56:54,270 --> 00:56:57,519
making things transparent also has a danger.

883
00:56:57,519 --> 00:57:01,000
I mean, this whole, it’s a bit like …

884
00:57:01,000 --> 00:57:03,380
a system should be transparent is a bit like

885
00:57:03,380 --> 00:57:05,880
marketing speak, because actually

886
00:57:05,880 --> 00:57:09,140
we don’t want systems to be completely transparent,

887
00:57:09,140 --> 00:57:13,430
’cause we also wanna be able
to engage with the systems.

888
00:57:13,430 --> 00:57:16,410
Are the systems working as they should be?

889
00:57:16,410 --> 00:57:20,380
So, I mean, this is a difficult balance to find, but yeah …

890
00:57:20,380 --> 00:57:24,730
Something that you achieve through usability studies,

891
00:57:24,730 --> 00:57:29,069
security analysis, etc.

892
00:57:29,069 --> 00:57:31,450
Herald: All right, Arne,
thank you very much for giving

893
00:57:31,450 --> 00:57:33,640
us your very inspiring talk,

894
00:57:33,640 --> 00:57:36,010
thank you for sharing your information with us.

895
00:57:36,010 --> 00:57:38,479
Please give him a round of applause.

896
00:57:38,479 --> 00:57:40,521
Thank you very much.
*applause*