0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/152 Thanks! 1 00:00:09,030 --> 00:00:10,439 Thank you, everyone. 2 00:00:10,440 --> 00:00:12,779 My name is Kate Krauss. 3 00:00:12,780 --> 00:00:15,179 I am an AIDS activist from the U.S. 4 00:00:15,180 --> 00:00:16,889 from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 5 00:00:16,890 --> 00:00:17,949 actually. 6 00:00:17,950 --> 00:00:20,039 I've been working as an AIDS advocate for 7 00:00:20,040 --> 00:00:22,349 about 20 years and I've worked on 8 00:00:22,350 --> 00:00:24,419 China and human rights for about 10 9 00:00:24,420 --> 00:00:27,029 of them. I'm director of an organization 10 00:00:27,030 --> 00:00:28,739 called the AIDS Policy Project. 11 00:00:30,150 --> 00:00:32,368 I'm here to talk about what happens 12 00:00:32,369 --> 00:00:34,829 when surveillance moves to large 13 00:00:34,830 --> 00:00:37,319 scale political repression 14 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:40,139 surveillance in China right now. 15 00:00:40,140 --> 00:00:42,719 It's like looking into a crystal ball 16 00:00:42,720 --> 00:00:44,789 and seeing what might happen in 17 00:00:44,790 --> 00:00:46,950 five years to everybody else. 18 00:00:48,030 --> 00:00:49,769 The people who know the details of 19 00:00:49,770 --> 00:00:51,839 China's program are either 20 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:53,939 spying themselves 21 00:00:53,940 --> 00:00:56,100 or risk harm if they talk about it. 22 00:00:57,300 --> 00:00:59,369 It's interesting to note that if you want 23 00:00:59,370 --> 00:01:00,959 to get a computer science degree in 24 00:01:00,960 --> 00:01:02,699 China, you have to join the People's 25 00:01:02,700 --> 00:01:03,700 Liberation Army. 26 00:01:05,630 --> 00:01:07,759 I'm not a technical person, 27 00:01:07,760 --> 00:01:09,859 but I want to share with you what I have 28 00:01:09,860 --> 00:01:11,959 learned about these ID cards and how 29 00:01:11,960 --> 00:01:12,960 they're being used. 30 00:01:14,330 --> 00:01:16,799 This information is not comprehensive. 31 00:01:16,800 --> 00:01:18,979 There are a lot of gaps, and I'm 32 00:01:18,980 --> 00:01:20,629 hoping that some people, even in this 33 00:01:20,630 --> 00:01:22,939 audience or online, maybe may 34 00:01:22,940 --> 00:01:24,950 be able to help fill in those gaps. 35 00:01:28,380 --> 00:01:30,689 China is a country with 4000 36 00:01:30,690 --> 00:01:31,919 years of history. 37 00:01:31,920 --> 00:01:34,079 It's an amazing place. 38 00:01:34,080 --> 00:01:36,239 It's got incredible history, 39 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:38,489 incredible culture. 40 00:01:38,490 --> 00:01:40,979 There's a lot to love about China, and 41 00:01:40,980 --> 00:01:42,479 we're not going to talk about really any 42 00:01:42,480 --> 00:01:43,590 of the good stuff today. 43 00:01:49,350 --> 00:01:50,430 There are people. 44 00:01:52,920 --> 00:01:53,920 Also, that 45 00:01:56,370 --> 00:01:58,679 there are people who say that since 46 00:01:58,680 --> 00:02:00,479 the Snowden revelations, they feel that 47 00:02:00,480 --> 00:02:02,639 they're living in science fiction 48 00:02:02,640 --> 00:02:04,619 like Minority Report. 49 00:02:04,620 --> 00:02:07,110 But many people in China really are 50 00:02:08,130 --> 00:02:10,319 a billion Chinese citizens have 51 00:02:10,320 --> 00:02:12,989 government issued smart cards, ID 52 00:02:12,990 --> 00:02:15,059 cards with a little radio antenna and 53 00:02:15,060 --> 00:02:16,709 a microcontroller in them. 54 00:02:16,710 --> 00:02:17,669 They're mandatory. 55 00:02:17,670 --> 00:02:19,499 You have to carry them with you at all 56 00:02:19,500 --> 00:02:20,500 times. 57 00:02:21,530 --> 00:02:24,499 And China has 500 58 00:02:24,500 --> 00:02:26,719 street demonstrations every single 59 00:02:26,720 --> 00:02:27,720 day. 60 00:02:32,840 --> 00:02:34,699 People protest when their farmland is 61 00:02:34,700 --> 00:02:36,889 stolen by the government, which happens 62 00:02:36,890 --> 00:02:39,289 to four million farmers every year, 63 00:02:39,290 --> 00:02:40,939 and they fight back when the government 64 00:02:40,940 --> 00:02:43,069 colludes with private developers and 65 00:02:43,070 --> 00:02:46,219 demolishes their houses so that 66 00:02:46,220 --> 00:02:48,259 developers can build new high rises on 67 00:02:48,260 --> 00:02:50,329 their land and people 68 00:02:50,330 --> 00:02:52,459 travel hundreds of miles to Beijing 69 00:02:52,460 --> 00:02:54,409 to complain in person to public 70 00:02:54,410 --> 00:02:56,449 officials, sometimes living in the 71 00:02:56,450 --> 00:02:58,819 streets while they wait for their chance. 72 00:02:58,820 --> 00:03:01,489 Those people are called petitioners. 73 00:03:01,490 --> 00:03:03,859 Petitioners may be beaten, arrested 74 00:03:03,860 --> 00:03:05,959 or thrown into jail, 75 00:03:05,960 --> 00:03:08,689 according to Melissa Chan of Al Jazeera, 76 00:03:08,690 --> 00:03:10,849 who got kicked out of China last year for 77 00:03:10,850 --> 00:03:12,469 reporting on this. 78 00:03:12,470 --> 00:03:14,779 Black jails, or basically 79 00:03:14,780 --> 00:03:16,999 secret jails, are holding facilities 80 00:03:17,000 --> 00:03:18,889 for petitioners who come in from the 81 00:03:18,890 --> 00:03:21,019 countryside, and the only reason they're 82 00:03:21,020 --> 00:03:23,089 let go, presumably, is because it's 83 00:03:23,090 --> 00:03:25,009 just too expensive to permanently hold 84 00:03:25,010 --> 00:03:26,010 them. 85 00:03:27,020 --> 00:03:29,749 The Chinese government's biggest fear 86 00:03:29,750 --> 00:03:31,939 in many people's opinion, is 87 00:03:31,940 --> 00:03:32,940 instability. 88 00:03:35,540 --> 00:03:37,939 It's hard to control a billion people, 89 00:03:37,940 --> 00:03:40,069 actually a billion, 0.3, three something. 90 00:03:40,070 --> 00:03:42,319 So China's top officials hatched 91 00:03:42,320 --> 00:03:45,199 a plan in early 2011. 92 00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:46,999 They decided to put all the people who 93 00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:49,099 don't like them into big 94 00:03:49,100 --> 00:03:51,889 groups called special populations 95 00:03:51,890 --> 00:03:53,779 of dangerous persons. 96 00:03:53,780 --> 00:03:56,389 Special populations get special attention 97 00:03:56,390 --> 00:03:58,100 from the Ministry of Public Security. 98 00:04:05,910 --> 00:04:07,889 Here we go. They include drug users and 99 00:04:07,890 --> 00:04:09,209 people in recovery. 100 00:04:09,210 --> 00:04:11,039 People with mental health issues like 101 00:04:11,040 --> 00:04:13,169 depression and people who are being 102 00:04:13,170 --> 00:04:14,969 persecuted using the mental health 103 00:04:14,970 --> 00:04:17,039 system, being threatened with 104 00:04:17,040 --> 00:04:18,719 being thrown into a mental hospital or 105 00:04:18,720 --> 00:04:20,669 given electroshock treatment. 106 00:04:20,670 --> 00:04:22,799 As we've seen in other places, 107 00:04:22,800 --> 00:04:24,719 the special populations also include 108 00:04:24,720 --> 00:04:26,969 human rights activists, 109 00:04:26,970 --> 00:04:29,129 ethnic minorities like wiggers, 110 00:04:29,130 --> 00:04:31,949 Buddhists and moving on 111 00:04:31,950 --> 00:04:32,970 sex workers, 112 00:04:35,190 --> 00:04:37,289 people with AIDS, lawyers who 113 00:04:37,290 --> 00:04:39,419 work for human rights and lots of people 114 00:04:39,420 --> 00:04:42,179 who just end up on the list by accident 115 00:04:42,180 --> 00:04:43,439 and can't get their names off of it. 116 00:04:44,640 --> 00:04:46,859 The special populations of dangerous 117 00:04:46,860 --> 00:04:49,019 people in China are enormous. 118 00:04:50,530 --> 00:04:52,599 And the government uses smart cards 119 00:04:52,600 --> 00:04:54,789 to track them so out 120 00:04:54,790 --> 00:04:56,499 in the world when they go to an internet 121 00:04:56,500 --> 00:04:58,599 cafe, when they try to check 122 00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:00,759 into a hotel or buy a train ticket 123 00:05:00,760 --> 00:05:01,809 or a plane ticket. 124 00:05:01,810 --> 00:05:04,329 Those smart cards follow them. 125 00:05:04,330 --> 00:05:06,459 Everyone over the age of 16 is required 126 00:05:06,460 --> 00:05:08,379 to carry one. And of course, when people 127 00:05:08,380 --> 00:05:10,149 go online well, the government is already 128 00:05:10,150 --> 00:05:12,579 looking over their shoulder, reading 129 00:05:12,580 --> 00:05:14,499 everything they read and watching 130 00:05:14,500 --> 00:05:15,500 everywhere they go. 131 00:05:16,560 --> 00:05:18,719 But unlike some places, people don't 132 00:05:18,720 --> 00:05:21,329 just get followed in China, 133 00:05:21,330 --> 00:05:23,069 they get beaten, they get kidnaped, they 134 00:05:23,070 --> 00:05:24,449 get picked up. 135 00:05:24,450 --> 00:05:26,609 Most of the Chinese public health experts 136 00:05:26,610 --> 00:05:28,679 that I know have actually been beaten by 137 00:05:28,680 --> 00:05:31,079 the police at some time in their lives, 138 00:05:31,080 --> 00:05:32,820 probably in the last five to 10 years. 139 00:05:35,080 --> 00:05:37,149 If you can raise your hand, if 140 00:05:37,150 --> 00:05:38,739 you think you would qualify as a 141 00:05:38,740 --> 00:05:40,359 dangerous person in China. 142 00:05:44,280 --> 00:05:46,349 In fact, that's a 143 00:05:46,350 --> 00:05:47,350 lot of people. 144 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:52,099 In fact, the blacklist 145 00:05:52,100 --> 00:05:54,409 in China numbers from 30 146 00:05:54,410 --> 00:05:56,569 million to 50 million people, 147 00:05:56,570 --> 00:05:57,889 and we know that they're being tracked 148 00:05:57,890 --> 00:06:00,109 because we have government documents that 149 00:06:00,110 --> 00:06:01,999 discuss them and the way that they're 150 00:06:02,000 --> 00:06:03,889 being tracked, among other ways, is this 151 00:06:03,890 --> 00:06:04,890 card. 152 00:06:06,580 --> 00:06:08,109 I have better ones, but I'm not sure I 153 00:06:08,110 --> 00:06:09,110 could fully. 154 00:06:09,890 --> 00:06:12,709 Mask them in a way that was completely 155 00:06:12,710 --> 00:06:14,629 unrecognizable, so this is the one that's 156 00:06:14,630 --> 00:06:15,630 on like Wikipedia. 157 00:06:17,600 --> 00:06:20,389 China's second generation ID card. 158 00:06:20,390 --> 00:06:22,549 It's a contactless integrated circuit 159 00:06:22,550 --> 00:06:23,550 smart card. 160 00:06:24,350 --> 00:06:25,969 All you have to do is hold it near a 161 00:06:25,970 --> 00:06:28,729 scanner and it gives up your data. 162 00:06:28,730 --> 00:06:30,319 The new ones have your fingerprint in 163 00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:31,309 them. 164 00:06:31,310 --> 00:06:33,229 Right now, the scanner has to be just a 165 00:06:33,230 --> 00:06:35,329 few inches away, but new scanners work 166 00:06:35,330 --> 00:06:36,649 from a much farther distance. 167 00:06:41,080 --> 00:06:43,149 The card is linked to your file in the 168 00:06:43,150 --> 00:06:45,339 national database that has your political 169 00:06:45,340 --> 00:06:47,529 beliefs, your HIV status, whether 170 00:06:47,530 --> 00:06:49,209 or not you're a drug user or a sex 171 00:06:49,210 --> 00:06:50,799 worker, your landlord's address, your 172 00:06:50,800 --> 00:06:53,259 parents names any politically 173 00:06:53,260 --> 00:06:55,329 troublesome nonprofit organizations 174 00:06:55,330 --> 00:06:57,609 you may be associated with, and much 175 00:06:57,610 --> 00:07:00,459 more because 176 00:07:00,460 --> 00:07:02,649 people know because people's ethnic 177 00:07:02,650 --> 00:07:04,299 groups are listed on these cards. 178 00:07:04,300 --> 00:07:06,399 There's this idea that I at least read 179 00:07:06,400 --> 00:07:09,159 about that it actually solidifies 180 00:07:09,160 --> 00:07:10,809 ethnic ethnic groups in China because 181 00:07:10,810 --> 00:07:12,220 you're labeled over and over again. 182 00:07:13,930 --> 00:07:15,519 There was a pilot program 183 00:07:16,930 --> 00:07:19,059 for these cards in Shenzhen, a city of 10 184 00:07:19,060 --> 00:07:21,219 million people in which the data tracked 185 00:07:21,220 --> 00:07:23,019 also included the person's health 186 00:07:23,020 --> 00:07:25,299 insurance status and personal 187 00:07:25,300 --> 00:07:27,489 reproductive history in accordance with 188 00:07:27,490 --> 00:07:29,800 China's one child policy at the time. 189 00:07:30,820 --> 00:07:32,889 Also in Shenzhen, the police had to 190 00:07:32,890 --> 00:07:35,319 wear a GPS on their belt everywhere 191 00:07:35,320 --> 00:07:37,509 they went and were also tracked by 192 00:07:37,510 --> 00:07:39,579 cell phone signal, just like 193 00:07:39,580 --> 00:07:40,809 everyone is now. 194 00:07:42,930 --> 00:07:45,059 There's a rumor that the police can scan 195 00:07:45,060 --> 00:07:46,060 the new cards. 196 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:50,339 From 10 yards away or 197 00:07:50,340 --> 00:07:52,739 50 meters away in China and crowds. 198 00:07:52,740 --> 00:07:54,059 So in other words, you can scan by 199 00:07:54,060 --> 00:07:56,249 standing in one place at a group 200 00:07:56,250 --> 00:07:57,689 of petitioners. 201 00:07:57,690 --> 00:07:59,759 And I couldn't find any proof of 202 00:07:59,760 --> 00:08:02,039 that. I just saw rumors and 203 00:08:02,040 --> 00:08:04,289 then and I thought it seemed kind of like 204 00:08:04,290 --> 00:08:05,639 10 years from now. 205 00:08:05,640 --> 00:08:07,169 And then somebody pointed out that the 206 00:08:07,170 --> 00:08:09,449 United States uses cards with a special 207 00:08:09,450 --> 00:08:11,129 meter with a special, 208 00:08:12,180 --> 00:08:14,399 you know, special scanner to scan workers 209 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:16,019 crossing the border back and forth from 210 00:08:16,020 --> 00:08:17,459 the U.S. to Mexico. 211 00:08:17,460 --> 00:08:20,759 And it has a several meter range. 212 00:08:20,760 --> 00:08:23,279 And then that same person pointed out 213 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:24,280 this. 214 00:08:26,760 --> 00:08:29,369 Easy pass, Easy Pass 215 00:08:29,370 --> 00:08:31,469 actually scans you and 216 00:08:31,470 --> 00:08:33,418 pays your toll as you go through a 217 00:08:33,419 --> 00:08:35,668 highway in the United States and almost 218 00:08:35,669 --> 00:08:37,709 I mean, almost everybody with a car has 219 00:08:37,710 --> 00:08:39,689 one of these things and it's tracking 220 00:08:39,690 --> 00:08:41,819 you. And it seemed really 221 00:08:41,820 --> 00:08:43,229 innocent at first because it's just a 222 00:08:43,230 --> 00:08:44,369 toll tracking thing. 223 00:08:46,710 --> 00:08:48,509 And that's when we found out that it's 224 00:08:48,510 --> 00:08:51,089 actually tracking you all over the place. 225 00:08:51,090 --> 00:08:54,029 There are hackers that managed to 226 00:08:54,030 --> 00:08:55,489 hack this thing together, where it makes 227 00:08:55,490 --> 00:08:58,229 a cow mooing sound every time you get 228 00:08:58,230 --> 00:08:59,699 the sensor picks you up. 229 00:08:59,700 --> 00:09:01,259 And if you're in New York City, it never 230 00:09:01,260 --> 00:09:02,260 stops moving. 231 00:09:04,680 --> 00:09:06,779 So they they seem to 232 00:09:06,780 --> 00:09:08,789 be tracking people like every few yards, 233 00:09:08,790 --> 00:09:11,069 and the idea is that it's for traffic 234 00:09:11,070 --> 00:09:12,989 patterns and traffic management. 235 00:09:12,990 --> 00:09:15,269 But you know, the technology is there. 236 00:09:15,270 --> 00:09:16,439 And what we've learned when the 237 00:09:16,440 --> 00:09:18,719 technology is there is the technology 238 00:09:18,720 --> 00:09:20,460 gets used in a lot of different ways. 239 00:09:25,060 --> 00:09:27,129 Can you raise your hand if your country 240 00:09:27,130 --> 00:09:29,520 requires you to carry an ID card? 241 00:09:30,890 --> 00:09:31,890 Wow, 242 00:09:33,680 --> 00:09:34,680 wow. 243 00:09:35,660 --> 00:09:37,519 And how many of those cards can you raise 244 00:09:37,520 --> 00:09:38,929 your hand again if there if they're smart 245 00:09:38,930 --> 00:09:39,930 cards? 246 00:09:42,290 --> 00:09:44,809 And raise your hand if your card includes 247 00:09:44,810 --> 00:09:45,810 your fingerprints. 248 00:09:50,590 --> 00:09:52,539 Again, the technology is there 249 00:09:55,150 --> 00:09:57,339 in China, if you want to tweet, you 250 00:09:57,340 --> 00:09:59,109 have to register with your national ID 251 00:09:59,110 --> 00:10:01,209 number. And most people use Weibo, 252 00:10:01,210 --> 00:10:03,249 which is heavily censored in China 253 00:10:03,250 --> 00:10:04,659 because Twitter is blocked. 254 00:10:06,960 --> 00:10:09,029 Your personal information is shared among 255 00:10:09,030 --> 00:10:11,159 many public ministries, the Ministry 256 00:10:11,160 --> 00:10:12,809 of Public Security, the Ministry of 257 00:10:12,810 --> 00:10:14,999 Health, the local police and even 258 00:10:15,000 --> 00:10:17,309 like low level neighborhood watch 259 00:10:17,310 --> 00:10:19,769 people have access to like, 260 00:10:19,770 --> 00:10:21,929 you know, your your history with STDs 261 00:10:21,930 --> 00:10:24,479 and stuff, and this information 262 00:10:24,480 --> 00:10:26,159 is used to round people up. 263 00:10:26,160 --> 00:10:28,109 For example, on December 1st of this 264 00:10:28,110 --> 00:10:29,729 year, which is World AIDS Day, a few 265 00:10:29,730 --> 00:10:32,009 weeks ago, a group of 200 266 00:10:32,010 --> 00:10:34,349 petitioners living with AIDS traveled 267 00:10:34,350 --> 00:10:36,629 to Beijing to plead for a monthly 268 00:10:36,630 --> 00:10:37,949 bit of money that they're supposed to get 269 00:10:37,950 --> 00:10:39,299 from the government. 270 00:10:39,300 --> 00:10:40,289 100 R&B. 271 00:10:40,290 --> 00:10:42,269 I think it is 100 or 120. 272 00:10:42,270 --> 00:10:44,489 They came to protest and police used 273 00:10:44,490 --> 00:10:46,559 hand-held scanners to select people 274 00:10:46,560 --> 00:10:47,970 from the crowd and detain them. 275 00:10:49,170 --> 00:10:50,519 So that was the Chinese government's 276 00:10:50,520 --> 00:10:52,499 Feel-Good Story for World AIDS Day, and 277 00:10:52,500 --> 00:10:53,819 they made the mistake of it being the 278 00:10:53,820 --> 00:10:55,709 first story. So it was actually the image 279 00:10:55,710 --> 00:10:57,209 from World AIDS Day in a lot of news 280 00:10:57,210 --> 00:10:58,210 outlets this year, 281 00:10:59,730 --> 00:11:01,499 and I want to focus a little bit on this 282 00:11:01,500 --> 00:11:03,779 special population of dangerous persons 283 00:11:03,780 --> 00:11:05,429 people with AIDS in China. 284 00:11:07,760 --> 00:11:09,229 That's just a list of everybody gets your 285 00:11:09,230 --> 00:11:10,429 car, your info. 286 00:11:10,430 --> 00:11:12,469 They share the database, so anyway, I'll 287 00:11:12,470 --> 00:11:14,269 talk more about it. And this is Hunan 288 00:11:14,270 --> 00:11:15,270 province. 289 00:11:17,120 --> 00:11:19,309 It's a rural farming area. 290 00:11:19,310 --> 00:11:21,439 There are millions of farmers intention, 291 00:11:21,440 --> 00:11:23,209 and they were the victims of a blood 292 00:11:23,210 --> 00:11:25,429 selling scandal over the past 20 293 00:11:25,430 --> 00:11:27,589 years. Government officials in the region 294 00:11:27,590 --> 00:11:29,779 ran profitable side businesses where 295 00:11:29,780 --> 00:11:31,759 they collected and sold blood for 296 00:11:31,760 --> 00:11:33,919 transfusions to blood banks. 297 00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:35,509 Originally, the government did not want 298 00:11:35,510 --> 00:11:37,609 to accept blood from outside of China 299 00:11:37,610 --> 00:11:38,629 because they were afraid it would be 300 00:11:38,630 --> 00:11:40,579 infected with HIV. 301 00:11:40,580 --> 00:11:42,859 So they started to pay 302 00:11:42,860 --> 00:11:44,749 people in China to do it. 303 00:11:44,750 --> 00:11:46,069 But it isn't something that a lot of 304 00:11:46,070 --> 00:11:47,659 people like to do for different cultural 305 00:11:47,660 --> 00:11:50,209 reasons. So they started to pay them 306 00:11:50,210 --> 00:11:51,799 and they would give them the equivalent 307 00:11:51,800 --> 00:11:52,969 of five U.S. 308 00:11:52,970 --> 00:11:55,069 dollars. And they put all the blood 309 00:11:55,070 --> 00:11:57,589 into big containers, big vats, 310 00:11:57,590 --> 00:11:59,539 big barrels, according to blood types. 311 00:11:59,540 --> 00:12:02,059 So one big barrel with type B, 312 00:12:02,060 --> 00:12:04,279 another big barrel with type A 313 00:12:04,280 --> 00:12:05,280 and so on. 314 00:12:06,050 --> 00:12:08,329 And they didn't test the blood for HIV 315 00:12:08,330 --> 00:12:10,819 hepatitis, anything else for cultural 316 00:12:10,820 --> 00:12:12,499 reasons. They then injected a little of 317 00:12:12,500 --> 00:12:13,969 the blood back into the person who had 318 00:12:13,970 --> 00:12:15,229 donated it. 319 00:12:15,230 --> 00:12:17,359 So if anybody else in the Typekit 320 00:12:17,360 --> 00:12:19,639 barrel had HIV, well, 321 00:12:19,640 --> 00:12:22,189 you might get it too. You probably would. 322 00:12:22,190 --> 00:12:24,019 It was injected directly into your 323 00:12:24,020 --> 00:12:26,209 bloodstream, and that is the most 324 00:12:26,210 --> 00:12:28,010 efficient way to transmit aids. 325 00:12:29,030 --> 00:12:30,229 And the farmers didn't know they were 326 00:12:30,230 --> 00:12:32,569 infected. They had never heard of AIDS. 327 00:12:32,570 --> 00:12:34,189 Many of them were poor farmers in their 328 00:12:34,190 --> 00:12:36,319 late teens or 20s. 329 00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:37,699 They eventually got married, had 330 00:12:37,700 --> 00:12:39,829 children, didn't know they were infected. 331 00:12:39,830 --> 00:12:42,229 Whole families and then whole villages 332 00:12:42,230 --> 00:12:44,239 started to die, and they were famously 333 00:12:44,240 --> 00:12:46,249 called AIDS villages. 334 00:12:46,250 --> 00:12:48,469 And this is how about 100000 335 00:12:48,470 --> 00:12:50,480 people were infected with AIDS in China. 336 00:12:51,970 --> 00:12:54,189 And plan a the government plan 337 00:12:54,190 --> 00:12:56,499 for dealing with this crisis 338 00:12:56,500 --> 00:12:58,869 was to let the people die off in secret. 339 00:13:01,790 --> 00:13:03,469 We have documents that disclose this, 340 00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:07,009 but planning did not work for the Chinese 341 00:13:07,010 --> 00:13:08,479 government because there was a 342 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:09,480 whistleblower. 343 00:13:10,760 --> 00:13:12,859 I will show you here's a picture from 344 00:13:12,860 --> 00:13:14,839 a few years ago of the families in one of 345 00:13:14,840 --> 00:13:16,489 these AIDS villages. 346 00:13:16,490 --> 00:13:18,679 These are people that like farm to eat 347 00:13:18,680 --> 00:13:19,680 so that they can't farm. 348 00:13:21,860 --> 00:13:23,569 Here's a baby from one of the AIDS 349 00:13:23,570 --> 00:13:24,570 villages. 350 00:13:30,870 --> 00:13:31,870 One of 351 00:13:32,940 --> 00:13:34,379 a woman's health, a women's health 352 00:13:34,380 --> 00:13:36,569 doctor, a gynecologist, was treating 353 00:13:36,570 --> 00:13:38,729 a woman in the region, and she 354 00:13:38,730 --> 00:13:40,199 eventually realized that this woman she 355 00:13:40,200 --> 00:13:42,359 was treating had aids, that she'd gotten 356 00:13:42,360 --> 00:13:44,279 it from a blood transfusion when she was 357 00:13:44,280 --> 00:13:45,329 giving birth. 358 00:13:45,330 --> 00:13:47,159 And then this doctor tested other women 359 00:13:47,160 --> 00:13:49,829 for HIV, and all of a sudden she realized 360 00:13:49,830 --> 00:13:51,569 that the blood supply in China was not 361 00:13:51,570 --> 00:13:54,569 safe, and she gradually 362 00:13:54,570 --> 00:13:56,039 traced it back to these blood selling 363 00:13:56,040 --> 00:13:58,379 businesses in Henan, which 364 00:13:58,380 --> 00:13:59,939 I think maybe early on didn't realize 365 00:13:59,940 --> 00:14:01,799 there was a problem. And then we can see 366 00:14:01,800 --> 00:14:03,209 there's like a timeline you can see when 367 00:14:03,210 --> 00:14:04,709 they realized there was a problem and the 368 00:14:04,710 --> 00:14:06,209 fact that they didn't change anything 369 00:14:06,210 --> 00:14:07,319 after they realized that there was a 370 00:14:07,320 --> 00:14:09,389 problem, which is China is not unique in 371 00:14:09,390 --> 00:14:12,029 that situation anyway. 372 00:14:12,030 --> 00:14:13,259 So this doctor 373 00:14:14,370 --> 00:14:15,989 wrote pamphlets about this to spread the 374 00:14:15,990 --> 00:14:18,149 word to families, and she gave 375 00:14:18,150 --> 00:14:20,009 interviews to very courageous local 376 00:14:20,010 --> 00:14:21,869 newspapers who printed information about 377 00:14:21,870 --> 00:14:23,669 this. And then the word got out to the 378 00:14:23,670 --> 00:14:25,349 New York Times, and it was no longer 379 00:14:25,350 --> 00:14:27,209 secret, and the Chinese government was 380 00:14:27,210 --> 00:14:29,189 unable to let people just die. 381 00:14:29,190 --> 00:14:31,080 They had to care for them a little bit. 382 00:14:34,190 --> 00:14:36,319 Here are cemeteries 383 00:14:36,320 --> 00:14:38,479 with a lot of recent graves in Hunan, and 384 00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:40,400 about 40000 people have already died. 385 00:14:42,440 --> 00:14:45,049 This is Gallia Chea, 386 00:14:45,050 --> 00:14:47,329 the whistleblower she risked 387 00:14:47,330 --> 00:14:48,649 her life to tell people about this 388 00:14:48,650 --> 00:14:49,969 epidemic. 389 00:14:49,970 --> 00:14:52,159 She is one tough person, one 390 00:14:52,160 --> 00:14:53,539 tough individual. 391 00:14:53,540 --> 00:14:55,429 She was harassed by the police. 392 00:14:55,430 --> 00:14:57,289 She was put under house arrest in her 393 00:14:57,290 --> 00:14:59,419 like 80s 70s, 394 00:14:59,420 --> 00:15:01,549 but she eventually was freed through 395 00:15:01,550 --> 00:15:03,799 the intervention of this woman. 396 00:15:08,450 --> 00:15:10,729 Dr. GAO received an award from 397 00:15:10,730 --> 00:15:12,859 Hillary Clinton's organization Vital 398 00:15:12,860 --> 00:15:16,429 Voices in Washington, D.C., in 2007 399 00:15:16,430 --> 00:15:18,799 to get her to D.C., Washington, D.C. 400 00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:20,419 and out of house arrest. 401 00:15:20,420 --> 00:15:22,609 The former first lady intervened on 402 00:15:22,610 --> 00:15:24,649 her behalf with Chinese officials. 403 00:15:24,650 --> 00:15:27,199 Dr. GAO now lives in New York, reportedly 404 00:15:27,200 --> 00:15:28,939 being taken care of by Columbia 405 00:15:28,940 --> 00:15:30,919 University graduate students. 406 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:32,719 So sometimes Hillary Clinton supports 407 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:35,089 whistleblowers, and that's an excellent 408 00:15:35,090 --> 00:15:36,090 thing. 409 00:15:42,180 --> 00:15:44,279 But getting back to the ID cards, 410 00:15:44,280 --> 00:15:45,509 these ID cards 411 00:15:47,220 --> 00:15:49,589 are used in a number of ways. 412 00:15:49,590 --> 00:15:51,299 For example, when the U.S. 413 00:15:51,300 --> 00:15:53,279 National Institutes of Health gives money 414 00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:55,649 to China, as they often do to study 415 00:15:55,650 --> 00:15:57,749 aids in China or, say, sex workers 416 00:15:57,750 --> 00:15:59,879 in HIV, China's health 417 00:15:59,880 --> 00:16:01,949 department collects the 418 00:16:01,950 --> 00:16:04,169 data, enters it into the national 419 00:16:04,170 --> 00:16:06,119 database, where the Ministry of Public 420 00:16:06,120 --> 00:16:08,099 Security can read it and arrest these 421 00:16:08,100 --> 00:16:10,439 people. Arrest the sex workers 422 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:12,989 when drug users check into a hotel. 423 00:16:12,990 --> 00:16:14,579 Twenty minutes later, there's a knock on 424 00:16:14,580 --> 00:16:16,710 the door and the police drag them away. 425 00:16:18,030 --> 00:16:19,169 Two months ago. 426 00:16:20,820 --> 00:16:22,439 Here we go. Two months ago, a Chinese 427 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:23,999 journalist wrote something negative about 428 00:16:24,000 --> 00:16:24,899 the government. 429 00:16:24,900 --> 00:16:26,999 And then later, not much later went to 430 00:16:27,000 --> 00:16:29,069 the train station to buy 431 00:16:29,070 --> 00:16:31,169 a ticket and you use your card to do it, 432 00:16:31,170 --> 00:16:33,569 your ID card, which you have to do. 433 00:16:33,570 --> 00:16:35,639 And when he entered his ID information, 434 00:16:35,640 --> 00:16:37,769 the word petitioner showed 435 00:16:37,770 --> 00:16:39,959 up on the ticket monitor, not journalist, 436 00:16:39,960 --> 00:16:41,789 which he is, but petitioner. 437 00:16:41,790 --> 00:16:43,769 He was actually labeled by the system, a 438 00:16:43,770 --> 00:16:45,149 protester. 439 00:16:45,150 --> 00:16:47,309 And the next day, his microblog 440 00:16:47,310 --> 00:16:50,669 account was closed and he was 441 00:16:50,670 --> 00:16:52,349 talked to by the police. 442 00:16:52,350 --> 00:16:53,999 So it's possible to label people 443 00:16:54,000 --> 00:16:56,219 incorrectly on purpose and use that 444 00:16:56,220 --> 00:16:57,990 to suppress their freedom of expression. 445 00:16:59,690 --> 00:17:01,189 In another case, in the last couple of 446 00:17:01,190 --> 00:17:03,379 months, a human rights lawyer used 447 00:17:03,380 --> 00:17:06,049 his card, bought a ticket, 448 00:17:06,050 --> 00:17:07,699 was just about to get on the train and 449 00:17:07,700 --> 00:17:10,189 was thrown into a van and ejected 450 00:17:10,190 --> 00:17:11,479 at his house. 451 00:17:11,480 --> 00:17:13,489 So imagine a world where you can't go 452 00:17:13,490 --> 00:17:15,019 anywhere in this weird way and you don't 453 00:17:15,020 --> 00:17:16,249 know when you don't know when it's going 454 00:17:16,250 --> 00:17:18,049 to happen because these things are not at 455 00:17:18,050 --> 00:17:20,239 every train station and nobody knows or 456 00:17:20,240 --> 00:17:22,338 nobody who doesn't run them 457 00:17:22,339 --> 00:17:24,739 knows which train stations they're at. 458 00:17:24,740 --> 00:17:27,259 So it's kind of a mind fuck and 459 00:17:27,260 --> 00:17:28,589 you have to self-censor. 460 00:17:28,590 --> 00:17:30,709 Like, maybe I won't go, you know, 461 00:17:30,710 --> 00:17:32,059 to wherever seen. 462 00:17:32,060 --> 00:17:33,799 Maybe I won't go here, maybe I won't go 463 00:17:33,800 --> 00:17:35,779 there. And pretty soon you're moving back 464 00:17:35,780 --> 00:17:37,069 and moving back. You're censoring 465 00:17:37,070 --> 00:17:37,969 yourself. 466 00:17:37,970 --> 00:17:39,739 So the government doesn't need to censor 467 00:17:39,740 --> 00:17:41,899 you. And that's much more efficient 468 00:17:41,900 --> 00:17:42,900 for the government. 469 00:17:46,640 --> 00:17:47,990 Huh. And then 470 00:17:49,220 --> 00:17:51,379 let me introduce you to the big 471 00:17:51,380 --> 00:17:52,459 men of China. 472 00:17:52,460 --> 00:17:54,979 This is the Politburo Standing Committee. 473 00:17:54,980 --> 00:17:56,899 Note the diversity. 474 00:17:56,900 --> 00:17:57,900 Just kidding. 475 00:17:58,700 --> 00:18:01,069 The guy in the top middle, Li Keqiang, 476 00:18:01,070 --> 00:18:02,869 was the governor of Hunan province during 477 00:18:02,870 --> 00:18:05,029 the blood selling scandal, when 100000 478 00:18:05,030 --> 00:18:07,159 people were infected with AIDS and no 479 00:18:07,160 --> 00:18:09,469 one has ever been held accountable. 480 00:18:09,470 --> 00:18:11,059 But he was in charge. 481 00:18:11,060 --> 00:18:12,949 He was in fact promoted several times, 482 00:18:12,950 --> 00:18:15,079 and the reason he's on this in 483 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:16,849 this picture is that he is now the 484 00:18:16,850 --> 00:18:18,139 premier of China. 485 00:18:18,140 --> 00:18:20,779 As of March of 2013, 486 00:18:20,780 --> 00:18:22,009 but we don't know much about him. 487 00:18:23,300 --> 00:18:25,009 There's a rumor that each of these guys 488 00:18:25,010 --> 00:18:26,899 gets the spoils of a whole corrupt 489 00:18:26,900 --> 00:18:28,279 Chinese industry. 490 00:18:28,280 --> 00:18:30,649 You get gold mining, you get banks. 491 00:18:30,650 --> 00:18:31,849 It would be interesting to know more 492 00:18:31,850 --> 00:18:33,349 about the finances of these public 493 00:18:33,350 --> 00:18:35,899 officials, especially Li Keqiang, 494 00:18:35,900 --> 00:18:36,900 the one with the arrow. 495 00:18:40,310 --> 00:18:41,959 These scanners are used to go after 496 00:18:41,960 --> 00:18:44,269 people. This is a $100 handheld 497 00:18:44,270 --> 00:18:46,249 scanner. It doesn't phone home. 498 00:18:46,250 --> 00:18:47,659 It just gets a basic information on the 499 00:18:47,660 --> 00:18:49,939 card name, address, ethnic 500 00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:52,039 background, which when you're talking to 501 00:18:52,040 --> 00:18:54,410 the Chinese police, is pretty scary. 502 00:18:57,260 --> 00:18:59,869 Here's an even cheaper one, $47. 503 00:19:02,240 --> 00:19:04,069 This is my favorite because of the name. 504 00:19:04,070 --> 00:19:06,109 This is the fugitive finder. 505 00:19:06,110 --> 00:19:08,329 It was just approved by for use 506 00:19:08,330 --> 00:19:10,369 by the U.S. TSA. 507 00:19:10,370 --> 00:19:12,649 It can scan your card and check over 508 00:19:12,650 --> 00:19:15,289 100 databases to find out exactly 509 00:19:15,290 --> 00:19:16,939 who you are. 510 00:19:16,940 --> 00:19:19,009 It was designed by an American company in 511 00:19:19,010 --> 00:19:21,289 Port Townsend, Washington, Washington 512 00:19:21,290 --> 00:19:23,479 state. The same company makes a Buie 513 00:19:23,480 --> 00:19:25,579 like device that floats in the water 514 00:19:25,580 --> 00:19:27,469 and monitors boats coming into the harbor 515 00:19:27,470 --> 00:19:29,599 in Washington state for oil companies 516 00:19:29,600 --> 00:19:30,769 and the U.S. government. 517 00:19:30,770 --> 00:19:32,359 And obviously, it can do it from a 518 00:19:32,360 --> 00:19:33,949 distance. It's not up against these 519 00:19:33,950 --> 00:19:34,950 boats. 520 00:19:37,930 --> 00:19:39,909 Here's another device by the same company 521 00:19:39,910 --> 00:19:42,009 in Port Townsend that the TSA 522 00:19:42,010 --> 00:19:43,599 would like to use in airports. 523 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:44,859 You can see the little skull and 524 00:19:44,860 --> 00:19:47,079 crossbones clearly there. 525 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:48,639 That means the guy, whoever it was, did 526 00:19:48,640 --> 00:19:50,499 not pass the test. 527 00:19:50,500 --> 00:19:51,609 Whatever, you know, the check. 528 00:19:55,700 --> 00:19:57,440 And here is an 529 00:19:58,610 --> 00:20:00,709 image of this Bui situation, the 530 00:20:00,710 --> 00:20:02,779 person who runs this company 531 00:20:02,780 --> 00:20:04,999 is an expert in military intelligence. 532 00:20:05,000 --> 00:20:07,129 He also does things that his makes 533 00:20:07,130 --> 00:20:10,189 apps that check people at bars 534 00:20:10,190 --> 00:20:12,799 for their ID and then also one where 535 00:20:12,800 --> 00:20:14,689 you download the app and you can you can 536 00:20:14,690 --> 00:20:16,489 record for yourself how much you've been 537 00:20:16,490 --> 00:20:18,649 drinking and where you've been 538 00:20:18,650 --> 00:20:20,189 and where on the map you've been. 539 00:20:20,190 --> 00:20:21,409 And I just feel like, you know what could 540 00:20:21,410 --> 00:20:22,429 possibly go wrong with that? 541 00:20:26,150 --> 00:20:28,339 Here are things that that need 542 00:20:28,340 --> 00:20:29,949 to be done necessarily by, you know, I 543 00:20:29,950 --> 00:20:31,129 look at the word you, I feel bad about 544 00:20:31,130 --> 00:20:32,989 it, but but things that are missing. 545 00:20:35,220 --> 00:20:36,659 Actually, let me start with what we don't 546 00:20:36,660 --> 00:20:38,909 know yet about or where, 547 00:20:38,910 --> 00:20:40,259 you know, the people that I've spoken to, 548 00:20:40,260 --> 00:20:41,909 which is a lot of human rights groups and 549 00:20:41,910 --> 00:20:43,259 Chinese activists, a bunch of people 550 00:20:43,260 --> 00:20:44,909 don't know yet. 551 00:20:44,910 --> 00:20:46,619 We don't know how much information is 552 00:20:46,620 --> 00:20:48,839 stored on the card and how much is stored 553 00:20:48,840 --> 00:20:50,369 in the national database because it could 554 00:20:50,370 --> 00:20:51,899 be all in the card. 555 00:20:51,900 --> 00:20:53,219 We know there's a national database and 556 00:20:53,220 --> 00:20:54,329 we know a lot of it's in the national 557 00:20:54,330 --> 00:20:55,769 database, but we don't know how much and 558 00:20:55,770 --> 00:20:57,149 exactly what it is. 559 00:20:57,150 --> 00:20:58,739 We don't know what kind of encryption is 560 00:20:58,740 --> 00:20:59,939 used on the chip. 561 00:20:59,940 --> 00:21:01,289 We don't know if the cards are 562 00:21:01,290 --> 00:21:04,529 reprogramed pre reprogramable. 563 00:21:04,530 --> 00:21:06,539 Like what if you were somebody else or 564 00:21:06,540 --> 00:21:08,279 somebody who didn't exist? 565 00:21:08,280 --> 00:21:09,629 We don't know if the card. 566 00:21:09,630 --> 00:21:10,949 We don't know how far away they can be 567 00:21:10,950 --> 00:21:12,359 scanned. We know that they can be scanned 568 00:21:12,360 --> 00:21:13,529 really close, but we don't know what the 569 00:21:13,530 --> 00:21:15,689 outer distance is and how to what 570 00:21:15,690 --> 00:21:17,639 extent the Chinese government is using 571 00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:19,649 for sure. Using the bigger scanners. 572 00:21:19,650 --> 00:21:21,899 The longer range scanners. 573 00:21:21,900 --> 00:21:23,999 We don't know who makes the decisions to 574 00:21:24,000 --> 00:21:26,129 say flag a reporter incorrectly 575 00:21:26,130 --> 00:21:27,130 as a petitioner, 576 00:21:28,650 --> 00:21:30,779 and there are lots of things 577 00:21:30,780 --> 00:21:33,089 that would be useful. 578 00:21:33,090 --> 00:21:35,189 One is encryption tools in Chinese 579 00:21:35,190 --> 00:21:36,989 that are easy to use. I'm sure everybody 580 00:21:36,990 --> 00:21:37,990 is aware of that. 581 00:21:38,730 --> 00:21:41,459 P-gp here's something that 582 00:21:41,460 --> 00:21:43,559 would be helpful to a small group 583 00:21:43,560 --> 00:21:44,999 of people who are under a lot of 584 00:21:45,000 --> 00:21:47,339 pressure. So sometimes 585 00:21:47,340 --> 00:21:49,439 your surveillance is like when you open 586 00:21:49,440 --> 00:21:50,939 your front door and there's five cops 587 00:21:50,940 --> 00:21:51,989 there and they're just there all the 588 00:21:51,990 --> 00:21:52,979 time. 589 00:21:52,980 --> 00:21:54,779 And sometimes your surveillance is you 590 00:21:54,780 --> 00:21:56,039 don't have to open your front door 591 00:21:56,040 --> 00:21:57,389 because somebody is actually living with 592 00:21:57,390 --> 00:21:59,189 you, which is happened to a friend of 593 00:21:59,190 --> 00:22:00,190 mine. 594 00:22:00,630 --> 00:22:02,729 And when that happens, 595 00:22:02,730 --> 00:22:04,439 you're kind of right on the edge of kind 596 00:22:04,440 --> 00:22:05,999 of being taken away pretty much all the 597 00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:08,279 time, especially at this time 598 00:22:08,280 --> 00:22:10,469 of year when the 599 00:22:10,470 --> 00:22:12,569 back of a lot of different people 600 00:22:12,570 --> 00:22:15,419 who would otherwise be get involved, 601 00:22:15,420 --> 00:22:16,739 you know, they're busy with the holidays, 602 00:22:16,740 --> 00:22:17,939 they're not paying attention. 603 00:22:17,940 --> 00:22:19,409 So this is the worst time of year for 604 00:22:19,410 --> 00:22:21,539 Chinese activists, and a 605 00:22:21,540 --> 00:22:23,249 lot of times they're dragged away like 606 00:22:23,250 --> 00:22:25,469 the middle of the night and nobody knows 607 00:22:25,470 --> 00:22:26,849 where. And the government doesn't have to 608 00:22:26,850 --> 00:22:29,339 say where they went for six months 609 00:22:29,340 --> 00:22:30,689 by law. 610 00:22:30,690 --> 00:22:32,309 So you don't know if they're dead or 611 00:22:32,310 --> 00:22:33,719 alive or where they went. 612 00:22:33,720 --> 00:22:35,129 It would be great if there was something 613 00:22:35,130 --> 00:22:37,289 this person could just like slam or, 614 00:22:37,290 --> 00:22:39,239 you know, or click or something that 615 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:40,379 would take their picture and maybe the 616 00:22:40,380 --> 00:22:42,599 picture of the person who's taking them 617 00:22:42,600 --> 00:22:44,069 and then track them. 618 00:22:44,070 --> 00:22:46,499 I know that's, you know, I'm 619 00:22:46,500 --> 00:22:48,779 not a I'm a human rights person. 620 00:22:48,780 --> 00:22:49,829 But that would be helpful. 621 00:22:49,830 --> 00:22:52,109 And then send like send a message to 622 00:22:52,110 --> 00:22:53,339 a human rights organization that's 623 00:22:53,340 --> 00:22:55,739 designated for this or, 624 00:22:55,740 --> 00:22:57,059 you know, a relative even. 625 00:23:02,710 --> 00:23:04,449 Activists like myself need to do a better 626 00:23:04,450 --> 00:23:06,729 job of preparing for Christmas 627 00:23:06,730 --> 00:23:07,659 and maybe doing something like 628 00:23:07,660 --> 00:23:09,399 Thunderclap, or you already enlist the 629 00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:11,559 support of everybody on a list 630 00:23:11,560 --> 00:23:13,059 and then when something bad happens, you 631 00:23:13,060 --> 00:23:15,459 push a button and hell rains down 632 00:23:15,460 --> 00:23:17,109 on the people that that 633 00:23:18,130 --> 00:23:20,709 arrested someone detain them. 634 00:23:20,710 --> 00:23:23,019 And it's good to to fund 635 00:23:23,020 --> 00:23:24,519 groups that are already smart that you 636 00:23:24,520 --> 00:23:25,659 already trust and respect. 637 00:23:26,830 --> 00:23:28,929 And I've done nonprofit work for 638 00:23:28,930 --> 00:23:30,369 long enough to be in the situation where 639 00:23:30,370 --> 00:23:31,899 you're in a totally underfunded group and 640 00:23:31,900 --> 00:23:34,329 a totally well-funded group and welfare 641 00:23:34,330 --> 00:23:36,099 groups can totally screw up. 642 00:23:36,100 --> 00:23:38,349 But if you're if the group is underfunded 643 00:23:38,350 --> 00:23:40,269 but really smart, people burn out and 644 00:23:40,270 --> 00:23:41,619 they don't have like, I mean, these are 645 00:23:41,620 --> 00:23:43,179 people that are dealing with the NSA. 646 00:23:43,180 --> 00:23:44,109 They're dealing with the Chinese 647 00:23:44,110 --> 00:23:46,239 government. You know, they need to 648 00:23:46,240 --> 00:23:48,909 have enough money to comfortably 649 00:23:48,910 --> 00:23:51,729 like put teens out to work on things 650 00:23:51,730 --> 00:23:52,989 because they're up against huge 651 00:23:52,990 --> 00:23:53,990 obstacles. 652 00:23:55,210 --> 00:23:57,129 And that's basically it. 653 00:23:57,130 --> 00:23:59,229 I'm going to say a huge number 654 00:23:59,230 --> 00:24:01,179 of people this took us. 655 00:24:01,180 --> 00:24:02,469 I mean, this was a lot of people's 656 00:24:02,470 --> 00:24:03,549 involvement. 657 00:24:03,550 --> 00:24:05,469 Thank you so much to the Chaos Computer 658 00:24:05,470 --> 00:24:06,849 Club. 659 00:24:06,850 --> 00:24:09,039 And thank you for having me here. 660 00:24:09,040 --> 00:24:10,839 This is an amazing experience for me. 661 00:24:10,840 --> 00:24:12,819 Hacker conferences. Not my usual area. 662 00:24:12,820 --> 00:24:14,949 Super exciting stuff. 663 00:24:14,950 --> 00:24:16,839 Alarcon, who lives near me in 664 00:24:16,840 --> 00:24:19,599 Philadelphia and has spoken at previous 665 00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:21,729 congresses and who has advised me 666 00:24:21,730 --> 00:24:23,889 on what to do. Griffin Boyce, who 667 00:24:23,890 --> 00:24:26,059 helps make bridges for tours so 668 00:24:26,060 --> 00:24:28,299 that to get people in 669 00:24:28,300 --> 00:24:30,519 repressed countries onto tour. 670 00:24:30,520 --> 00:24:32,349 John James, a great friend of mine who 671 00:24:32,350 --> 00:24:34,689 helped me to research reporters Paul 672 00:24:34,690 --> 00:24:37,179 Mooney and Melissa Chen Mack Davis, 673 00:24:37,180 --> 00:24:39,309 who's a China Hand China expert in 674 00:24:39,310 --> 00:24:41,529 Geneva Privacy Watch, Human Rights 675 00:24:41,530 --> 00:24:44,079 Watch, open society foundations. 676 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:46,089 The people in anonymous, they're the 677 00:24:46,090 --> 00:24:47,409 anonymous sources. Not the same as 678 00:24:47,410 --> 00:24:49,119 anonymous would make a fantastic dinner 679 00:24:49,120 --> 00:24:50,559 party, and I wish that I could bring them 680 00:24:50,560 --> 00:24:51,729 all together because they're amazing 681 00:24:51,730 --> 00:24:53,979 group of people and feminism, which gives 682 00:24:53,980 --> 00:24:55,599 me the guts to stand here. 683 00:24:56,740 --> 00:24:57,849 So that's all. Thank you. 684 00:25:09,590 --> 00:25:10,759 One more thing. 685 00:25:10,760 --> 00:25:12,499 This is my first trip to Germany, and as 686 00:25:12,500 --> 00:25:14,599 an AIDS activist, I'm so thrilled 687 00:25:14,600 --> 00:25:16,909 this is the Berlin patient on the right 688 00:25:16,910 --> 00:25:18,739 when he was in my city of Philadelphia. 689 00:25:18,740 --> 00:25:20,599 He's the first person ever cured of AIDS, 690 00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:22,009 and the country that cured him was 691 00:25:22,010 --> 00:25:24,380 Germany. So anyway, so yeah. 692 00:25:31,300 --> 00:25:32,769 OK, thank you very much. 693 00:25:32,770 --> 00:25:35,259 There was a very interesting but also 694 00:25:35,260 --> 00:25:37,539 kind of chilling talk 695 00:25:37,540 --> 00:25:39,849 that your go from the topic here. 696 00:25:39,850 --> 00:25:41,799 Now we still have time from four 697 00:25:41,800 --> 00:25:43,779 questions from the audience. 698 00:25:43,780 --> 00:25:45,909 If you have questions, could you line up 699 00:25:45,910 --> 00:25:48,039 in front of the microphones 700 00:25:48,040 --> 00:25:50,439 here? And I 701 00:25:50,440 --> 00:25:52,059 will also have questions from the 702 00:25:52,060 --> 00:25:54,279 internet because this talk is streamed 703 00:25:54,280 --> 00:25:57,129 into the internet and 704 00:25:57,130 --> 00:25:59,349 I play car or signal angel has 705 00:25:59,350 --> 00:26:01,319 one question Go ahead, please. 706 00:26:01,320 --> 00:26:03,759 Oh, the RFID chip 707 00:26:03,760 --> 00:26:05,829 got the most attention in 708 00:26:05,830 --> 00:26:07,959 the chat, so they 709 00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:10,029 all want that. Like what is about 710 00:26:10,030 --> 00:26:11,859 physical errors in your I.D. 711 00:26:11,860 --> 00:26:13,569 card? How is that handled? 712 00:26:13,570 --> 00:26:15,759 And like, are people allowed 713 00:26:15,760 --> 00:26:17,919 to use RFID blockers? 714 00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:20,229 Like what happens if police 715 00:26:20,230 --> 00:26:22,839 can't reach your scanners from distance? 716 00:26:22,840 --> 00:26:25,689 Or I mean, what happens if somebody 717 00:26:25,690 --> 00:26:27,969 use a microwave to deactivate 718 00:26:27,970 --> 00:26:30,249 the chip? Are they, like, punished? 719 00:26:30,250 --> 00:26:32,739 So there's this whole area 720 00:26:32,740 --> 00:26:34,899 got really a lot of 721 00:26:34,900 --> 00:26:37,479 detailed questions, right? 722 00:26:37,480 --> 00:26:39,399 Those are questions that I mostly don't 723 00:26:39,400 --> 00:26:40,389 have the answers to. 724 00:26:40,390 --> 00:26:41,390 I do know that. 725 00:26:42,640 --> 00:26:44,769 I mean, it's hard to get a card 726 00:26:44,770 --> 00:26:46,839 to pull apart because you need to carry 727 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:48,189 it all the time if you're in China, so 728 00:26:48,190 --> 00:26:50,469 it's hard for me to just borrow one 729 00:26:50,470 --> 00:26:51,699 or something. 730 00:26:51,700 --> 00:26:53,439 And those are answers that we don't have 731 00:26:53,440 --> 00:26:54,609 that I personally don't have. 732 00:26:54,610 --> 00:26:56,679 The people that I spoke to didn't seem to 733 00:26:56,680 --> 00:26:59,739 have. We don't really know the exact 734 00:26:59,740 --> 00:27:01,809 architecture of the chips in these 735 00:27:01,810 --> 00:27:03,909 cards, and therefore we don't 736 00:27:03,910 --> 00:27:05,679 know how to hack them. 737 00:27:05,680 --> 00:27:07,179 And so the first thing is, what is the 738 00:27:07,180 --> 00:27:09,519 card like? What is the what is the card 739 00:27:09,520 --> 00:27:11,409 exactly understanding the cards better, 740 00:27:11,410 --> 00:27:13,239 which means getting a hold of some cards. 741 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:15,339 And the second would be thinking about, 742 00:27:15,340 --> 00:27:17,529 I don't know, other stuff. 743 00:27:17,530 --> 00:27:19,509 Plus this is probably not discussed very 744 00:27:19,510 --> 00:27:20,949 openly. 745 00:27:20,950 --> 00:27:22,809 Question a lot of this stuff is not 746 00:27:24,430 --> 00:27:26,529 like if this were happening in a 747 00:27:26,530 --> 00:27:28,059 lot of countries, you just find people 748 00:27:28,060 --> 00:27:29,349 that worked on this and they would tell 749 00:27:29,350 --> 00:27:31,449 you and, you know, maybe 750 00:27:31,450 --> 00:27:32,679 they couldn't do anything about it, but 751 00:27:32,680 --> 00:27:34,149 the information would be there. 752 00:27:34,150 --> 00:27:36,279 This is not this is very, very 753 00:27:36,280 --> 00:27:37,959 difficult information to get, either 754 00:27:37,960 --> 00:27:40,089 people didn't have it or the couple, 755 00:27:40,090 --> 00:27:41,919 really. I mean, one example, I think the 756 00:27:41,920 --> 00:27:43,389 person had it and was too afraid to tell 757 00:27:43,390 --> 00:27:44,589 me it's 758 00:27:45,610 --> 00:27:47,829 it's not not the same as 759 00:27:47,830 --> 00:27:49,389 other countries. 760 00:27:49,390 --> 00:27:51,189 OK, well, thank you. 761 00:27:51,190 --> 00:27:52,749 Microphone number two, appear in front, 762 00:27:52,750 --> 00:27:53,709 please. 763 00:27:53,710 --> 00:27:55,569 Yeah, well, more 764 00:27:56,890 --> 00:28:00,369 challenge. I guess the actual question 765 00:28:00,370 --> 00:28:01,569 you actually already 766 00:28:02,890 --> 00:28:05,439 formed the think 767 00:28:05,440 --> 00:28:07,809 the challenge that now is up to us, 768 00:28:07,810 --> 00:28:10,509 which apparently is there's something 769 00:28:10,510 --> 00:28:12,280 really to research in 770 00:28:13,510 --> 00:28:15,999 those currents, still a 771 00:28:16,000 --> 00:28:18,519 very worthwhile looking at, I think. 772 00:28:18,520 --> 00:28:20,619 But obviously the 773 00:28:20,620 --> 00:28:22,809 challenges we need to get 774 00:28:22,810 --> 00:28:25,509 more than one car to know 775 00:28:25,510 --> 00:28:27,579 what's inside those most 776 00:28:27,580 --> 00:28:28,580 likely. 777 00:28:29,120 --> 00:28:31,279 Um, yeah, and 778 00:28:31,280 --> 00:28:33,469 that's really the question how to 779 00:28:33,470 --> 00:28:35,689 obtain at least 10 carts 780 00:28:35,690 --> 00:28:36,889 or so, which 781 00:28:36,890 --> 00:28:37,349 10 cars 782 00:28:37,350 --> 00:28:39,889 should be the basis to figure 783 00:28:39,890 --> 00:28:41,839 out what the inside? 784 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:43,459 I don't think that that's impossible. 785 00:28:43,460 --> 00:28:44,959 And I think that the great thing about 786 00:28:44,960 --> 00:28:47,029 having this platform and being able to 787 00:28:47,030 --> 00:28:48,739 to like, be here and you saying that is 788 00:28:48,740 --> 00:28:50,809 that now people can hear this and maybe 789 00:28:50,810 --> 00:28:52,389 they have some cards. 790 00:28:52,390 --> 00:28:53,440 Yeah. Mm hmm. 791 00:28:54,590 --> 00:28:57,709 Thank you. Let's hope for next year. 792 00:28:57,710 --> 00:28:59,479 That's all for next year. Thank you. 793 00:28:59,480 --> 00:29:00,480 OK. 794 00:29:02,630 --> 00:29:04,639 Microphone number four in the center of 795 00:29:04,640 --> 00:29:05,640 the room. 796 00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:08,749 My name is also not really a question, 797 00:29:08,750 --> 00:29:10,999 it's you said stuff to do, 798 00:29:11,000 --> 00:29:13,099 and one of them was get 799 00:29:13,100 --> 00:29:15,019 a way to track people who have been 800 00:29:15,020 --> 00:29:16,639 abducted practically by the police. 801 00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:18,829 Yeah, but the whole joke 802 00:29:18,830 --> 00:29:21,409 was about one big 803 00:29:21,410 --> 00:29:23,659 one card, which is used to track people. 804 00:29:23,660 --> 00:29:25,759 So if wouldn't 805 00:29:25,760 --> 00:29:28,429 it be possible to just use that card 806 00:29:28,430 --> 00:29:30,919 and scan a the person 807 00:29:30,920 --> 00:29:33,019 who's a policeman do have 808 00:29:33,020 --> 00:29:35,119 to get to this car the 809 00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:36,719 whole time, don't they? 810 00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:38,809 The card has to be, as it's 811 00:29:38,810 --> 00:29:40,789 been explained to me. The card doesn't do 812 00:29:40,790 --> 00:29:42,959 anything itself. It's like a computer. 813 00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:45,109 And forgive me, I am. 814 00:29:45,110 --> 00:29:46,729 I'm there are probably 100 people in this 815 00:29:46,730 --> 00:29:47,899 room, you know, that know more about 816 00:29:47,900 --> 00:29:49,789 this. But my understanding is the card is 817 00:29:49,790 --> 00:29:51,889 almost like it holds the data. 818 00:29:51,890 --> 00:29:53,329 It's almost like a computer disk that you 819 00:29:53,330 --> 00:29:54,649 put into the computer. 820 00:29:54,650 --> 00:29:56,329 You need the computer to be able to read 821 00:29:56,330 --> 00:29:58,249 it. So that's a scanner of some sort. 822 00:29:58,250 --> 00:30:00,439 Either the sort of dumb one or the one 823 00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:03,019 that sent that phone's home or whatever. 824 00:30:03,020 --> 00:30:05,139 So I don't know, you 825 00:30:05,140 --> 00:30:06,769 know, that could happen, but we would 826 00:30:06,770 --> 00:30:08,429 need the police to helpfully scan, and 827 00:30:08,430 --> 00:30:09,589 that doesn't feel like maybe that would 828 00:30:09,590 --> 00:30:10,549 happen. Is that? 829 00:30:10,550 --> 00:30:11,749 I understand your question or your 830 00:30:11,750 --> 00:30:12,799 comment, though. Yeah, the 831 00:30:12,800 --> 00:30:14,899 popular comment was why not scan the 832 00:30:14,900 --> 00:30:16,279 people who are getting 833 00:30:17,490 --> 00:30:20,149 well, use the card against 834 00:30:20,150 --> 00:30:22,669 its master, basically 835 00:30:22,670 --> 00:30:24,259 because it is a tracking device. 836 00:30:24,260 --> 00:30:26,719 So well, why not using it to track 837 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:28,189 abducted people? 838 00:30:28,190 --> 00:30:29,359 That's possibly. 839 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:31,339 There's also this thing that if you if 840 00:30:31,340 --> 00:30:33,409 you're a lost hiker, it sends 841 00:30:33,410 --> 00:30:34,909 tweets out. And I don't think we want 842 00:30:34,910 --> 00:30:37,369 tweets, but and it's not encrypted. 843 00:30:37,370 --> 00:30:38,689 But that would be an interesting and 844 00:30:38,690 --> 00:30:39,889 like. I wonder if somehow that could be 845 00:30:39,890 --> 00:30:40,969 moved into something and there are 846 00:30:40,970 --> 00:30:42,529 bracelets that they've made for this 847 00:30:42,530 --> 00:30:44,689 purpose. But like 848 00:30:44,690 --> 00:30:46,219 without asking, I guess, the right people 849 00:30:46,220 --> 00:30:47,719 because you know, you don't want someone 850 00:30:47,720 --> 00:30:50,089 to try and remove the bracelet 851 00:30:50,090 --> 00:30:51,090 the wrong way. 852 00:30:52,250 --> 00:30:53,250 But thank you. 853 00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:55,519 OK? Microphone number two up here, 854 00:30:55,520 --> 00:30:56,529 please. 855 00:30:56,530 --> 00:30:58,099 You've mentioned this list of the 856 00:30:58,100 --> 00:31:00,169 undesirable people and how you get 857 00:31:00,170 --> 00:31:02,809 on there. I wonder how big a problem just 858 00:31:02,810 --> 00:31:05,389 corruption is. So if if some some 859 00:31:05,390 --> 00:31:07,369 police just pay a bribe or you'll be 860 00:31:07,370 --> 00:31:09,919 listed as a truck, a truck user, 861 00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:11,589 is that a big problem? 862 00:31:11,590 --> 00:31:14,029 Or I understand that somehow 863 00:31:14,030 --> 00:31:15,739 there are counterfeit cards, but I have 864 00:31:15,740 --> 00:31:17,539 no other information than I have not seen 865 00:31:17,540 --> 00:31:18,679 one. 866 00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:19,790 I mean, you can you can. 867 00:31:21,530 --> 00:31:23,269 You can order fake ones, but they're not 868 00:31:23,270 --> 00:31:24,619 really fake and they wouldn't pass a 869 00:31:24,620 --> 00:31:25,759 scam. You know, I mean, like, they're 870 00:31:25,760 --> 00:31:27,589 just picture cards and not as far as I 871 00:31:27,590 --> 00:31:28,549 can tell. 872 00:31:28,550 --> 00:31:30,499 Now, I wonder if you. 873 00:31:30,500 --> 00:31:32,899 What's the danger of being listed 874 00:31:32,900 --> 00:31:35,119 incorrectly in this database 875 00:31:35,120 --> 00:31:37,909 as, say, say, a drug user 876 00:31:37,910 --> 00:31:40,249 if you just didn't pay a bribe to it 877 00:31:40,250 --> 00:31:41,239 to the police? 878 00:31:41,240 --> 00:31:43,309 Possibly. I mean, first of all, 879 00:31:43,310 --> 00:31:45,859 I'm not sure we know who's in who's 880 00:31:45,860 --> 00:31:47,689 actually. I think I believe that I was 881 00:31:47,690 --> 00:31:49,519 told that a lot of people can enter the 882 00:31:49,520 --> 00:31:50,419 data. 883 00:31:50,420 --> 00:31:52,759 So maybe that's possible bribing bribing 884 00:31:52,760 --> 00:31:54,859 someone to change your data? 885 00:31:54,860 --> 00:31:56,059 That's an interesting idea. 886 00:31:58,180 --> 00:32:00,039 OK. More questions from the Internet 887 00:32:00,040 --> 00:32:01,040 Africa. 888 00:32:05,700 --> 00:32:06,750 So I'm sorry. 889 00:32:08,190 --> 00:32:10,079 So the next question is, do 890 00:32:11,130 --> 00:32:13,199 do you think our EU and 891 00:32:13,200 --> 00:32:15,989 US privacy laws will be sufficient 892 00:32:15,990 --> 00:32:18,239 to counter these invasive usage 893 00:32:18,240 --> 00:32:20,699 of I.D. systems like 894 00:32:20,700 --> 00:32:23,189 we started to have some in Germany, 895 00:32:23,190 --> 00:32:24,779 for example? 896 00:32:24,780 --> 00:32:26,549 Yeah, that is a good question. 897 00:32:26,550 --> 00:32:28,499 Right now, the United States I.D. 898 00:32:28,500 --> 00:32:30,689 card is a piece of paper that 899 00:32:30,690 --> 00:32:33,209 falls apart and which until 900 00:32:33,210 --> 00:32:34,649 a couple of years ago, I was always 901 00:32:34,650 --> 00:32:36,899 mentally criticizing. 902 00:32:36,900 --> 00:32:38,459 It's a little it's a piece of cardboard 903 00:32:38,460 --> 00:32:40,289 and it it falls apart. 904 00:32:40,290 --> 00:32:41,729 It's just nothing. 905 00:32:41,730 --> 00:32:42,899 It's not even plastic. 906 00:32:42,900 --> 00:32:44,189 You don't even have. It's not even 907 00:32:44,190 --> 00:32:45,149 encased in plastic. 908 00:32:45,150 --> 00:32:47,459 So I think that 909 00:32:47,460 --> 00:32:48,539 I worry that 910 00:32:49,710 --> 00:32:52,199 I mean, our record is not good right now 911 00:32:52,200 --> 00:32:53,200 on this. 912 00:32:53,980 --> 00:32:55,799 This is the situation is OK right now. 913 00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:57,899 It's fine this piece of paper, 914 00:32:57,900 --> 00:32:59,759 but it seems like who knows what the 915 00:32:59,760 --> 00:33:02,039 future holds. And I think that one reason 916 00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:03,389 that I wanted to do this talk is just 917 00:33:03,390 --> 00:33:04,769 have people keep an eye on this. 918 00:33:04,770 --> 00:33:06,449 You know, in the United States and 919 00:33:06,450 --> 00:33:08,819 elsewhere and here in Germany, 920 00:33:08,820 --> 00:33:10,889 you have you have an antenna in your 921 00:33:10,890 --> 00:33:13,019 cards and you can have 922 00:33:13,020 --> 00:33:14,249 fingerprint data. 923 00:33:14,250 --> 00:33:16,739 And you know, again 924 00:33:16,740 --> 00:33:18,479 that the technology is there. 925 00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:19,529 It just, I don't know. 926 00:33:21,910 --> 00:33:23,209 OK. 927 00:33:23,210 --> 00:33:24,609 The lady from the center of the room, 928 00:33:24,610 --> 00:33:26,469 please thank you. 929 00:33:26,470 --> 00:33:28,539 I'm a student at UCLA 930 00:33:28,540 --> 00:33:30,609 and I was born and raised in China 931 00:33:30,610 --> 00:33:32,739 and went to United States 932 00:33:32,740 --> 00:33:34,269 five years ago. 933 00:33:34,270 --> 00:33:36,549 And so right now I live in L.A., 934 00:33:38,890 --> 00:33:41,079 I I have ID card. 935 00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:43,059 And this is not a U.S. 936 00:33:43,060 --> 00:33:43,599 citizen. 937 00:33:43,600 --> 00:33:45,489 I don't use it anymore. 938 00:33:45,490 --> 00:33:47,069 If you need you. 939 00:33:51,290 --> 00:33:52,290 They say. 940 00:33:56,790 --> 00:33:57,899 This is a great this is a 941 00:33:57,900 --> 00:33:58,900 great Congress 942 00:34:00,840 --> 00:34:02,549 that is very helpful to know and that you 943 00:34:02,550 --> 00:34:03,869 should say nothing else, I 944 00:34:06,210 --> 00:34:07,649 know that mean, but if you want it, of 945 00:34:07,650 --> 00:34:08,908 course. 946 00:34:08,909 --> 00:34:11,039 Yeah, I don't have it with me, but you 947 00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:12,959 know, maybe we can talk later. 948 00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:14,729 I'm going to go to the noisy square in 949 00:34:14,730 --> 00:34:16,229 case anybody else has any, you know, 950 00:34:16,230 --> 00:34:18,329 after this to case anybody wants to talk. 951 00:34:19,469 --> 00:34:21,839 OK, good 952 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:23,789 upfront here, please. 953 00:34:23,790 --> 00:34:26,039 I was just wondering, you 954 00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:28,138 said that you wanted a function to 955 00:34:28,139 --> 00:34:29,729 attract people when they are picked up by 956 00:34:29,730 --> 00:34:31,859 police, but when those people are picked 957 00:34:31,860 --> 00:34:33,779 up by police and they searched for cell 958 00:34:33,780 --> 00:34:36,718 phones and the other types of devices, 959 00:34:36,719 --> 00:34:37,769 and I take off them. 960 00:34:37,770 --> 00:34:39,869 So this device would have to be 961 00:34:39,870 --> 00:34:42,119 very small and to 962 00:34:42,120 --> 00:34:43,019 be able to be hidden. 963 00:34:43,020 --> 00:34:45,299 So it wouldn't be an option to just do 964 00:34:45,300 --> 00:34:47,579 an app for a smartphone that I 965 00:34:47,580 --> 00:34:49,709 just cannot imagine the device that 966 00:34:49,710 --> 00:34:51,809 wouldn't be found by police and be 967 00:34:51,810 --> 00:34:53,699 so easy to handle at the same time. 968 00:34:55,290 --> 00:34:56,939 Well, one thing that's weird that I don't 969 00:34:56,940 --> 00:34:58,949 understand, and probably I just haven't 970 00:34:58,950 --> 00:35:00,779 asked the right person, is that sometimes 971 00:35:00,780 --> 00:35:02,939 they let you keep your cell phone when 972 00:35:02,940 --> 00:35:05,039 you're detained for a while and like, 973 00:35:05,040 --> 00:35:08,219 then there are these like, weird. 974 00:35:08,220 --> 00:35:09,329 I mean, this happens in the US 975 00:35:09,330 --> 00:35:10,379 demonstrated like protests. 976 00:35:10,380 --> 00:35:11,819 Also, for some reason, they've let you 977 00:35:11,820 --> 00:35:13,499 and then you send a series of messages 978 00:35:13,500 --> 00:35:15,569 out and then people all respond 979 00:35:15,570 --> 00:35:16,529 to the messages. 980 00:35:16,530 --> 00:35:17,999 And then eventually, like four days 981 00:35:18,000 --> 00:35:19,739 later, your phone disappears for, you 982 00:35:19,740 --> 00:35:20,669 know, the duration. 983 00:35:20,670 --> 00:35:22,709 But they do seem to sometimes let people 984 00:35:22,710 --> 00:35:24,359 keep their phones. I I can't even imagine 985 00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:25,469 why it doesn't. 986 00:35:25,470 --> 00:35:27,539 And I haven't asked, but that's a 987 00:35:27,540 --> 00:35:29,099 thing. But obviously, you have to be 988 00:35:29,100 --> 00:35:31,649 really tiny, you know? 989 00:35:31,650 --> 00:35:33,989 And I I that's like a dream 990 00:35:33,990 --> 00:35:35,849 thing. I know nothing of the world of 991 00:35:35,850 --> 00:35:37,089 making something like that. Nothing. 992 00:35:37,090 --> 00:35:38,969 So it may be completely unrealistic, but 993 00:35:38,970 --> 00:35:40,829 it would be something tiny would probably 994 00:35:40,830 --> 00:35:43,139 be necessary, you know, or something 995 00:35:43,140 --> 00:35:45,329 that you can easily pick up 996 00:35:45,330 --> 00:35:47,519 and hide or put in your ear. 997 00:35:47,520 --> 00:35:48,520 You know, I don't know. 998 00:35:50,460 --> 00:35:51,689 I mean, these are people that literally 999 00:35:51,690 --> 00:35:52,769 that, you know, they get dragged away and 1000 00:35:52,770 --> 00:35:53,909 nobody hears from them for two years. 1001 00:35:53,910 --> 00:35:56,129 The stakes are really high, you know? 1002 00:35:56,130 --> 00:35:57,749 So I mean, this is a country that 1003 00:35:57,750 --> 00:35:59,189 unfortunately, although it has so many 1004 00:35:59,190 --> 00:36:01,440 wonderful things about it, currently is 1005 00:36:02,970 --> 00:36:05,119 detaining a Nobel Prize winner. 1006 00:36:05,120 --> 00:36:06,120 So. 1007 00:36:08,690 --> 00:36:09,690 OK. OK. 1008 00:36:11,000 --> 00:36:12,649 Another question from the Internet 1009 00:36:12,650 --> 00:36:13,669 Africa. 1010 00:36:13,670 --> 00:36:15,050 Yeah, one last question. 1011 00:36:16,250 --> 00:36:18,499 Like Chinese people, if they travel 1012 00:36:18,500 --> 00:36:20,869 abroad, like come to such a Congress 1013 00:36:20,870 --> 00:36:22,879 or something. Do they have to take their 1014 00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,039 cards with them or are they allowed to 1015 00:36:25,040 --> 00:36:26,909 take their coats with them? 1016 00:36:26,910 --> 00:36:28,669 I would. The people that I know. 1017 00:36:28,670 --> 00:36:30,769 The cards that I've seen, I would 1018 00:36:30,770 --> 00:36:32,089 imagine that they are allowed to bring 1019 00:36:32,090 --> 00:36:34,099 them and other people would probably know 1020 00:36:34,100 --> 00:36:34,969 better than me. 1021 00:36:34,970 --> 00:36:36,829 But do they have to bring them? 1022 00:36:36,830 --> 00:36:38,779 I don't know. That's a good question. 1023 00:36:38,780 --> 00:36:40,759 I don't think. 1024 00:36:40,760 --> 00:36:42,499 I don't know. I'm not going to speculate. 1025 00:36:42,500 --> 00:36:43,500 I'm not sure. 1026 00:36:44,340 --> 00:36:45,340 Sorry. 1027 00:36:45,810 --> 00:36:46,619 It's a good question. 1028 00:36:46,620 --> 00:36:48,899 And on the other hand, like two 1029 00:36:48,900 --> 00:36:51,039 people traveling to China 1030 00:36:51,040 --> 00:36:52,979 have to carry a card. 1031 00:36:52,980 --> 00:36:54,959 Yes, they do. 1032 00:36:54,960 --> 00:36:56,369 They need a passport. 1033 00:36:56,370 --> 00:36:58,379 So we're not talking about passports, 1034 00:36:58,380 --> 00:37:01,139 we're talking about internal passports 1035 00:37:01,140 --> 00:37:02,140 right now. 1036 00:37:02,700 --> 00:37:03,840 OK, thanks. Sure. 1037 00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:06,299 Yes, please. 1038 00:37:06,300 --> 00:37:08,069 I think I can answer this question from 1039 00:37:08,070 --> 00:37:09,269 the internet. 1040 00:37:09,270 --> 00:37:11,849 Yeah, I'm I'm from China 1041 00:37:11,850 --> 00:37:14,189 Pure. I don't bring because he brings 1042 00:37:14,190 --> 00:37:15,209 the I.D. 1043 00:37:15,210 --> 00:37:17,279 card. And even in China, I 1044 00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:19,589 don't bring every day I live in China 1045 00:37:19,590 --> 00:37:21,689 for. I live in Beijing for 17 1046 00:37:21,690 --> 00:37:22,619 years. 1047 00:37:22,620 --> 00:37:24,569 I didn't bring the I.D. 1048 00:37:24,570 --> 00:37:25,939 card to ever deal with me. 1049 00:37:25,940 --> 00:37:27,899 Hmm. No. Police I.D. 1050 00:37:27,900 --> 00:37:28,979 Ha. 1051 00:37:28,980 --> 00:37:30,959 They seem like they are now. 1052 00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:32,759 They're doing more spot checks. 1053 00:37:32,760 --> 00:37:34,569 But I don't, you know, I don't mean to. 1054 00:37:34,570 --> 00:37:36,389 But that's what people have been saying. 1055 00:37:36,390 --> 00:37:37,979 They didn't used to, but now they are. 1056 00:37:37,980 --> 00:37:40,199 I don't know why, and I may be incorrect, 1057 00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:42,379 but that's what I've been been told. 1058 00:37:42,380 --> 00:37:44,519 And in a sense, for your research 1059 00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:46,259 and the for another question about as a 1060 00:37:46,260 --> 00:37:47,399 microblog. 1061 00:37:47,400 --> 00:37:49,559 Yeah. And in China, we can use 1062 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:50,459 magboro. 1063 00:37:50,460 --> 00:37:52,649 I can register an account in the Michael 1064 00:37:52,650 --> 00:37:53,999 Brown Michael Brown. 1065 00:37:54,000 --> 00:37:56,309 Right, right. Without it. 1066 00:37:56,310 --> 00:37:57,729 But with your ID number, right? 1067 00:37:57,730 --> 00:37:59,219 Yeah. Your I.D. number 1068 00:37:59,220 --> 00:38:00,899 with without you. 1069 00:38:00,900 --> 00:38:02,279 Just follow some. 1070 00:38:02,280 --> 00:38:04,349 Some someone told to wash. 1071 00:38:04,350 --> 00:38:05,399 You do not put anything. 1072 00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:07,619 You don't need it. Import any I.D.. 1073 00:38:07,620 --> 00:38:09,749 No, but I know several years 1074 00:38:09,750 --> 00:38:11,969 ago and we can write 1075 00:38:11,970 --> 00:38:13,739 something without input. 1076 00:38:13,740 --> 00:38:15,509 Our I.D. number. 1077 00:38:15,510 --> 00:38:17,579 Currently is usually this 1078 00:38:17,580 --> 00:38:20,069 suicide machine, something you need 1079 00:38:20,070 --> 00:38:22,229 for the I.D. card, but it's very easy 1080 00:38:22,230 --> 00:38:25,089 for for Chinese tool 1081 00:38:25,090 --> 00:38:27,149 to search, to use a Google to 1082 00:38:27,150 --> 00:38:28,919 search for an I.D. 1083 00:38:28,920 --> 00:38:31,079 number from the internet and put 1084 00:38:31,080 --> 00:38:32,369 it into the mirror. 1085 00:38:32,370 --> 00:38:33,639 So you cast your mind. 1086 00:38:35,400 --> 00:38:36,400 Yeah. 1087 00:38:38,230 --> 00:38:39,789 OK, thank you. 1088 00:38:39,790 --> 00:38:40,790 Thank you. 1089 00:38:41,800 --> 00:38:43,479 These are great. This is really exciting, 1090 00:38:43,480 --> 00:38:45,550 right? Like things to hear? 1091 00:38:47,120 --> 00:38:48,769 Any more questions from the internet, I 1092 00:38:48,770 --> 00:38:49,889 think. 1093 00:38:49,890 --> 00:38:51,109 Who's speaking from the internet? 1094 00:38:51,110 --> 00:38:52,850 It seems like, God, where's the person 1095 00:38:54,830 --> 00:38:56,199 up there right beside the camera 1096 00:38:57,750 --> 00:38:59,659 and she has microphone as well? 1097 00:38:59,660 --> 00:39:02,029 OK, no more questions 1098 00:39:02,030 --> 00:39:03,259 from the room. 1099 00:39:03,260 --> 00:39:05,779 So that leaves us 1100 00:39:05,780 --> 00:39:08,179 to wish you good luck for your struggle 1101 00:39:08,180 --> 00:39:10,609 and for your calls and 1102 00:39:10,610 --> 00:39:11,959 people interested in meeting. 1103 00:39:11,960 --> 00:39:13,009 You can meet your later. 1104 00:39:13,010 --> 00:39:13,879 Like where? 1105 00:39:13,880 --> 00:39:15,619 Like Noisey Square? 1106 00:39:15,620 --> 00:39:17,179 OK, I don't know where that is. 1107 00:39:17,180 --> 00:39:18,559 I mean, I remember where that what part 1108 00:39:18,560 --> 00:39:20,179 of the center it's in. 1109 00:39:20,180 --> 00:39:22,009 But yeah, it's on the second floor, I 1110 00:39:22,010 --> 00:39:23,089 think. 1111 00:39:23,090 --> 00:39:25,249 OK. And I would have to look around 1112 00:39:25,250 --> 00:39:27,649 as well. OK, once again, 1113 00:39:27,650 --> 00:39:28,969 thank you very much. 1114 00:39:28,970 --> 00:39:29,970 Thank you.