0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/95 Thanks! 1 00:00:10,250 --> 00:00:11,719 Welcome, Julian. 2 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:13,039 Thanks. Thanks a lot. 3 00:00:13,040 --> 00:00:15,319 Children is from New Zealand, 4 00:00:15,320 --> 00:00:17,479 currently living in Berlin, and 5 00:00:17,480 --> 00:00:19,579 he started out as a new media 6 00:00:19,580 --> 00:00:22,519 artist, rich and credits 7 00:00:22,520 --> 00:00:25,009 social say, as a full blown engineer 8 00:00:25,010 --> 00:00:27,169 due to his work. 9 00:00:27,170 --> 00:00:28,940 And he's doing 10 00:00:30,410 --> 00:00:33,020 arts, engineering, arts, arts that shows 11 00:00:34,370 --> 00:00:36,559 the the complexity of 12 00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:38,779 the world and in a way that only 13 00:00:38,780 --> 00:00:41,659 someone who can actually understands 14 00:00:41,660 --> 00:00:43,579 the complexity of the world or is fully 15 00:00:43,580 --> 00:00:45,679 involved in this complexities 16 00:00:45,680 --> 00:00:46,840 can show and. 17 00:00:49,710 --> 00:00:52,109 You will socialists us today, stuff like 18 00:00:52,110 --> 00:00:54,749 transparency, grenades or Newsweek, 19 00:00:54,750 --> 00:00:56,999 which I actually saw myself 20 00:00:57,000 --> 00:00:59,729 as electronic in 2011, and 21 00:00:59,730 --> 00:01:01,169 even though I didn't know you, then I 22 00:01:01,170 --> 00:01:02,369 became a fan. Oh, cool. 23 00:01:03,480 --> 00:01:05,579 So I'm looking very much forward to 24 00:01:05,580 --> 00:01:06,780 that. Excellent. Thanks very much. 25 00:01:18,300 --> 00:01:20,609 OK, so it's been a long day 26 00:01:20,610 --> 00:01:22,919 for for everyone, 27 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:25,379 of course, and particularly 28 00:01:25,380 --> 00:01:26,369 me, I'm not going to say I've had the 29 00:01:26,370 --> 00:01:28,259 longest stable I've had at least the 30 00:01:28,260 --> 00:01:30,179 second longest day. 31 00:01:30,180 --> 00:01:32,339 I've had about two and a half hours sleep 32 00:01:32,340 --> 00:01:34,769 coming in from Paris and 33 00:01:34,770 --> 00:01:36,899 and just seeing some amazing, amazing 34 00:01:36,900 --> 00:01:38,489 lectures, particularly one on 35 00:01:38,490 --> 00:01:40,559 supersymmetry, which I actually 36 00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:42,269 had to leave in order to actually stop my 37 00:01:42,270 --> 00:01:44,399 brain turning into a 38 00:01:44,400 --> 00:01:46,649 kind of fruit salad so 39 00:01:46,650 --> 00:01:47,579 that I could give this talk. 40 00:01:47,580 --> 00:01:49,649 But I wanted to continue into the fruit 41 00:01:49,650 --> 00:01:52,649 salad status and had to retract 42 00:01:52,650 --> 00:01:54,359 amazing. Well, anyway, I'm going to be 43 00:01:54,360 --> 00:01:56,639 talking about mostly critical 44 00:01:56,640 --> 00:01:58,079 engineering. I'm going to 45 00:01:59,220 --> 00:02:01,319 give some sort of background to 46 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:03,599 to the movement, if you like. 47 00:02:03,600 --> 00:02:05,459 I mean, it has certainly taken off in the 48 00:02:05,460 --> 00:02:07,709 last couple of years, and I'm going to 49 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:11,879 probably use about a third 50 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:14,059 of the of the lecture covering that, 51 00:02:14,060 --> 00:02:15,899 that sort of that substrate, that basis. 52 00:02:15,900 --> 00:02:18,089 And then I'm going to go and show you 53 00:02:18,090 --> 00:02:20,339 a whole bunch of projects that I think 54 00:02:20,340 --> 00:02:22,829 represent critical engineering, 55 00:02:22,830 --> 00:02:24,989 both as a sort of a as a as as 56 00:02:24,990 --> 00:02:27,599 an ethos, if you like, but as a as a 57 00:02:27,600 --> 00:02:29,849 as a as a techno 58 00:02:29,850 --> 00:02:31,589 political political practice and very 59 00:02:31,590 --> 00:02:33,059 much as an as an engineering practice of 60 00:02:33,060 --> 00:02:34,019 its own. 61 00:02:34,020 --> 00:02:35,669 So out of the exploit, what do I what I 62 00:02:35,670 --> 00:02:36,670 mean by this? 63 00:02:37,320 --> 00:02:38,309 Well, first of all, I'll just start 64 00:02:38,310 --> 00:02:40,199 talking about the art, the art part. 65 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:42,449 There was a really nice 66 00:02:42,450 --> 00:02:44,669 piece of neon artwork 67 00:02:44,670 --> 00:02:46,829 or neon signage on the outside of the 68 00:02:46,830 --> 00:02:48,989 Ulta's Museum in Berlin for 69 00:02:48,990 --> 00:02:50,999 quite some years, and it it said all art 70 00:02:51,000 --> 00:02:53,189 has been contemporary, and I think that's 71 00:02:53,190 --> 00:02:55,389 a very, very important thing to 72 00:02:55,390 --> 00:02:57,359 to to remember when we are looking at the 73 00:02:57,360 --> 00:02:59,669 relevance of a given artistic or critical 74 00:02:59,670 --> 00:03:02,279 practice in relation to the now, 75 00:03:02,280 --> 00:03:03,569 you can in fact go right back to human 76 00:03:03,570 --> 00:03:05,639 history and find work that now, of 77 00:03:05,640 --> 00:03:07,469 course, would look traditionally old or, 78 00:03:07,470 --> 00:03:08,639 you know, antiquated. 79 00:03:08,640 --> 00:03:10,739 But at the time was was was 80 00:03:10,740 --> 00:03:12,749 was the most rigorous expression 81 00:03:12,750 --> 00:03:14,729 available to artists at that time without 82 00:03:14,730 --> 00:03:15,730 having their heads cut off. 83 00:03:18,450 --> 00:03:20,609 One very, very famous work was 84 00:03:20,610 --> 00:03:22,859 was was by Bruegel the elder, 85 00:03:22,860 --> 00:03:25,259 and this was painted in 15 59. 86 00:03:25,260 --> 00:03:27,389 This was the the 87 00:03:27,390 --> 00:03:29,609 the the club was for many 88 00:03:29,610 --> 00:03:31,799 years and in fact still is now 89 00:03:31,800 --> 00:03:34,379 really the closest 90 00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:36,539 depiction of what medieval life 91 00:03:36,540 --> 00:03:37,439 was like. 92 00:03:37,440 --> 00:03:39,810 Well, life, at least in the 1800s, 93 00:03:40,830 --> 00:03:42,929 it depicts it depicts a 94 00:03:42,930 --> 00:03:45,299 non idealized representation 95 00:03:45,300 --> 00:03:46,769 of of of reality. 96 00:03:46,770 --> 00:03:47,819 In those times. 97 00:03:47,820 --> 00:03:49,469 Naturally, drunkenness was the 98 00:03:49,470 --> 00:03:51,479 predominant activity it looks like in 99 00:03:51,480 --> 00:03:53,729 that time. But but also, you know, people 100 00:03:53,730 --> 00:03:55,799 engaging in the marketplace in the 101 00:03:55,800 --> 00:03:57,929 chaos of the marketplace, playing with 102 00:03:57,930 --> 00:04:00,149 chickens, admittedly 103 00:04:00,150 --> 00:04:01,049 like soccer balls. 104 00:04:01,050 --> 00:04:03,149 But but yeah, it's 105 00:04:03,150 --> 00:04:05,529 just a general madness of that time and 106 00:04:05,530 --> 00:04:08,129 and also a sense of rivalry, 107 00:04:08,130 --> 00:04:10,349 a sense of of of 108 00:04:10,350 --> 00:04:12,329 of decay, of suffering is all represented 109 00:04:12,330 --> 00:04:14,699 in that in that singular image. 110 00:04:14,700 --> 00:04:16,979 And I found this 111 00:04:16,980 --> 00:04:19,169 very fascinating in that that 112 00:04:19,170 --> 00:04:21,059 the singularity, if you like, of that of 113 00:04:21,060 --> 00:04:23,339 that image containing what 114 00:04:23,340 --> 00:04:25,529 anthropologists agree 115 00:04:25,530 --> 00:04:28,229 is a very, very stark and coherent 116 00:04:28,230 --> 00:04:30,029 representation of a representation of 117 00:04:30,030 --> 00:04:32,669 life. In that time, it would be extremely 118 00:04:32,670 --> 00:04:34,769 difficult to do today. 119 00:04:34,770 --> 00:04:36,089 I mean, to, for instance, we are just to 120 00:04:36,090 --> 00:04:38,159 focus on on a couple of people walking 121 00:04:38,160 --> 00:04:39,160 inside the scene. 122 00:04:40,390 --> 00:04:42,309 We see this this character here, the 123 00:04:42,310 --> 00:04:44,109 one's got some sort of odd growth on his 124 00:04:44,110 --> 00:04:45,549 back of some sort, I don't know whether 125 00:04:45,550 --> 00:04:48,099 he's sort of smuggling a small child 126 00:04:48,100 --> 00:04:49,749 or something like that, but this is a guy 127 00:04:49,750 --> 00:04:51,999 with a lantern and walking arm in arm 128 00:04:52,000 --> 00:04:53,409 down the street and the the having an 129 00:04:53,410 --> 00:04:54,609 intimate conversation. 130 00:04:54,610 --> 00:04:56,559 What would be the equivalent of that 131 00:04:56,560 --> 00:04:58,629 today in a European city, maybe 132 00:04:58,630 --> 00:05:00,849 even in Ghent or, you know, 133 00:05:00,850 --> 00:05:03,309 Antwerp or somewhere in the Netherlands 134 00:05:03,310 --> 00:05:04,310 or Belgium? 135 00:05:06,430 --> 00:05:08,349 That kind of intimacy could be a guy on a 136 00:05:08,350 --> 00:05:10,059 on a brick phone like this talking to his 137 00:05:10,060 --> 00:05:11,060 mate. 138 00:05:12,340 --> 00:05:13,959 The actual movement of people itself 139 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:16,269 would need to be coordinated by 140 00:05:16,270 --> 00:05:17,270 by 141 00:05:18,850 --> 00:05:21,129 a system of signaling and 142 00:05:21,130 --> 00:05:23,139 an infrastructure of signaling, if you 143 00:05:23,140 --> 00:05:25,119 like. In this case, we have the classic 144 00:05:25,120 --> 00:05:27,009 red light green light, you know, walk, 145 00:05:27,010 --> 00:05:28,010 don't walk. 146 00:05:29,110 --> 00:05:31,119 The monetary aspect itself, you know 147 00:05:31,120 --> 00:05:32,649 where people actually get cash, you know, 148 00:05:32,650 --> 00:05:34,239 maybe rather than trading a goat for a 149 00:05:34,240 --> 00:05:35,240 bag of rice 150 00:05:37,000 --> 00:05:38,499 or some other form of property at that 151 00:05:38,500 --> 00:05:40,749 time, the cash 152 00:05:40,750 --> 00:05:42,729 itself can actually be pulled literally 153 00:05:42,730 --> 00:05:43,629 out of the wall. 154 00:05:43,630 --> 00:05:46,129 And and that itself represents also 155 00:05:46,130 --> 00:05:48,519 an inability for us to coherently 156 00:05:48,520 --> 00:05:50,659 and singularly represent 157 00:05:50,660 --> 00:05:52,419 the flow of forces. 158 00:05:52,420 --> 00:05:54,819 If you like the network of forces that 159 00:05:54,820 --> 00:05:56,469 comprises what we understand to be 160 00:05:56,470 --> 00:05:57,970 contemporary European life today. 161 00:05:59,050 --> 00:06:01,209 Then of course, behind that that ATM 162 00:06:01,210 --> 00:06:03,039 machine behind that gold ultimate we 163 00:06:03,040 --> 00:06:04,199 have. 164 00:06:04,200 --> 00:06:06,729 We have, we have 165 00:06:06,730 --> 00:06:08,559 trading. We have the we have the broader 166 00:06:08,560 --> 00:06:10,089 financial marketplace. 167 00:06:10,090 --> 00:06:11,859 Of course, now we understand that that's 168 00:06:11,860 --> 00:06:14,259 heavily impacted by 169 00:06:14,260 --> 00:06:16,389 high frequency trading, which 170 00:06:16,390 --> 00:06:18,999 itself is built atop 171 00:06:19,000 --> 00:06:21,489 of a bedrock, a substrate of of 172 00:06:21,490 --> 00:06:23,919 of algorithmic inputs 173 00:06:23,920 --> 00:06:26,409 and modifiers, parametric and 174 00:06:26,410 --> 00:06:29,379 and disruptive and in other ways, 175 00:06:29,380 --> 00:06:30,969 even the food itself. 176 00:06:30,970 --> 00:06:32,679 I mean, if we to represent that 177 00:06:32,680 --> 00:06:34,809 marketplace scene of people purchasing 178 00:06:34,810 --> 00:06:36,609 food from someone that's sitting on a 179 00:06:36,610 --> 00:06:37,610 barrel 180 00:06:38,860 --> 00:06:40,299 in order to do that now, we would have to 181 00:06:40,300 --> 00:06:41,679 talk about these weird things, these 182 00:06:41,680 --> 00:06:42,680 indoor 183 00:06:44,260 --> 00:06:46,479 representations of that market with these 184 00:06:46,480 --> 00:06:49,029 with these repeating products, 185 00:06:49,030 --> 00:06:51,819 sitting in boxes with expiry dates, 186 00:06:51,820 --> 00:06:53,709 which of course for much of our food 187 00:06:53,710 --> 00:06:55,629 system depends heavily on this thing 188 00:06:55,630 --> 00:06:57,399 called refrigeration. 189 00:06:57,400 --> 00:06:59,499 The Center for Disease Control in 190 00:06:59,500 --> 00:07:02,199 the United States has covered extensively 191 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:04,269 the impact on human life and in 192 00:07:04,270 --> 00:07:06,449 contemporary human life of 193 00:07:06,450 --> 00:07:09,249 of refrigeration just ceasing to exist. 194 00:07:09,250 --> 00:07:11,019 Huge numbers of us would be dead in a 195 00:07:11,020 --> 00:07:12,759 couple of weeks due to food poisoning. 196 00:07:14,130 --> 00:07:15,299 But of course, we know the fridge is 197 00:07:15,300 --> 00:07:16,529 something like this, so we're heavily 198 00:07:16,530 --> 00:07:18,599 dependent upon upon all sorts 199 00:07:18,600 --> 00:07:21,539 of forces 200 00:07:21,540 --> 00:07:24,509 and networks of forces as inputs 201 00:07:24,510 --> 00:07:26,639 in order to to to 202 00:07:26,640 --> 00:07:28,499 maintain, if you like, even support this 203 00:07:28,500 --> 00:07:31,109 thing that we call every day 204 00:07:31,110 --> 00:07:32,279 urban urban life. 205 00:07:33,530 --> 00:07:35,639 Now what we deal with 206 00:07:35,640 --> 00:07:37,769 now, as opposed to 207 00:07:37,770 --> 00:07:39,689 back in the time of Bruegel, the elder, 208 00:07:39,690 --> 00:07:41,609 is this increasing problem of the 209 00:07:41,610 --> 00:07:44,619 diametric of invisibility and 210 00:07:44,620 --> 00:07:46,259 invisibility. We have this. 211 00:07:46,260 --> 00:07:48,269 We have this running problem of the 212 00:07:48,270 --> 00:07:50,099 inability to see the inner workings of 213 00:07:50,100 --> 00:07:53,369 our of our technologically 214 00:07:53,370 --> 00:07:56,399 engineered and mediated environment, 215 00:07:56,400 --> 00:07:59,009 bring on a tour of a very smart man said. 216 00:07:59,010 --> 00:08:01,049 When a machine runs efficiently, when a 217 00:08:01,050 --> 00:08:03,359 matter of fact, a set of one one 218 00:08:03,360 --> 00:08:05,729 need focus only on its inputs and outputs 219 00:08:05,730 --> 00:08:08,729 and not on its internal complexity. 220 00:08:08,730 --> 00:08:10,499 Thus, paradoxically, the more science and 221 00:08:10,500 --> 00:08:12,719 technology succeed, the more opaque 222 00:08:12,720 --> 00:08:14,669 and obscure they become. 223 00:08:14,670 --> 00:08:16,769 So, so, so the better running 224 00:08:16,770 --> 00:08:18,869 of a system of a machine, the more it 225 00:08:18,870 --> 00:08:20,999 actually increases to become what tends 226 00:08:21,000 --> 00:08:23,309 to become closed and become opaque. 227 00:08:24,870 --> 00:08:27,269 Bruno was very 228 00:08:27,270 --> 00:08:30,239 polemic at the time for introducing, 229 00:08:30,240 --> 00:08:32,009 among many things, the network theory, et 230 00:08:32,010 --> 00:08:34,168 cetera, et cetera, but also this 231 00:08:34,169 --> 00:08:35,249 idea of the black box. 232 00:08:35,250 --> 00:08:36,719 He really brought it into a lot of 233 00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:38,699 critical remarks at the time, looking at 234 00:08:38,700 --> 00:08:41,279 the problem of of opacity as regards 235 00:08:42,330 --> 00:08:43,859 systems. 236 00:08:43,860 --> 00:08:45,539 And here we have an interesting 237 00:08:45,540 --> 00:08:47,069 representation of a black box. 238 00:08:47,070 --> 00:08:48,519 We have the input coming in on the left 239 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:49,589 and output over here. 240 00:08:49,590 --> 00:08:51,119 But in the middle, we have a hidden 241 00:08:51,120 --> 00:08:53,279 feedback control loop. 242 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:54,359 And that, for me, is a very, very 243 00:08:54,360 --> 00:08:56,489 interesting starting point for for 244 00:08:56,490 --> 00:08:58,169 looking at some of the techno political 245 00:08:58,170 --> 00:09:00,059 challenges of our time today. 246 00:09:01,230 --> 00:09:03,539 And of course, things things 247 00:09:03,540 --> 00:09:05,639 become increasingly problematic when we 248 00:09:05,640 --> 00:09:06,719 start talking about this thing called 249 00:09:06,720 --> 00:09:07,720 infrastructure. 250 00:09:08,580 --> 00:09:10,979 When we look at the 251 00:09:10,980 --> 00:09:12,989 internet of representations of of the 252 00:09:12,990 --> 00:09:15,089 internet as, of course, a network of 253 00:09:15,090 --> 00:09:16,799 networks that wasn't ever so much 254 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:19,799 designed as as just sort of emerged 255 00:09:19,800 --> 00:09:21,899 as an ongoing attempt for networks to 256 00:09:21,900 --> 00:09:23,729 connect to other networks, you know, the 257 00:09:23,730 --> 00:09:25,919 Tree of Stars phenomenon we have 258 00:09:25,920 --> 00:09:28,410 with IPv4 and and 259 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:31,260 and this sort of clustering around that. 260 00:09:32,640 --> 00:09:35,219 But to to that to an end user, 261 00:09:35,220 --> 00:09:36,689 I like a quote. I heard earlier that the 262 00:09:36,690 --> 00:09:38,219 only people that refer to users are 263 00:09:38,220 --> 00:09:40,889 software designers and drug dealers. 264 00:09:40,890 --> 00:09:43,109 But yet when we are talking 265 00:09:43,110 --> 00:09:45,449 about users, you know, we're pushed 266 00:09:45,450 --> 00:09:47,699 into this field of surfaces in 267 00:09:47,700 --> 00:09:48,929 themselves much of the time. 268 00:09:48,930 --> 00:09:50,999 Thankfully, Mozilla 269 00:09:51,000 --> 00:09:53,099 Firefox is not playing that game 270 00:09:53,100 --> 00:09:55,169 of opacity, but we have pushed 271 00:09:55,170 --> 00:09:57,239 into into this kind of a black box again, 272 00:09:57,240 --> 00:09:59,219 a kind of scanning over, at least as 273 00:09:59,220 --> 00:10:00,779 regards the world wide web, not the 274 00:10:00,780 --> 00:10:02,100 internet itself, but the web, 275 00:10:03,210 --> 00:10:05,309 which which provides, of course, many 276 00:10:05,310 --> 00:10:07,139 conveniences but comes with the cost of a 277 00:10:07,140 --> 00:10:09,389 lack of a lack of visibility 278 00:10:09,390 --> 00:10:11,519 of transparency, engineered 279 00:10:11,520 --> 00:10:13,619 infrastructure, as is as a part of 280 00:10:13,620 --> 00:10:14,519 our environment. 281 00:10:14,520 --> 00:10:16,019 I mean, I grew up in New Zealand, where I 282 00:10:16,020 --> 00:10:18,349 couldn't see another house surrounded 283 00:10:18,350 --> 00:10:20,279 by beautiful indigenous forests that had 284 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:21,359 never been cut down. 285 00:10:21,360 --> 00:10:22,360 That's where I grew up. 286 00:10:23,220 --> 00:10:25,739 And now I live in cities and I'm 287 00:10:25,740 --> 00:10:27,689 regularly aware still to this day. 288 00:10:27,690 --> 00:10:29,639 Having spent 10 years living here in 289 00:10:29,640 --> 00:10:31,649 Europe of just the presence of 290 00:10:31,650 --> 00:10:33,929 infrastructure, and it always 291 00:10:33,930 --> 00:10:35,369 makes me nervous. It always it always 292 00:10:35,370 --> 00:10:36,370 has. 293 00:10:37,100 --> 00:10:39,419 But the idea 294 00:10:39,420 --> 00:10:41,399 that we can actually have an environment, 295 00:10:41,400 --> 00:10:42,989 an urban environment and talk about it as 296 00:10:42,990 --> 00:10:44,510 a singular thing is 297 00:10:45,600 --> 00:10:47,669 problematic, not just 298 00:10:47,670 --> 00:10:49,529 not just for reasons of wanting to be 299 00:10:49,530 --> 00:10:52,319 able to depict contemporary life, 300 00:10:52,320 --> 00:10:54,449 but in order to be able to understand 301 00:10:54,450 --> 00:10:56,850 how that environment shapes 302 00:10:57,900 --> 00:10:59,969 shapes us on 303 00:10:59,970 --> 00:11:02,039 a small scale, we can look at an object 304 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:03,149 like this. 305 00:11:03,150 --> 00:11:05,189 This is obviously the gramophone, which 306 00:11:05,190 --> 00:11:06,869 was the shit hot. 307 00:11:07,920 --> 00:11:10,019 MP three player of its time. 308 00:11:10,020 --> 00:11:12,299 And and I like to think of this 309 00:11:12,300 --> 00:11:15,359 actual object. It's very much a social 310 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:18,029 object, very much an extroverted object, 311 00:11:18,030 --> 00:11:20,009 and it's in its own sense. 312 00:11:20,010 --> 00:11:21,269 If you look at it, all of its inner 313 00:11:21,270 --> 00:11:22,709 functionality is expressed. 314 00:11:22,710 --> 00:11:24,779 Outwardly, we see the horn where the 315 00:11:24,780 --> 00:11:26,879 sound comes out and if the 316 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:28,499 if the record is actually playing, we can 317 00:11:28,500 --> 00:11:30,569 put our ear to that horn 318 00:11:30,570 --> 00:11:32,369 and we and we can confirm with our air 319 00:11:32,370 --> 00:11:33,959 that that is in fact where the sound is, 320 00:11:33,960 --> 00:11:36,299 is very much being amplified 321 00:11:36,300 --> 00:11:37,500 and pushed out into the room. 322 00:11:38,940 --> 00:11:41,289 Structured air pressure effectively. 323 00:11:41,290 --> 00:11:43,439 And if we actually look at the crank, we 324 00:11:43,440 --> 00:11:45,149 can see this is our energy inputs and we 325 00:11:45,150 --> 00:11:47,759 can we can wind that, that crank. 326 00:11:47,760 --> 00:11:49,319 And in doing so, we see an immediate 327 00:11:49,320 --> 00:11:51,899 response with the platter itself 328 00:11:51,900 --> 00:11:53,399 actually spinning. And if we look close 329 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:55,199 enough on the record itself, we can see a 330 00:11:55,200 --> 00:11:57,389 little needle bobbing up and down as 331 00:11:57,390 --> 00:11:59,399 it winds around the spiral of that of 332 00:11:59,400 --> 00:12:00,809 that record. 333 00:12:00,810 --> 00:12:02,399 So the inner workings of this object are 334 00:12:02,400 --> 00:12:03,979 expressed outwardly. 335 00:12:03,980 --> 00:12:07,469 It's a it's a highly porous, transparent, 336 00:12:07,470 --> 00:12:09,029 we should say, less translucent objects 337 00:12:09,030 --> 00:12:11,549 in that regard. Compare it to the iPod 338 00:12:11,550 --> 00:12:13,859 Nano, which just represents or 339 00:12:13,860 --> 00:12:15,869 is represented by a field of surfaces 340 00:12:15,870 --> 00:12:19,169 that presents itself as a as a skinned 341 00:12:19,170 --> 00:12:21,749 object of metaphors, you know, 342 00:12:21,750 --> 00:12:24,359 fast forward and rewind. 343 00:12:25,650 --> 00:12:28,529 My girlfriend, Crystal, told me how 344 00:12:28,530 --> 00:12:30,209 she was trying to explain to her to a 345 00:12:30,210 --> 00:12:32,369 young boy the phenomenon the 346 00:12:32,370 --> 00:12:34,659 the the the the 347 00:12:35,970 --> 00:12:38,249 the experience of of of rewind. 348 00:12:38,250 --> 00:12:40,199 And fast forward from her experience 349 00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:42,239 growing up with tapes with cassettes. 350 00:12:42,240 --> 00:12:44,789 And he just could not fathom the 351 00:12:44,790 --> 00:12:46,649 the concept in our head to actually pull 352 00:12:46,650 --> 00:12:48,719 out a cassette, put it into a machine 353 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:50,489 and show and what it was to fast forward 354 00:12:50,490 --> 00:12:51,479 and rewind naturally. 355 00:12:51,480 --> 00:12:54,239 Now we skip, Oh, I'm 356 00:12:54,240 --> 00:12:56,519 so already we start to see these, 357 00:12:56,520 --> 00:12:58,859 these sort of metaphors themselves 358 00:12:58,860 --> 00:13:01,139 playing into the way that we use 359 00:13:01,140 --> 00:13:03,209 technology and also informing 360 00:13:03,210 --> 00:13:05,579 back into the into the design. 361 00:13:05,580 --> 00:13:07,019 But if you take this field of surfaces 362 00:13:07,020 --> 00:13:08,909 and you're really interested in 363 00:13:08,910 --> 00:13:10,979 understanding how it works and what 364 00:13:10,980 --> 00:13:12,959 it does, you have to open it up. 365 00:13:12,960 --> 00:13:15,089 And almost almost no 366 00:13:15,090 --> 00:13:17,339 one you or I know could tell 367 00:13:17,340 --> 00:13:19,469 you precisely exactly 368 00:13:19,470 --> 00:13:21,009 how an iPod nano works. 369 00:13:21,010 --> 00:13:22,049 I wouldn't be able to. 370 00:13:22,050 --> 00:13:23,759 Most people wouldn't be able to tell you 371 00:13:23,760 --> 00:13:25,139 where the DSP chip is. 372 00:13:25,140 --> 00:13:26,399 They wouldn't tell me the digital signal 373 00:13:26,400 --> 00:13:27,809 processor was on this board. 374 00:13:27,810 --> 00:13:29,969 They might not even recognize the power 375 00:13:29,970 --> 00:13:31,709 interface to the battery. 376 00:13:31,710 --> 00:13:34,439 They might not even recognize the lithium 377 00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:37,259 battery itself as being a 378 00:13:37,260 --> 00:13:39,479 as being a power source. 379 00:13:39,480 --> 00:13:41,669 So, so the opacity is 380 00:13:41,670 --> 00:13:43,409 also expressed sort of inwardly. 381 00:13:43,410 --> 00:13:45,929 And this problem of of of ever retreating 382 00:13:45,930 --> 00:13:46,930 scale. 383 00:13:47,550 --> 00:13:49,379 Most of us, at least, I mean, maybe not 384 00:13:49,380 --> 00:13:51,659 here this is the C3, but most 385 00:13:51,660 --> 00:13:52,729 of us can say that we don't. 386 00:13:52,730 --> 00:13:54,499 Really, no, the devices in our pockets, 387 00:13:54,500 --> 00:13:56,029 you know, these things that we sleep, 388 00:13:56,030 --> 00:13:58,039 sleep right next to and walk around with 389 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:00,439 and and speak 390 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:02,929 and to hear, for instance, 391 00:14:02,930 --> 00:14:05,239 as the as 392 00:14:05,240 --> 00:14:07,549 the wireless radio 393 00:14:07,550 --> 00:14:09,619 part of an iPhone, an iPhone, iPhone 394 00:14:09,620 --> 00:14:10,729 four. 395 00:14:10,730 --> 00:14:12,379 So the right to deconstruct, modify and 396 00:14:12,380 --> 00:14:14,269 ruin our rights that that actually come 397 00:14:14,270 --> 00:14:16,249 with ownership or at least should. 398 00:14:16,250 --> 00:14:17,629 This is something that that's very, very 399 00:14:17,630 --> 00:14:19,129 important to me personally. 400 00:14:19,130 --> 00:14:20,479 The right to open those things that we 401 00:14:20,480 --> 00:14:23,299 own, even just to study them, 402 00:14:23,300 --> 00:14:24,679 is increasingly contested. 403 00:14:24,680 --> 00:14:25,819 Now there's this. 404 00:14:25,820 --> 00:14:28,159 There's a wall of lawyers between 405 00:14:28,160 --> 00:14:30,229 us and and an object 406 00:14:30,230 --> 00:14:31,369 that we have in our pockets, you know, to 407 00:14:31,370 --> 00:14:33,559 open that object, they actually open 408 00:14:33,560 --> 00:14:35,179 it up and inspect and study. 409 00:14:35,180 --> 00:14:37,399 It is already trading 410 00:14:37,400 --> 00:14:39,229 on legal territory. 411 00:14:39,230 --> 00:14:42,229 This is why we should stop talking about 412 00:14:42,230 --> 00:14:43,669 we should we should start talking about 413 00:14:43,670 --> 00:14:45,089 lawyers in a new plural. 414 00:14:45,090 --> 00:14:46,369 I would like to start referring to a 415 00:14:46,370 --> 00:14:47,929 murder of lawyers. 416 00:14:47,930 --> 00:14:48,979 You've got a murder of crows. 417 00:14:48,980 --> 00:14:50,389 You know, black, those beautiful black 418 00:14:50,390 --> 00:14:51,559 birds, but a murder of lawyers. 419 00:14:51,560 --> 00:14:52,560 I think it's better. 420 00:14:53,630 --> 00:14:55,729 What we need is the right to 421 00:14:55,730 --> 00:14:57,919 read, write and execute 422 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:00,049 as regards the objects that we 423 00:15:00,050 --> 00:15:01,429 that we own. 424 00:15:01,430 --> 00:15:02,839 And this is something that needs to be 425 00:15:02,840 --> 00:15:04,909 not just pushed in the 426 00:15:04,910 --> 00:15:06,739 form of policy reform and that kind of 427 00:15:06,740 --> 00:15:09,109 thing. It needs to be actively upheld 428 00:15:09,110 --> 00:15:10,969 through through the daily practice of 429 00:15:10,970 --> 00:15:13,099 studying that which we 430 00:15:13,100 --> 00:15:15,259 that which we hold near to us, that 431 00:15:15,260 --> 00:15:17,359 infrastructure and that which 432 00:15:17,360 --> 00:15:19,609 we depend upon us personally. 433 00:15:19,610 --> 00:15:21,409 Most importantly, what's at stake? 434 00:15:21,410 --> 00:15:22,579 Of course, we have that. Yes, we scan 435 00:15:22,580 --> 00:15:25,009 problem that charismatic 436 00:15:25,010 --> 00:15:26,010 man. 437 00:15:27,940 --> 00:15:30,219 This is my album, by the way. 438 00:15:30,220 --> 00:15:31,220 Smell it. 439 00:15:32,230 --> 00:15:34,419 But yeah, we have this, we have this 440 00:15:34,420 --> 00:15:35,859 incredible stuff like, for instance, you 441 00:15:35,860 --> 00:15:37,749 know, when I read on scene it a while 442 00:15:37,750 --> 00:15:40,209 ago, Senate bill rewrite, let us feds 443 00:15:40,210 --> 00:15:42,459 read your email without warrants. 444 00:15:43,810 --> 00:15:45,939 If you were to, if you were to ask. 445 00:15:45,940 --> 00:15:47,559 But this just gets down to the problem of 446 00:15:47,560 --> 00:15:48,909 education. The problem very much of 447 00:15:48,910 --> 00:15:50,679 language. If you were to ask just about 448 00:15:50,680 --> 00:15:52,809 anyone, you know how the postcard that 449 00:15:52,810 --> 00:15:55,059 you sent them arrived in there 450 00:15:55,060 --> 00:15:56,199 in their mailbox. 451 00:15:56,200 --> 00:15:57,099 They would be able to give you a 452 00:15:57,100 --> 00:15:58,989 relatively coherent description of the 453 00:15:58,990 --> 00:16:01,419 process or the the set of processes 454 00:16:01,420 --> 00:16:03,789 that resulted in that postcard arriving 455 00:16:03,790 --> 00:16:05,049 in in a mailbox. 456 00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:08,979 And I would talk about the van, 457 00:16:08,980 --> 00:16:11,109 the Postcards Island postcodes, you 458 00:16:11,110 --> 00:16:12,129 know, the fact that there is this 459 00:16:12,130 --> 00:16:14,080 combination of street numbers and 460 00:16:15,280 --> 00:16:17,379 and names recall addresses, 461 00:16:17,380 --> 00:16:19,599 you know, but they 462 00:16:19,600 --> 00:16:20,979 if you would ask that same person how the 463 00:16:20,980 --> 00:16:23,079 email that that you sent them arrived 464 00:16:23,080 --> 00:16:25,269 in their inbox, very few people, you 465 00:16:25,270 --> 00:16:26,829 know, would be able to do so without 466 00:16:28,060 --> 00:16:30,159 without leaning on and relying on 467 00:16:30,160 --> 00:16:31,989 high surrealism and extremely 468 00:16:31,990 --> 00:16:34,059 imaginatively rich poetry in order 469 00:16:34,060 --> 00:16:35,649 to and they still wouldn't even get 470 00:16:35,650 --> 00:16:36,879 close. 471 00:16:36,880 --> 00:16:39,009 And this is precisely why this 472 00:16:39,010 --> 00:16:41,139 kind of thing can happen 473 00:16:41,140 --> 00:16:43,059 again. If you were to tell people that 474 00:16:43,060 --> 00:16:45,339 speaking of data retention and the like, 475 00:16:45,340 --> 00:16:46,899 if you were to tell people that all of 476 00:16:46,900 --> 00:16:49,359 the all of the the letters, the physical, 477 00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:50,709 you know, snail mail letters that they've 478 00:16:50,710 --> 00:16:52,959 been sending for years using the 479 00:16:52,960 --> 00:16:55,149 postal system have been 480 00:16:55,150 --> 00:16:57,309 taken into a special room that no 481 00:16:57,310 --> 00:16:58,899 one can see inside. 482 00:16:58,900 --> 00:17:00,699 They've they've been steam opened 483 00:17:00,700 --> 00:17:02,199 carefully. The letters have been taken 484 00:17:02,200 --> 00:17:04,269 out, they've been copied and 485 00:17:04,270 --> 00:17:06,338 then the sender and recipient of that 486 00:17:06,339 --> 00:17:07,899 envelope has been then been copied and 487 00:17:07,900 --> 00:17:09,669 will put into a database. 488 00:17:09,670 --> 00:17:10,868 Probably be a lot of old people in the 489 00:17:10,869 --> 00:17:13,179 streets, burning cars and protest. 490 00:17:13,180 --> 00:17:15,279 But but but instead we have this thing 491 00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:16,219 called data retention. 492 00:17:16,220 --> 00:17:18,009 So we have again another layer of opacity 493 00:17:18,010 --> 00:17:19,779 there where language and the technical 494 00:17:19,780 --> 00:17:21,879 complexity, the abstraction is 495 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:23,739 coming between us and having a meaningful 496 00:17:23,740 --> 00:17:25,749 conversation about the techno political 497 00:17:25,750 --> 00:17:27,429 challenges of the world that we live in. 498 00:17:27,430 --> 00:17:29,669 And this is where assholes like this can 499 00:17:29,670 --> 00:17:30,819 have a free hand. 500 00:17:30,820 --> 00:17:32,889 They can just come and play poker with 501 00:17:32,890 --> 00:17:34,959 with with a flip of a sneaky dime. 502 00:17:34,960 --> 00:17:37,119 You know, one sided coin 503 00:17:37,120 --> 00:17:39,249 and and and and then, 504 00:17:39,250 --> 00:17:42,129 yeah, we're all we're all 505 00:17:42,130 --> 00:17:44,259 sleeping next to the NSA as they stroke 506 00:17:44,260 --> 00:17:45,279 our hair while we sleep. 507 00:17:47,050 --> 00:17:48,159 Engineering is complex. 508 00:17:48,160 --> 00:17:50,179 It's terms abstract. 509 00:17:50,180 --> 00:17:52,239 That's that's that that's that 510 00:17:52,240 --> 00:17:53,589 that other layer of opacity I was just 511 00:17:53,590 --> 00:17:55,209 referring to. Then, for instance, what 512 00:17:55,210 --> 00:17:56,619 does a computer network? 513 00:17:56,620 --> 00:17:58,479 What is the internet? Very few people can 514 00:17:58,480 --> 00:18:00,609 can answer that question with any 515 00:18:00,610 --> 00:18:02,859 with any degree of realism. 516 00:18:04,390 --> 00:18:05,769 This is my definition of the internet 517 00:18:05,770 --> 00:18:07,929 based on my questions 518 00:18:07,930 --> 00:18:09,459 going out to people and the feedback I've 519 00:18:09,460 --> 00:18:11,319 got back. It's a deeply misunderstood 520 00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:12,320 technology. 521 00:18:19,250 --> 00:18:20,869 The smart ass at the party who's whose 522 00:18:20,870 --> 00:18:22,789 brother is a brain surgeon will say it's 523 00:18:22,790 --> 00:18:24,949 a series of tubes, of course, other 524 00:18:24,950 --> 00:18:26,119 people will just refer to it as a 525 00:18:26,120 --> 00:18:28,459 magical, powerful reality. 526 00:18:28,460 --> 00:18:30,109 Of course, The Matrix is the first point 527 00:18:30,110 --> 00:18:31,309 of call. You know, there's reach for 528 00:18:31,310 --> 00:18:32,600 that. It's the first thing 529 00:18:34,160 --> 00:18:35,329 because the internet is somehow 530 00:18:35,330 --> 00:18:37,339 everywhere. Now, you know, this is in the 531 00:18:37,340 --> 00:18:39,019 air itself. It's a subatomic particle, 532 00:18:39,020 --> 00:18:40,020 the internet, I think, 533 00:18:41,630 --> 00:18:44,159 or it's this highly centrist model 534 00:18:44,160 --> 00:18:46,289 in a throbbing, you know, sort of 535 00:18:46,290 --> 00:18:48,109 dark star in this case of purple, dark 536 00:18:48,110 --> 00:18:50,119 star of sentience and awareness. 537 00:18:50,120 --> 00:18:52,489 And you get humanities guys that 538 00:18:52,490 --> 00:18:54,049 at the future of the internet and the 539 00:18:54,050 --> 00:18:55,760 internet belongs to the people kind of 540 00:18:56,990 --> 00:18:58,159 debates. 541 00:18:58,160 --> 00:19:00,409 Talking about the internet as an entity, 542 00:19:00,410 --> 00:19:02,629 as a living thing and also talking about, 543 00:19:02,630 --> 00:19:04,549 you know, the internet is a something 544 00:19:04,550 --> 00:19:06,559 that truly belongs to the people. 545 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:08,209 And again, the lack of awareness as to 546 00:19:08,210 --> 00:19:10,339 the real infrastructural reality of 547 00:19:10,340 --> 00:19:12,649 the internet doesn't 548 00:19:12,650 --> 00:19:14,569 afford them the insight that they need in 549 00:19:14,570 --> 00:19:17,099 order to to to to 550 00:19:17,100 --> 00:19:19,819 to, you know, to inform those claims. 551 00:19:19,820 --> 00:19:21,919 The internet is, in fact, as 552 00:19:21,920 --> 00:19:25,159 many of us here know, a highly privatized 553 00:19:25,160 --> 00:19:27,559 space right from the physical layer, 554 00:19:27,560 --> 00:19:29,630 right up to even the application layer. 555 00:19:31,070 --> 00:19:32,269 Where am I on the internet? 556 00:19:32,270 --> 00:19:34,219 Few people can can say, you know, if 557 00:19:34,220 --> 00:19:35,539 you're you're here, you know, very few 558 00:19:35,540 --> 00:19:36,859 people can actually do that. 559 00:19:36,860 --> 00:19:38,290 I mean, you know, GOP. 560 00:19:39,650 --> 00:19:40,650 Yeah. 561 00:19:41,060 --> 00:19:42,829 In fact, where people's data is is, of 562 00:19:42,830 --> 00:19:44,359 course, in these things called data 563 00:19:44,360 --> 00:19:46,609 centers. I mean, as I've said in a 564 00:19:46,610 --> 00:19:48,889 few talks this last year, 565 00:19:48,890 --> 00:19:51,199 your drunken tweets and Facebook 566 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:53,509 wall buried underground, surrounded 567 00:19:53,510 --> 00:19:55,639 by dirt, machine guns, 568 00:19:55,640 --> 00:19:56,899 lawyers and tax. 569 00:19:56,900 --> 00:19:58,519 I mean, that's where it is, actually, you 570 00:19:58,520 --> 00:20:00,529 know, it's you would you would find it 571 00:20:00,530 --> 00:20:03,799 very, very difficult to have the right 572 00:20:03,800 --> 00:20:06,649 of access to see that 573 00:20:06,650 --> 00:20:09,259 hard disk containing that file system 574 00:20:09,260 --> 00:20:11,599 that has that drunken tweet on it 575 00:20:11,600 --> 00:20:13,970 that you wish you never you never sent. 576 00:20:15,230 --> 00:20:17,539 Instead, we pushed this children's book 577 00:20:17,540 --> 00:20:19,549 representation of of the Technical 578 00:20:19,550 --> 00:20:21,559 Reality, The Cloud, the height of every 579 00:20:21,560 --> 00:20:23,329 dangerous reduction, and it was an 580 00:20:23,330 --> 00:20:26,059 absolute pathetic, patronizing 581 00:20:26,060 --> 00:20:28,389 reduction of of 582 00:20:28,390 --> 00:20:30,409 of that thing that we call the internet 583 00:20:30,410 --> 00:20:31,410 the cloud. I mean, 584 00:20:32,810 --> 00:20:35,509 there was a big survey done in the US. 585 00:20:35,510 --> 00:20:37,189 I wish I could cite it directly right now 586 00:20:37,190 --> 00:20:38,479 on this. Many of you remember it was 587 00:20:38,480 --> 00:20:39,480 quite famous. 588 00:20:41,120 --> 00:20:43,669 It was a large proportion of Americans 589 00:20:43,670 --> 00:20:45,889 believe that cloud computing was affected 590 00:20:45,890 --> 00:20:46,910 by bad weather. 591 00:20:48,020 --> 00:20:49,020 Now there is. 592 00:20:50,390 --> 00:20:51,390 There are some. 593 00:20:52,820 --> 00:20:53,809 There's a little something in it. 594 00:20:53,810 --> 00:20:55,489 I mean, if there a if there's a, you 595 00:20:55,490 --> 00:20:57,739 know, typhoon and you've got your 596 00:20:57,740 --> 00:20:59,749 power, you've got your power grid knocked 597 00:20:59,750 --> 00:21:01,249 out, then yeah, the clouds down. 598 00:21:01,250 --> 00:21:03,349 But but I don't think they 599 00:21:03,350 --> 00:21:04,999 were they were reaching quite quite that 600 00:21:05,000 --> 00:21:06,319 far, those guys. 601 00:21:06,320 --> 00:21:07,309 So we need to see the land through the 602 00:21:07,310 --> 00:21:09,779 clouds. This, for instance, is 603 00:21:09,780 --> 00:21:12,169 as on Apple's data centers. 604 00:21:12,170 --> 00:21:13,459 This is where a lot of people's iTunes 605 00:21:13,460 --> 00:21:14,749 profiles are stored. 606 00:21:14,750 --> 00:21:16,219 And as I've also said in a couple of 607 00:21:16,220 --> 00:21:17,959 talks, it clearly doesn't have the 608 00:21:17,960 --> 00:21:19,789 genesis of an Apple product. 609 00:21:19,790 --> 00:21:22,279 I mean, it's just doesn't, you know, and 610 00:21:22,280 --> 00:21:24,019 the way the trees are lined up, then if 611 00:21:24,020 --> 00:21:25,839 you look really closely this, there's, 612 00:21:26,870 --> 00:21:28,249 you know, really, really high 613 00:21:29,730 --> 00:21:30,919 heavy duty fences. 614 00:21:30,920 --> 00:21:32,809 There is definitely four or five guys 615 00:21:32,810 --> 00:21:34,429 walking around there with submachine 616 00:21:34,430 --> 00:21:36,349 guns. You know, it just is probably two 617 00:21:36,350 --> 00:21:37,729 two layers of passport checks, you know, 618 00:21:37,730 --> 00:21:39,829 so. So when we talk about ownership and 619 00:21:39,830 --> 00:21:42,049 the internet and and 620 00:21:42,050 --> 00:21:44,239 our our political 621 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:46,429 relationship with this thing called 622 00:21:46,430 --> 00:21:48,109 the internet, we need to get down to the 623 00:21:48,110 --> 00:21:49,249 middle. 624 00:21:49,250 --> 00:21:51,049 Instead, we're pushed this again. 625 00:21:51,050 --> 00:21:53,269 Field of surfaces, the iPod nano 626 00:21:53,270 --> 00:21:54,270 effect. 627 00:21:54,850 --> 00:21:56,349 Our fear of this is an ideology of 628 00:21:56,350 --> 00:21:57,849 shamelessness, the expectation that 629 00:21:57,850 --> 00:21:59,199 things should always be seamless. 630 00:22:01,340 --> 00:22:03,449 In fact, I like to 631 00:22:03,450 --> 00:22:05,269 to get back, at least in my practice and 632 00:22:05,270 --> 00:22:06,619 those of my colleagues, this thing called 633 00:22:06,620 --> 00:22:08,569 sinfulness of bringing the ages into the 634 00:22:08,570 --> 00:22:09,570 picture. 635 00:22:12,730 --> 00:22:14,220 It's time now actually how much of a go. 636 00:22:15,890 --> 00:22:16,890 Half an hour. 637 00:22:17,820 --> 00:22:19,519 Cool, great. So the submarine cable map 638 00:22:19,520 --> 00:22:21,869 is, for me, an excellent example 639 00:22:21,870 --> 00:22:24,299 of of the kinds of initiatives that 640 00:22:24,300 --> 00:22:26,849 admittedly it was intended for the 641 00:22:26,850 --> 00:22:28,199 for the investor market, for people to 642 00:22:28,200 --> 00:22:29,519 invest in this thing called submarine 643 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:31,439 cables. But it's had a really interesting 644 00:22:31,440 --> 00:22:32,849 spin off effect in the critical 645 00:22:32,850 --> 00:22:36,089 community, talking about the problems 646 00:22:36,090 --> 00:22:38,579 of talking about the internet as a 647 00:22:38,580 --> 00:22:40,769 as a thing that belongs to the people. 648 00:22:40,770 --> 00:22:42,419 And look at the submarine cable map on 649 00:22:42,420 --> 00:22:44,099 submarine cable map dot com. 650 00:22:44,100 --> 00:22:46,439 You can you can click on the cables 651 00:22:46,440 --> 00:22:48,509 that that connect countries and in fact, 652 00:22:48,510 --> 00:22:50,639 envelop and wrap around countries and see 653 00:22:50,640 --> 00:22:53,039 the owners you find very, very quickly. 654 00:22:53,040 --> 00:22:54,209 Then when you're clicking on these submarine 655 00:22:54,210 --> 00:22:56,579 cables that very few of them even 656 00:22:56,580 --> 00:22:58,679 have public ownership of 657 00:22:58,680 --> 00:23:00,959 any sort, even as a share, it is hardly 658 00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:03,429 any government ownership of these cables 659 00:23:03,430 --> 00:23:05,669 entirely privatized. 660 00:23:05,670 --> 00:23:07,979 And now, as we've seen with 661 00:23:07,980 --> 00:23:11,309 with with 662 00:23:11,310 --> 00:23:13,499 HQ and the and the NSA and of course, 663 00:23:13,500 --> 00:23:15,749 black boxing and tapping these submarine 664 00:23:15,750 --> 00:23:18,209 cables that that right of access 665 00:23:18,210 --> 00:23:20,159 is just as effectively a financial 666 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:21,779 transaction. 667 00:23:21,780 --> 00:23:23,159 There is. There isn't the public 668 00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:25,379 ownership in order to to to represent 669 00:23:25,380 --> 00:23:27,659 the rights that we expect on this thing 670 00:23:27,660 --> 00:23:28,979 called the internet at it, even the 671 00:23:28,980 --> 00:23:29,980 physical layer. 672 00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:34,949 So critical engineering is really getting 673 00:23:34,950 --> 00:23:36,569 up, getting away from this definition of 674 00:23:36,570 --> 00:23:38,399 engineering as the practical application 675 00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:40,709 of science to commerce and industry 676 00:23:40,710 --> 00:23:42,959 and really looking at how 677 00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:44,819 we can forget about the utility and 678 00:23:44,820 --> 00:23:47,339 forget about industry and application 679 00:23:47,340 --> 00:23:49,949 industry. Forget about, you know, 680 00:23:49,950 --> 00:23:52,139 the economics of it all and just actually 681 00:23:52,140 --> 00:23:53,369 look at how can we use this? 682 00:23:53,370 --> 00:23:55,469 Think this this collection of languages 683 00:23:55,470 --> 00:23:57,599 and concepts around engineering 684 00:23:57,600 --> 00:23:59,459 and the many different disciplines of 685 00:23:59,460 --> 00:24:00,719 engineering? 686 00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:02,549 How can we use them critically in order 687 00:24:02,550 --> 00:24:04,679 to open up public 688 00:24:04,680 --> 00:24:06,929 dialog about this infrastructure 689 00:24:06,930 --> 00:24:08,609 that we depend upon? 690 00:24:08,610 --> 00:24:10,499 It's a critical engineering as a frame 691 00:24:10,500 --> 00:24:12,119 for applied research and development that 692 00:24:12,120 --> 00:24:13,889 positions engineering rather than art or 693 00:24:13,890 --> 00:24:15,959 design as primary within the 694 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:18,029 creative and critical process. 695 00:24:18,030 --> 00:24:20,309 So it's about it's about turning 696 00:24:20,310 --> 00:24:22,679 engineering from being a discipline 697 00:24:22,680 --> 00:24:23,680 known to the 698 00:24:25,470 --> 00:24:27,689 known to the how to know 699 00:24:27,690 --> 00:24:29,369 these clichés are really boring, but the, 700 00:24:29,370 --> 00:24:31,439 you know, sandal wearing Bryans of the 701 00:24:31,440 --> 00:24:33,029 world or something like this and 702 00:24:33,030 --> 00:24:34,359 actually, you know, saying that it's 703 00:24:34,360 --> 00:24:36,059 now's the time that we all need to 704 00:24:36,060 --> 00:24:38,369 develop a basic vocabulary 705 00:24:38,370 --> 00:24:40,499 interface to this thing called 706 00:24:40,500 --> 00:24:41,849 engineering, such that we can 707 00:24:41,850 --> 00:24:43,499 meaningfully describe and therefore 708 00:24:43,500 --> 00:24:45,479 critically engage the world that we live 709 00:24:45,480 --> 00:24:46,480 in. 710 00:24:47,040 --> 00:24:48,419 Critical Engineering Manifesto was 711 00:24:48,420 --> 00:24:50,609 written in 2011 by this 712 00:24:50,610 --> 00:24:51,610 guy. 713 00:24:52,110 --> 00:24:53,110 This guy. 714 00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:56,279 And and myself. 715 00:24:56,280 --> 00:24:58,619 And it was quickly translated into 14 716 00:24:58,620 --> 00:25:01,049 languages, and it can now be found in 717 00:25:01,050 --> 00:25:02,669 labs all around the world in the 718 00:25:02,670 --> 00:25:04,619 so-called Hack Labs maker spaces and 719 00:25:04,620 --> 00:25:05,999 things that's made its way into 720 00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:08,129 university programs is now part 721 00:25:08,130 --> 00:25:09,839 of curricula. 722 00:25:09,840 --> 00:25:12,599 Even recently at the MIT, thanks to 723 00:25:12,600 --> 00:25:14,159 Governor Levin. 724 00:25:14,160 --> 00:25:15,589 And it's 725 00:25:16,720 --> 00:25:18,299 it turns out that we did had a bit of a 726 00:25:18,300 --> 00:25:19,559 nerve. Positively 727 00:25:21,240 --> 00:25:22,469 critical engineering seeks to answer 728 00:25:22,470 --> 00:25:23,669 questions surrounding influence and 729 00:25:23,670 --> 00:25:24,989 control in the world of integrated 730 00:25:24,990 --> 00:25:27,479 systems and closed, opaque technology. 731 00:25:27,480 --> 00:25:29,819 And the first points in 732 00:25:29,820 --> 00:25:31,589 the manifesto is this critic engineer 733 00:25:31,590 --> 00:25:32,879 considers engineering to be the most 734 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:34,619 transformative language of our time, 735 00:25:34,620 --> 00:25:36,119 shaping the way we move, communicate and 736 00:25:36,120 --> 00:25:38,039 think. It's thus the work of the critical 737 00:25:38,040 --> 00:25:39,869 engineer study and exploit this language, 738 00:25:39,870 --> 00:25:41,400 exposing its influence. 739 00:25:42,920 --> 00:25:45,469 The first work I want to talk about as 740 00:25:45,470 --> 00:25:47,329 regards representing this thing called 741 00:25:47,330 --> 00:25:49,429 critical engineering is in 742 00:25:49,430 --> 00:25:52,549 fact this is my favorite work from 2012. 743 00:25:52,550 --> 00:25:54,400 It's by Gordon Savage, 744 00:25:55,910 --> 00:25:57,319 one of the coauthors of the of the 745 00:25:57,320 --> 00:25:59,359 manifesto. You saw his face before end up 746 00:25:59,360 --> 00:26:00,509 being stolen. 747 00:26:00,510 --> 00:26:01,999 Very talented. 748 00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:04,699 Sweet, who is who was 749 00:26:04,700 --> 00:26:06,170 my studio partner in Berlin 750 00:26:07,340 --> 00:26:09,439 and Packard Brook was developed 751 00:26:09,440 --> 00:26:11,479 for big exhibition that we did in the 752 00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:14,239 House of Culture and developed in Berlin 753 00:26:14,240 --> 00:26:16,189 that opened on the day of transmedia. 754 00:26:16,190 --> 00:26:17,809 We were given a nice big room and we were 755 00:26:17,810 --> 00:26:19,879 asked to come up with 10 works 756 00:26:19,880 --> 00:26:21,199 for the exhibition. 757 00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:23,359 And the one that that Gordon and Banks 758 00:26:23,360 --> 00:26:25,219 came up with was was was, was very 759 00:26:25,220 --> 00:26:26,929 special indeed. 760 00:26:26,930 --> 00:26:29,599 What they did was it was 761 00:26:29,600 --> 00:26:30,680 in the studio. 762 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,089 Well, who here is familiar with with with 763 00:26:36,090 --> 00:26:38,729 with Mac addresses, link layer. 764 00:26:38,730 --> 00:26:39,789 Yeah. 765 00:26:39,790 --> 00:26:41,909 Beacon Beacon frames just the 766 00:26:41,910 --> 00:26:42,910 quick. 767 00:26:58,730 --> 00:26:59,869 So here we have a whole bunch of 768 00:26:59,870 --> 00:27:01,639 different stations around us right now. 769 00:27:01,640 --> 00:27:03,769 Obviously, these we have this 770 00:27:03,770 --> 00:27:04,849 is Mac addresses here. 771 00:27:04,850 --> 00:27:07,009 We have that represent our access points 772 00:27:07,010 --> 00:27:08,089 basis IDs. 773 00:27:08,090 --> 00:27:09,529 We have pro requests over here and we 774 00:27:09,530 --> 00:27:10,609 have these things called beacons. 775 00:27:10,610 --> 00:27:11,929 And these beacons are really the 776 00:27:11,930 --> 00:27:14,479 management layer of of wireless 777 00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:15,480 wireless networks. 778 00:27:17,180 --> 00:27:18,740 It's another representation of this. 779 00:27:21,770 --> 00:27:23,059 I mean, there's a huge number of these 780 00:27:23,060 --> 00:27:25,069 beacons flying around the around the room 781 00:27:25,070 --> 00:27:27,589 right now, and these are vital for 782 00:27:27,590 --> 00:27:29,689 for the inner functioning 783 00:27:29,690 --> 00:27:31,639 of of wireless networks 784 00:27:33,980 --> 00:27:35,509 at the at the at the link layer. 785 00:27:36,840 --> 00:27:39,179 Now, as far as 786 00:27:39,180 --> 00:27:40,979 packet workers are concerned that they 787 00:27:40,980 --> 00:27:42,899 were really interested in the fact that 788 00:27:42,900 --> 00:27:44,339 they're these location services, what 789 00:27:44,340 --> 00:27:46,229 they call fine grained location services 790 00:27:46,230 --> 00:27:48,599 versus coarse grain like jeeps 791 00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:50,739 that many of us are highly depended upon, 792 00:27:50,740 --> 00:27:52,829 on a on a on a on a so-called 793 00:27:52,830 --> 00:27:55,199 smartphones or or spying 794 00:27:55,200 --> 00:27:56,969 spying devices you can make calls on, as 795 00:27:56,970 --> 00:27:58,619 Jacob said a while ago. 796 00:28:00,060 --> 00:28:02,189 And what they wanted to do was, was 797 00:28:02,190 --> 00:28:03,839 to was to show it was perfectly possible 798 00:28:03,840 --> 00:28:05,909 to intervene on that, on that, 799 00:28:05,910 --> 00:28:09,089 on that geolocation dependency, 800 00:28:09,090 --> 00:28:10,169 for instance. 801 00:28:10,170 --> 00:28:12,329 Obviously, we all knew about 802 00:28:12,330 --> 00:28:14,789 the carrier IQ scandal, where 803 00:28:14,790 --> 00:28:16,019 people were inadvertently on their 804 00:28:16,020 --> 00:28:18,329 smartphones, capturing 805 00:28:18,330 --> 00:28:20,279 beacons that were then being pushed back 806 00:28:20,280 --> 00:28:22,379 to the mothership and then be used to 807 00:28:22,380 --> 00:28:24,479 build comprehensive location, 808 00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:26,579 fine grained location maps, if you like, 809 00:28:26,580 --> 00:28:28,170 built around access points 810 00:28:31,020 --> 00:28:32,639 all around the world. 811 00:28:32,640 --> 00:28:34,889 And and now when someone 812 00:28:34,890 --> 00:28:37,019 is dissatisfied with GPS, they can, 813 00:28:37,020 --> 00:28:38,699 of course, switch to this fine grained 814 00:28:38,700 --> 00:28:39,869 location services. 815 00:28:39,870 --> 00:28:41,939 They set up a tree of 816 00:28:41,940 --> 00:28:44,039 of ED 11 radios in 817 00:28:44,040 --> 00:28:46,439 the studio, which is in Liqun and 818 00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:47,909 in Berlin, and then down the house to 819 00:28:47,910 --> 00:28:50,039 culture and develops, which is 820 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:51,539 right on the other side of town. 821 00:28:51,540 --> 00:28:53,489 They had the equivalent sister tree of 822 00:28:53,490 --> 00:28:55,709 these ed ed L1 radios. 823 00:28:55,710 --> 00:28:57,659 Each one of these represents a different 824 00:28:57,660 --> 00:29:00,209 chunk of the of of the of the 825 00:29:00,210 --> 00:29:02,279 of the ED 11 spectra. 826 00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:04,529 So we have we have a channel represented 827 00:29:04,530 --> 00:29:05,759 by each one of these antenna. 828 00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:07,919 You can say the captured 829 00:29:07,920 --> 00:29:10,479 beacon frames at 830 00:29:10,480 --> 00:29:12,719 at the studio and then sent 831 00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:15,309 them over a tunnel to 832 00:29:15,310 --> 00:29:17,519 to to the House of Culture and developed 833 00:29:17,520 --> 00:29:19,109 where they were launched back into the 834 00:29:19,110 --> 00:29:20,159 air. 835 00:29:20,160 --> 00:29:22,439 And you had we had 2000 people 836 00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:24,949 come through the door of 837 00:29:24,950 --> 00:29:26,429 our of our exhibition in the House of 838 00:29:26,430 --> 00:29:28,349 Concerned developed two 2000 people came 839 00:29:28,350 --> 00:29:30,719 in just just in to our room alone and 840 00:29:30,720 --> 00:29:32,759 huge numbers and walking out into the 841 00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:34,529 night around the house to turn into 842 00:29:34,530 --> 00:29:36,719 vaults with their phones blowing up 843 00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:38,879 on their faces, looking for hotels, 844 00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:40,739 bars and restaurants that didn't exist 845 00:29:41,760 --> 00:29:43,199 around the house to capture and develop. 846 00:29:43,200 --> 00:29:44,999 They existed and the curtain around the 847 00:29:45,000 --> 00:29:47,699 studio, so they they had entirely 848 00:29:47,700 --> 00:29:49,579 folded the map. 849 00:29:49,580 --> 00:29:50,939 People were genuinely confused. 850 00:29:50,940 --> 00:29:53,039 You know, there's this they say, I 851 00:29:53,040 --> 00:29:54,419 swear it was here. You could see people 852 00:29:54,420 --> 00:29:57,119 walking out to this weird little forest 853 00:29:57,120 --> 00:29:59,219 opposite the are just really, you know, 854 00:29:59,220 --> 00:30:00,599 friends loyally following us. 855 00:30:00,600 --> 00:30:01,600 Just. 856 00:30:06,010 --> 00:30:07,419 And this is this is for me, really 857 00:30:07,420 --> 00:30:10,139 important because it uses 858 00:30:10,140 --> 00:30:12,599 this, this this and 859 00:30:12,600 --> 00:30:14,199 leverages this implicit trust that we 860 00:30:14,200 --> 00:30:16,269 place on technology, uses it 861 00:30:16,270 --> 00:30:18,339 as a as a vulnerable surface, 862 00:30:18,340 --> 00:30:20,079 intervenes on that and then throws the 863 00:30:20,080 --> 00:30:22,089 whole infrastructure back in your face 864 00:30:22,090 --> 00:30:24,399 and says, Look, you know you, you 865 00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:25,749 are depending on something that that 866 00:30:25,750 --> 00:30:27,849 itself puts you in 867 00:30:27,850 --> 00:30:29,439 a highly volatile and vulnerable 868 00:30:29,440 --> 00:30:30,429 position. 869 00:30:30,430 --> 00:30:32,259 It's all about that belief. 870 00:30:32,260 --> 00:30:34,719 And I'll stick a really neat piece made 871 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:36,939 made very recently by Dennis 872 00:30:36,940 --> 00:30:37,929 Paul. 873 00:30:37,930 --> 00:30:39,219 He's probably here is probably the one 874 00:30:39,220 --> 00:30:40,479 clapping just saying that you, Dennis 875 00:30:41,890 --> 00:30:43,749 Clifford, your and stuff. And it's just 876 00:30:43,750 --> 00:30:44,709 that too. 877 00:30:44,710 --> 00:30:46,619 I'm joking. That's a really neat space. 878 00:30:46,620 --> 00:30:48,099 It doesn't need to be complex, you know, 879 00:30:48,100 --> 00:30:49,179 a work of critical engineering. 880 00:30:49,180 --> 00:30:50,499 Here's a good example now stick a. 881 00:30:53,700 --> 00:30:55,099 You get its goals destroyed, a great. 882 00:30:57,310 --> 00:30:58,269 So, of course, you know, you have you 883 00:30:58,270 --> 00:31:00,399 plug that into the wall and and a fuze 884 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:02,409 blows and you take out the you take out 885 00:31:02,410 --> 00:31:04,869 the, you know, effectively 886 00:31:04,870 --> 00:31:07,449 a large scale version is would do this. 887 00:31:07,450 --> 00:31:08,499 But you know, you can wear it as a 888 00:31:08,500 --> 00:31:11,049 necklace. I really like it as a poetic 889 00:31:11,050 --> 00:31:13,029 inversion. You know, take the just fold 890 00:31:13,030 --> 00:31:15,189 that back and create a loop. 891 00:31:15,190 --> 00:31:17,260 And then Blown Super 892 00:31:19,030 --> 00:31:21,219 is a piece made by me this 893 00:31:21,220 --> 00:31:23,409 this year with a lot of help 894 00:31:23,410 --> 00:31:25,899 from my girlfriend building the tank. 895 00:31:25,900 --> 00:31:27,639 It's called No Network. No Network is a 896 00:31:27,640 --> 00:31:29,979 GSM jammer in the form of a battle tank. 897 00:31:31,390 --> 00:31:32,390 So I just. 898 00:31:35,150 --> 00:31:36,859 Yes, just as just a little it's a little 899 00:31:36,860 --> 00:31:39,439 object that that that, you know, just 900 00:31:39,440 --> 00:31:41,209 plays with cyber warfare and this this 901 00:31:41,210 --> 00:31:42,499 whole, you know, kind of metaphor of 902 00:31:42,500 --> 00:31:43,399 cyber war. 903 00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:44,989 But but when you when you flip the 904 00:31:44,990 --> 00:31:47,149 switch, it knocks, 905 00:31:47,150 --> 00:31:49,249 it knocks you off the network with the 906 00:31:49,250 --> 00:31:51,379 sphere sphere of around about six meter 907 00:31:51,380 --> 00:31:52,669 radius around the actual object. 908 00:31:52,670 --> 00:31:54,829 So people can it can experience in 909 00:31:54,830 --> 00:31:57,079 a in a in a in a controlled environment. 910 00:31:57,080 --> 00:31:58,080 You know, ideally, 911 00:31:59,300 --> 00:32:01,309 you know, being off the off the grid if 912 00:32:01,310 --> 00:32:02,779 you like, you know, in that regard, and 913 00:32:02,780 --> 00:32:03,919 this is this is something that is 914 00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:04,819 increasingly rare. 915 00:32:04,820 --> 00:32:06,259 I mean, I love going back to my home 916 00:32:06,260 --> 00:32:07,669 country of New Zealand and just simply 917 00:32:07,670 --> 00:32:09,679 being at the family farm and not being 918 00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:11,959 able to receive calls, make them or, 919 00:32:11,960 --> 00:32:13,909 you know, dismiss as, I'm just I'm really 920 00:32:13,910 --> 00:32:16,099 I'm contactable because 921 00:32:16,100 --> 00:32:18,019 there just simply is no network there. 922 00:32:18,020 --> 00:32:19,730 There are no cell towers, was that. 923 00:32:21,740 --> 00:32:23,089 I guess that's the next one. 924 00:32:23,090 --> 00:32:24,439 I really want to do that. Actually make 925 00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:25,729 it remote controls. Just send it off down 926 00:32:25,730 --> 00:32:27,049 the street. Yeah, absolutely. 927 00:32:28,190 --> 00:32:30,049 Yeah, just be a really bad neighbor. 928 00:32:31,220 --> 00:32:33,170 Yeah. Oh my German immigration. 929 00:32:34,610 --> 00:32:36,559 Yeah, yeah. 930 00:32:36,560 --> 00:32:37,639 And you could just see the little the 931 00:32:37,640 --> 00:32:40,399 German side, the transparency Grenada's 932 00:32:40,400 --> 00:32:41,989 project that that I made for the 933 00:32:41,990 --> 00:32:43,519 exhibition in the House of Culture and 934 00:32:43,520 --> 00:32:45,829 developed that that again looks at this 935 00:32:45,830 --> 00:32:47,629 metaphor of cyber warfare and the cyber 936 00:32:47,630 --> 00:32:49,879 weapon and tries to create 937 00:32:49,880 --> 00:32:51,859 a kind of an iconic handheld, fully 938 00:32:51,860 --> 00:32:54,379 functional package that that that 939 00:32:54,380 --> 00:32:57,079 that that deals with some of these 940 00:32:57,080 --> 00:32:59,209 questions we have around opacity and data 941 00:32:59,210 --> 00:33:01,579 and transparency, particularly 942 00:33:01,580 --> 00:33:02,959 in the government and corporate sector, 943 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:05,629 where we're fully aware that that these 944 00:33:05,630 --> 00:33:07,939 these very powerful entities are 945 00:33:07,940 --> 00:33:10,759 making decisions increasingly behind 946 00:33:10,760 --> 00:33:12,229 closed doors. And I wanted to come up 947 00:33:12,230 --> 00:33:13,879 with a hand-held iconic solution to that 948 00:33:13,880 --> 00:33:16,639 and came up with with this, 949 00:33:16,640 --> 00:33:18,799 it's based on the Soviet one hand 950 00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:20,389 grenade and it's just around about the 951 00:33:20,390 --> 00:33:21,559 same size. 952 00:33:21,560 --> 00:33:23,769 It's got all lovely silver work made by 953 00:33:23,770 --> 00:33:25,609 a very talented metal worker. 954 00:33:25,610 --> 00:33:27,739 Suzanne Stark also lives 955 00:33:27,740 --> 00:33:29,089 in Berlin. 956 00:33:29,090 --> 00:33:31,189 It's got a it's got a little microphone, 957 00:33:31,190 --> 00:33:32,989 quite a powerful microphone, a little 958 00:33:34,240 --> 00:33:36,299 a gum sticks overstock.com, a little 959 00:33:36,300 --> 00:33:38,989 little tiny, a little tiny iron based 960 00:33:38,990 --> 00:33:41,119 board on the inside, and I'm running 961 00:33:41,120 --> 00:33:43,219 a division on it, my operating system 962 00:33:43,220 --> 00:33:45,589 of choice wherever possible, and 963 00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:47,510 it has a little bar back there. 964 00:33:49,070 --> 00:33:50,299 And when you pull the pin on this 965 00:33:51,740 --> 00:33:53,569 on the subject, when you pull the pin, it 966 00:33:53,570 --> 00:33:55,729 captures all of the all of the wireless 967 00:33:55,730 --> 00:33:57,829 traffic it possibly can, and it's in 968 00:33:57,830 --> 00:34:00,259 its in its proximity and then tunnels 969 00:34:00,260 --> 00:34:02,449 it up to my server, where 970 00:34:02,450 --> 00:34:04,249 a pill script goes through and then pulls 971 00:34:04,250 --> 00:34:06,529 out html, jpeg, gif, 972 00:34:06,530 --> 00:34:08,689 PNG fragments and 973 00:34:08,690 --> 00:34:10,729 then does the TCP stream following and 974 00:34:10,730 --> 00:34:12,949 then shows in real time on a map 975 00:34:15,320 --> 00:34:16,320 what people are doing. 976 00:34:17,510 --> 00:34:20,059 So someone can, for instance, be, 977 00:34:20,060 --> 00:34:21,060 you know. 978 00:34:25,790 --> 00:34:26,928 So I'm going to be checking their email 979 00:34:26,929 --> 00:34:28,698 or something like this, and obviously 980 00:34:28,699 --> 00:34:29,839 when I've shown this in public, I've 981 00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:32,089 shown to the Nemo Museum and in 982 00:34:32,090 --> 00:34:33,979 Amsterdam, you know, huge museum in 983 00:34:33,980 --> 00:34:35,809 downtown incident and many other big 984 00:34:35,810 --> 00:34:36,799 places showed it right next to the 985 00:34:36,800 --> 00:34:38,388 Pentagon actually at the Corcoran Gallery 986 00:34:38,389 --> 00:34:40,669 there. And and and 987 00:34:40,670 --> 00:34:41,569 people have to be warned. 988 00:34:41,570 --> 00:34:42,738 You know, when you entering the room, you 989 00:34:42,739 --> 00:34:45,019 know, be aware that your you know, 990 00:34:45,020 --> 00:34:46,759 that you need to have you have you have 991 00:34:46,760 --> 00:34:48,289 you should lock down, you have to be had 992 00:34:48,290 --> 00:34:49,218 to be secured. 993 00:34:49,219 --> 00:34:51,379 And and that itself that the terror 994 00:34:51,380 --> 00:34:53,509 of the object and representing itself as 995 00:34:53,510 --> 00:34:54,709 a violent weapon 996 00:34:56,239 --> 00:34:57,199 gets people talking. 997 00:34:57,200 --> 00:34:59,869 And so you see you see mother and 998 00:34:59,870 --> 00:35:02,119 daughter and grandpa having a chat 999 00:35:02,120 --> 00:35:03,799 about the phone and the grenade, you 1000 00:35:03,800 --> 00:35:06,169 know, and just trying to work things out, 1001 00:35:06,170 --> 00:35:07,849 you know, just just trying to reduce 1002 00:35:07,850 --> 00:35:10,669 that, that they're sharing 1003 00:35:10,670 --> 00:35:13,099 that, that that unintended emission 1004 00:35:14,840 --> 00:35:16,939 prism, the bacon frame is just 1005 00:35:16,940 --> 00:35:18,949 a little project that Daniel and I, 1006 00:35:18,950 --> 00:35:21,019 Daniel Vasilyev and I again 1007 00:35:21,020 --> 00:35:23,119 coauthor of the benefits of Manifesto Put 1008 00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:24,979 Together in two days for Art Hack Day in 1009 00:35:24,980 --> 00:35:26,089 Berlin. 1010 00:35:26,090 --> 00:35:28,339 This is a very, 1011 00:35:28,340 --> 00:35:30,559 very little project that 1012 00:35:30,560 --> 00:35:32,210 is intended as intended to 1013 00:35:33,590 --> 00:35:34,849 to. 1014 00:35:34,850 --> 00:35:37,219 It's a speculative 1015 00:35:37,220 --> 00:35:38,510 proposal of what? 1016 00:35:39,790 --> 00:35:40,790 NSA. 1017 00:35:42,350 --> 00:35:44,359 Wireless network forensics equipment 1018 00:35:44,360 --> 00:35:46,549 might look like, but also 1019 00:35:46,550 --> 00:35:48,019 obviously with the joke of having a big 1020 00:35:48,020 --> 00:35:49,429 prism in the middle of it. 1021 00:35:49,430 --> 00:35:51,709 And and when this thing 1022 00:35:51,710 --> 00:35:53,629 runs, I'll show you a video in a second, 1023 00:35:53,630 --> 00:35:55,039 the PRISM spends. 1024 00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:57,169 When someone is merely in the room 1025 00:35:57,170 --> 00:35:59,659 and there's there's a network 1026 00:35:59,660 --> 00:36:01,249 that they are associating with, and when 1027 00:36:01,250 --> 00:36:03,769 they ask for a DHC place, 1028 00:36:03,770 --> 00:36:05,989 you know, they ask for ask for a lease 1029 00:36:05,990 --> 00:36:08,389 on that network, ask for an IP, 1030 00:36:08,390 --> 00:36:09,889 that boot pay packet that goes out. 1031 00:36:09,890 --> 00:36:11,749 We capture it and we show inside the 1032 00:36:11,750 --> 00:36:13,879 prism, the host name of 1033 00:36:13,880 --> 00:36:15,199 the device. And if it's an iPhone, it's 1034 00:36:15,200 --> 00:36:17,689 almost always Cyrus iPhone, Tom's 1035 00:36:17,690 --> 00:36:20,599 iPhone, you know, Tim's iPhone. 1036 00:36:20,600 --> 00:36:23,329 And then underneath it, the Mac address. 1037 00:36:23,330 --> 00:36:25,729 This looks like looks like this. 1038 00:36:25,730 --> 00:36:27,529 Hopefully, we got some audio. 1039 00:36:27,530 --> 00:36:29,599 Um, Prisma, does you know? 1040 00:37:24,890 --> 00:37:25,969 Susie was iPhone. 1041 00:37:29,260 --> 00:37:30,790 And look, it's the. 1042 00:37:33,550 --> 00:37:35,620 Angela, Miss Angela Merkel's iPhone 1043 00:37:36,700 --> 00:37:37,700 Plus BlackBerry. 1044 00:37:38,570 --> 00:37:40,550 The how she doing there, anyway. 1045 00:37:50,050 --> 00:37:51,549 So you and this is just the again, it's 1046 00:37:51,550 --> 00:37:53,739 just one of the wonderful things 1047 00:37:53,740 --> 00:37:56,169 about working in a 1048 00:37:56,170 --> 00:37:57,429 free software environment from a credit 1049 00:37:57,430 --> 00:37:58,899 perspective is you can just cobble stuff 1050 00:37:58,900 --> 00:38:01,149 together. I mean, what what banks, 1051 00:38:01,150 --> 00:38:03,249 Danya, Gordo 1052 00:38:03,250 --> 00:38:05,229 and I do all the time as we just we just 1053 00:38:05,230 --> 00:38:06,399 glue everything together with shell 1054 00:38:06,400 --> 00:38:07,419 scripts, you know, it's just it's 1055 00:38:07,420 --> 00:38:09,909 fantastic. You know, this firehose 1056 00:38:09,910 --> 00:38:11,979 and piping and Unix pipelines, you know, 1057 00:38:11,980 --> 00:38:14,139 you can really rapidly prototype in this 1058 00:38:14,140 --> 00:38:15,909 context. I would never, ever dream of of 1059 00:38:15,910 --> 00:38:18,369 working outside of the service 1060 00:38:18,370 --> 00:38:20,019 domain. You can really get good work done 1061 00:38:20,020 --> 00:38:22,269 fast against a two day project 1062 00:38:22,270 --> 00:38:23,919 at a transient medium to 1063 00:38:26,410 --> 00:38:27,709 this next one, 2014. 1064 00:38:27,710 --> 00:38:29,049 I'm going to have a really sinister 1065 00:38:29,050 --> 00:38:31,539 version of that project when it comes to 1066 00:38:31,540 --> 00:38:33,920 mountain houses is a very important 1067 00:38:36,430 --> 00:38:38,469 developer, artist, engineer in this. 1068 00:38:38,470 --> 00:38:40,539 In this scene, he made 1069 00:38:40,540 --> 00:38:42,969 it to work that I think is is 1070 00:38:42,970 --> 00:38:44,049 very, very important. 1071 00:38:44,050 --> 00:38:46,179 The Earth boot computer he's really 1072 00:38:46,180 --> 00:38:48,579 interested in and in the fact that 1073 00:38:48,580 --> 00:38:51,039 our our our hardware is, 1074 00:38:51,040 --> 00:38:53,469 is it sort of detached, 1075 00:38:53,470 --> 00:38:56,019 at least conceptually in our mind from 1076 00:38:56,020 --> 00:38:58,179 the Earth in which those those 1077 00:38:58,180 --> 00:39:00,339 minerals are in fact found? 1078 00:39:00,340 --> 00:39:02,469 You know, much of what we actually have 1079 00:39:02,470 --> 00:39:04,270 in our pockets comes from a vast, 1080 00:39:07,090 --> 00:39:09,489 diverse array of of geographical 1081 00:39:09,490 --> 00:39:10,839 locations and is a huge number of 1082 00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:12,699 different hands and minds and processes 1083 00:39:12,700 --> 00:39:14,199 involved in producing that thing that we 1084 00:39:14,200 --> 00:39:15,219 call, for instance, a motherboard or 1085 00:39:15,220 --> 00:39:16,479 something like that. 1086 00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:18,339 He made a computer for an Earth boot 1087 00:39:18,340 --> 00:39:21,039 computer that this machine only boots 1088 00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:22,690 if you actually stick it in the ground. 1089 00:39:23,880 --> 00:39:26,009 And and, yeah, it's 1090 00:39:26,010 --> 00:39:27,389 beautiful, it's a beautiful project. 1091 00:39:27,390 --> 00:39:29,129 You stick it in the ground and it 1092 00:39:29,130 --> 00:39:31,529 actually uses the the the 1093 00:39:31,530 --> 00:39:33,779 very fine electricity running through the 1094 00:39:33,780 --> 00:39:35,219 soil of the Earth itself 1095 00:39:36,540 --> 00:39:38,879 as a as a literally a programing 1096 00:39:38,880 --> 00:39:40,799 interface and programs directly the 1097 00:39:40,800 --> 00:39:43,349 computer and and and effects directly. 1098 00:39:43,350 --> 00:39:44,580 It's its runtime function. 1099 00:39:45,660 --> 00:39:46,619 And it's sticking in the ground. 1100 00:39:46,620 --> 00:39:47,939 And here's one here. Just sort of stuck 1101 00:39:47,940 --> 00:39:49,639 in the ground over here. 1102 00:39:49,640 --> 00:39:51,149 I mean, this is a very, very poetic, you 1103 00:39:51,150 --> 00:39:53,279 know, philosophical representation of, 1104 00:39:53,280 --> 00:39:55,709 I think, another way of approaching 1105 00:39:55,710 --> 00:39:57,659 critical engineering. You know, imagine 1106 00:39:57,660 --> 00:40:00,149 if, for instance, you're you're on 1107 00:40:00,150 --> 00:40:02,459 the phone in your pocket, 1108 00:40:02,460 --> 00:40:04,589 needed contact with the ground from 1109 00:40:04,590 --> 00:40:07,049 where it actually came, arguably 1110 00:40:07,050 --> 00:40:08,050 in order to function. 1111 00:40:08,910 --> 00:40:10,469 I'm not going to talk about broadband 1112 00:40:10,470 --> 00:40:11,789 because I'm out of time. 1113 00:40:11,790 --> 00:40:14,159 I think I've been doing a lot of work on 1114 00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:16,319 cell tower research, and I'm very 1115 00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:18,149 focused on the cellular network 1116 00:40:18,150 --> 00:40:19,150 infrastructure at the moment. 1117 00:40:20,220 --> 00:40:22,529 But just very briefly regarding 1118 00:40:22,530 --> 00:40:24,479 infrastructure and hidden infrastructure. 1119 00:40:24,480 --> 00:40:25,979 Opacity takes other forms. 1120 00:40:25,980 --> 00:40:28,109 You know this this this removal from view 1121 00:40:28,110 --> 00:40:30,359 of of of the engineered reality 1122 00:40:30,360 --> 00:40:31,859 of the world that we live in, 1123 00:40:31,860 --> 00:40:33,269 particularly in the form of these things 1124 00:40:33,270 --> 00:40:35,699 called stealth cell towers. 1125 00:40:35,700 --> 00:40:38,159 There's a bizarre design practice 1126 00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:40,469 of of disguising cell towers 1127 00:40:40,470 --> 00:40:43,139 as other things like 1128 00:40:43,140 --> 00:40:44,519 the almost always bad. 1129 00:40:44,520 --> 00:40:46,169 I mean, this one here is a cell tower 1130 00:40:46,170 --> 00:40:48,269 badly disguised as a tree in 1131 00:40:48,270 --> 00:40:50,399 a place called Braun home in England. 1132 00:40:50,400 --> 00:40:52,649 There's an archive put together 1133 00:40:52,650 --> 00:40:54,909 by Chris Pensione, who 1134 00:40:54,910 --> 00:40:58,019 who? Who went through countless 1135 00:40:58,020 --> 00:40:59,549 examples of stealth cell towers that 1136 00:40:59,550 --> 00:41:01,169 people have found. The ones that I myself 1137 00:41:01,170 --> 00:41:03,689 have found and put it into some PDFs 1138 00:41:03,690 --> 00:41:05,779 for me, for my research. 1139 00:41:05,780 --> 00:41:07,919 And and what we see here 1140 00:41:07,920 --> 00:41:10,049 is is a is a growing community 1141 00:41:10,050 --> 00:41:12,119 of radio enthusiasts that 1142 00:41:12,120 --> 00:41:13,769 are going around and finding these these 1143 00:41:13,770 --> 00:41:16,019 things. He's one disguise as a street 1144 00:41:16,020 --> 00:41:18,149 lamp, and it was only found 1145 00:41:19,950 --> 00:41:22,559 I was told it was only found because 1146 00:41:22,560 --> 00:41:24,449 people in this absolutely horrible, 1147 00:41:24,450 --> 00:41:26,549 gloomy part of England were were 1148 00:41:26,550 --> 00:41:28,289 trying to walk home to their houses, 1149 00:41:28,290 --> 00:41:30,359 obviously in the world's worst weather. 1150 00:41:30,360 --> 00:41:32,189 And and there was a street lamp that 1151 00:41:32,190 --> 00:41:33,300 never functioned ever. 1152 00:41:35,060 --> 00:41:37,189 And I mean, all they had to 1153 00:41:37,190 --> 00:41:39,799 do was to apply power 1154 00:41:39,800 --> 00:41:42,019 to the put a bulb 1155 00:41:42,020 --> 00:41:43,699 in it and apply power, and no one would 1156 00:41:43,700 --> 00:41:45,829 have investigated what this thing was 1157 00:41:45,830 --> 00:41:47,179 and found out that it's actually a cell 1158 00:41:47,180 --> 00:41:48,180 tower. 1159 00:41:48,860 --> 00:41:49,999 This is the best one of all. 1160 00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:52,219 I mean, some, some some 1161 00:41:52,220 --> 00:41:53,869 really poor, poor sod 1162 00:41:54,920 --> 00:41:57,139 had the job of trying to disguise 1163 00:41:57,140 --> 00:41:59,419 cell towers as as bricks. 1164 00:41:59,420 --> 00:42:00,649 And so they obviously went up there on a 1165 00:42:00,650 --> 00:42:02,479 ladder and took it, took a photograph of 1166 00:42:02,480 --> 00:42:05,179 those of those of those bricks. 1167 00:42:05,180 --> 00:42:07,219 And then and then, you know, loyally went 1168 00:42:07,220 --> 00:42:09,259 down to the print shop, I suppose, and 1169 00:42:09,260 --> 00:42:11,779 printed out some some vinyl 1170 00:42:11,780 --> 00:42:13,849 onto adhesive vinyl, but didn't use UV 1171 00:42:13,850 --> 00:42:15,529 resistant adhesive vinyl. 1172 00:42:15,530 --> 00:42:17,959 So as time goes on, 1173 00:42:17,960 --> 00:42:19,879 the disguise effect fake, shall we say, 1174 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:21,829 is sort of, you know, it's an attrition 1175 00:42:21,830 --> 00:42:23,749 that wears off and they become more and 1176 00:42:23,750 --> 00:42:26,029 more visible. 1177 00:42:26,030 --> 00:42:28,279 Um, anyway, this is this is an 1178 00:42:28,280 --> 00:42:30,859 example of of of the corporate 1179 00:42:30,860 --> 00:42:32,419 level and the physical infrastructure 1180 00:42:32,420 --> 00:42:35,029 world, individuals actively 1181 00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:36,979 working to ensure that that that 1182 00:42:36,980 --> 00:42:39,079 cellphone, you know that you are not 1183 00:42:39,080 --> 00:42:40,549 aware that there's a cell tower going up 1184 00:42:40,550 --> 00:42:41,809 next to your kindergarten. 1185 00:42:41,810 --> 00:42:43,219 You know that your kid goes to or 1186 00:42:43,220 --> 00:42:45,139 something like this because people don't 1187 00:42:45,140 --> 00:42:46,489 like that idea. 1188 00:42:48,620 --> 00:42:51,829 I'm going to talk about 1189 00:42:51,830 --> 00:42:54,290 finally trusted engineering. 1190 00:42:55,850 --> 00:42:57,109 And to conclude here with a project 1191 00:42:57,110 --> 00:42:59,229 called On Tweak that was made by 1192 00:42:59,230 --> 00:43:01,429 by Daniel, the city of Dunia and myself 1193 00:43:01,430 --> 00:43:03,619 in 2011, we were lucky enough to get the 1194 00:43:03,620 --> 00:43:06,139 Golden Nikka for this ad as electronica, 1195 00:43:06,140 --> 00:43:07,669 which was certainly a great honor, and 1196 00:43:07,670 --> 00:43:09,109 we've been showing this work around a 1197 00:43:09,110 --> 00:43:11,210 lot. It comes in the form of a 1198 00:43:12,470 --> 00:43:14,659 of a that's that's 1199 00:43:14,660 --> 00:43:16,219 one of the posters 1200 00:43:17,420 --> 00:43:19,549 comes in the form of of a small wall wart 1201 00:43:19,550 --> 00:43:20,899 like a little matchstick, a kind of 1202 00:43:20,900 --> 00:43:23,149 thing. Plug it into the wall. 1203 00:43:23,150 --> 00:43:25,129 It attacks the local wireless network, 1204 00:43:25,130 --> 00:43:27,259 just using it in the first version, just 1205 00:43:27,260 --> 00:43:29,509 acacia spoofing attacks. 1206 00:43:29,510 --> 00:43:31,669 A local wireless network roots 1207 00:43:31,670 --> 00:43:33,079 all of the traffic through itself and 1208 00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:35,269 allows the owner of that of that of that 1209 00:43:35,270 --> 00:43:37,639 that the book called this one 1210 00:43:37,640 --> 00:43:38,809 right. 1211 00:43:38,810 --> 00:43:40,909 The owner of that of that box to go to 1212 00:43:40,910 --> 00:43:42,739 Madagascar, Kuala Lumpur, Auckland, New 1213 00:43:42,740 --> 00:43:44,749 Zealand and manipulate the news. 1214 00:43:44,750 --> 00:43:46,999 Read on that wireless network. 1215 00:43:47,000 --> 00:43:49,339 So they plug it and walk out 1216 00:43:49,340 --> 00:43:51,469 and then jump on a plane and in the 1217 00:43:51,470 --> 00:43:54,469 comfort of your of your two star hotel, 1218 00:43:54,470 --> 00:43:56,479 you can then stop manipulating the news 1219 00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:57,679 that's actually on that network. 1220 00:43:57,680 --> 00:43:59,479 So you could tell people, for instance, 1221 00:43:59,480 --> 00:44:01,549 that you could cancel flights at an 1222 00:44:01,550 --> 00:44:03,709 airport, you know, manipulate 1223 00:44:03,710 --> 00:44:05,809 the the sights there. 1224 00:44:05,810 --> 00:44:08,269 Or you could tell people that in fact, 1225 00:44:08,270 --> 00:44:10,369 on BBC that an 1226 00:44:10,370 --> 00:44:12,679 asteroid storm is imminently on way 1227 00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:15,169 to to Earth Solar System 1228 00:44:15,170 --> 00:44:17,299 and that now's time to crack open 1229 00:44:17,300 --> 00:44:18,300 the whiskey. 1230 00:44:25,020 --> 00:44:26,249 So I'm just going to show you show you 1231 00:44:26,250 --> 00:44:28,349 the video now, and I think we'll I think 1232 00:44:28,350 --> 00:44:29,429 we'll call it a day and open up for 1233 00:44:29,430 --> 00:44:30,430 questions. Here we go. 1234 00:44:32,490 --> 00:44:33,929 It's not like people think they're being 1235 00:44:33,930 --> 00:44:35,339 subject to propaganda. 1236 00:44:35,340 --> 00:44:36,689 If people don't think that they're 1237 00:44:36,690 --> 00:44:38,369 looking for that, they're much easier to 1238 00:44:38,370 --> 00:44:39,269 propagandize. 1239 00:44:39,270 --> 00:44:40,859 And that's the genius of our media 1240 00:44:40,860 --> 00:44:41,860 system. 1241 00:44:54,900 --> 00:44:55,900 I'm 1242 00:44:58,500 --> 00:44:59,500 of. 1243 00:45:02,160 --> 00:45:03,160 I. 1244 00:45:05,550 --> 00:45:07,459 I don't. 1245 00:45:59,880 --> 00:46:01,669 It's a real bakery. 1246 00:46:01,670 --> 00:46:02,670 Really, this 1247 00:46:03,980 --> 00:46:06,229 media is the nervous system 1248 00:46:06,230 --> 00:46:08,779 of a democracy, if it's not functioning 1249 00:46:08,780 --> 00:46:10,429 well, the democracy can't function. 1250 00:47:52,570 --> 00:47:53,689 Thanks, guys. 1251 00:47:53,690 --> 00:47:54,699 OK. Question time. 1252 00:47:55,710 --> 00:47:56,790 Thank you very, very much. 1253 00:47:58,290 --> 00:48:00,329 Yes, any questions, please? 1254 00:48:00,330 --> 00:48:01,949 Yes, please line up in front of the 1255 00:48:01,950 --> 00:48:02,950 microphones. 1256 00:48:04,940 --> 00:48:06,139 Shall I just go ahead? 1257 00:48:06,140 --> 00:48:08,239 OK, we'll start with questions from 1258 00:48:08,240 --> 00:48:09,240 I.R.S., 1259 00:48:10,460 --> 00:48:12,529 So the main question 1260 00:48:12,530 --> 00:48:14,749 and I see three, where can 1261 00:48:14,750 --> 00:48:16,579 I get one of these devices? 1262 00:48:18,770 --> 00:48:20,839 Well, actually we had a how to 1263 00:48:20,840 --> 00:48:22,819 up and running for about two years. 1264 00:48:22,820 --> 00:48:25,129 And that and the page 1265 00:48:25,130 --> 00:48:27,169 is currently as currently broken because 1266 00:48:27,170 --> 00:48:29,359 we lost some images, but many people 1267 00:48:29,360 --> 00:48:30,439 have made them. 1268 00:48:30,440 --> 00:48:31,849 They've been used all over the all over 1269 00:48:31,850 --> 00:48:33,079 the world. We're currently doing an 1270 00:48:33,080 --> 00:48:35,269 upgrade for some new new 1271 00:48:35,270 --> 00:48:37,999 boards. But if you go to Newsweek.com, 1272 00:48:38,000 --> 00:48:40,549 slash how to you can 1273 00:48:40,550 --> 00:48:42,799 you can see that it is a bit broken 1274 00:48:42,800 --> 00:48:44,419 there at the moment. But in about a week 1275 00:48:44,420 --> 00:48:46,190 or two, we should have a whole new 1276 00:48:47,930 --> 00:48:49,819 How-To there for people to be able to 1277 00:48:49,820 --> 00:48:51,589 make their own using some modern hardware 1278 00:48:51,590 --> 00:48:52,519 because at the moment is a couple of 1279 00:48:52,520 --> 00:48:54,709 years old and we want to push, push 1280 00:48:54,710 --> 00:48:56,569 out a new release or the firmware and 1281 00:48:56,570 --> 00:48:59,389 stuff we've we we have 1282 00:48:59,390 --> 00:49:00,919 freely available, of course, all the 1283 00:49:00,920 --> 00:49:02,389 shell scripts themselves. 1284 00:49:02,390 --> 00:49:04,729 You can read and study. 1285 00:49:04,730 --> 00:49:05,730 Yeah. 1286 00:49:07,130 --> 00:49:08,329 Number two, please. 1287 00:49:08,330 --> 00:49:09,619 Hi, there. 1288 00:49:09,620 --> 00:49:11,989 So thanks for 1289 00:49:11,990 --> 00:49:14,059 bridging the new media community with the 1290 00:49:14,060 --> 00:49:15,799 hacker community, there isn't enough 1291 00:49:15,800 --> 00:49:17,030 overlap, in my opinion. 1292 00:49:18,350 --> 00:49:21,109 But the main question that I have 1293 00:49:21,110 --> 00:49:23,239 is basically how do you deal with the 1294 00:49:23,240 --> 00:49:25,519 fact that a lot of art 1295 00:49:25,520 --> 00:49:27,619 that also bridges activism to a 1296 00:49:27,620 --> 00:49:30,019 certain degree anyway often 1297 00:49:30,020 --> 00:49:32,209 ends up as a sort of like gesture 1298 00:49:32,210 --> 00:49:34,099 in a gallery like you showed us a lot of 1299 00:49:34,100 --> 00:49:36,319 work that is exhibited at 1300 00:49:36,320 --> 00:49:38,269 transmedia, etc. 1301 00:49:38,270 --> 00:49:40,369 and so on. But like, how 1302 00:49:40,370 --> 00:49:43,189 do you actually bring it into 1303 00:49:43,190 --> 00:49:45,439 your practice? How do you see it 1304 00:49:45,440 --> 00:49:46,640 deployed in the world? 1305 00:49:47,660 --> 00:49:48,619 Like, how is that? 1306 00:49:48,620 --> 00:49:49,789 Not just the gesture? 1307 00:49:49,790 --> 00:49:51,379 Oh, absolutely. This is this is really 1308 00:49:51,380 --> 00:49:53,089 important. It's important to break away 1309 00:49:53,090 --> 00:49:55,129 from the from from the black box of the 1310 00:49:55,130 --> 00:49:56,539 art world itself. You could even argue, 1311 00:49:56,540 --> 00:49:58,429 you know, for many people, it's opaque. 1312 00:49:58,430 --> 00:50:00,589 Those that that have some 1313 00:50:00,590 --> 00:50:02,839 contact with the kinds of conversations 1314 00:50:02,840 --> 00:50:04,939 around art as a as a 1315 00:50:04,940 --> 00:50:06,649 as a sort of a in some ways, you could 1316 00:50:06,650 --> 00:50:08,659 argue, a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy 1317 00:50:08,660 --> 00:50:10,609 much of the time as especially as regards 1318 00:50:10,610 --> 00:50:12,919 the market now, it's just really closed, 1319 00:50:12,920 --> 00:50:14,989 you know, so. So the way that 1320 00:50:14,990 --> 00:50:17,599 that we do it is, for one thing, we 1321 00:50:17,600 --> 00:50:19,339 we show that it works. 1322 00:50:19,340 --> 00:50:22,369 We do it in big public museums. 1323 00:50:22,370 --> 00:50:24,499 Secondly, we we build workshops 1324 00:50:24,500 --> 00:50:26,749 around around the projects that 1325 00:50:26,750 --> 00:50:28,249 have that have a general public. 1326 00:50:28,250 --> 00:50:30,679 And we've been very lucky to work with 1327 00:50:30,680 --> 00:50:32,659 organizations all over the world, 1328 00:50:32,660 --> 00:50:34,279 cultural organizations that bring general 1329 00:50:34,280 --> 00:50:36,649 public and they they have zero 1330 00:50:38,870 --> 00:50:41,059 zero skill base to get up and go. 1331 00:50:41,060 --> 00:50:43,249 But then we take them through to 1332 00:50:43,250 --> 00:50:44,869 to having real contact with some of these 1333 00:50:44,870 --> 00:50:47,149 ideas through the actual engineering, 1334 00:50:47,150 --> 00:50:48,619 through the material itself. 1335 00:50:48,620 --> 00:50:49,759 We do a lot of that. 1336 00:50:49,760 --> 00:50:51,799 The other thing to do is to just is to 1337 00:50:51,800 --> 00:50:53,719 upload how to so other people can make 1338 00:50:53,720 --> 00:50:56,119 their own and then freak the friends 1339 00:50:56,120 --> 00:50:57,519 and family out, you know? 1340 00:50:57,520 --> 00:50:59,269 And this is definitely what happened with 1341 00:50:59,270 --> 00:51:01,129 Newsweek. Many, many people were making 1342 00:51:01,130 --> 00:51:03,199 these making these little wall plugs. 1343 00:51:04,330 --> 00:51:06,559 It ended up pissing people off all around 1344 00:51:06,560 --> 00:51:07,560 the world, actually. 1345 00:51:08,920 --> 00:51:09,920 Thanks. Yep. 1346 00:51:10,860 --> 00:51:12,449 Please address the question from number 1347 00:51:12,450 --> 00:51:13,439 four. 1348 00:51:13,440 --> 00:51:15,000 Yeah. Have you ever thought of 1349 00:51:16,590 --> 00:51:18,779 applying those new 1350 00:51:18,780 --> 00:51:21,209 streets to cars, 1351 00:51:21,210 --> 00:51:23,339 taxis, things like that, so you only 1352 00:51:23,340 --> 00:51:25,319 get a distraction for a moment? 1353 00:51:25,320 --> 00:51:27,389 You know, I have my new site and I 1354 00:51:27,390 --> 00:51:29,459 read something and I click reload 1355 00:51:29,460 --> 00:51:31,289 or maybe go back to an article and it's 1356 00:51:31,290 --> 00:51:32,309 different. 1357 00:51:32,310 --> 00:51:34,469 So it's a little bit static 1358 00:51:34,470 --> 00:51:36,869 the way you do it with the wall plugs, 1359 00:51:36,870 --> 00:51:38,459 and I think the structure would be even 1360 00:51:38,460 --> 00:51:40,529 greater if things moves 1361 00:51:40,530 --> 00:51:42,599 move. So just put a solar cell 1362 00:51:42,600 --> 00:51:44,609 on it or may be mounted on some taxi or 1363 00:51:44,610 --> 00:51:45,719 something? I don't know. 1364 00:51:47,200 --> 00:51:48,089 Yeah. 1365 00:51:48,090 --> 00:51:49,739 Well, most people, when they're reading 1366 00:51:49,740 --> 00:51:51,089 the news in a taxi, they're going through 1367 00:51:51,090 --> 00:51:53,549 the 3G, you know, two, three, 1368 00:51:53,550 --> 00:51:55,289 four now 4G networks. 1369 00:51:55,290 --> 00:51:56,519 So it's it's a totally different 1370 00:51:57,960 --> 00:51:58,949 opinion. Yeah. 1371 00:51:58,950 --> 00:52:01,229 I'm not talking about taxi to distract 1372 00:52:01,230 --> 00:52:03,479 the guys in the taxi, but in a densely 1373 00:52:03,480 --> 00:52:04,799 populated areas. 1374 00:52:04,800 --> 00:52:06,869 Yeah, you could use taxis because 1375 00:52:06,870 --> 00:52:07,870 they have 1376 00:52:09,060 --> 00:52:10,459 yeah, they have a lot. 1377 00:52:10,460 --> 00:52:12,329 You have a lot of beacons around there. 1378 00:52:12,330 --> 00:52:15,149 So from here, from that works 1379 00:52:15,150 --> 00:52:16,559 from the houses. 1380 00:52:16,560 --> 00:52:18,329 Yeah, for sure. I mean, I suppose if you 1381 00:52:18,330 --> 00:52:19,979 could, if you could do that, if you could 1382 00:52:19,980 --> 00:52:22,529 change the network topology fast enough, 1383 00:52:22,530 --> 00:52:23,819 you'd have to. You couldn't use something 1384 00:52:23,820 --> 00:52:24,749 like optic spoofing. 1385 00:52:24,750 --> 00:52:26,249 It would be too slow and too unreliable. 1386 00:52:26,250 --> 00:52:27,509 You need to this. 1387 00:52:27,510 --> 00:52:29,189 But yes, that's an interesting idea. 1388 00:52:29,190 --> 00:52:30,599 Maybe trams would be good because that 1389 00:52:30,600 --> 00:52:32,069 sort of speed would be enough for you to 1390 00:52:32,070 --> 00:52:34,289 be able to go around and and and, 1391 00:52:34,290 --> 00:52:35,669 you know, really work with a whole bunch 1392 00:52:35,670 --> 00:52:37,289 of open wireless networks. 1393 00:52:37,290 --> 00:52:38,489 Many cities have open 1394 00:52:39,690 --> 00:52:41,819 open access points now that opens 1395 00:52:41,820 --> 00:52:43,289 up the territory a lot, and so you're 1396 00:52:43,290 --> 00:52:44,609 getting out into the street is maybe a 1397 00:52:44,610 --> 00:52:46,439 more interesting direction. 1398 00:52:46,440 --> 00:52:47,440 Sure, good. 1399 00:52:49,400 --> 00:52:51,499 We might have time for about three more 1400 00:52:51,500 --> 00:52:52,880 questions. Number four, please. 1401 00:52:54,200 --> 00:52:55,739 Yeah, I've heard yeah, 1402 00:52:57,140 --> 00:52:58,849 I've heard about Newsweek, but I didn't 1403 00:52:58,850 --> 00:53:01,499 know that you were the guy behind it. 1404 00:53:01,500 --> 00:53:02,509 One of two you? 1405 00:53:02,510 --> 00:53:03,799 Yeah. 1406 00:53:03,800 --> 00:53:06,409 Are there any other projects you 1407 00:53:06,410 --> 00:53:07,749 did recently? 1408 00:53:07,750 --> 00:53:09,129 Um, do you have? 1409 00:53:09,130 --> 00:53:10,069 Yeah. 1410 00:53:10,070 --> 00:53:12,259 Well, I'm 1411 00:53:12,260 --> 00:53:14,959 really focused on on on 1412 00:53:14,960 --> 00:53:16,549 GSM cell tower infrastructure at the 1413 00:53:16,550 --> 00:53:17,749 moment, but I can't really talk about 1414 00:53:17,750 --> 00:53:19,249 that. And it was I need to talk to my 1415 00:53:19,250 --> 00:53:21,329 lawyer a bit about. 1416 00:53:21,330 --> 00:53:22,639 He's one of the good ones, actually, as 1417 00:53:22,640 --> 00:53:24,829 to what I can and can't do and how 1418 00:53:24,830 --> 00:53:26,329 I represent it. 1419 00:53:26,330 --> 00:53:28,399 But Dan, you and I are working hard 1420 00:53:28,400 --> 00:53:31,219 on some upcoming 1421 00:53:31,220 --> 00:53:34,159 intervention and in Berlin 1422 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:35,939 that we're going to test out and transmit 1423 00:53:35,940 --> 00:53:38,329 Theola and then take it to the next. 1424 00:53:38,330 --> 00:53:40,789 Take it to the next level after that. 1425 00:53:40,790 --> 00:53:42,689 Yeah, lots of lots of stuff, really. 1426 00:53:42,690 --> 00:53:44,869 I'm also interested very much in 1427 00:53:46,400 --> 00:53:48,679 and looking at more rapid 1428 00:53:48,680 --> 00:53:50,749 prototyping, low, low tech solutions, 1429 00:53:50,750 --> 00:53:51,719 a bit like the now sticker. 1430 00:53:51,720 --> 00:53:53,929 You know, projects like this that can you 1431 00:53:53,930 --> 00:53:56,479 can drive the point home with 1432 00:53:56,480 --> 00:53:58,429 with a bang and not necessarily need to 1433 00:53:58,430 --> 00:54:00,649 go quite so, quite so hard all the time. 1434 00:54:01,700 --> 00:54:03,440 But you just, I guess, follow 1435 00:54:04,490 --> 00:54:06,509 you can follow what we're doing on 1436 00:54:06,510 --> 00:54:08,059 online. 1437 00:54:08,060 --> 00:54:09,229 I'd love to tell you about the same 1438 00:54:09,230 --> 00:54:10,399 stuff. I just can't. Sorry. 1439 00:54:10,400 --> 00:54:11,869 OK. Yeah. 1440 00:54:11,870 --> 00:54:13,999 So on your website, you yeah, keep 1441 00:54:14,000 --> 00:54:15,479 it up. We'll be pushing some stuff. 1442 00:54:15,480 --> 00:54:16,639 The upshot cosmetics. 1443 00:54:17,840 --> 00:54:19,550 One more question from I.R.S.. 1444 00:54:20,780 --> 00:54:23,149 So some people are interested in the 1445 00:54:23,150 --> 00:54:24,739 firmware and the source for the 1446 00:54:24,740 --> 00:54:26,539 transparency grenade as well, which 1447 00:54:26,540 --> 00:54:28,369 doesn't seem to be on the website. 1448 00:54:28,370 --> 00:54:29,419 Well, the the the 1449 00:54:29,420 --> 00:54:31,579 transparency grenade itself is extremely 1450 00:54:31,580 --> 00:54:33,739 simple. It's on that level. 1451 00:54:33,740 --> 00:54:36,499 It's just basically it's 1452 00:54:36,500 --> 00:54:38,659 tcpdump capturing 1453 00:54:38,660 --> 00:54:40,789 with it's 1454 00:54:40,790 --> 00:54:42,469 running Debian on a 1455 00:54:42,470 --> 00:54:45,409 on a over a 1456 00:54:45,410 --> 00:54:47,659 come from Game six 1457 00:54:47,660 --> 00:54:49,969 and and then GCP dumpers 1458 00:54:49,970 --> 00:54:51,229 running with a set of zero. 1459 00:54:51,230 --> 00:54:52,279 And it's just capturing everything it 1460 00:54:52,280 --> 00:54:53,719 possibly can. And then it tunnels, it 1461 00:54:55,580 --> 00:54:57,829 tunnels it over VPN to 1462 00:54:57,830 --> 00:54:59,539 my server. So the actual the interesting 1463 00:54:59,540 --> 00:55:00,739 stuff that I'm working on publishing at 1464 00:55:00,740 --> 00:55:02,029 the moment is really on the server side. 1465 00:55:02,030 --> 00:55:03,379 It's all the Perl. 1466 00:55:03,380 --> 00:55:04,549 That's the stuff that's interesting that 1467 00:55:04,550 --> 00:55:06,839 does the TCB stream following and formats 1468 00:55:06,840 --> 00:55:08,749 that an interesting and useful way on the 1469 00:55:08,750 --> 00:55:11,569 grenade. It's really just a case of 1470 00:55:11,570 --> 00:55:12,979 a few shell scripts that 1471 00:55:14,210 --> 00:55:16,399 that work meaningfully 1472 00:55:16,400 --> 00:55:18,679 with with a target network, for instance, 1473 00:55:18,680 --> 00:55:19,760 you might want to supply a key 1474 00:55:21,020 --> 00:55:22,009 or if it's it's an open net where you 1475 00:55:22,010 --> 00:55:23,089 don't need to, of course. And then it's 1476 00:55:23,090 --> 00:55:25,339 just, yeah, if you 1477 00:55:25,340 --> 00:55:26,340 going to utilize. 1478 00:55:27,280 --> 00:55:29,049 Nothing too exciting, but I will publish 1479 00:55:29,050 --> 00:55:31,239 it soon, I promise. 1480 00:55:31,240 --> 00:55:32,240 No one, please. 1481 00:55:33,250 --> 00:55:35,529 The work you showed was very disruptive 1482 00:55:35,530 --> 00:55:37,899 and destructive. 1483 00:55:37,900 --> 00:55:40,449 Would you ever consider a more positive 1484 00:55:40,450 --> 00:55:42,579 approach of engineering? 1485 00:55:42,580 --> 00:55:44,530 Positive examples of technology? 1486 00:55:46,150 --> 00:55:47,589 I think lots of people are sort of doing 1487 00:55:47,590 --> 00:55:49,449 that already. I'm really interested and 1488 00:55:49,450 --> 00:55:51,729 dangerous too. And and 1489 00:55:51,730 --> 00:55:53,799 productive inducing, productive, 1490 00:55:53,800 --> 00:55:56,409 healthy paranoia and fear. 1491 00:55:56,410 --> 00:55:58,149 Fear is a good is a good way to that, you 1492 00:55:58,150 --> 00:55:59,150 know? 1493 00:56:00,240 --> 00:56:01,240 It's like when? 1494 00:56:02,380 --> 00:56:04,209 Like when you actually changing changing 1495 00:56:04,210 --> 00:56:05,619 stuff on someone's phone because they 1496 00:56:05,620 --> 00:56:07,989 don't make a distinction between between, 1497 00:56:07,990 --> 00:56:09,459 you know, where that you know, the 1498 00:56:09,460 --> 00:56:10,749 network service, they're using all the 1499 00:56:10,750 --> 00:56:12,189 time. But if you can change what happens 1500 00:56:12,190 --> 00:56:13,569 in the in that and that little 1501 00:56:13,570 --> 00:56:16,109 rectilinear bounds on their phone, which 1502 00:56:16,110 --> 00:56:18,399 which they they are inherently dependent 1503 00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:20,469 upon that being a consistent 1504 00:56:20,470 --> 00:56:22,359 relationship with with a trusted 1505 00:56:22,360 --> 00:56:24,099 provider, it could be a new source or it 1506 00:56:24,100 --> 00:56:26,739 could even just actually be the your 1507 00:56:26,740 --> 00:56:28,449 data plan. Or it could be, you know, the 1508 00:56:28,450 --> 00:56:30,399 wireless networking using Starbucks. 1509 00:56:30,400 --> 00:56:33,009 If you can manipulate that that space and 1510 00:56:33,010 --> 00:56:35,409 introduce fear and paranoia 1511 00:56:35,410 --> 00:56:37,389 into that space, then already you're 1512 00:56:37,390 --> 00:56:39,249 beginning what I would describe as a 1513 00:56:39,250 --> 00:56:41,469 healthy healing, positive 1514 00:56:41,470 --> 00:56:43,689 process of of change. 1515 00:56:45,580 --> 00:56:46,580 Yeah. 1516 00:56:48,680 --> 00:56:50,420 One last question from IOC. 1517 00:56:51,650 --> 00:56:53,809 Last question from IOC is, are 1518 00:56:53,810 --> 00:56:56,779 you worried about the repercussion 1519 00:56:56,780 --> 00:56:58,580 in particular from Newsweek? 1520 00:56:59,840 --> 00:57:02,059 Yes. If we I mean, we had we had we 1521 00:57:02,060 --> 00:57:03,589 had a lot of people writing to us wanting 1522 00:57:03,590 --> 00:57:05,899 to buy hundreds of these, these 1523 00:57:05,900 --> 00:57:08,029 these little boxes we 1524 00:57:08,030 --> 00:57:10,609 had. We had a very, very bizarre one from 1525 00:57:10,610 --> 00:57:12,799 from a Chechen source 1526 00:57:12,800 --> 00:57:14,219 that didn't seem to realize that Dungy 1527 00:57:14,220 --> 00:57:16,369 himself is from St. Petersburg, 1528 00:57:16,370 --> 00:57:18,079 which has been unusual. But the moment 1529 00:57:18,080 --> 00:57:20,209 that we had to sell any of these 1530 00:57:20,210 --> 00:57:22,369 things, we are immediately 1531 00:57:22,370 --> 00:57:24,439 in a very, very different legal category. 1532 00:57:24,440 --> 00:57:26,569 And so we prefer to work, you 1533 00:57:26,570 --> 00:57:28,669 know, as as in a research like 1534 00:57:28,670 --> 00:57:31,279 sort of territory applied nonetheless. 1535 00:57:31,280 --> 00:57:33,530 But but we're not in the market of. 1536 00:57:34,590 --> 00:57:36,809 Of of of actually 1537 00:57:36,810 --> 00:57:38,189 pushing this stuff out into the world is 1538 00:57:38,190 --> 00:57:40,349 a product that that then 1539 00:57:40,350 --> 00:57:42,509 would would, according to my 1540 00:57:42,510 --> 00:57:44,489 lawyer, at least put us in a very 1541 00:57:44,490 --> 00:57:46,589 different legal domain 1542 00:57:46,590 --> 00:57:48,599 at the moment. We're quite OK. 1543 00:57:48,600 --> 00:57:51,749 Again, disclaimers are really everything. 1544 00:57:51,750 --> 00:57:53,279 You know, if you just write on the if you 1545 00:57:53,280 --> 00:57:55,439 write on a on a site, this 1546 00:57:55,440 --> 00:57:57,809 is intended to scare your sister, 1547 00:57:57,810 --> 00:57:59,550 you know, not people at airports, then 1548 00:58:00,690 --> 00:58:01,919 then yeah. 1549 00:58:01,920 --> 00:58:02,920 What can a lawyer say? 1550 00:58:05,890 --> 00:58:07,299 Thank you very much for your talk. 1551 00:58:07,300 --> 00:58:08,300 Pleasure. David.