1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:14,488 *34C3 preroll music* 2 00:00:14,488 --> 00:00:19,939 Herald angel: Today two people from privacy international, one is Eva Blum--Dumontet 3 00:00:19,939 --> 00:00:25,349 she's a research officer working on data exploitation especially in the global 4 00:00:25,349 --> 00:00:34,750 south and Millie Wood who's a lawyer and is fighting against spy agencies and 5 00:00:34,750 --> 00:00:41,070 before that she fought seven years against police cases and they're gonna be talking 6 00:00:41,070 --> 00:00:46,340 about policing in the the age of data exploitation. Give them a warm welcome. 7 00:00:46,340 --> 00:00:55,242 *Applause* 8 00:00:55,242 --> 00:00:58,440 Millie Wood: Hi I'm Millie as was just said I've been 9 00:00:58,440 --> 00:01:02,440 at privacy international for two years working as a lawyer before that I spent 10 00:01:02,440 --> 00:01:08,320 seven years bringing cases against the police and what increasingly concerns me 11 00:01:08,320 --> 00:01:14,130 based on these experiences is a lack of understanding of what tactics are being 12 00:01:14,130 --> 00:01:21,000 used by the police today and what legal basis they are doing this on. The lack of 13 00:01:21,000 --> 00:01:26,780 transparency undermines the ability of activists lawyers and technologists to 14 00:01:26,780 --> 00:01:31,479 challenge the police tactics and whilst I'm sure a lot of you have a broad 15 00:01:31,479 --> 00:01:36,990 awareness of the technology that the police can use I don't think this is 16 00:01:36,990 --> 00:01:43,390 enough and we need to know what specific police forces are using against 17 00:01:43,390 --> 00:01:50,479 individuals. The reason why is that when you're arrested you need to know what 18 00:01:50,479 --> 00:01:56,810 disclosure to ask for in order to prove your innocence. Your lawyers need to know 19 00:01:56,810 --> 00:02:03,010 what expert evidence to ask for in order to defend their client. And increasingly 20 00:02:03,010 --> 00:02:08,949 as there are invisible ways or seemingly invisible for the police to monitor a scale 21 00:02:08,949 --> 00:02:14,010 we need to know that there are effective legal safeguards. Now those who are 22 00:02:14,010 --> 00:02:20,720 affected are not just the guilty or those who understand technology they include 23 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:29,730 pensioners such as John Cat a 90 year old man who's a peace protester and he's a 24 00:02:29,730 --> 00:02:36,260 law-abiding citizen no criminal record and yet he is on the UK domestic extremism 25 00:02:36,260 --> 00:02:42,980 database and listed here are some of the entries: He took his sketchpad and made 26 00:02:42,980 --> 00:02:50,220 drawings, he's clean shaven, and he was holding a board with orange people on it. 27 00:02:50,220 --> 00:02:56,020 So this is the kind of people that they are surveilling. John's case exposes 28 00:02:56,020 --> 00:03:03,800 unlawful actions by the police but these actions date back to 2005 to 2009 as far 29 00:03:03,800 --> 00:03:10,170 as I'm aware there are no cases challenging modern police tactics and 30 00:03:10,170 --> 00:03:14,879 privacy international in the UK and with our partners throughout the world are 31 00:03:14,879 --> 00:03:20,520 increasingly concerned at the pace this is developing unobstructed because people 32 00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:28,480 don't know what's going on, and so we've started in the UK to try and uncover some 33 00:03:28,480 --> 00:03:34,180 of the police tactics using Freedom of Information requests. These laws should be 34 00:03:34,180 --> 00:03:39,480 available throughout Europe and we want to make similar requests in other countries 35 00:03:39,480 --> 00:03:44,450 hopefully with some of you. So now I'm going to hand over to my colleague Eva who 36 00:03:44,450 --> 00:03:47,860 will talk a bit about privacy international, some of the tactics we know 37 00:03:47,860 --> 00:03:52,030 the police are using, and then we'll speak about some of the things that we found out 38 00:03:52,030 --> 00:03:54,570 through our initial research. 39 00:03:54,570 --> 00:03:59,530 *Applause* 40 00:03:59,530 --> 00:04:02,919 Thank you so, I'm just going to tell you a little bit more about Privacy 41 00:04:02,919 --> 00:04:07,150 International for those of you who don't know this organization. We are based in 42 00:04:07,150 --> 00:04:11,470 London and we fight against surveillance and defend the right to privacy across the 43 00:04:11,470 --> 00:04:15,519 world. Basically, essentially what we're doing is that we do litigation, we conduct 44 00:04:15,519 --> 00:04:21,350 research, and we carry out advocacy including at the United Nations, we 45 00:04:21,350 --> 00:04:26,830 develop policies on issues that are defining modern rights. Now, our work 46 00:04:26,830 --> 00:04:30,900 ranges from litigations against intelligence services to a wide range of 47 00:04:30,900 --> 00:04:36,880 reports on issues such as connected cars, smart cities, and FinTech. We've recently 48 00:04:36,880 --> 00:04:41,610 published an investigation on the role of companies like Cambridge Analytica and 49 00:04:41,610 --> 00:04:47,990 Harris Media and their role in the latest Kenyan elections. With our network of 50 00:04:47,990 --> 00:04:52,471 partner organisations across the world we advocate for stronger privacy protection 51 00:04:52,471 --> 00:04:59,161 in the law and technology and stronger safeguards against surveillance. Now we 52 00:04:59,161 --> 00:05:04,080 talk about data exploitation and it's actually the title of the talk so what do 53 00:05:04,080 --> 00:05:10,380 we mean by that? The concept of data exploitation emerges from our concerns 54 00:05:10,380 --> 00:05:15,720 that the industry and governments are building a world that prioritize the 55 00:05:15,720 --> 00:05:22,650 exploitation of all data. We observe three prevailing trends in data exploitation. 56 00:05:22,650 --> 00:05:28,000 One is the excessive data that's generated beyond our control. The second one is the 57 00:05:28,000 --> 00:05:34,139 fact that this data is processed in a way we cannot understand or influence and the 58 00:05:34,139 --> 00:05:39,530 lack of transparency around it. The last one is, that at the moment this data is 59 00:05:39,530 --> 00:05:44,690 used to disadvantage us the ones who are producing this data and it's further 60 00:05:44,690 --> 00:05:51,270 empowering the already powerful. We hardly control the data anymore that's generated 61 00:05:51,270 --> 00:05:55,290 from phones or in our computers, but now in the world we live in data just don't 62 00:05:55,290 --> 00:06:00,130 come just from our phones or computers. It comes from the cars we're driving, it 63 00:06:00,130 --> 00:06:05,970 comes from our payment systems, from the cities we live in. This is all generating 64 00:06:05,970 --> 00:06:12,770 data and this data is used by other entities to make assumptions about us and 65 00:06:12,770 --> 00:06:18,450 take decisions that eventually influence our lives. Are we entitled to a loan? Do 66 00:06:18,450 --> 00:06:25,060 we qualify for affordable insurance? Should we be sent to jail or set free? Who 67 00:06:25,060 --> 00:06:31,130 should be arrested? This is at the core of the world that we're building around data 68 00:06:31,130 --> 00:06:37,630 exploitation. The question of power imbalance between those who have the data 69 00:06:37,630 --> 00:06:42,490 and who gets to make decisions based on this data and those who are producing the 70 00:06:42,490 --> 00:06:50,180 data and losing control over it. Now what is policing have to do with data, what 71 00:06:50,180 --> 00:06:57,020 does data exploitation have to do with policing? The police has always been 72 00:06:57,020 --> 00:07:04,620 actually using data in the past. To give you one example in 1980 a transit police 73 00:07:04,620 --> 00:07:10,530 officer named Jack Maple, developed a project called chart of the future, this 74 00:07:10,530 --> 00:07:16,479 is how he described it: "I call them the chart of the future. On 55 feet of wall 75 00:07:16,479 --> 00:07:20,740 space, I mapped every train station in New York City and every train. Then I used 76 00:07:20,740 --> 00:07:25,340 crayons to mark every violent crime, robbery, and grand larceny that occurred. 77 00:07:25,340 --> 00:07:33,250 I mapped the solved versus the unsolved". Now the system was used by the Transit 78 00:07:33,250 --> 00:07:41,110 Police and it was credited with reducing felonies by 27% and robberies by 1/3 79 00:07:41,110 --> 00:07:50,280 between 1990 and 1992. So this generated a lot of interest in his projects and former 80 00:07:50,280 --> 00:07:56,039 New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani asked the New York police department to essentially 81 00:07:56,039 --> 00:08:02,479 take up chart of the future and develop their own project. It became CompStat. 82 00:08:02,479 --> 00:08:10,360 CompStat was again essentially about mapping crime to try and make assumptions 83 00:08:10,360 --> 00:08:19,360 about where crime wars are happening. So this kind of shows the building of this 84 00:08:19,360 --> 00:08:25,570 narrative around this idea that the more data you have, the more data you generate, 85 00:08:25,570 --> 00:08:31,780 the better you will be at reducing crime. Now it becomes interesting in the world we 86 00:08:31,780 --> 00:08:36,379 live in that we describe, where we are constantly generating data, often without 87 00:08:36,379 --> 00:08:42,059 the consent or even the knowledge of those who are producing this data. So there are 88 00:08:42,059 --> 00:08:48,339 new questions to be asked: What data is the police entitled to access? What can 89 00:08:48,339 --> 00:08:54,490 they do with it? Are we all becoming suspects by default? One of the key 90 00:08:54,490 --> 00:09:00,449 elements of the intersection between data exploitation and policing is the question 91 00:09:00,449 --> 00:09:06,119 of smart cities. It's worth bearing in mind that data-driven policing is often 92 00:09:06,119 --> 00:09:12,029 referred to as smart policing, so obviously the word smart has been used generally in 93 00:09:12,029 --> 00:09:17,699 a generic manner by various industry to kind of describe this trend of using mass 94 00:09:17,699 --> 00:09:26,689 data collection in order to provide new services. But there is actually a real and 95 00:09:26,689 --> 00:09:34,670 genuine connection between smart cities and data-driven policing. The first reason 96 00:09:34,670 --> 00:09:43,709 for that is that actually one of the main reasons for cities to invest in smart city 97 00:09:43,709 --> 00:09:48,910 infrastructure is actually the question of security. This is something we've explored 98 00:09:48,910 --> 00:09:54,320 in our latest report on smart cities and this is emerging also from the work we're 99 00:09:54,320 --> 00:10:00,890 doing other organizations including coding rights in Brazil and DRF in Pakistan. So 100 00:10:00,890 --> 00:10:06,009 actually Brazil is an interesting example, because before the mega events they 101 00:10:06,009 --> 00:10:10,350 started organizing like the football World Cup and the Olympics they invested 102 00:10:10,350 --> 00:10:16,850 massively in smart city infrastructure. Including projects with IBM and precisely 103 00:10:16,850 --> 00:10:20,250 the purpose of what they were trying to achieve with their smart city 104 00:10:20,250 --> 00:10:25,850 infrastructure, was making the city safer so it was extremely strongly connected 105 00:10:25,850 --> 00:10:32,420 with the police. So this is a picture for example of the control room that 106 00:10:32,420 --> 00:10:39,109 was built to control CCTV cameras and to create graphs in order to showcase where 107 00:10:39,109 --> 00:10:45,860 crime was happening and also in a way the likeliness of natural disasters in some 108 00:10:45,860 --> 00:10:51,649 areas. In Pakistan there is a whole new program on investment of smart cities, 109 00:10:51,649 --> 00:10:58,799 which is actually referred to as the safe city project. Now companies understand 110 00:10:58,799 --> 00:11:05,249 that very well and this is actually an image from an IBM presentation describing 111 00:11:05,249 --> 00:11:11,189 their vision of smart cities. And as you see like policing that is very much 112 00:11:11,189 --> 00:11:16,790 integrated into their vision, their heavily centralized vision of what smart 113 00:11:16,790 --> 00:11:22,829 cities are. So that's no wonder that companies that offer smart city 114 00:11:22,829 --> 00:11:28,379 infrastructure are actually now also offering a platform for policing. So those 115 00:11:28,379 --> 00:11:34,820 companies include IBM as I mentioned but also Oracle and Microsoft. We see in many 116 00:11:34,820 --> 00:11:39,600 countries including the UK where we based some pressure on budgets and budget 117 00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:44,379 reductions for the police and so there is a very strong appeal with this narrative, 118 00:11:44,379 --> 00:11:51,120 that you can purchase platform you can gather more data that will help you do 119 00:11:51,120 --> 00:11:58,109 policing in less time and do it more efficiently. But little thought is given 120 00:11:58,109 --> 00:12:03,230 to the impact on society, or right to privacy and what happens if someone 121 00:12:03,230 --> 00:12:13,439 unexpected take the reins of power. Now we're gonna briefly explain what data- 122 00:12:13,439 --> 00:12:20,499 driven policing looks like, and eventually Millie will look at our findings. So 123 00:12:20,499 --> 00:12:26,339 the first thing I wanted to discuss is actually predictive policing, because 124 00:12:26,339 --> 00:12:30,740 that's often something we think of and talked about when we think about data- 125 00:12:30,740 --> 00:12:37,759 driven policing. I mentioned CompStat before and essentially predictive policing 126 00:12:37,759 --> 00:12:43,319 works on a similar premise. The idea is that if you map where crime happens you 127 00:12:43,319 --> 00:12:50,859 can eventually guess where the next crime will happen. So the key player in 128 00:12:50,859 --> 00:12:54,989 predictive policing is this company called PREDPOL, I mean I think they describe 129 00:12:54,989 --> 00:12:58,230 pretty much what they do, they use artificial intelligence to help you 130 00:12:58,230 --> 00:13:06,249 prevent crime, right, predicting when and where crime will most likely occur. Now 131 00:13:06,249 --> 00:13:10,929 PREDPOL and other companies using something called a Hawkes process that's 132 00:13:10,929 --> 00:13:17,019 used normally for the prediction of earthquake tremors, so what Hawkes 133 00:13:17,019 --> 00:13:23,269 originally did is that he was analyzing how after an earthquake you have after 134 00:13:23,269 --> 00:13:28,660 shakes and usually the after shakes tend to happen where the original earthquake 135 00:13:28,660 --> 00:13:35,940 happened and in a short period of time after that. So the Hawkes process basically 136 00:13:35,940 --> 00:13:40,910 is described as when a certain event happens, other events of the same kind will 137 00:13:40,910 --> 00:13:45,470 happen shortly after in the same in the same location. Now obviously it actually 138 00:13:45,470 --> 00:13:50,790 works quite well for earthquakes, whether it works for crime is a lot more 139 00:13:50,790 --> 00:13:56,290 questionable. But that's actually the premise on which companies that 140 00:13:56,290 --> 00:14:02,119 are offering predictive policing services are relying. So basically applied to 141 00:14:02,119 --> 00:14:08,730 predictive policing the mantra is monitoring data on places where crime is 142 00:14:08,730 --> 00:14:13,309 happening you can identify geographic hotspots where crime will most likely 143 00:14:13,309 --> 00:14:20,819 happen again. Now other companies than PREDPOL are joining in and they are adding 144 00:14:20,819 --> 00:14:26,259 more data than just simply location of past crimes. So this data has included 145 00:14:26,259 --> 00:14:30,629 open source intelligence and we talked a little bit more about this later on. 146 00:14:30,629 --> 00:14:35,699 Weather report, census data, the location of key landmarks like bars, churches, 147 00:14:35,699 --> 00:14:40,089 schools, data sporting events, and moon phases. I'm not quite sure what they're 148 00:14:40,089 --> 00:14:50,209 doing with moon phases but somehow that's something they're using. When predictive 149 00:14:50,209 --> 00:14:56,179 policing first sort of emerged one of the the key concerns was whether our world was 150 00:14:56,179 --> 00:15:00,999 going to be turning into a Minority Report kind of scenario where people are arrested 151 00:15:00,999 --> 00:15:05,490 before a crime is even committed and companies like PREDPOL were quick to 152 00:15:05,490 --> 00:15:10,199 reassure people and say that do not concern about who will commit crime but 153 00:15:10,199 --> 00:15:15,800 where crimes are happening. Now that's not actually true because in fact at the 154 00:15:15,800 --> 00:15:21,100 moment we see several programs emerging especially in the US, where police 155 00:15:21,100 --> 00:15:25,509 departments are concerned not so much with where crimes are happening, but who's 156 00:15:25,509 --> 00:15:30,920 committing it.,So I'm gonna talk about two example of this: One is the Kansas City No 157 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:37,850 Violence Alliance, which is a program laid by the local police to identify who will 158 00:15:37,850 --> 00:15:42,579 become the next criminal - basically - and they're using an algorithm that combines 159 00:15:42,579 --> 00:15:48,189 data from traditional policing as well as social media intelligence and information 160 00:15:48,189 --> 00:15:53,569 that they have on drug use, based on this they create graphics generated using 161 00:15:53,569 --> 00:16:01,609 predictive policing to show how certain people are connected to already convicted 162 00:16:01,609 --> 00:16:06,169 criminals and gang members. Once they've identified these people they request 163 00:16:06,169 --> 00:16:11,479 meeting with them whether they've committed crimes or not in the past. And 164 00:16:11,479 --> 00:16:16,420 they would have a discussion about their connection to those convicted criminals 165 00:16:16,420 --> 00:16:21,910 and gang members and what they tell them is that they are warned that if a crime 166 00:16:21,910 --> 00:16:27,109 next happened within their network of people every person connected to this 167 00:16:27,109 --> 00:16:33,319 network will be arrested whether or not they were actually involved in the crime 168 00:16:33,319 --> 00:16:38,379 being committed. Now there are actually dozens of police departments that are 169 00:16:38,379 --> 00:16:46,100 using similar programs. The Chicago Police Department has an index of the 400 people 170 00:16:46,100 --> 00:16:50,359 most likely to be involved in violent crimes. That sounds like a BuzzFeed 171 00:16:50,359 --> 00:16:56,389 article but actually there is a reality which is extremely concerning, because 172 00:16:56,389 --> 00:17:02,069 those people who are in this list are for the most part not actual criminals, they 173 00:17:02,069 --> 00:17:08,019 are purely seen to be connected to people who've committed crime. So if your next- 174 00:17:08,019 --> 00:17:16,679 door neighbor is a criminal then you may well find your name on that list. Now 175 00:17:16,679 --> 00:17:21,480 predictive policing is deceptive and problematic for several reasons: First of 176 00:17:21,480 --> 00:17:26,519 all there's the question of the presumption of innocence. In a world where 177 00:17:26,519 --> 00:17:32,519 even before you commit a crime you can find your name on that list or be called 178 00:17:32,519 --> 00:17:37,899 by the police - you know - what happens to this very basis of democracy which is the 179 00:17:37,899 --> 00:17:42,529 presumption of the of innocence. But also there's the other question of like can we 180 00:17:42,529 --> 00:17:47,720 really use the math that was originally designed for earthquakes and apply to 181 00:17:47,720 --> 00:17:53,049 human beings because human beings don't work like earthquakes. They have their own 182 00:17:53,049 --> 00:17:59,870 set of biases and the biases start with how we collect the data. For 183 00:17:59,870 --> 00:18:07,640 example, if the police is more likely to police areas where there is minorities, 184 00:18:07,640 --> 00:18:11,769 people of color, then obviously the data they will have will be disproportionately 185 00:18:11,769 --> 00:18:18,490 higher on persons of color. Likewise if they are unlikely to investigate white- 186 00:18:18,490 --> 00:18:24,200 collar crime they will be unlikely to have data that are reflecting a reality where 187 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:29,040 crime also happens in wealthier areas. So basically we are inputting biased datasets 188 00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:35,030 that obviously will lead to biased results. And what these biased results 189 00:18:35,030 --> 00:18:41,600 mean is that it will continue the already existing trend of over policing 190 00:18:41,600 --> 00:18:48,440 communities of color and low-income communities. I'll leave it to Millie for 191 00:18:48,440 --> 00:18:55,667 the next box. So, one of the increasingly popular technologies we're seeing in the 192 00:18:55,667 --> 00:19:00,586 UK, and is no doubt used around the world and probably at border points, although we 193 00:19:00,586 --> 00:19:06,450 need more help with the reasearch to prove this, is mobile phone extraction. The 194 00:19:06,450 --> 00:19:10,680 police can extract data from your phone, your laptop, and other devices which 195 00:19:10,680 --> 00:19:16,431 results in a memory dump of the extracted data taken from your device and now held 196 00:19:16,431 --> 00:19:23,331 in an agency database. So for example all your photos, all your messages, and all 197 00:19:23,331 --> 00:19:28,330 those of people who had no idea they would end up in a police database because 198 00:19:28,330 --> 00:19:34,549 they're associated with you retained for as long as the police wish. Now these 199 00:19:34,549 --> 00:19:38,600 devices are pretty user friendly for the police and if you're interested you can 200 00:19:38,600 --> 00:19:42,559 look on YouTube where Cellebrite one of the big players has lots of videos about 201 00:19:42,559 --> 00:19:48,929 how you can use them, and so depending on the device and the operating system some 202 00:19:48,929 --> 00:19:54,419 of the data this is from a police document but it lists what they can extract using a 203 00:19:54,419 --> 00:20:01,820 Cellebrite UFED is what you might expect: device information, calls, messages, 204 00:20:01,820 --> 00:20:08,970 emails, social media, and Wi-Fi networks. But if you look at their website and here 205 00:20:08,970 --> 00:20:14,750 are a few examples they can also collect: system and deleted data, they can access 206 00:20:14,750 --> 00:20:20,580 cloud storage, and inaccessible partitions of the device. Now this is data that is 207 00:20:20,580 --> 00:20:26,490 clearly beyond the average users control, and as the volume of data we hold on our 208 00:20:26,490 --> 00:20:31,749 phones increases so will this list. And the companies we know the UK police are 209 00:20:31,749 --> 00:20:39,059 using, which includes: Cellebrite, Acceso, Radio Tactics, MSAB, are all aware of how 210 00:20:39,059 --> 00:20:44,750 valuable this is and as one of them have stated: "if you've got access to a person 211 00:20:44,750 --> 00:20:50,500 SIM card, you've got access to the whole of a person's life". They also go on to 212 00:20:50,500 --> 00:20:56,070 note: "the sheer amount of data stored on mobile phones is significantly greater 213 00:20:56,070 --> 00:21:04,149 today than ever before." There are also no temporal limits to the extraction of data, 214 00:21:04,149 --> 00:21:09,149 this is from another police document we obtained and it shows that if you choose 215 00:21:09,149 --> 00:21:16,159 to extract to certain data type you will obtain all data of a particular type, not 216 00:21:16,159 --> 00:21:21,280 just the data relevant to an investigation. So all that data on a 217 00:21:21,280 --> 00:21:28,429 police database, indefinitely and even if you were asked whether you were happy for 218 00:21:28,429 --> 00:21:32,789 your data to be extracted during an investigation I think it's highly unlikely 219 00:21:32,789 --> 00:21:37,630 you would realize the volume that the police were going to take. Other targets 220 00:21:37,630 --> 00:21:44,179 for the police that we know about are: infotainment systems in cars, Smart TVs, 221 00:21:44,179 --> 00:21:51,230 and connected devices in the home. This is an extract from a tech UK report, where 222 00:21:51,230 --> 00:21:56,700 Mark Stokes head of digital forensics at the Met Police which the police in London 223 00:21:56,700 --> 00:22:03,200 stated in January, that the crime scene of tomorrow will be the Internet of Things 224 00:22:03,200 --> 00:22:08,450 and detectors of the future will carry a digital forensics toolkit that will help 225 00:22:08,450 --> 00:22:15,020 them analyze microchips and download data at the scene rather than removing devices 226 00:22:15,020 --> 00:22:20,081 for testing. Now I can imagine that the evidence storage room is going to get a 227 00:22:20,081 --> 00:22:24,840 bit full if they start dragging in connected fridges, hair dryers, hair 228 00:22:24,840 --> 00:22:32,570 brushes, your Google home, Amazon echo and whatever else you have. However, their 229 00:22:32,570 --> 00:22:38,240 plans to walk into your home and download everything, make no mention of needing a 230 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:43,509 specific warrant and so the only limitations at the moment are the 231 00:22:43,509 --> 00:22:50,220 protections that may exist on the devices. The law does not protect us and this needs 232 00:22:50,220 --> 00:22:59,409 to change. So I'm going to be talking a little bit about open source intelligence 233 00:22:59,409 --> 00:23:05,470 and in particular social media intelligence, because when I talked about 234 00:23:05,470 --> 00:23:10,830 predictive policing I identified those two sources as some of the data that's being 235 00:23:10,830 --> 00:23:17,470 used for predictive policing. Now, open source intelligence is often thought as, 236 00:23:17,470 --> 00:23:23,409 or often assumed to be innocuous, and there is the understanding that if 237 00:23:23,409 --> 00:23:29,440 information is publicly available then it should be fair for the police to use. Now 238 00:23:29,440 --> 00:23:34,270 the problem is that among open source intelligence there's often social media 239 00:23:34,270 --> 00:23:40,509 intelligence that we refer to as documents. Now there are many ways to 240 00:23:40,509 --> 00:23:45,900 conduct document and it can range from like the single police officer, who is 241 00:23:45,900 --> 00:23:54,009 just you know using Facebook or Twitter to look up the accounts of victims or 242 00:23:54,009 --> 00:23:58,620 suspected criminals, but there was also companies that are scrapping the likes of 243 00:23:58,620 --> 00:24:04,580 Facebook and Twitter to allow the police to monitor social media. Now social medias 244 00:24:04,580 --> 00:24:10,580 have like blurred the lines between public and private, because obviously we are 245 00:24:10,580 --> 00:24:17,909 broadcasting our views on this platform and at the moment the police has been 246 00:24:17,909 --> 00:24:25,059 exploiting this kind of unique space, this blured line, ithey are accessing this 247 00:24:25,059 --> 00:24:30,809 content in a completely unregulated manner, as long as the content is publicly 248 00:24:30,809 --> 00:24:37,620 available like for example you don't need to be friend or to have any already 249 00:24:37,620 --> 00:24:43,470 established connection with the suspected criminal or the police or the victim 250 00:24:43,470 --> 00:24:48,610 anything that's available to you it's completely unregulated there are no rules 251 00:24:48,610 --> 00:24:56,700 and I mentioned earlier the question of a budget restriction and so the police is 252 00:24:56,700 --> 00:25:01,749 benefiting hugely from this because it doesn't really cost anything to use social 253 00:25:01,749 --> 00:25:07,019 media so at the moment SOCMINT is kind of like the first and easy step in a police 254 00:25:07,019 --> 00:25:14,470 investigation because there is no cost and because there is no oversight. Now, 255 00:25:14,470 --> 00:25:19,420 SOCMINT actually isn't so innocent in the sense that it allows the police to 256 00:25:19,420 --> 00:25:25,519 identify the locations of people based on their post, it allows them to establish 257 00:25:25,519 --> 00:25:30,669 people's connection, their relationships, their association, it allows the 258 00:25:30,669 --> 00:25:37,380 monitoring of protest and also to identify the leaders of various movement, and to 259 00:25:37,380 --> 00:25:45,880 measure a person's influence. Now, in the UK what we know is that the police is 260 00:25:45,880 --> 00:25:52,019 largely using marketing products, so this is an anonymous quote from a report by 261 00:25:52,019 --> 00:25:58,029 academics that have been doing research on SOCMINT and what someone said was that: "A 262 00:25:58,029 --> 00:26:01,620 lot of stuff came out of marketing because marketing were using social media to 263 00:26:01,620 --> 00:26:05,190 understand what people were saying about their product... We wanted to understand 264 00:26:05,190 --> 00:26:11,549 what people were saying so it's almost using it in reverse". Now again, this is 265 00:26:11,549 --> 00:26:16,350 not considered like surveillance device this is purely a marketing project that 266 00:26:16,350 --> 00:26:23,309 they're using and for that reason law enforcement agencies and security agencies 267 00:26:23,309 --> 00:26:30,140 are often arguing that SOCMINT has basically no impact on privacy. But 268 00:26:30,140 --> 00:26:36,640 actually when your post reveals your location or when the content of your post 269 00:26:36,640 --> 00:26:40,080 reveal what used to be considered and is still considered actually as sensitive 270 00:26:40,080 --> 00:26:45,090 private information like details about your sexual life, about your health, about 271 00:26:45,090 --> 00:26:50,120 your politics, can we really minimize the impact of the police accessing this 272 00:26:50,120 --> 00:26:56,190 information. Now obviously we may not have a problem with the average twitter user or 273 00:26:56,190 --> 00:27:00,880 with a friend reading this information but when the ones who are reading the 274 00:27:00,880 --> 00:27:06,460 information and taking actions on this information have power over us like the 275 00:27:06,460 --> 00:27:17,717 police does, you know, what does it actually mean for our right to privacy? 276 00:27:17,717 --> 00:27:26,610 That's not to say that people should stop using social media but rather what kind of 277 00:27:26,610 --> 00:27:32,960 regulation can we put in place so that it's not so easy for the police to access. 278 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:41,720 The absence of regulations on SOCMINT has actually already led to abuse in two cases 279 00:27:41,720 --> 00:27:48,159 both in the US that we've identified: One is Raza v. the City of New York which is a 280 00:27:48,159 --> 00:27:55,840 case from the ACLU where we knew that we found out that the city of New York, 281 00:27:55,840 --> 00:28:00,179 sorry, the New York Police Department was systematically gathering intelligence on 282 00:28:00,179 --> 00:28:04,799 Muslim communities, and one of the ways they were gathering this intelligence was 283 00:28:04,799 --> 00:28:11,509 essentially by surveilling social media accounts of Muslims in New York. The 284 00:28:11,509 --> 00:28:17,320 second case is a company called ZeroFOX. So what ZeroFox does is social media 285 00:28:17,320 --> 00:28:23,150 monitoring. Now, during the the riots that followed the funeral of Freddie Gray, 286 00:28:23,150 --> 00:28:30,500 Freddie Gray was a 25 year old black man who had been shot by the police, so after 287 00:28:30,500 --> 00:28:36,549 his funeral there had been a series of riots in the UK and ZeroFOX produced a 288 00:28:36,549 --> 00:28:41,360 report that they shared with the Baltimore Police to essentially advertise for their 289 00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:47,929 social social media monitoring tool and what the company was doing was again like 290 00:28:47,929 --> 00:28:52,970 browsing social media and trying to establish who were the threat actors in 291 00:28:52,970 --> 00:28:58,659 these riots and among the 19 threat actors that they identified two of them 292 00:28:58,659 --> 00:29:04,499 were actually leaders of the black lives matter movement. Actually at least one of 293 00:29:04,499 --> 00:29:09,550 them was a woman definitely not a physical threat but this is how they were 294 00:29:09,550 --> 00:29:17,570 essentially labeled. So these two examples actually show that again it's still sort 295 00:29:17,570 --> 00:29:24,240 of the same targets, it's people of colors, it's activists, it's people from 296 00:29:24,240 --> 00:29:30,179 poor income backgrounds, that are singled out as likely criminals. And it's very 297 00:29:30,179 --> 00:29:34,029 telling when we realize that SOCMINT is actually one of the sources of data that's 298 00:29:34,029 --> 00:29:38,740 eventually used for predictive policing and then again predictive policing leading 299 00:29:38,740 --> 00:29:45,409 to people being more surveiled and potentially exposed to more police 300 00:29:45,409 --> 00:29:51,169 surveillance based on the fact that they all singled out as as likely criminal. Now 301 00:29:51,169 --> 00:29:56,890 social media is a fascinating place because it's a mix between a private and a 302 00:29:56,890 --> 00:30:02,210 public space as I said we are broadcasting our views publicly but then again it's a 303 00:30:02,210 --> 00:30:07,679 privately owned space where we follow the rules that is set up by private companies. 304 00:30:07,679 --> 00:30:13,779 Now, if we want to protect this space and ensure that like free expression and 305 00:30:13,779 --> 00:30:18,619 political organization can still happen on the spaces we need to fully understand how 306 00:30:18,619 --> 00:30:23,460 much the police have been exploiting the spaces and how we can limit and regulate 307 00:30:23,460 --> 00:30:29,879 the use of it. Now, I'll talk to Millie about what we can do next. So I'm going to 308 00:30:29,879 --> 00:30:33,460 briefly look at some of our initial findings we've made using Freedom of 309 00:30:33,460 --> 00:30:39,539 Information requests, broadly: the lack of awareness by the public, weak legal basis, 310 00:30:39,539 --> 00:30:45,429 and a lack of oversight. Now, sometimes the lack of awareness appears intentional 311 00:30:45,429 --> 00:30:54,740 - we asked the police about their plans to extract data from connected devices in the 312 00:30:54,740 --> 00:31:01,679 home and they replied neither confirm nor deny. Now this is kind of a bizarre 313 00:31:01,679 --> 00:31:06,659 response given that Mark Stokes who's a member of the police had already said that 314 00:31:06,659 --> 00:31:13,509 they plan to do this, in addition the UK government Home Office replied to us 315 00:31:13,509 --> 00:31:18,269 saying the Home Office plans to develop skills and capacity to exploit the 316 00:31:18,269 --> 00:31:23,929 Internet of Things as part of criminal investigations. They also said that police 317 00:31:23,929 --> 00:31:29,920 officers will receive training in relation to extracting, obtaining, retrieving, data 318 00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:35,399 from or generated by connected devices. So we wrote back to every police force in the 319 00:31:35,399 --> 00:31:40,970 UK had refused to reply to us and presented the evidence but they maintained 320 00:31:40,970 --> 00:31:45,679 their stance so we will be bringing a challenge against them under the Freedom 321 00:31:45,679 --> 00:31:51,929 of Information Act. Now, Eva has also identified the huge risks associated with 322 00:31:51,929 --> 00:31:57,769 predictive policing yet in the UK we've found out this is set to increase with 323 00:31:57,769 --> 00:32:02,070 forces either using commercial tools or in-house ones they've developed or 324 00:32:02,070 --> 00:32:09,049 planning trials for 2018. There has been no public consultation, there are no 325 00:32:09,049 --> 00:32:14,279 safeguards, and there is no oversight. So when we ask them more questions about the 326 00:32:14,279 --> 00:32:21,370 plans we were told we were 'vexatious' and they won't respond to more requests so it 327 00:32:21,370 --> 00:32:27,299 seems like we have yet another challenge, and what about mobile phone extraction 328 00:32:27,299 --> 00:32:32,570 tools here are some of the stats that have been found out and I would say these 329 00:32:32,570 --> 00:32:36,821 aren't completely accurate because it depends on how reliable the police force 330 00:32:36,821 --> 00:32:42,940 are in responding but roughly I'd say it's probably more than 93 percent now of UK 331 00:32:42,940 --> 00:32:48,379 police forces throughout the country are extracting data from digital devices. We 332 00:32:48,379 --> 00:32:53,080 know they plan to increase, we've seen in their documents they plan to train more 333 00:32:53,080 --> 00:32:58,690 officers, to buy more equipment, and to see extraction as a standard part of 334 00:32:58,690 --> 00:33:04,009 arrest, even if the devices had absolutely nothing to do with the offense and so 335 00:33:04,009 --> 00:33:09,769 these figures are likely to increase exponentially, but in the UK not only to 336 00:33:09,769 --> 00:33:15,610 the police not need a warrant in documents we've read they do not even need to notify 337 00:33:15,610 --> 00:33:21,139 the individual that they have extracted data, for example, from their mobile phone 338 00:33:21,139 --> 00:33:27,590 or that they're storing it. If this is being done without people's knowledge how 339 00:33:27,590 --> 00:33:32,220 on earth can people challenge it, how can they ask for their data to be removed if 340 00:33:32,220 --> 00:33:39,590 they're found innocent? Turning to social media monitoring which the police refer to 341 00:33:39,590 --> 00:33:44,330 as open source research. This is Jenny Jones she's a member of the House of Lords 342 00:33:44,330 --> 00:33:50,730 in the Green Party and next to her photo is a quote from her entry on the domestic 343 00:33:50,730 --> 00:33:57,249 extremism database, and so, if a member of the House of Lords is being subject to 344 00:33:57,249 --> 00:34:04,659 social media monitoring for attending a bike ride then I think it's highly likely 345 00:34:04,659 --> 00:34:08,830 that a large number of people who legitimately exercise their right to 346 00:34:08,830 --> 00:34:14,429 protest are being subject to social media monitoring. Now, this hasn't gone 347 00:34:14,429 --> 00:34:20,399 unnoticed completely although they're slightly old these are quotes from two 348 00:34:20,399 --> 00:34:24,899 officials: the first the UK independent reviewer of terrorism who notes that the 349 00:34:24,899 --> 00:34:29,690 extent of the use of social media monitoring is not public known, and the 350 00:34:29,690 --> 00:34:33,679 second is the chief surveillance commissioner who is and this is a very 351 00:34:33,679 --> 00:34:38,949 strong statement for a commissioner is saying that basically social media should 352 00:34:38,949 --> 00:34:47,649 not be treated as fair game by the police. So now I'll move on to a weak or outdated 353 00:34:47,649 --> 00:34:52,649 legal basis. For most of the technologies we've looked at it's very unclear what 354 00:34:52,649 --> 00:34:58,359 legal basis the police are using even when we've asked them. This relates to mobile 355 00:34:58,359 --> 00:35:03,940 phone extraction - so the legislation they're relying on is over 30 years old 356 00:35:03,940 --> 00:35:11,310 and is wholly inappropriate for mobile phone extraction this law was developed to 357 00:35:11,310 --> 00:35:16,680 deal with standard traditional searches, the search of a phone can in no way be 358 00:35:16,680 --> 00:35:22,300 equated to the search of a person, or the search of a house, and despite the fact 359 00:35:22,300 --> 00:35:26,901 that we have repeatedly asked for a warrant this is not the case and we 360 00:35:26,901 --> 00:35:31,270 believe that there should be a warrant in place not only in the UK but in the rest 361 00:35:31,270 --> 00:35:35,550 of the world. So if you think that either you or your friends have had their data 362 00:35:35,550 --> 00:35:39,369 extracted when they're arrested or your phone has been in the possession of the 363 00:35:39,369 --> 00:35:45,650 authorities you should be asking questions, and very briefly something on 364 00:35:45,650 --> 00:35:52,420 lack of oversight, so we reported in January this year about documents that 365 00:35:52,420 --> 00:35:58,000 were obtained by The Bristol Cable's investigation into Cellebrite and one 366 00:35:58,000 --> 00:36:04,020 report said that in half of the cases sampled the police noted the police had 367 00:36:04,020 --> 00:36:10,320 failed to receive authorization internally for the use of extraction tools. Poor 368 00:36:10,320 --> 00:36:15,809 training undermined investigations into serious offences such as murder, and 369 00:36:15,809 --> 00:36:20,940 inadequate security practices meant that encryption was not taking place even when 370 00:36:20,940 --> 00:36:26,849 it was easy to do and they were losing files containing intimate personal data. 371 00:36:26,849 --> 00:36:33,490 So why does this matter? Here are some key points: In relation to information 372 00:36:33,490 --> 00:36:37,760 asymmetry - it's clear as Eva has explained that the police can now access 373 00:36:37,760 --> 00:36:43,670 far more data on our devices than the average user. In relation to imbalance of 374 00:36:43,670 --> 00:36:47,420 power - it's clear they can collect and analyze sources that are beyond our 375 00:36:47,420 --> 00:36:54,320 control whether it's publicly placed sensors, cameras, and other devices. There 376 00:36:54,320 --> 00:36:58,890 is also unequal access and if lawyers don't know what's being gathered they 377 00:36:58,890 --> 00:37:03,660 don't know what to ask for from the police. All in all this puts the 378 00:37:03,660 --> 00:37:10,410 individual at a huge disadvantage. Another impact is the chilling effect on political 379 00:37:10,410 --> 00:37:16,850 expression now I'm sure many of you maybe think that the police monitor your social 380 00:37:16,850 --> 00:37:21,859 media but the average person is unlikely to, and so if they start to know about 381 00:37:21,859 --> 00:37:27,110 this are they going to think twice about joining in protesting either physically or 382 00:37:27,110 --> 00:37:32,380 using a hashtag, and what about who your friends are? If they know you attend 383 00:37:32,380 --> 00:37:38,540 protests are they really want to have their data on your phone if they know that 384 00:37:38,540 --> 00:37:44,460 potentially that could be extracted and end up on a police database? It's far 385 00:37:44,460 --> 00:37:49,380 easier to be anonymous face among many people than a single isolated person 386 00:37:49,380 --> 00:37:55,119 standing up to power but these new forms of policing we have been discussing 387 00:37:55,119 --> 00:38:00,339 redefine the very act of protesting by singling out each and every one of us from 388 00:38:00,339 --> 00:38:08,309 the crowd. So, what can we do? Many of you will be familiar with these technologies, 389 00:38:08,309 --> 00:38:12,720 but do you know how to find out what the police are doing? In the UK we've been 390 00:38:12,720 --> 00:38:16,610 using Freedom of Information requests, we want to do this with people throughout 391 00:38:16,610 --> 00:38:21,910 Europe and you don't need to be a lawyer so please get in touch. We also want to 392 00:38:21,910 --> 00:38:26,660 dig into the technology a bit more, I want someone to use a Cellebrite UFED on my 393 00:38:26,660 --> 00:38:31,809 phone and show me exactly what can come out of it, and we want to tell lawyers and 394 00:38:31,809 --> 00:38:37,329 activists about these new techniques. Many lawyers I speak to who are experts in 395 00:38:37,329 --> 00:38:42,210 actions against the police do not know the police are using these tools. This means 396 00:38:42,210 --> 00:38:46,700 they don't know the right questions to ask and so it's fundamental you speak to 397 00:38:46,700 --> 00:38:50,920 people who are bringing these cases and tell them about what they can do or what 398 00:38:50,920 --> 00:38:56,640 questions they should be asking, and finally we want you to also raise the 399 00:38:56,640 --> 00:39:18,034 debate, to share our research, and to critique it, thank you. 400 00:39:18,034 --> 00:39:24,220 Herald: So we've got ample enough time for Q&A are there any questions in the hall, 401 00:39:24,220 --> 00:39:28,670 yes, there's one over there. Question: You mentioned the problem of 402 00:39:28,670 --> 00:39:33,110 when they do physical extraction from the Celebrite device it's going to get all of 403 00:39:33,110 --> 00:39:37,710 the photos, all of the emails, or whatever maybe rather than just what the 404 00:39:37,710 --> 00:39:42,059 investigator needs. What is the solution to that from your eyes is there a 405 00:39:42,059 --> 00:39:45,740 technical one that these companies are gonna have to implement - which they're 406 00:39:45,740 --> 00:39:51,140 not going to - or a legal one, because on the other side a mobile phone is a crucial 407 00:39:51,140 --> 00:39:56,890 part in a any criminal investigation in 2017. So what's the workaround or the 408 00:39:56,890 --> 00:40:00,020 solution to that? Answer: I think it's both, I think the 409 00:40:00,020 --> 00:40:04,000 fact that there isn't any law looking at this and no one's discussing can there be 410 00:40:04,000 --> 00:40:08,520 a technical solution or does it need to be one where there's better regulation and 411 00:40:08,520 --> 00:40:12,660 oversight so you extract everything, can you keep it for a certain period to see 412 00:40:12,660 --> 00:40:16,859 what's relevant then do you have to delete it? The trouble is we don't see any 413 00:40:16,859 --> 00:40:22,290 deletion practices and the police have publicly stated in the media that they can 414 00:40:22,290 --> 00:40:27,280 just keep everything as long as they like. They like data you can kind of see why but 415 00:40:27,280 --> 00:40:31,240 that doesn't mean they should keep everyone's data indefinitely just in case 416 00:40:31,240 --> 00:40:35,062 it's useful so I think there may be tech solutions there may be legal ones and I 417 00:40:35,062 --> 00:40:40,510 think perhaps both together as is one of the answers. Herald: The next question 418 00:40:40,510 --> 00:40:45,349 from microphone one please. Q: I'm just wondering how those laws on 419 00:40:45,349 --> 00:40:50,280 action and power given to the cops are being sold to the UK people is it because 420 00:40:50,280 --> 00:40:56,510 to fight terrorism as I said or to fight drugs or this kind of stuff, what's the 421 00:40:56,510 --> 00:41:00,490 argument used by the government to sold that to the people. 422 00:41:00,490 --> 00:41:05,170 A: I think actually one thing that's important is to bear in mind is that I'm 423 00:41:05,170 --> 00:41:10,630 not sure most of the of the public in the UK is even aware of it, so I think unlike 424 00:41:10,630 --> 00:41:15,330 the work of intelligence services an agency where terrorism is used as the 425 00:41:15,330 --> 00:41:22,450 excuse for ever more power and especially laws that have become increasingly 426 00:41:22,450 --> 00:41:26,130 invasive, actually with policing we don't even fall in that kind of discourse 427 00:41:26,130 --> 00:41:30,980 because it's actually hardly talked about in UK. Yeah, and the mobile phone 428 00:41:30,980 --> 00:41:34,880 extraction stuff we've been looking at is low-level crimes, so that's like you 429 00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:40,750 have, it could be you know a pub fight, it could be a robbery, which that's more 430 00:41:40,750 --> 00:41:45,550 serious, it could be an assault, so they want to use it in every case. For all the 431 00:41:45,550 --> 00:41:48,170 other techniques we have no idea what they're using for that's one of the 432 00:41:48,170 --> 00:41:53,599 problems. Herald: The next question from the 433 00:41:53,599 --> 00:41:57,400 internet please. Q: When you say that there's a lack of 434 00:41:57,400 --> 00:42:04,460 laws and regulations for police concerning us in extraction and data from devices are 435 00:42:04,460 --> 00:42:09,790 you talking just about UK and/or USA or do you have any examples of other countries 436 00:42:09,790 --> 00:42:13,500 who do better or worse? A: I don't know of any country that has a 437 00:42:13,500 --> 00:42:18,520 regulation on publicly available information on social media. 438 00:42:18,520 --> 00:42:25,849 Herald: Microphone number four. Q: Thank you again for a great talk. In 439 00:42:25,849 --> 00:42:31,920 terms of data exploitation an element that I didn't hear you talk about that I'd like 440 00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:35,940 to hear a little bit more is when there are questions around who is doing the 441 00:42:35,940 --> 00:42:40,410 exploitation, I know in the U.S. some FOIA researchers get around how difficult it is 442 00:42:40,410 --> 00:42:44,640 to get data from the feds by going after local and state police departments, is 443 00:42:44,640 --> 00:42:48,450 that something that you're doing or do you have a way of addressing confusion when 444 00:42:48,450 --> 00:42:50,880 people don't know what agency has the data? 445 00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:56,580 A: Yeah, I think actually what one of the things the data exploitation program at 446 00:42:56,580 --> 00:43:00,330 Privacy International is doing is actually looking into the connection between the 447 00:43:00,330 --> 00:43:06,050 private sector and governments because obviously at the moment there's the whole 448 00:43:06,050 --> 00:43:09,950 question of data brokers which is an industry that's hardly regulated at all, 449 00:43:09,950 --> 00:43:14,130 that people don't necessarily know about, we don't, the companies that are doing it 450 00:43:14,130 --> 00:43:19,900 are familiar household name. I'll let Millie talk a lot more about the 451 00:43:19,900 --> 00:43:24,920 government aspects of it. I guess the question is again a country-by-country 452 00:43:24,920 --> 00:43:29,470 basis, we work in many countries that don't have any data protection regulations 453 00:43:29,470 --> 00:43:36,609 at all so there is this first difficulty as how do we regulate, how do we limit the 454 00:43:36,609 --> 00:43:40,920 power of the state when you don't even have the basic legislation around 455 00:43:40,920 --> 00:43:45,710 data protection? One thing to bear in mind is like the problem with companies is like 456 00:43:45,710 --> 00:43:53,220 how do you also hold companies accountable whereas with the state there is the whole 457 00:43:53,220 --> 00:43:58,119 challenge of finding the right legal framework to limit their power, but maybe 458 00:43:58,119 --> 00:44:02,069 I'll let Millie talk a little bit more about this. Yeah, with our with our FOIA 459 00:44:02,069 --> 00:44:06,270 request we tend to go after everyone so with the example of the Home Office saying 460 00:44:06,270 --> 00:44:08,990 something that the other police didn't that was because we went to all the 461 00:44:08,990 --> 00:44:14,680 different state bodies and I think that there's a good example in in the states 462 00:44:14,680 --> 00:44:17,690 where there's far more research done on what the police are doing, but they're 463 00:44:17,690 --> 00:44:22,600 using the same product in the UK I think it's axiom and they're a storage device 464 00:44:22,600 --> 00:44:29,119 for body-worn camera videos, and a lawyer in the states said that in order to access 465 00:44:29,119 --> 00:44:32,799 the video containing his client he had to agree to the terms and condition on Axioms 466 00:44:32,799 --> 00:44:38,140 website which basically gave them full use of his clients video about a crime scene. 467 00:44:38,140 --> 00:44:42,750 So that's a private company having use of this video so given that we found they're 468 00:44:42,750 --> 00:44:47,120 using it in the UK we don't know if those kind of terms and conditions exist but 469 00:44:47,120 --> 00:44:54,673 it's a very real problem as they rely increasingly on private companies. 470 00:44:54,673 --> 00:44:58,370 Herald: Number two please. Q: Thank you for your work perhaps you've 471 00:44:58,370 --> 00:45:03,450 already answered this partially from other people's questions but it looks like we 472 00:45:03,450 --> 00:45:08,539 have a great way to start the process and kind of taking the power back but you know 473 00:45:08,539 --> 00:45:13,250 the state and the system certainly doesn't want to give up this much power, how do we 474 00:45:13,250 --> 00:45:18,190 actually directly, what's kind of the endgame, what's the strategies for making 475 00:45:18,190 --> 00:45:24,770 the police or the government's give up and restore balance, is it a suit, is it 476 00:45:24,770 --> 00:45:27,859 challenging through Parliament and in the slow process of democracy, or what do you 477 00:45:27,859 --> 00:45:32,170 think is the right way of doing it? A: I never think one works on its own, 478 00:45:32,170 --> 00:45:36,670 even though I'm a litigator I often think litigation is quite a weak tactic, 479 00:45:36,670 --> 00:45:40,920 particularly if you don't have the public on side, and then again if you don't have 480 00:45:40,920 --> 00:45:44,220 Parliament. So we need all of them and they can all come through different means 481 00:45:44,220 --> 00:45:49,090 so we wouldn't just focus on one of the different countries it might be that you 482 00:45:49,090 --> 00:45:53,540 go down the legal route or the down the parliamentary route but in the UK we're 483 00:45:53,540 --> 00:45:57,460 trying all different routes so for example on mobile phone extraction in the 484 00:45:57,460 --> 00:46:00,900 beginning of next year we're going to be doing a video we're going to be doing 485 00:46:00,900 --> 00:46:04,120 interviewing the public and speaking to them about it, we're going to be going to 486 00:46:04,120 --> 00:46:08,960 Parliament, and I've also been speaking to a lot of lawyers so I'm hoping some cases 487 00:46:08,960 --> 00:46:15,280 will start because those individual cases brought by local lawyers are where also 488 00:46:15,280 --> 00:46:19,859 you see a lot of change like the John Cat case, that's one lawyer, so I think we 489 00:46:19,859 --> 00:46:25,901 need all different things to see what works and what sticks. 490 00:46:25,901 --> 00:46:31,150 Herald: We haven't had number three yet. Q: Hi, thanks for the talk, so I have a 491 00:46:31,150 --> 00:46:39,020 question regarding concerning the solution side of things because one aspect I was 492 00:46:39,020 --> 00:46:45,569 missing in your talk was the economics of the game actually because like you are 493 00:46:45,569 --> 00:46:51,510 from the UK and the private sector has like stepped in also and another public 494 00:46:51,510 --> 00:46:58,799 domain the NHS to help out because funds are missing and I would like to ask you 495 00:46:58,799 --> 00:47:03,299 whether or not you think first of all the logic is the same within the police 496 00:47:03,299 --> 00:47:12,720 departments because it might also be like cost driven aspect to limit the salaries 497 00:47:12,720 --> 00:47:18,589 or because you have the problem with police force coming in because you have to 498 00:47:18,589 --> 00:47:24,099 pay their rents and automated things especially when I'm given to the private 499 00:47:24,099 --> 00:47:30,779 sector which has another whole logic of thinking about this stuff is cost saving 500 00:47:30,779 --> 00:47:43,930 and so maybe it would be a nice thing whether if you could talk a bit about the, 501 00:47:43,930 --> 00:47:49,359 I'm sorry, the attempt to maybe like get economics a bit more into the picture when 502 00:47:49,359 --> 00:47:56,130 it comes to solutions of the whole thing. A: So I think yeah, your very right in 503 00:47:56,130 --> 00:48:02,309 pointing actually the relation, well that you compare what's happening with the NHS 504 00:48:02,309 --> 00:48:07,799 and what's happening with the police because in both the economics of 505 00:48:07,799 --> 00:48:14,940 companies offering policing services arise from the same situation there's a need of 506 00:48:14,940 --> 00:48:23,380 doing more efficient policing because of budget cuts, so the same way the NHS is 507 00:48:23,380 --> 00:48:30,079 being essentially privatized due to the budget cuts and due to the to the needs 508 00:48:30,079 --> 00:48:34,799 that arise from being limited in your finance, again there's a similar thing 509 00:48:34,799 --> 00:48:38,880 with the police when you when you're understaffed then you're more likely to 510 00:48:38,880 --> 00:48:44,329 rely on on technologies to help you do your work more efficiently because 511 00:48:44,329 --> 00:48:51,210 essentially with predictive policing the idea behind this is that if you know where 512 00:48:51,210 --> 00:48:56,380 and when crime will happen then you can focus the limited resources you have there 513 00:48:56,380 --> 00:49:02,640 and not sort of look at a more global larger picture. So I mean I'm not gonna be 514 00:49:02,640 --> 00:49:06,599 here on stage advocating for more funds for the police, I'm not gonna do that, but 515 00:49:06,599 --> 00:49:11,660 I think that there is there is a desperate need to reframe actually the narrative 516 00:49:11,660 --> 00:49:19,170 around how we do policing actually and then definitely also look at a different 517 00:49:19,170 --> 00:49:22,680 perspective and a different approach to policing because as I've tried to show 518 00:49:22,680 --> 00:49:28,010 it's been a really long time since this narrative has developed of more data leads 519 00:49:28,010 --> 00:49:32,789 to crime resolution but actually what I didn't have the time to get into in this 520 00:49:32,789 --> 00:49:37,490 talk is actually all the research that are showing that those product actually don't 521 00:49:37,490 --> 00:49:42,770 work like PREDPOL is actually basically gaslighting a lot of police officers with 522 00:49:42,770 --> 00:49:47,650 their figures, the kind of figures that are pushing and suggesting are just like 523 00:49:47,650 --> 00:49:53,671 plain inaccurate, it's not accurate to compare a city on the one year to what a 524 00:49:53,671 --> 00:49:59,230 city is becoming in another year so it's not even clear that a lot of this 525 00:49:59,230 --> 00:50:05,460 project are even like properly functioning and in a sense I don't want them to 526 00:50:05,460 --> 00:50:09,250 function I'm not gonna say if we had better predictive policing then the 527 00:50:09,250 --> 00:50:14,869 problem will be solved no that is not the question, the question is how do we have 528 00:50:14,869 --> 00:50:20,820 regulation that force the police to look differently into the way they are 529 00:50:20,820 --> 00:50:25,597 conducting policing. Herald: Number four please. 530 00:50:25,597 --> 00:50:31,980 Q: So, thank you for your presentation I have a question about SOCMINT, my opinion 531 00:50:31,980 --> 00:50:37,359 SOCMINT might violate the terms of services of for example Twitter and 532 00:50:37,359 --> 00:50:41,000 Facebook have you tried to cooperate with these companies to make them actually 533 00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:46,360 enforce their TOS? A: So actually there is two things as I 534 00:50:46,360 --> 00:50:51,270 said like all companies that are doing scraping of data and you're right in this 535 00:50:51,270 --> 00:50:58,700 case they violate the terms of services of Facebook and Twitter. Now, the other 536 00:50:58,700 --> 00:51:03,049 problem is that there is already a loop to this and actually the marketing company I 537 00:51:03,049 --> 00:51:08,289 was talking about that's being used by the UK police what they essentially do is that 538 00:51:08,289 --> 00:51:13,559 they purchase the data from Facebook and Twitter, so this is why it's interesting 539 00:51:13,559 --> 00:51:19,900 because when Facebook's say we don't sell your data, well essentially actually with 540 00:51:19,900 --> 00:51:25,970 marketing tools that are there to monitor what people say about products essentially 541 00:51:25,970 --> 00:51:29,599 what you're doing is selling your data, they're not selling necessarily like your 542 00:51:29,599 --> 00:51:34,400 name or your location or things like that but whatever you're going to be posting 543 00:51:34,400 --> 00:51:41,109 publicly for example in like groups or public pages is something that they are 544 00:51:41,109 --> 00:51:45,329 going to be trying to sell to those companies. So I think you're right and 545 00:51:45,329 --> 00:51:50,839 maybe Millie will have more to say about this. I think those companies have a role 546 00:51:50,839 --> 00:51:56,260 to play but at the moment I think the challenge we face is actually this loop 547 00:51:56,260 --> 00:52:00,960 that we're facing where by purchasing the data directly from the company they don't 548 00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:07,420 face any they don't violate the terms of services. Yeah, we've spoken a bit to the 549 00:52:07,420 --> 00:52:12,840 some of the social media companies, we've been told that one of their big focuses is 550 00:52:12,840 --> 00:52:17,710 the problems of the social media monitoring at the U.S. border and so 551 00:52:17,710 --> 00:52:22,609 because there's a lot known about that they're looking at those issues so I think 552 00:52:22,609 --> 00:52:27,000 once we show more and more the problems say in the UK or in other countries I 553 00:52:27,000 --> 00:52:31,869 think it would be very interesting to look at what's happened over the Catalan 554 00:52:31,869 --> 00:52:37,410 independence vote period to see how social media was used then. I think the companies 555 00:52:37,410 --> 00:52:42,380 aren't going to react until we make them although they probably will meet with us. 556 00:52:42,380 --> 00:52:49,990 A slightly different aspect we revealed in a different part of our work that the 557 00:52:49,990 --> 00:52:53,190 intelligence agencies were gathering social media that's probably not 558 00:52:53,190 --> 00:52:57,779 groundbreaking news but it was it was there in plain fact and so they all got a 559 00:52:57,779 --> 00:53:01,480 bit concerned about how that was happening, whether some of them knew or 560 00:53:01,480 --> 00:53:05,950 some of them didn't, so the better our research the more people speaking about it 561 00:53:05,950 --> 00:53:11,030 I think they will engage, or we'll find out are they are the police getting it 562 00:53:11,030 --> 00:53:17,350 lawfully or unlawfully. Herald: Number one please. 563 00:53:17,350 --> 00:53:21,200 Q: Thanks for your talk, I have a question on predictive policing because German 564 00:53:21,200 --> 00:53:28,700 authorities in the last two years piloted pre-cops PREDPOL projects in three states I think 565 00:53:28,700 --> 00:53:33,630 and they claimed that they would never use these techniques with data on individuals 566 00:53:33,630 --> 00:53:38,870 but only aggregate data like the new repeat stuff you presented and they 567 00:53:38,870 --> 00:53:42,940 presented as just an additional tool in their toolbox and that if use responsibly 568 00:53:42,940 --> 00:53:48,240 can lead to more cost effective policing, do you buy this argument or would you say 569 00:53:48,240 --> 00:53:55,020 that there's inevitably slippery slope or kind of like a path dependency to more 570 00:53:55,020 --> 00:54:01,010 granular data assessment or evaluation that would inevitably infringe on privacy 571 00:54:01,010 --> 00:54:05,319 rights? A: I think this goes back to the question 572 00:54:05,319 --> 00:54:08,740 of like you know are we using per listening to identify where crime is 573 00:54:08,740 --> 00:54:14,369 happening or who it is who's committing a crime but actually I think even if we if 574 00:54:14,369 --> 00:54:18,910 we stick to this even if we stick to identifying where crime is happening we 575 00:54:18,910 --> 00:54:23,650 still run into problems we still run into the fundamental problem of predictive 576 00:54:23,650 --> 00:54:28,599 policing which is we only have data on crime that have already been reported ever 577 00:54:28,599 --> 00:54:35,809 or already been addressed by the police, and that's by essence already biased data. 578 00:54:35,809 --> 00:54:41,430 If we have police in some areas then we're more likely to, you know, further police 579 00:54:41,430 --> 00:54:51,579 because the solution of those companies of those algorithm will be leading to more 580 00:54:51,579 --> 00:54:57,880 suggestions that crime is is happening more predominantly in those areas. So, as 581 00:54:57,880 --> 00:55:04,459 we've seen so far is that we fall into these fundamental problems of just 582 00:55:04,459 --> 00:55:11,329 overpolicing communities that are already overpoliced. So in a sense in terms of 583 00:55:11,329 --> 00:55:18,069 well the right to privacy but also the question of the presumption of innocence I 584 00:55:18,069 --> 00:55:23,040 think purely just having trying to cultivate data on the where crime is 585 00:55:23,040 --> 00:55:29,660 happening it's not efficient policing first of all but it's also causing 586 00:55:29,660 --> 00:55:35,020 challenges for fundamental rights as well. Yeah, I guess it's not a great comparison 587 00:55:35,020 --> 00:55:39,481 but what a lot of what they're bringing in now is a program to assist you with the 588 00:55:39,481 --> 00:55:43,910 charging decision, so you've got someone you've arrested do you charge them or not? 589 00:55:43,910 --> 00:55:48,319 The police say oh well of course it's only advisory you only have to look at how busy 590 00:55:48,319 --> 00:55:52,660 a police station is to know how advisory is that going to be and how much is it 591 00:55:52,660 --> 00:55:56,740 going to sway your opinion. So the more you use these tools the more it makes your 592 00:55:56,740 --> 00:56:01,260 job easier because rather than thinking, where are we going to go, what areas 593 00:56:01,260 --> 00:56:04,250 things going to happen, who are we going to arrest, well the computer told us to do 594 00:56:04,250 --> 00:56:08,700 this so let's just do that. Herald: Thank you and microphone number 595 00:56:08,700 --> 00:56:13,111 three please. Q: Thank you, do you think that there are 596 00:56:13,111 --> 00:56:19,940 any credible arguments to be made for limiting the police's abilities under acts 597 00:56:19,940 --> 00:56:25,130 in the UK that incorporate EU level restrictions on privacy data protection 598 00:56:25,130 --> 00:56:29,650 human rights or fundamental rights and if so do you anticipate that those arguments 599 00:56:29,650 --> 00:56:35,140 might change after brexit? A: Well they they're bringing in GDPR and 600 00:56:35,140 --> 00:56:39,670 the Law Enforcement Directive now and they're not going to scrap those once 601 00:56:39,670 --> 00:56:44,299 brexit comes in. We'll still be part, hopefully, of the European Court of Human 602 00:56:44,299 --> 00:56:49,130 Rights, but not the European Court of Justice. I think there are going to be 603 00:56:49,130 --> 00:56:51,960 implications it's going to be very interesting how they play it out they're 604 00:56:51,960 --> 00:56:57,420 still going to want the data from Europol, they want to be part of Interpol, policing 605 00:56:57,420 --> 00:57:02,309 operates at a different level and I think if they have to comply with certain laws 606 00:57:02,309 --> 00:57:06,029 so that they can play with the big boys then they probably will, but they may do 607 00:57:06,029 --> 00:57:12,160 things behind the scenes, so it depends where it works for them, but certainly the 608 00:57:12,160 --> 00:57:16,019 politicians and definitely the police wanna be part of those groups. So we'll 609 00:57:16,019 --> 00:57:20,809 have to see, but we will still use them and we'll still rely on European judgments 610 00:57:20,809 --> 00:57:26,865 the force they have in a court of law may be more difficult. 611 00:57:26,865 --> 00:57:32,319 Herald: Does the internet have any questions, nope, well then number two 612 00:57:32,319 --> 00:57:35,839 please. Q: So you've mentioned that they don't 613 00:57:35,839 --> 00:57:41,609 have really good operational security and sometimes some stuff that should not leak 614 00:57:41,609 --> 00:57:47,869 leaked now within the last year we had major data leaks all across the world like 615 00:57:47,869 --> 00:57:54,710 Philippines, South Africa, just to mention a few, now if the, security, OPSEC is so 616 00:57:54,710 --> 00:58:00,160 bad in the police in Great Britain it's not unlikely that something will happen 617 00:58:00,160 --> 00:58:05,299 in Europe of a similar kind what kind of impact do you think such a huge data leak 618 00:58:05,299 --> 00:58:11,750 of private information which the police legally stored has even if it was not 619 00:58:11,750 --> 00:58:16,539 leaked by the police and it would be leaked by a private company that had some way 620 00:58:16,539 --> 00:58:19,329 access to it? A: I I guess it depends what it what it 621 00:58:19,329 --> 00:58:25,340 is, if it's a database with serious criminals and only the bad people, then 622 00:58:25,340 --> 00:58:29,480 people will think when it's good they have that information but they 623 00:58:29,480 --> 00:58:35,920 need to make it more secure. If somehow databases which held all sorts of 624 00:58:35,920 --> 00:58:39,589 information say from people's mobile phones, innocent people's pictures, all 625 00:58:39,589 --> 00:58:44,820 that kind of thing then we might see a much wider public reaction to the tools 626 00:58:44,820 --> 00:58:51,039 that are used and the safeguards, the legal safeguards, will come a lot quicker 627 00:58:51,039 --> 00:58:55,599 than probably we will achieve in the way we're trying to go now because there'll be 628 00:58:55,599 --> 00:59:02,030 a bigger public outrage. Herald: Okay one last and hopefully short 629 00:59:02,030 --> 00:59:06,619 question from microphone one. Q: Hi, thanks for the talk was really 630 00:59:06,619 --> 00:59:10,320 interesting, it's actually quite a short question how much is a Cellebrite, and can 631 00:59:10,320 --> 00:59:14,760 we buy one? A: I did look to buy one, I think there 632 00:59:14,760 --> 00:59:21,319 were some on eBay but I'm sure if they were like the right things but a couple of 633 00:59:21,319 --> 00:59:24,319 thousand pounds, but I think you have to actually be a police force to get those 634 00:59:24,319 --> 00:59:30,529 ones, maybe there are other types but it's expensive but not unobtainable, but 635 00:59:30,529 --> 00:59:34,779 I'm trying to find universities that might have them because I think that a lot of 636 00:59:34,779 --> 00:59:38,369 forensic schools I'm hoping that they will, I know they do extractions of 637 00:59:38,369 --> 00:59:41,725 laptops but I haven't found one yet that does phones but I probably haven't asked 638 00:59:41,725 --> 00:59:45,808 enough people. Herald: So thank you very much. 639 00:59:45,808 --> 00:59:50,990 *34C3 Music* 640 00:59:50,990 --> 01:00:07,000 subtitles created by c3subtitles.de in the year 2020. Join, and help us!