0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/682 Thanks! 1 00:00:14,180 --> 00:00:16,459 OK, so it is said that history 2 00:00:16,460 --> 00:00:18,529 is written by the victors, but in the 3 00:00:18,530 --> 00:00:20,599 era of information, we just have to dig 4 00:00:20,600 --> 00:00:22,669 out the truth and expose the lies. 5 00:00:22,670 --> 00:00:24,139 The student archive is a group of 6 00:00:24,140 --> 00:00:26,209 volunteers dedicated to documenting 7 00:00:26,210 --> 00:00:28,279 human rights violations committed by all 8 00:00:28,280 --> 00:00:30,589 sides during the Syrian conflict, 9 00:00:30,590 --> 00:00:32,929 with over 2000 incidents preserved 10 00:00:32,930 --> 00:00:34,699 in more hours of online footage than 11 00:00:34,700 --> 00:00:36,769 there have been hours of conflict. 12 00:00:36,770 --> 00:00:38,839 The Syrian archive is the only tool 13 00:00:38,840 --> 00:00:41,569 to gather and verify all this data. 14 00:00:41,570 --> 00:00:43,459 Without further ado, I present to you 15 00:00:43,460 --> 00:00:44,479 this year Nakib team. 16 00:00:52,610 --> 00:00:54,829 Hello, everyone, my name is Kathy, 17 00:00:54,830 --> 00:00:56,719 and I'm Jeff Sorich. 18 00:00:56,720 --> 00:00:58,699 First of all, I would like to thank you 19 00:00:58,700 --> 00:01:01,129 for being here and thank you for inviting 20 00:01:01,130 --> 00:01:03,559 us. It's really, uh, we appreciate 21 00:01:03,560 --> 00:01:05,849 being able to present here, uh, 22 00:01:05,850 --> 00:01:07,909 what will be going through in the next 23 00:01:07,910 --> 00:01:10,039 30 minutes, uh, is an overview 24 00:01:10,040 --> 00:01:12,349 of the project, their backgrounds, 25 00:01:12,350 --> 00:01:13,849 uh, specific problems that we have 26 00:01:13,850 --> 00:01:15,589 identified by working on user generated 27 00:01:15,590 --> 00:01:18,079 content, uh, our methodology 28 00:01:18,080 --> 00:01:20,179 and, uh, three case studies as 29 00:01:20,180 --> 00:01:22,670 well as our plans for 2017. 30 00:01:25,070 --> 00:01:26,929 So we have started this work, uh, in 31 00:01:26,930 --> 00:01:29,569 Turkey in 2014, working with journalists, 32 00:01:29,570 --> 00:01:32,389 uh, lawyers and human rights activists. 33 00:01:32,390 --> 00:01:34,759 Uh, and the project is about 34 00:01:34,760 --> 00:01:38,029 a platform that collects, verifies, 35 00:01:38,030 --> 00:01:40,159 uh, preserve and analyze 36 00:01:40,160 --> 00:01:41,809 visual documentation of human rights 37 00:01:41,810 --> 00:01:42,889 violations. 38 00:01:42,890 --> 00:01:44,839 And the goal is to create an evidence 39 00:01:44,840 --> 00:01:47,509 based tool that can be used for reporting 40 00:01:47,510 --> 00:01:49,879 advocacy, accountability by 41 00:01:49,880 --> 00:01:51,559 journalists, human rights defenders and 42 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:52,560 lawyers. 43 00:01:53,590 --> 00:01:56,149 Since then, we have been collaborating 44 00:01:56,150 --> 00:01:58,249 with a number of groups, uh, 45 00:01:58,250 --> 00:02:00,769 the United Nations or Shihad, which is 46 00:02:00,770 --> 00:02:02,719 the investigation team based in Geneva, 47 00:02:02,720 --> 00:02:04,279 doing investigations on Syria. 48 00:02:04,280 --> 00:02:06,349 Since 2012, we've been working 49 00:02:06,350 --> 00:02:08,089 with them on investigations related to 50 00:02:08,090 --> 00:02:10,129 Aleppo since they got the mandate to do 51 00:02:10,130 --> 00:02:12,139 this from the Security Council a few 52 00:02:12,140 --> 00:02:13,159 weeks ago. 53 00:02:13,160 --> 00:02:14,599 And we've been also working with Human 54 00:02:14,600 --> 00:02:16,819 Rights Watch later to cluster munitions 55 00:02:16,820 --> 00:02:19,039 research in Syria, Amnesty International 56 00:02:19,040 --> 00:02:21,589 as well with the 57 00:02:21,590 --> 00:02:23,539 digital verification team, which is a 58 00:02:23,540 --> 00:02:25,789 group of young professionals from 59 00:02:25,790 --> 00:02:27,829 Berkeley University and Essex University 60 00:02:27,830 --> 00:02:29,659 who are helping us doing in-depth 61 00:02:29,660 --> 00:02:31,459 verification. 62 00:02:31,460 --> 00:02:32,719 We've been also collaborating with 63 00:02:32,720 --> 00:02:35,479 Billancourt, which is a collective 64 00:02:35,480 --> 00:02:37,609 of investigators specializing in the use 65 00:02:37,610 --> 00:02:40,499 of open source investigations. 66 00:02:40,500 --> 00:02:42,619 Uh, we're also working 67 00:02:42,620 --> 00:02:44,959 with the Meedan, uh, integrating 68 00:02:44,960 --> 00:02:47,029 their platform, which is a collaborative 69 00:02:47,030 --> 00:02:49,189 verification platform, uh, 70 00:02:49,190 --> 00:02:50,779 also with the witness in terms of 71 00:02:50,780 --> 00:02:52,969 improving our methodology and workflow 72 00:02:52,970 --> 00:02:55,069 with technical technology collective 73 00:02:55,070 --> 00:02:56,719 that are supporting us in the development 74 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:58,699 of the collecting infrastructure, as well 75 00:02:58,700 --> 00:03:01,249 as, of course, citizen journalists, 76 00:03:01,250 --> 00:03:02,719 lawyers and human rights defenders as 77 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:04,519 they are our main source of information, 78 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:06,589 such such as the Institute for 79 00:03:06,590 --> 00:03:07,590 Justice. 80 00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:10,879 So since the Tunisian revolution, we have 81 00:03:10,880 --> 00:03:13,489 seen a big shift in how conflict 82 00:03:13,490 --> 00:03:15,539 has been being reported. 83 00:03:15,540 --> 00:03:17,719 Uh, so from, uh, being 84 00:03:17,720 --> 00:03:19,819 reported by journalists, NGOs who had 85 00:03:19,820 --> 00:03:22,399 access to the country into 86 00:03:22,400 --> 00:03:24,139 depending on user generated content, 87 00:03:24,140 --> 00:03:25,639 especially in areas where you can't 88 00:03:25,640 --> 00:03:27,019 actually access the country. 89 00:03:27,020 --> 00:03:29,449 Uh, journalists and NGOs are banned 90 00:03:29,450 --> 00:03:31,429 from reporting. And in the case of Syria, 91 00:03:31,430 --> 00:03:33,529 there are more hours of online footage 92 00:03:33,530 --> 00:03:35,539 than they are actually ours in the 93 00:03:35,540 --> 00:03:36,529 conflict itself. 94 00:03:36,530 --> 00:03:38,479 And hidden in that footage, there's 95 00:03:38,480 --> 00:03:40,699 hundreds of untold stories of human 96 00:03:40,700 --> 00:03:43,129 rights violations and possibly 97 00:03:43,130 --> 00:03:44,300 war crime evidence. 98 00:03:46,160 --> 00:03:48,079 But with this user generated content that 99 00:03:48,080 --> 00:03:50,719 we have been working with, we identified 100 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:52,549 three kind of problems. 101 00:03:52,550 --> 00:03:54,679 One of it is the content is being erased 102 00:03:54,680 --> 00:03:56,509 and can be found. 103 00:03:56,510 --> 00:03:58,459 Content is not verified. 104 00:03:58,460 --> 00:04:00,020 The content is unsearchable. 105 00:04:01,760 --> 00:04:03,409 So working with lawyers and human rights 106 00:04:03,410 --> 00:04:05,599 activists, they are 107 00:04:05,600 --> 00:04:07,639 doing this work in a hostile environment. 108 00:04:07,640 --> 00:04:09,859 There have been attacks and targeted by 109 00:04:09,860 --> 00:04:11,389 many groups for doing their work. 110 00:04:11,390 --> 00:04:12,919 There have been attacks by all kinds of 111 00:04:12,920 --> 00:04:13,920 weapons. Basically, 112 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:17,208 their devices get damaged, their data 113 00:04:17,209 --> 00:04:19,759 gets lost, the evidence gets lost. 114 00:04:19,760 --> 00:04:21,409 Of course, when they are moving through 115 00:04:21,410 --> 00:04:23,419 checkpoints where they are moving through 116 00:04:23,420 --> 00:04:25,969 borders, also, their devices are seized, 117 00:04:25,970 --> 00:04:28,069 damaged, and of course, information 118 00:04:28,070 --> 00:04:30,289 is being lost. If they are publishing 119 00:04:30,290 --> 00:04:32,209 what they have on social media platform, 120 00:04:32,210 --> 00:04:34,279 it's being deleted, is being removed 121 00:04:34,280 --> 00:04:36,529 because it violates the privacy policy 122 00:04:36,530 --> 00:04:39,019 of those commercial social media services 123 00:04:39,020 --> 00:04:41,389 and also because their accounts 124 00:04:41,390 --> 00:04:42,949 get hacked because of what they are 125 00:04:42,950 --> 00:04:44,189 publishing. 126 00:04:44,190 --> 00:04:46,369 In this case, Physicians for Human Rights 127 00:04:46,370 --> 00:04:48,619 has worked on 128 00:04:48,620 --> 00:04:50,959 an investigation and documentation 129 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:52,819 related to attacks against hospitals in 130 00:04:52,820 --> 00:04:54,049 Syria. 131 00:04:54,050 --> 00:04:56,029 They refer to visual evidence that was 132 00:04:56,030 --> 00:04:57,379 published on YouTube. 133 00:04:57,380 --> 00:04:59,089 It's not there anymore. 134 00:04:59,090 --> 00:05:01,309 We lost the evidence that actually refers 135 00:05:01,310 --> 00:05:03,319 to this type of attack and I don't know 136 00:05:03,320 --> 00:05:04,929 if we can get it again. 137 00:05:04,930 --> 00:05:08,029 Uh, it's not just us that are 138 00:05:08,030 --> 00:05:09,499 having this problem, but also other 139 00:05:09,500 --> 00:05:11,000 investigators, such as 140 00:05:12,140 --> 00:05:14,479 Blanchot Elliot from Billycart, 141 00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:16,069 who is the director, has been doing a lot 142 00:05:16,070 --> 00:05:17,809 of work on chemical attacks that happened 143 00:05:17,810 --> 00:05:20,599 in August 2013. 144 00:05:20,600 --> 00:05:22,699 And basically most of the evidence 145 00:05:22,700 --> 00:05:24,769 that he has been looking for 146 00:05:24,770 --> 00:05:27,499 and analyzing has been also 147 00:05:27,500 --> 00:05:28,500 gun. 148 00:05:30,880 --> 00:05:32,979 The other problem related to this is that 149 00:05:32,980 --> 00:05:34,389 content is basically scattered 150 00:05:34,390 --> 00:05:35,289 everywhere. 151 00:05:35,290 --> 00:05:37,479 It's on different social media platforms, 152 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:38,379 different websites. 153 00:05:38,380 --> 00:05:39,759 It's really hard to understand what 154 00:05:39,760 --> 00:05:41,439 happened in a specific incident because 155 00:05:41,440 --> 00:05:42,879 it's really hard to understand the full 156 00:05:42,880 --> 00:05:43,880 image. 157 00:05:44,680 --> 00:05:47,019 It's also, of course, scattered offline 158 00:05:47,020 --> 00:05:49,539 when there's no Internet connectivity 159 00:05:49,540 --> 00:05:51,940 and external hard drives or computers. 160 00:05:53,380 --> 00:05:54,849 When it's published online, it's not 161 00:05:54,850 --> 00:05:57,009 verified. There are hundreds and hundreds 162 00:05:57,010 --> 00:05:58,989 of videos. We are not talking about one 163 00:05:58,990 --> 00:06:01,479 or two that are coming every day. 164 00:06:01,480 --> 00:06:03,849 With this comes a lot of fake information 165 00:06:03,850 --> 00:06:05,709 as well, which makes it really hard for a 166 00:06:05,710 --> 00:06:08,319 journalist and human rights organization 167 00:06:08,320 --> 00:06:10,809 to actually respond to this huge amount 168 00:06:10,810 --> 00:06:12,669 of data related to violations. 169 00:06:14,830 --> 00:06:16,959 It is so difficult for 170 00:06:16,960 --> 00:06:18,399 it to be searchable because it doesn't 171 00:06:18,400 --> 00:06:19,809 have any kind of metadata when it's 172 00:06:19,810 --> 00:06:20,810 published. 173 00:06:22,020 --> 00:06:23,679 Also, metadata is being stripped from 174 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:25,899 social media platform when visual 175 00:06:25,900 --> 00:06:27,669 evidence is published there. 176 00:06:27,670 --> 00:06:29,589 Most reports that are published by human 177 00:06:29,590 --> 00:06:31,719 rights organizations 178 00:06:31,720 --> 00:06:33,669 or articles by journalists in different 179 00:06:33,670 --> 00:06:34,879 formats, formats. 180 00:06:34,880 --> 00:06:36,580 So it's really inaccessible. 181 00:06:39,290 --> 00:06:41,479 So we worked 182 00:06:41,480 --> 00:06:44,059 to address these three problems 183 00:06:44,060 --> 00:06:45,499 in a variety of ways. 184 00:06:45,500 --> 00:06:47,169 So for the first problem, the contents 185 00:06:47,170 --> 00:06:48,709 being deleted or that it scattered 186 00:06:48,710 --> 00:06:50,869 throughout the Internet, we worked 187 00:06:50,870 --> 00:06:52,579 to develop an automated, secure content 188 00:06:52,580 --> 00:06:53,779 backup tool. 189 00:06:53,780 --> 00:06:55,849 So every day our content is being scraped 190 00:06:55,850 --> 00:06:57,679 and backed up externally in servers 191 00:06:57,680 --> 00:06:58,680 throughout the world. 192 00:06:59,810 --> 00:07:01,579 Also, by making the platform, 193 00:07:03,620 --> 00:07:05,329 the database online available online, 194 00:07:05,330 --> 00:07:07,429 we've kind of centralized the data that's 195 00:07:07,430 --> 00:07:08,629 being scattered throughout the Internet 196 00:07:08,630 --> 00:07:09,800 and put it in one place 197 00:07:10,880 --> 00:07:12,379 dealing with the fact that the content is 198 00:07:12,380 --> 00:07:14,749 not verified. We've worked to develop a 199 00:07:14,750 --> 00:07:16,939 very detailed methodology. 200 00:07:16,940 --> 00:07:19,009 It's an open source methodology 201 00:07:19,010 --> 00:07:19,969 that we're going to go into in a little 202 00:07:19,970 --> 00:07:22,099 bit and also an 203 00:07:22,100 --> 00:07:24,289 infrastructure so that we can 204 00:07:24,290 --> 00:07:25,789 highlight how the verification is 205 00:07:25,790 --> 00:07:26,790 actually working 206 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:29,719 and then relating to the fact that the 207 00:07:29,720 --> 00:07:31,489 country's unsearchable. 208 00:07:31,490 --> 00:07:33,559 We recognize the fact that 209 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:36,109 we needed to have a very standardized 210 00:07:36,110 --> 00:07:38,329 metadata scheme and filter 211 00:07:38,330 --> 00:07:39,619 system so that you can search through all 212 00:07:39,620 --> 00:07:40,730 the content that we have. 213 00:07:42,050 --> 00:07:43,759 So for the methodology, we found three 214 00:07:43,760 --> 00:07:45,439 components. 215 00:07:45,440 --> 00:07:46,789 There's a collection, the archival 216 00:07:46,790 --> 00:07:47,689 component. 217 00:07:47,690 --> 00:07:50,239 There's the basic verification component 218 00:07:50,240 --> 00:07:52,310 and more in-depth investigations. 219 00:07:54,460 --> 00:07:56,109 So there's five steps that we've 220 00:07:56,110 --> 00:07:58,269 identified for collection in our kivel, 221 00:07:58,270 --> 00:08:00,129 the first step before we have any of the 222 00:08:00,130 --> 00:08:02,319 content is to first make a list 223 00:08:02,320 --> 00:08:04,449 of all of our sources for 224 00:08:04,450 --> 00:08:05,769 that content. 225 00:08:05,770 --> 00:08:08,139 So we have identified 200 credible 226 00:08:08,140 --> 00:08:10,389 sources made up of a variety of 227 00:08:10,390 --> 00:08:12,040 individuals or organizations, 228 00:08:13,660 --> 00:08:15,459 you know, local field clinics, individual 229 00:08:15,460 --> 00:08:17,679 citizens and larger NGOs. 230 00:08:17,680 --> 00:08:19,479 A lot of the sources that we're working 231 00:08:19,480 --> 00:08:21,669 with have been reporting 232 00:08:21,670 --> 00:08:24,609 on the conflict since 2011 or 2012, 233 00:08:24,610 --> 00:08:25,779 although some are more recent. 234 00:08:27,130 --> 00:08:28,869 So after we have a list of the sources 235 00:08:28,870 --> 00:08:30,609 for the content, we need to develop a 236 00:08:30,610 --> 00:08:33,129 list of sources for the verification, 237 00:08:33,130 --> 00:08:34,959 you can't verify the content with the 238 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:36,158 same sources who are providing the 239 00:08:36,159 --> 00:08:37,159 content. 240 00:08:38,140 --> 00:08:40,119 So we need to develop the separate list. 241 00:08:40,120 --> 00:08:42,519 And this is mostly made up of a team of 242 00:08:42,520 --> 00:08:44,739 citizen journalists and journalists 243 00:08:44,740 --> 00:08:45,819 and human rights defenders who are 244 00:08:45,820 --> 00:08:47,409 located in Syria. 245 00:08:47,410 --> 00:08:49,479 When we need additional information 246 00:08:49,480 --> 00:08:51,579 regarding verification of any of the 247 00:08:51,580 --> 00:08:53,469 videos, we get in touch with them and 248 00:08:53,470 --> 00:08:55,539 they can also help us 249 00:08:55,540 --> 00:08:56,799 identify a specific place 250 00:08:58,600 --> 00:08:59,919 or item 251 00:09:01,510 --> 00:09:02,530 in the videos. 252 00:09:04,120 --> 00:09:05,409 And the third step that we have for the 253 00:09:05,410 --> 00:09:07,869 collection archival is to 254 00:09:07,870 --> 00:09:09,549 establish this metadata scheme 255 00:09:10,720 --> 00:09:12,879 and we for our database 256 00:09:12,880 --> 00:09:15,219 decide to use the metadata 257 00:09:15,220 --> 00:09:16,779 scheme developed by the U.N. 258 00:09:16,780 --> 00:09:18,039 Office for High Commissioner for Human 259 00:09:18,040 --> 00:09:18,989 Rights. 260 00:09:18,990 --> 00:09:21,069 And we did this because they are 261 00:09:21,070 --> 00:09:22,900 in a unique position 262 00:09:23,920 --> 00:09:25,959 to investigate and also to prosecute. 263 00:09:25,960 --> 00:09:28,299 So we felt that if we 264 00:09:28,300 --> 00:09:30,219 categorize our data by their standards, 265 00:09:30,220 --> 00:09:32,109 then it could be useful for future 266 00:09:32,110 --> 00:09:33,110 investigations. 267 00:09:35,110 --> 00:09:36,459 These are some of the categories that 268 00:09:36,460 --> 00:09:38,709 they have in their metadata scheme, 269 00:09:38,710 --> 00:09:40,089 and I'm not going to go over all of them 270 00:09:40,090 --> 00:09:41,199 now, but you can just see them. 271 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:42,309 We can come back to them later. 272 00:09:44,260 --> 00:09:46,149 The first step of the collection of 273 00:09:46,150 --> 00:09:48,339 archival is to record as much 274 00:09:48,340 --> 00:09:50,289 of the metadata that we can. 275 00:09:50,290 --> 00:09:52,479 So we want to contextualize the material 276 00:09:52,480 --> 00:09:55,689 that we do have to identify the location, 277 00:09:55,690 --> 00:09:57,039 the data that it was recorded and 278 00:09:57,040 --> 00:09:58,959 uploaded. I can talk about that in a bit 279 00:09:58,960 --> 00:10:00,519 and also the origin of the video, which 280 00:10:00,520 --> 00:10:02,530 is a bit harder to identify. 281 00:10:03,970 --> 00:10:05,739 As I mentioned, a lot of the metadata is 282 00:10:05,740 --> 00:10:07,299 stripped when it's uploaded into social 283 00:10:07,300 --> 00:10:08,469 media platforms. 284 00:10:08,470 --> 00:10:10,479 So sometimes there's very little 285 00:10:10,480 --> 00:10:11,979 additional information and sometimes it's 286 00:10:11,980 --> 00:10:12,980 more. 287 00:10:14,260 --> 00:10:16,449 And then step five, once we have 288 00:10:16,450 --> 00:10:18,279 identified all of the metadata and an 289 00:10:18,280 --> 00:10:20,589 incident, we work to collect 290 00:10:20,590 --> 00:10:22,779 store hash and timestamp all 291 00:10:22,780 --> 00:10:23,950 of the videos that we have 292 00:10:25,090 --> 00:10:26,829 so that we can preserve the integrity of 293 00:10:26,830 --> 00:10:28,899 the videos and make sure that 294 00:10:28,900 --> 00:10:30,159 they're not modified after we have 295 00:10:30,160 --> 00:10:32,169 downloaded them and stored in securely. 296 00:10:34,400 --> 00:10:36,079 So for the verification, we also have 297 00:10:36,080 --> 00:10:38,209 five steps, the first step, once 298 00:10:38,210 --> 00:10:40,429 we have the video downloaded and stored 299 00:10:40,430 --> 00:10:42,649 in our servers, is the person 300 00:10:42,650 --> 00:10:44,149 to aggregate all the metadata that we 301 00:10:44,150 --> 00:10:46,399 have using, as 302 00:10:46,400 --> 00:10:48,439 I mentioned, the metadata scheme from 303 00:10:48,440 --> 00:10:51,019 UNCHR, but also 304 00:10:51,020 --> 00:10:53,179 additional metadata fields like 305 00:10:53,180 --> 00:10:55,429 type of munitions used, if that's 306 00:10:56,690 --> 00:10:59,719 able to be determined or 307 00:10:59,720 --> 00:11:01,789 the weather unique landmarks 308 00:11:01,790 --> 00:11:04,099 that are in individual videos. 309 00:11:04,100 --> 00:11:05,569 Once we have all of that, we can start 310 00:11:05,570 --> 00:11:07,759 the verification process 311 00:11:07,760 --> 00:11:09,889 for the second step is to verify 312 00:11:09,890 --> 00:11:10,890 the source of the video. 313 00:11:12,080 --> 00:11:13,399 A lot of the videos that we're getting 314 00:11:13,400 --> 00:11:15,469 are sent directly by sources 315 00:11:15,470 --> 00:11:16,489 on the ground. 316 00:11:16,490 --> 00:11:18,229 So in that case, we we know we know who 317 00:11:18,230 --> 00:11:19,230 this is. 318 00:11:20,030 --> 00:11:21,919 But when something is uploaded online, we 319 00:11:21,920 --> 00:11:23,449 can determine the source by the user 320 00:11:23,450 --> 00:11:25,549 accounts, whether it's a media house 321 00:11:25,550 --> 00:11:27,379 or whether it's an individual journalist. 322 00:11:28,970 --> 00:11:31,369 We we we we we determine 323 00:11:31,370 --> 00:11:32,999 whether they're credible or not based on 324 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,059 their history of uploading and whether or 325 00:11:35,060 --> 00:11:37,549 not they're known to us or not. 326 00:11:37,550 --> 00:11:38,550 If they're not 327 00:11:40,100 --> 00:11:42,469 within our database of credible sources, 328 00:11:42,470 --> 00:11:44,149 we have a procedure for verifying them, 329 00:11:44,150 --> 00:11:45,529 for vetting them. And I can go into that 330 00:11:45,530 --> 00:11:46,530 in a bit. 331 00:11:48,020 --> 00:11:50,509 The third step for verification 332 00:11:50,510 --> 00:11:51,739 is to verify the location. 333 00:11:51,740 --> 00:11:53,149 So this is the whole geolocation 334 00:11:53,150 --> 00:11:54,529 component. 335 00:11:54,530 --> 00:11:56,479 So there's basically geolocation that we 336 00:11:56,480 --> 00:11:58,759 can determine by reading the 337 00:11:58,760 --> 00:12:00,349 descriptions of the videos that we've 338 00:12:00,350 --> 00:12:01,939 uploaded and also communicating with the 339 00:12:01,940 --> 00:12:04,069 people who have uploaded them 340 00:12:04,070 --> 00:12:04,969 in some cases. 341 00:12:04,970 --> 00:12:07,789 We also do more in-depth geolocation 342 00:12:07,790 --> 00:12:09,289 as that is going to go over in some of 343 00:12:09,290 --> 00:12:10,290 the key studies. 344 00:12:12,010 --> 00:12:13,999 And then a fourth step is verifying the 345 00:12:14,000 --> 00:12:16,339 filming and the upload date, so 346 00:12:16,340 --> 00:12:18,409 upload dates are able to be 347 00:12:18,410 --> 00:12:20,509 determined by the date that it has been 348 00:12:20,510 --> 00:12:21,619 uploaded to YouTube. 349 00:12:21,620 --> 00:12:23,779 But there's tools developed by groups 350 00:12:23,780 --> 00:12:25,669 like Witness and others that help with 351 00:12:25,670 --> 00:12:26,670 this process. 352 00:12:27,740 --> 00:12:29,869 Sometimes it may be difficult to 353 00:12:29,870 --> 00:12:31,279 verify the date that it was actually 354 00:12:31,280 --> 00:12:33,439 filmed. People can film, 355 00:12:33,440 --> 00:12:34,969 they can upload it at the same day or 356 00:12:34,970 --> 00:12:37,909 sometimes many months later. 357 00:12:37,910 --> 00:12:40,189 So we have to cross-reference this with 358 00:12:40,190 --> 00:12:43,129 a lot of news accounts, reports by NGOs 359 00:12:43,130 --> 00:12:44,130 or international 360 00:12:45,410 --> 00:12:46,610 human rights organizations. 361 00:12:48,000 --> 00:12:49,859 And then the last step is to publish this 362 00:12:49,860 --> 00:12:51,989 into our database, so 363 00:12:51,990 --> 00:12:54,299 we make our database publicly available 364 00:12:54,300 --> 00:12:56,459 and open in an open source format, and 365 00:12:56,460 --> 00:12:58,109 this is what the database looks like. 366 00:12:58,110 --> 00:13:00,209 So you can see on the left there's 367 00:13:00,210 --> 00:13:01,889 an identifier, there's description, the 368 00:13:01,890 --> 00:13:04,319 date that it was recorded, where it was 369 00:13:04,320 --> 00:13:06,419 and a type of violation according to 370 00:13:06,420 --> 00:13:09,119 the UNCHR standards. 371 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:11,069 So in the red box, you can see the type 372 00:13:11,070 --> 00:13:12,659 of violation and this is using that 373 00:13:12,660 --> 00:13:15,029 metadata scheme underneath 374 00:13:15,030 --> 00:13:17,219 that, you can see the types of 375 00:13:17,220 --> 00:13:18,239 weapons identified. 376 00:13:19,860 --> 00:13:20,970 And then location. 377 00:13:22,300 --> 00:13:23,649 And when you click on an individual 378 00:13:23,650 --> 00:13:25,419 incident, you can see on the left hand 379 00:13:25,420 --> 00:13:27,399 side, this is where the video is, they 380 00:13:27,400 --> 00:13:29,289 don't auto play because we don't want to 381 00:13:29,290 --> 00:13:31,449 expose people to content 382 00:13:31,450 --> 00:13:33,219 that they might find disturbing. 383 00:13:33,220 --> 00:13:36,129 And if we found that a video 384 00:13:36,130 --> 00:13:37,989 has is particularly graphic, we always 385 00:13:37,990 --> 00:13:39,969 include a warning and a red banner at 386 00:13:39,970 --> 00:13:41,529 this one doesn't have it. 387 00:13:41,530 --> 00:13:42,879 On the right hand side, you can see the 388 00:13:42,880 --> 00:13:45,009 initial metadata at, 389 00:13:45,010 --> 00:13:46,899 then blow it. We've geo located so you 390 00:13:46,900 --> 00:13:48,789 can see where each video was actually 391 00:13:48,790 --> 00:13:50,709 filmed. On the right hand side, you can 392 00:13:50,710 --> 00:13:52,539 see more additional metadata like the 393 00:13:52,540 --> 00:13:54,909 weather or weapons used. 394 00:13:56,530 --> 00:13:59,259 So when we look at the videos altogether, 395 00:13:59,260 --> 00:14:01,659 we've developed a map where you can 396 00:14:01,660 --> 00:14:02,919 it's interactive. This is just a 397 00:14:02,920 --> 00:14:04,899 screenshot, but you can zoom in or out 398 00:14:04,900 --> 00:14:07,419 and you can find particular areas 399 00:14:07,420 --> 00:14:09,010 where particular incidents were filmed. 400 00:14:10,630 --> 00:14:12,609 This is all able to be filtered by the 401 00:14:12,610 --> 00:14:14,469 type of munition used or the type of 402 00:14:14,470 --> 00:14:15,609 investigation that we're doing, for 403 00:14:15,610 --> 00:14:17,409 instance, on cluster bombs or chemical 404 00:14:17,410 --> 00:14:18,410 weapons. 405 00:14:19,390 --> 00:14:20,769 And with that, we've done a number of 406 00:14:20,770 --> 00:14:22,659 investigations. 407 00:14:22,660 --> 00:14:25,209 So we do this for a couple of reasons. 408 00:14:25,210 --> 00:14:27,399 One, we wanted the archive to be used 409 00:14:27,400 --> 00:14:29,649 as an advocacy tool for 410 00:14:29,650 --> 00:14:30,489 people right now. 411 00:14:30,490 --> 00:14:32,439 We wanted to keep people updated in terms 412 00:14:32,440 --> 00:14:34,959 of what's the current situation. 413 00:14:34,960 --> 00:14:37,179 We also want to speak directly 414 00:14:37,180 --> 00:14:39,369 to policymakers, people like 415 00:14:39,370 --> 00:14:41,439 the ICC, people like 416 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:43,509 the UNCHR and 417 00:14:43,510 --> 00:14:44,510 others. 418 00:14:45,310 --> 00:14:47,259 But also we recognize that there's a 419 00:14:47,260 --> 00:14:49,329 strong amount of trust that's 420 00:14:49,330 --> 00:14:50,889 needed between us and the people who are 421 00:14:50,890 --> 00:14:52,329 uploading the videos 422 00:14:53,380 --> 00:14:55,719 the way we need to trust them in order 423 00:14:55,720 --> 00:14:57,879 to know that the content that they're 424 00:14:57,880 --> 00:15:00,159 providing us with is legitimate or 425 00:15:00,160 --> 00:15:01,809 if they're vouching for it, 426 00:15:02,950 --> 00:15:04,149 that that they're making the correct 427 00:15:04,150 --> 00:15:06,309 claims. But they also need to trust us 428 00:15:06,310 --> 00:15:08,739 that we're using the data 429 00:15:08,740 --> 00:15:10,059 for the intended purposes. 430 00:15:10,060 --> 00:15:11,739 And this is particularly true when 431 00:15:11,740 --> 00:15:13,179 they're sending us information directly. 432 00:15:14,610 --> 00:15:16,709 So we have an investigation as 433 00:15:16,710 --> 00:15:18,390 part of the website, as you can see here, 434 00:15:19,740 --> 00:15:21,509 and the first one on chemical weapons is 435 00:15:21,510 --> 00:15:22,979 a case study that is going to talk about 436 00:15:22,980 --> 00:15:23,980 now. 437 00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:26,379 So the first case study is related to 438 00:15:27,460 --> 00:15:29,559 the use of chemical weapons in Syria 439 00:15:29,560 --> 00:15:32,199 since 2011, until until now, 440 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:34,689 we have located and verified, 441 00:15:34,690 --> 00:15:36,729 collected hundreds of visual evidence 442 00:15:36,730 --> 00:15:38,229 related to this. 443 00:15:38,230 --> 00:15:40,239 What we can quickly see from this is, 444 00:15:40,240 --> 00:15:42,429 first, chemical weapons has been, 445 00:15:42,430 --> 00:15:44,499 uh, a tool from the beginning of the 446 00:15:44,500 --> 00:15:46,349 conflict since 2012. 447 00:15:46,350 --> 00:15:48,459 Uh, most of the organizations maybe 448 00:15:48,460 --> 00:15:50,589 or, uh, human rights community 449 00:15:50,590 --> 00:15:52,449 think that it started in 2013 because 450 00:15:52,450 --> 00:15:54,369 there is a very big incident there. 451 00:15:54,370 --> 00:15:55,959 But it actually started before. 452 00:15:55,960 --> 00:15:57,489 We could also see that it's still 453 00:15:57,490 --> 00:16:00,039 continuing 2015 and 2016, 454 00:16:00,040 --> 00:16:02,529 even after the OPCW, the Organization 455 00:16:02,530 --> 00:16:04,839 of Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, have 456 00:16:04,840 --> 00:16:07,029 announced that they destroyed chemical 457 00:16:07,030 --> 00:16:10,689 weapons in Syria in 2015. 458 00:16:10,690 --> 00:16:12,789 Another graph that shows the peak, 459 00:16:12,790 --> 00:16:14,559 uh, in 2013. 460 00:16:14,560 --> 00:16:16,299 And most of the video has been published, 461 00:16:16,300 --> 00:16:18,099 uh, there because there was a big 462 00:16:18,100 --> 00:16:19,729 incident in the countryside of Damascus 463 00:16:19,730 --> 00:16:21,579 of the use of sarin gas against 464 00:16:21,580 --> 00:16:22,599 civilians. 465 00:16:22,600 --> 00:16:24,069 Uh, we can see that it's still 466 00:16:24,070 --> 00:16:26,139 continuing, not even November, but also 467 00:16:26,140 --> 00:16:27,339 until a few days ago. 468 00:16:27,340 --> 00:16:29,259 This is one of the recent incidents that 469 00:16:29,260 --> 00:16:31,329 happened in eastern Aleppo, which was 470 00:16:31,330 --> 00:16:34,089 the use of chlorine cylinders 471 00:16:34,090 --> 00:16:36,669 against, uh, civilian and 472 00:16:36,670 --> 00:16:38,259 also civilian areas. 473 00:16:38,260 --> 00:16:40,329 Uh, this is the, uh, the 474 00:16:40,330 --> 00:16:42,399 video that has been, uh, 475 00:16:42,400 --> 00:16:44,559 published by the Syrian Institute 476 00:16:44,560 --> 00:16:46,509 for Justice, which are lawyers that are 477 00:16:46,510 --> 00:16:48,039 based in Aleppo. 478 00:16:48,040 --> 00:16:49,929 And we can see that they are taking 479 00:16:49,930 --> 00:16:52,269 footage of their impact sites after 480 00:16:52,270 --> 00:16:54,279 the gas cylinder has been dropped 481 00:16:55,510 --> 00:16:57,399 from this type of images. 482 00:16:57,400 --> 00:16:59,409 We try to identify structure of the 483 00:16:59,410 --> 00:17:01,359 buildings to be able to understand where 484 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:02,699 this actually happens. 485 00:17:02,700 --> 00:17:04,779 Uh, this is the gas cylinder that was 486 00:17:04,780 --> 00:17:06,939 used. We they sent us, uh, 487 00:17:06,940 --> 00:17:08,899 a very close image to it. 488 00:17:08,900 --> 00:17:11,049 If we go even closer, we 489 00:17:11,050 --> 00:17:13,118 can see that there is the 490 00:17:13,119 --> 00:17:15,309 sticker from A, B, B, 491 00:17:15,310 --> 00:17:17,289 C, which is A, B, C, C, which is a 492 00:17:17,290 --> 00:17:19,959 Jordanian company that produces, uh, 493 00:17:19,960 --> 00:17:20,868 chemicals. 494 00:17:20,869 --> 00:17:23,289 And, uh, 495 00:17:23,290 --> 00:17:25,358 we also were able to 496 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:27,669 identify the structure of the buildings, 497 00:17:27,670 --> 00:17:29,739 uh, as you can see, also the 498 00:17:29,740 --> 00:17:31,659 impact site, as has been seen in the 499 00:17:31,660 --> 00:17:33,969 videos, the tree 500 00:17:33,970 --> 00:17:35,469 that has been seen also in the video. 501 00:17:35,470 --> 00:17:37,629 And through that, we go to Google Earth 502 00:17:37,630 --> 00:17:39,759 to be able to understand where 503 00:17:39,760 --> 00:17:41,919 this actually happened. 504 00:17:41,920 --> 00:17:43,449 And the title there is a description of 505 00:17:43,450 --> 00:17:44,949 what happened and we looked around that 506 00:17:44,950 --> 00:17:47,079 area. This is exactly where the cameraman 507 00:17:47,080 --> 00:17:48,219 is standing. 508 00:17:48,220 --> 00:17:50,409 And then by getting a 509 00:17:50,410 --> 00:17:52,959 better satellite imagery, we can see 510 00:17:52,960 --> 00:17:54,609 the same buildings on the right, the 511 00:17:54,610 --> 00:17:56,799 impact site. And that she so we know 512 00:17:56,800 --> 00:17:58,869 exactly that. This is the location 513 00:17:58,870 --> 00:18:01,029 in eastern Aleppo that has been attacked. 514 00:18:02,620 --> 00:18:04,809 This is not the only attack that's 515 00:18:04,810 --> 00:18:06,759 used this kind of gas cylinder. 516 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:09,279 Uh, but also there have been, uh, 517 00:18:09,280 --> 00:18:12,069 earlier ones from Zeta in October 518 00:18:12,070 --> 00:18:13,689 2016. 519 00:18:13,690 --> 00:18:15,669 Uh, there has been a recent one a few 520 00:18:15,670 --> 00:18:17,289 weeks ago in Elfreda's district near 521 00:18:17,290 --> 00:18:20,689 Aleppo, December 8th, 2016. 522 00:18:20,690 --> 00:18:22,959 There has been another one a few days ago 523 00:18:22,960 --> 00:18:24,399 that happened in the second Hanano in 524 00:18:24,400 --> 00:18:27,069 Aleppo, December 18th, 2016, 525 00:18:27,070 --> 00:18:29,259 which also shows a pattern 526 00:18:29,260 --> 00:18:30,729 of the use of gas cylinder against 527 00:18:30,730 --> 00:18:32,949 civilians. And we can identify 528 00:18:32,950 --> 00:18:34,449 that this is one of the tactics that has 529 00:18:34,450 --> 00:18:35,709 been used by the Syrian government to 530 00:18:35,710 --> 00:18:38,469 take control of, uh, of Aleppo. 531 00:18:38,470 --> 00:18:40,729 All these claimed reports 532 00:18:40,730 --> 00:18:42,819 we can match with the 533 00:18:42,820 --> 00:18:44,889 OPCW also report 534 00:18:44,890 --> 00:18:47,439 that has been published in 2015 proving 535 00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:48,729 that the Syrian government was 536 00:18:48,730 --> 00:18:51,009 responsible for the use of chemicals 537 00:18:51,010 --> 00:18:52,019 against civilians. 538 00:18:53,440 --> 00:18:55,629 So the second, uh, case study is 539 00:18:55,630 --> 00:18:58,149 related to, uh, cluster munitions used 540 00:18:58,150 --> 00:18:59,349 in Syria. 541 00:18:59,350 --> 00:19:01,779 Uh, it has been used by 542 00:19:01,780 --> 00:19:04,449 the Syrian government and also by the 543 00:19:04,450 --> 00:19:05,979 Russian government starting in their 544 00:19:05,980 --> 00:19:08,799 operation, uh, September 2015. 545 00:19:08,800 --> 00:19:10,989 They deny that they have any kind of, 546 00:19:10,990 --> 00:19:13,059 uh, weapons like this in 547 00:19:13,060 --> 00:19:14,060 Syria. 548 00:19:14,740 --> 00:19:16,809 But there was a report 549 00:19:16,810 --> 00:19:19,569 that has been published by Russia today. 550 00:19:19,570 --> 00:19:21,669 So a video and this video, 551 00:19:21,670 --> 00:19:23,829 uh, has been published from 552 00:19:23,830 --> 00:19:25,989 an airbase, which is the main airbase 553 00:19:25,990 --> 00:19:28,369 of the Russia aircraft. 554 00:19:28,370 --> 00:19:30,459 And we can identify two types 555 00:19:30,460 --> 00:19:32,169 of, uh, cluster munitions. 556 00:19:32,170 --> 00:19:34,379 One is incendiary RPK and it's a 557 00:19:34,380 --> 00:19:36,519 2.5, and the other one is 558 00:19:36,520 --> 00:19:38,739 more as a cluster, uh, identified 559 00:19:38,740 --> 00:19:40,239 cluster munitions, I believe, a hundred 560 00:19:40,240 --> 00:19:42,759 eighty two point five RTM. 561 00:19:42,760 --> 00:19:45,039 Uh, we there were also other, 562 00:19:45,040 --> 00:19:47,109 uh, footage from an air base that we 563 00:19:47,110 --> 00:19:49,269 are talking by journalists, uh, that 564 00:19:49,270 --> 00:19:51,489 were there visiting, uh, and by 565 00:19:51,490 --> 00:19:53,789 accident. They also, uh, photo 566 00:19:53,790 --> 00:19:55,599 to this, uh, cluster munitions. 567 00:19:55,600 --> 00:19:56,600 That is their. 568 00:19:57,870 --> 00:20:00,089 So since then, we started to 569 00:20:00,090 --> 00:20:02,219 collect and verify the 570 00:20:02,220 --> 00:20:04,449 visual evidence from media activists that 571 00:20:04,450 --> 00:20:06,509 there have been claims that there was a 572 00:20:06,510 --> 00:20:08,279 cluster munitions has been used. 573 00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:10,469 And with Human Rights Watch in 574 00:20:10,470 --> 00:20:12,539 July 2016, we were 575 00:20:12,540 --> 00:20:14,369 able to collaborate on a report about 576 00:20:14,370 --> 00:20:15,839 cluster munitions used in Syria. 577 00:20:17,310 --> 00:20:19,409 And through the database, they 578 00:20:19,410 --> 00:20:21,539 have identified specific 579 00:20:21,540 --> 00:20:23,849 types of cluster munitions, as we can see 580 00:20:23,850 --> 00:20:26,159 in this light and also 581 00:20:26,160 --> 00:20:27,160 on the. 582 00:20:29,020 --> 00:20:31,329 So the third case study is related 583 00:20:31,330 --> 00:20:32,859 to Israeli airstrikes. 584 00:20:32,860 --> 00:20:35,199 Russian airstrikes, coalition airstrikes, 585 00:20:35,200 --> 00:20:37,269 we started with the Russian airstrikes 586 00:20:37,270 --> 00:20:39,039 since the beginning of the operation in 587 00:20:39,040 --> 00:20:42,099 September 2015. 588 00:20:42,100 --> 00:20:44,079 We have been collecting hundreds and 589 00:20:44,080 --> 00:20:46,299 hundreds of also visual evidence related 590 00:20:46,300 --> 00:20:47,349 to that. 591 00:20:47,350 --> 00:20:50,169 We try to locate as much as possible 592 00:20:50,170 --> 00:20:52,629 to understand what happened 593 00:20:52,630 --> 00:20:54,369 and where where was the most attacks 594 00:20:54,370 --> 00:20:56,289 happened and in which areas. 595 00:20:56,290 --> 00:20:57,849 And we did some in-depth also 596 00:20:57,850 --> 00:21:00,999 investigations of specific videos. 597 00:21:01,000 --> 00:21:03,099 Uh, this is one of them. 598 00:21:03,100 --> 00:21:05,439 It's it was published by the Just Short 599 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:07,089 Media Center, which is a group that is 600 00:21:07,090 --> 00:21:08,619 based in Idlib. 601 00:21:08,620 --> 00:21:10,719 And they were claiming that there was 602 00:21:10,720 --> 00:21:12,129 a mosque being bombed. 603 00:21:12,130 --> 00:21:14,319 It's called Hattab, and they were also 604 00:21:14,320 --> 00:21:16,929 claiming that it was bombed by 605 00:21:16,930 --> 00:21:17,930 Russian aircraft. 606 00:21:19,130 --> 00:21:21,259 So after that, uh, the Russian Ministry 607 00:21:21,260 --> 00:21:23,329 of Defense has 608 00:21:23,330 --> 00:21:25,439 announced that they are not 609 00:21:25,440 --> 00:21:27,989 responsible for this type of attack 610 00:21:27,990 --> 00:21:30,109 and this is all fake 611 00:21:30,110 --> 00:21:32,929 and they have published satellite imagery 612 00:21:32,930 --> 00:21:35,029 of the actual mosque saying 613 00:21:35,030 --> 00:21:37,219 that this is the actual mosque that 614 00:21:37,220 --> 00:21:38,479 was reported. 615 00:21:38,480 --> 00:21:39,679 And it's still intact. 616 00:21:39,680 --> 00:21:41,659 And this is a recent satellite imagery. 617 00:21:41,660 --> 00:21:43,489 So what we did is we asked one of the 618 00:21:43,490 --> 00:21:45,769 journalists, our sources that we work 619 00:21:45,770 --> 00:21:47,959 with from Idlib to take a photo 620 00:21:47,960 --> 00:21:50,119 of this, uh, mosque 621 00:21:50,120 --> 00:21:51,499 that has been showing on the satellite 622 00:21:51,500 --> 00:21:52,939 image. And he did. 623 00:21:52,940 --> 00:21:54,919 And it actually was still intact. 624 00:21:54,920 --> 00:21:57,339 But the name was Al Faruk, not Farouk 625 00:21:57,340 --> 00:21:58,279 not. 626 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:01,099 So we located this one 627 00:22:01,100 --> 00:22:02,659 through Google Earth just to understand 628 00:22:02,660 --> 00:22:04,109 where it is exactly. 629 00:22:04,110 --> 00:22:06,019 And then what we try to do is we try to 630 00:22:06,020 --> 00:22:08,449 do to look for other mosques 631 00:22:08,450 --> 00:22:10,280 from close to this area. 632 00:22:11,990 --> 00:22:14,329 And we have found this satellite imagery 633 00:22:14,330 --> 00:22:16,789 that was posted on Facebook page 634 00:22:16,790 --> 00:22:18,889 of the just distributed media center of 635 00:22:18,890 --> 00:22:21,019 a mosque that is close to that 636 00:22:21,020 --> 00:22:23,479 mosque. But it's still intact 637 00:22:23,480 --> 00:22:25,250 because it was months before the attack. 638 00:22:26,900 --> 00:22:28,399 But through the satellite imagery, we 639 00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:30,979 were able to locate 640 00:22:30,980 --> 00:22:33,169 the drone image with the 641 00:22:33,170 --> 00:22:34,759 videos that has been published about the 642 00:22:34,760 --> 00:22:36,859 attack. This is one of the videos from 643 00:22:36,860 --> 00:22:38,959 one of the sources, Asherman Abdullah, 644 00:22:38,960 --> 00:22:41,179 that we work with him in Idlib. 645 00:22:41,180 --> 00:22:43,639 This is another one from other sources, 646 00:22:43,640 --> 00:22:45,709 the just one media center. 647 00:22:45,710 --> 00:22:48,169 And from there, we were able to use 648 00:22:48,170 --> 00:22:50,329 Google Earth again to 649 00:22:50,330 --> 00:22:52,909 locate, uh, the actual 650 00:22:52,910 --> 00:22:54,349 mosque that was attacked. 651 00:22:55,670 --> 00:22:57,979 And then we saw 652 00:22:57,980 --> 00:23:00,559 that the distance is about one kilometer 653 00:23:00,560 --> 00:23:02,389 between the claimed mosque that was 654 00:23:02,390 --> 00:23:04,729 attacked and the 655 00:23:04,730 --> 00:23:07,339 actual mosque. And we can see this 656 00:23:07,340 --> 00:23:09,499 clearer and this footage 657 00:23:09,500 --> 00:23:10,670 from Google Earth right now. 658 00:23:12,440 --> 00:23:13,909 So it's about one kilometer away. 659 00:23:15,530 --> 00:23:17,629 And we got 660 00:23:17,630 --> 00:23:19,819 a clear satellite imagery where 661 00:23:19,820 --> 00:23:22,099 after the attack, where we can see that 662 00:23:22,100 --> 00:23:25,159 the mosque was was also attacked. 663 00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:27,709 We have also noticed that the logo 664 00:23:27,710 --> 00:23:29,809 of the satellite imagery published 665 00:23:29,810 --> 00:23:31,729 by the Russian minister of defense is 666 00:23:31,730 --> 00:23:33,649 covering the actual mosque that was 667 00:23:33,650 --> 00:23:34,609 attacked. 668 00:23:34,610 --> 00:23:36,979 And we don't know if it happened by 669 00:23:36,980 --> 00:23:39,289 accident or if it's on purpose, 670 00:23:39,290 --> 00:23:41,569 but we know that there was a fake 671 00:23:41,570 --> 00:23:43,669 information or wrong information 672 00:23:43,670 --> 00:23:45,139 that was published by the Ministry of 673 00:23:45,140 --> 00:23:46,140 Defense. 674 00:23:48,300 --> 00:23:49,589 So those are a couple of projects that 675 00:23:49,590 --> 00:23:51,659 we're working on in 2016, but 676 00:23:51,660 --> 00:23:54,749 for 2017, we have a bunch of plans. 677 00:23:54,750 --> 00:23:56,829 One, we want to add a lot of new 678 00:23:56,830 --> 00:23:59,309 sources of the base that we're 679 00:23:59,310 --> 00:24:00,539 that we're using. 680 00:24:00,540 --> 00:24:02,429 So these are both platform based. 681 00:24:02,430 --> 00:24:03,899 Right now, we're using mostly videos from 682 00:24:03,900 --> 00:24:05,009 YouTube. 683 00:24:05,010 --> 00:24:07,109 But you also want to incorporate Twitter 684 00:24:07,110 --> 00:24:10,019 and telegram into into our database 685 00:24:10,020 --> 00:24:11,339 and also from organizations and 686 00:24:11,340 --> 00:24:12,839 individuals like the Violations 687 00:24:12,840 --> 00:24:14,189 Documentation Center, who's doing a lot 688 00:24:14,190 --> 00:24:15,929 of really amazing work. 689 00:24:15,930 --> 00:24:17,819 But we don't have their information in 690 00:24:17,820 --> 00:24:19,049 our system yet. 691 00:24:19,050 --> 00:24:21,179 And also groups like the UN 692 00:24:21,180 --> 00:24:22,859 and various various 693 00:24:24,390 --> 00:24:26,489 organizations that are working on 694 00:24:26,490 --> 00:24:28,049 human rights issues that are currently 695 00:24:28,050 --> 00:24:30,219 publishing in PDF format. 696 00:24:30,220 --> 00:24:31,469 Of course, we also want to be 697 00:24:31,470 --> 00:24:33,709 incorporating offline data sources more 698 00:24:33,710 --> 00:24:35,939 into the database that we're using. 699 00:24:35,940 --> 00:24:38,009 We're looking forward to continuing the 700 00:24:38,010 --> 00:24:39,629 open source investigations that we're 701 00:24:39,630 --> 00:24:41,489 doing with Belenkaya and with Amnesty 702 00:24:41,490 --> 00:24:43,109 International's Digital Verification 703 00:24:43,110 --> 00:24:44,110 Corps. 704 00:24:44,940 --> 00:24:47,069 And we're looking to develop a toolkit 705 00:24:47,070 --> 00:24:49,199 for open source investigations, 706 00:24:49,200 --> 00:24:50,580 open source here, meaning 707 00:24:51,930 --> 00:24:54,839 information that's publicly available. 708 00:24:54,840 --> 00:24:56,459 But the toolkit itself is also going to 709 00:24:56,460 --> 00:24:58,529 be open source, as in it 710 00:24:58,530 --> 00:25:00,119 will be on gett and available for 711 00:25:00,120 --> 00:25:01,139 comments. 712 00:25:01,140 --> 00:25:02,459 So if you have any feedback, please let 713 00:25:02,460 --> 00:25:03,460 us know. 714 00:25:03,930 --> 00:25:05,729 And then lastly, we're looking to develop 715 00:25:05,730 --> 00:25:07,319 a platform for collaborative verification 716 00:25:07,320 --> 00:25:09,089 of large data sets. 717 00:25:09,090 --> 00:25:11,039 So right now there isn't one. 718 00:25:11,040 --> 00:25:13,649 There's projects like check 719 00:25:13,650 --> 00:25:15,269 from meeting that are working on 720 00:25:15,270 --> 00:25:17,429 verification and individual videos, 721 00:25:17,430 --> 00:25:19,529 which is super, super helpful, but for 722 00:25:19,530 --> 00:25:21,299 large data set that doesn't currently 723 00:25:21,300 --> 00:25:22,300 exist. 724 00:25:23,640 --> 00:25:25,799 So thanks so much for all your time. 725 00:25:25,800 --> 00:25:27,089 If you have questions, I know we still 726 00:25:27,090 --> 00:25:28,409 have a couple of minutes left. 727 00:25:28,410 --> 00:25:30,929 Otherwise, we're available afterwards. 728 00:25:30,930 --> 00:25:32,939 And if you have any interest in helping 729 00:25:32,940 --> 00:25:35,069 or supporting us, you can check us out 730 00:25:35,070 --> 00:25:36,209 here at our website. 731 00:25:36,210 --> 00:25:38,099 We're on Twitter and you can email us. 732 00:25:38,100 --> 00:25:39,779 That's EPDP King. 733 00:25:39,780 --> 00:25:40,780 Thanks so much. 734 00:25:54,640 --> 00:25:56,169 Thank you very much. Thank you very much. 735 00:25:56,170 --> 00:25:58,119 We have a few minutes for questions, so 736 00:25:58,120 --> 00:25:59,299 please microphone one. 737 00:26:00,340 --> 00:26:02,439 So I want to ask, how could 738 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:04,629 you verify the number of casualty 739 00:26:04,630 --> 00:26:06,819 casualties for every crime 740 00:26:06,820 --> 00:26:09,099 and whether if your archive 741 00:26:09,100 --> 00:26:11,319 include crimes, less 742 00:26:11,320 --> 00:26:14,199 major crimes and the chemical weapons 743 00:26:14,200 --> 00:26:17,319 that you've been used since 744 00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:19,219 2011? 745 00:26:19,220 --> 00:26:20,220 Right. So 746 00:26:21,520 --> 00:26:23,859 we didn't verify the number 747 00:26:23,860 --> 00:26:26,109 of casualties as a result 748 00:26:26,110 --> 00:26:27,759 of the chemical attacks. 749 00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:29,649 There are other organizations who are 750 00:26:29,650 --> 00:26:31,159 doing so, like the Violation 751 00:26:31,160 --> 00:26:32,649 Documentation Center. 752 00:26:32,650 --> 00:26:34,299 And what we are trying to do is to 753 00:26:34,300 --> 00:26:36,699 incorporate what they have dataset 754 00:26:36,700 --> 00:26:37,959 with the visual evidence so we can 755 00:26:37,960 --> 00:26:40,179 understand exactly what happened. 756 00:26:40,180 --> 00:26:42,609 OK. And whether your archives 757 00:26:42,610 --> 00:26:45,279 include other crimes that are 758 00:26:45,280 --> 00:26:47,679 started since 2011 or 759 00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:49,749 whether it just includes 760 00:26:49,750 --> 00:26:52,369 crimes since 2014. 761 00:26:52,370 --> 00:26:54,489 Um, so 762 00:26:54,490 --> 00:26:56,979 we have videos 763 00:26:56,980 --> 00:26:59,379 about crimes from 2011 764 00:26:59,380 --> 00:27:01,479 until now, we were not able 765 00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,089 to process all this information because 766 00:27:04,090 --> 00:27:06,729 we're talking about thousands 767 00:27:06,730 --> 00:27:09,069 of footage, but their plan 768 00:27:09,070 --> 00:27:10,960 is to go through it for next year. 769 00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:13,160 Thank you. 770 00:27:13,720 --> 00:27:14,769 Uh, next question. 771 00:27:14,770 --> 00:27:17,349 Microphone number three, I 772 00:27:17,350 --> 00:27:18,639 just wanted to say that you're doing a 773 00:27:18,640 --> 00:27:20,169 great job. It's very important that 774 00:27:20,170 --> 00:27:22,539 somebody does this and, you know, it's 775 00:27:22,540 --> 00:27:23,769 please keep this up. 776 00:27:23,770 --> 00:27:24,939 It's actually two questions. 777 00:27:24,940 --> 00:27:27,069 First question is, do 778 00:27:27,070 --> 00:27:29,559 you have a narrative which brings 779 00:27:29,560 --> 00:27:30,879 the facts together? 780 00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:33,369 In a way, I'm not talking about a factual 781 00:27:33,370 --> 00:27:35,619 narrative, but what the different parties 782 00:27:35,620 --> 00:27:37,299 involved in this war are saying and what 783 00:27:37,300 --> 00:27:39,019 they're claiming about these events. 784 00:27:39,020 --> 00:27:41,079 So we know what happened, but 785 00:27:41,080 --> 00:27:42,179 what are they saying about it? 786 00:27:42,180 --> 00:27:43,869 And you have that in the platform. 787 00:27:43,870 --> 00:27:45,399 And the second question is, how can we 788 00:27:45,400 --> 00:27:46,929 help? I mean, we have a lot of people 789 00:27:46,930 --> 00:27:48,579 here in this room probably want to help. 790 00:27:48,580 --> 00:27:49,539 So how can we do that? 791 00:27:49,540 --> 00:27:50,619 Right. 792 00:27:50,620 --> 00:27:53,199 So for the first question, we don't have 793 00:27:53,200 --> 00:27:55,479 the narrative from all the groups 794 00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:57,249 that are on the ground. 795 00:27:57,250 --> 00:28:00,339 What we focus on is just contextualizing 796 00:28:00,340 --> 00:28:02,049 the visual evidence and make sure that it 797 00:28:02,050 --> 00:28:03,489 has more metadata so it's more 798 00:28:03,490 --> 00:28:05,559 understandable and more has a 799 00:28:05,560 --> 00:28:07,809 value to be used for advocacy purposes, 800 00:28:07,810 --> 00:28:10,299 accountability purposes and so on. 801 00:28:10,300 --> 00:28:12,099 In terms of the help, I mean, we are here 802 00:28:12,100 --> 00:28:14,139 really to to reach out to the hackers 803 00:28:14,140 --> 00:28:16,269 community to and to 804 00:28:16,270 --> 00:28:18,579 everyone who is able to help technically 805 00:28:18,580 --> 00:28:21,009 and then technically on this in terms of 806 00:28:21,010 --> 00:28:22,780 research, building methodology, 807 00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:25,209 technical infrastructure 808 00:28:26,830 --> 00:28:27,449 and more. 809 00:28:27,450 --> 00:28:29,319 Yeah, and just to add onto that, I mean, 810 00:28:29,320 --> 00:28:31,839 a lot of the methods that we're using are 811 00:28:31,840 --> 00:28:34,209 pretty they're not that difficult 812 00:28:34,210 --> 00:28:36,039 in all of our methodologies as outlined 813 00:28:36,040 --> 00:28:38,259 in every report that we're writing, 814 00:28:38,260 --> 00:28:39,489 what we're going to be making, this tool 815 00:28:39,490 --> 00:28:40,989 kit that's available and get. 816 00:28:40,990 --> 00:28:42,639 So if you have any suggestions, like, 817 00:28:42,640 --> 00:28:44,709 please help us there, give us 818 00:28:44,710 --> 00:28:46,299 some comments, that would be really 819 00:28:46,300 --> 00:28:48,399 helpful. There's also a huge backlog of 820 00:28:48,400 --> 00:28:50,289 lots of videos. I mean, if you have time, 821 00:28:50,290 --> 00:28:51,519 it would be great to help us with some of 822 00:28:51,520 --> 00:28:53,079 those things. 823 00:28:53,080 --> 00:28:55,209 Thank you. I think we have one more time 824 00:28:55,210 --> 00:28:57,039 to squeeze in one more question, but 825 00:28:57,040 --> 00:28:57,969 please be precise. 826 00:28:57,970 --> 00:28:59,079 Maybe the I.R.S. 827 00:28:59,080 --> 00:29:00,080 Channel. 828 00:29:01,590 --> 00:29:03,659 Well, we have questions 829 00:29:03,660 --> 00:29:05,909 from ask one question 830 00:29:05,910 --> 00:29:07,529 is if your work is based on the 831 00:29:07,530 --> 00:29:09,599 international human rights definition or 832 00:29:09,600 --> 00:29:11,009 if there is a special human rights 833 00:29:11,010 --> 00:29:12,989 definition made in Syria. 834 00:29:17,060 --> 00:29:18,289 And I'm sorry, can you repeat the 835 00:29:18,290 --> 00:29:19,290 question? 836 00:29:20,270 --> 00:29:22,429 One one user wants to know if 837 00:29:22,430 --> 00:29:24,349 your work is based on the international 838 00:29:24,350 --> 00:29:26,419 human rights definition by the UN 839 00:29:26,420 --> 00:29:28,579 or if your 840 00:29:28,580 --> 00:29:30,619 work relies on a special human rights 841 00:29:30,620 --> 00:29:32,599 definition defined in Syria. 842 00:29:33,950 --> 00:29:36,109 So it's it's we're using 843 00:29:36,110 --> 00:29:38,419 the UN categories, which 844 00:29:38,420 --> 00:29:40,999 means we are working according 845 00:29:41,000 --> 00:29:43,339 to the international humanitarian law, 846 00:29:43,340 --> 00:29:44,719 basically. 847 00:29:44,720 --> 00:29:46,819 So some of that is related to also 848 00:29:46,820 --> 00:29:49,249 the Syrian court panel 849 00:29:49,250 --> 00:29:50,899 and some of it is not there. 850 00:29:50,900 --> 00:29:53,029 But the standard is UN 851 00:29:53,030 --> 00:29:55,219 charter and international humanitarian 852 00:29:55,220 --> 00:29:56,220 law. 853 00:29:57,080 --> 00:29:58,699 And I'm afraid that's all the time we 854 00:29:58,700 --> 00:30:00,559 have. Thank you very much, guys. 855 00:30:00,560 --> 00:30:01,660 Thank you. Thank you.