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So you all know tour,
right? It's a really awesome
tool for anonymous
communication, but
sometimes, sadly, it just
doesn't work for the use case you have.
Maybe you need more bandwidth or
something.
So this is what does talk but
explore other other options
in the realm of and not other
anonymization networks.
So we have Eric here now
a little bit different from what was
announced and the schedule.
But this is Eric now
and he will
give a talk how Alice and Bob meet.
If they don't like onions, please welcome
him.
Hi, my name is Eric.
I welcome you to my talk.
I'm from the University of Hamburg,
from the group Security and Privacy,
and we have a
long tradition and researching and
to anonymization networks,
especially Germany,
where my professor, Professor Faridabad,
has some experience
for about, let's say, 15 to 20
years.
So let's have a look at
the agenda for
this talk. First of all, we
do some basics about anonymity
and strategies to achieve anonymity.
We look at different adversaries.
And afterwards we have
a look at the practical and
anonymous communication networks,
especially at the top,
Freenet, Nonet and Rondonia.
Afterwards, we only
for a short period look into
current research work and
conclude to talk.
So what is anonymity?
Anonymity is the state
that being is
not identifiable within a
certain set within a certain group.
Then anonymity said,
yeah, we see on the left
side alleys and
she is within anonymity
said of us who said
that traffic towards the anonymity
of the ASEAN and
Anonymous Communication Network.
So the same as
or the same as valid for
he is within a send
of potential recipients
and therefore
he also can achieve some recipient
anonymity and then
also the options that both
sides of the HCN
anonymous.
In this case, we speak of
recipient anonymity.
So and there's
also the property
of unlink ability,
which describes that
there are some items of interest,
which Atika
is not able
to sufficiently
distinguish whether these two objects
are linked or related to each other,
because this relationship anonymity
that the out the hat
is not able to distinguish
whether the messages which are
sent by Ellis towards
HCN and received
by BOPE, whether these
are related or not, in this case,
they can be linked.
But that's also the case that they
cannot be linked
and like
this, that he can do some traffic
analysis and
tries to recognize patterns
and the size of the packets on
the timing of the packets, or
like some aggregated
measures like the
bandwidth consumption of antirecession,
one like from the content
of the messages.
So an
important question when we talk
about anonymity is
who do you trust?
And there are different
strategies towards
anonymity which try to
establish trust.
Like, for example, that is
the strategy of covert traffic,
that you send some
random traffic to
hide your real
contender within
quite successful broadcasting messages,
that you send your message not to
one recipient, but
to a lot of recipients, but only
the true recipient.
Let's say Bob is able
to decrypt the message and
then you can also use a trusted third
party, what is
usually a VPN or a proxy.
But you have to
yeah, it depends on your trust model.
If you are fine with trusting your VPN
and then you can achieve some sort
of anonymity this way.
Then later on
we will also have a slide for this, like
the shuffling and delaying of message,
which is done by mics
or mixes with like
an anonymous remailer.
And there are different anonymity
systems that try to distribute
trust that you do not have to
trust a single entity, but you
can trust like different
parties.
And they do it by using
secure multiparty computation.
That is a cryptographic
scheme which is used in
the disinhibits.
Systems for dining were first.
And then a cascade of mixes
which are quite
typical, maybe we will see
that later on and the onion routing and
garlic routing, I'm going to
show that also on an extra slide.
So here we see
the basic principle of
one.
We see that Charlie sends a
message to what's the mix and
sends two messages towards the mix.
And they have a certain order.
The order. It's like Charlie's
message arrives the first
and afterwards it's
blue and orange one.
And and the
mix can have like a threshold
that says, OK, I'm
OK. I'm I'm only able to catch
three messages.
And then he shuffled
the messages
after the
threshold shift and
sends them out in a different
order and different
and and with
some latency.
So, yeah.
And then check out who observes
here. The left and the right side has
some difficulties to link the
messages with each other.
And then onion routing
is explained on this scheme.
I think if you are quite familiar with
Twilio, you might already know it.
So you have the send
and the receiver and
it a message which is
encrypted with three
layers of encryption.
And we will see
three nodes and the HCN
and the Peppin or
the message is encrypted towards
the purple
node and the green note and the blue
note. And then while
the packet
propagates through the HCN
and single layers of encryption
are removed by the nodes
so that
it's also getting the message
as expected.
So Garlick routing,
which is used by Tuppy,
it's bits.
Yeah. And that's some parts
in common with onion routing, but they're
also quite some stuff different.
So first of all, in comparison
to the earlier slide,
we have a peer to peer architecture.
That means that Ellis
wants to send a message, can
also be used by other nodes
to relay messages within
the network.
So she is actively
taking part in the AC and
then she has
an outbound tunnel, which
you see there
with the blue lines
and has an inbound tunnel.
So so what we see
is that these tunnels or change
in that they are you need directional
so messages can only go through in
one direction
and
special for
Galica encryption that
messages can be bundled
similar like a garlic clove
where you have like multiple pots.
And so alerts
can enter and encrypt a message
to Bob or like like multiple
messages to Bob, which is
after what saving some benefits
were. When Bob's acknowledged
that he received the message, it only has
to send it for one time and not
multiple times.
So. And the black
link then it's
like,
yeah, it's a connection between
like Ellis
Outbound Tunnel
and Bob's inbound
tunnel gateway that is
like the first node of
Bob's inbound tunnel.
And this node
actually does not know
the real identity
or the real address of Bob.
And she only knows his
inbound gateway, which is
the first node of
the tunnel.
And between then, these
notes of the tunnel and also
onion onion encryption used.
So let's have a look
at the adversaries,
I think maybe you also know
them from your computer science class
so that their
external adversary, who
is not taking part in the network, I
can only observe the traffic
which is going through.
Then we have the internal adversary
which is able to
get that knowledge from the network,
which is participating in some
encryption keys or
whatever he has access to.
And he also
knows which messages
are forwarding that this way.
So.
Then we have to passive adversary,
which is just looking at
the things which are passing by and
we have to act of adversary, which
is able to modify
things like he can delete messages,
you can modify them
or send additional
messages,
and then we have to local adversary,
which is only present
in a small
part of the network.
Well, we have a global adversary
which is
controlling the entire network.
Often we use global
passive observer, which
is like observing all the
traffic which is
flowing within the network.
OK, now let's go to the interesting
part of the talk.
So
then
how did we select
the networks which
which we surveyed?
Like we had a look at
what is there, and we noted
on notice that there are a lot
of things which are either
not implemented or they are not
functioning well.
And they are simply it's
not practical to use them.
And we noticed
that there are four networks
which accept
from their foreign networks, which
are quite,
quite easy to use,
and that they have some active
development, which are name
Freenet Kunhardt and I Tuppy.
And later on.
Yeah, and for
the research project, we just
thought, OK, what might be interesting
that there actually too many of them and
then we just picked some
of which seem
to be interesting to you.
So
first of all, let's
have a look at HP at
its low latency,
low latency peer to peer network
with approximately
seventy thousand nodes in
comparison to the TOR relates
to has around about seven thousand
nodes.
And I.
Tuppy, so it's
regarding the nodes and every
relay or every year or
so like a node in this case.
Yeah, it's larger about
Tor in general has more users,
a few millions
and per day.
So I
Tuppy, that's a focus
on hidden services.
So it's not intended to use
like legacy internet
like you are not
that there are a few out proxies so
you can access some normal
websites which like
Takasawa or whatever,
but actually it's not intended
to be used in that way.
So typical HP applications,
a peer to peer applications, which
includes like file sharing
and BitTorrent
web browsing, then
email, instant messaging, IAC
and search.
The community of HP is quite
active and then they released
during the last year like every
two every three months and.
And you release.
So here we see how
Alice and Bob are meeting
on ITP here,
this pass the north
of the tunnel.
And it's not necessary
that they are just three notes.
Actually, everybody
can decide how many notes
he wants to have or she wants to have.
So we see
and this is the size of the bar shows
you where the encryption layer
is removed or
added. So we see that the outbound tunnel
removes encryption layers,
the inbound tunnel again at
them.
And we see that for garlick
routing, we need like two
to
three lengths of
like every participant needs
at least two tunnels, one inbound tunnel
and one outbound tunnel for a successful
communication similar to
the lifetime of a tunnel.
It's limited or
both limiting the lifetime to 10
minutes.
So I to be
how does it solve the
bootstrapping problem
and puts Peer-to-peer networks
have a problem of
how they find out who's
already participating and the
network.
So I
took P and also Freenet and Lunette,
which we will investigate later.
And they use they download
a public source
which is hardcoded in the software
and they don't load
some active list of
some active piercey.
And afterwards,
yeah. And afterwards they can
take part in the network.
Then special about it
appears that every node
collects a local statistic
about all the other nodes,
which is used
later when he wants to
build his or her tunnel,
and that
yeah, he can choose to
just use the reperforming nodes
to establish his tunnel.
Then beside the inbound and outbound
tunnel, there are also exploratory
tunnels used and I took
P which
which have the purpose to build, manage
and destroy the other tunnels so
that this can be done anonymously
and it's being done by
sending tunnel construction request
over the exploratory tunnel.
And then if
it accepts to take part
in this tunnel, then symmetric
keys are exchanged.
And after and
I found the success
of this note,
she can
ascend to this
node, the successor address
for the tunnel.
So how does a let's
get the contact information of Bob?
And there
is and there are
two data, especially to data
structures from
an HP, which is
the router info and the least set
the router for information
about HP, where
the public key is safe to identify
as a safe. The contact information
like the inbound
internal gateway are safe there.
And the list that is used
when you operate a
service with an eye to a hidden service
and then you can publish
this inbound
address.
Yeah, which I call this that.
And this information is
collected by SuperPower's
flatfooted.
Say I called and I took P and
yeah, this is a distributed hash
table, the network database
on that DB.
So I had to
protect the information which
operates a certain service
and with some previous knowledge
about Bob let's say as well,
and you can contact him
by his Lisetta or you know, some
like his identifier and then you can
request that.
TB and contact him,
so let's have a look at
Freenet,
Freenet, it's also a peer to peer
network.
It's smaller.
It has around about ten thousand
nodes and it's
focuses on distributed information,
information storage.
So it's actively developed
since 2001.
And then there is an
optional friend to friend to
topology so
you can decide whether
you only trust your friends.
And and it's like a whitelist,
the wireless to which
you want to connect.
And typical applications for Freenet
storage.
Static Web page set to email social.
Yeah.
So let's have a look at how
lsm media.
We see that there are no
tunnels and there's
also no encryption involved.
And Freenet.
So
it's like this.
Let's ask a neighbor
for certain information and
the neighbor
like um so she has
a key for information she is
looking for and
then the neighbor
does not and this case doesn't have
the information and the neighbor as
his next neighbor.
But this neighbor has the information
and the neighbor replies, no, I don't
have this information.
And then again,
the
the next
notes are asked.
And here
we see finally after we follow
all the links, we see that Bob
was the only one who replied that
he had this information.
And with number 10,
he is sending this information
towards Ellis' and he's not sending
this information directly, but
he's sending us this
about the dark matter and the green
note.
And what is
special about
Freenet. You might assume, OK,
this is rather ineffective.
It would be much more effective
if you would send it straight to Alice.
But this is also a plausible
deniability.
It's a shift that,
like the dark red node
network, like
it's a he also gets
the information and
then.
You have one, Atika, it's
more difficult to decide, OK?
Where did this information come
from and where did it has been sent
to since?
Also, a lot of other
notes are getting this information.
The anonymity said,
like the potential recipients
in this way increased
and and
this peer-to-peer network does,
and that distributed information storage.
And if you request information
and it was the
reply as successful, then
the notes on the green part,
that they are cashing that information
so that when else
for the next time ask,
for example, the green note.
Do you have this information?
Then this note can already serve
this information.
And by this method,
this information which
is once sent
to the Freenet, it's
like censorship resistant,
cached by the notes and
like and it would be the
publisher. He would have no option
to delete this message after
what messages are
only deleted like if they
are if they are too old,
but when they have not been requested
for a long time.
And so the cache
and they are removed from the cache
and each node in the Freenet
provides a few gigabyte
roundabout and talk to
the network to store
such information.
It is very similar
to Freenet,
but that there's also
some pattern that a new net foundation,
which also intends to
develop an alternative network
stack where you
also have this Oppikoppi architecture
topology.
So the primary
application of net is also
for storage and sharing.
It's similar to Freenet,
but has an economically inspired
trust model.
So Relais is
a can
can
decide whether they want to forward
a message two to one
node or to multiple nodes,
and also the option
to trade anonymity versus
efficiency identical
to Freenet that also
the friend to friend option
available where you only trust
the friends you already know.
So have a look at how
this works.
Yeah, we say
see that a little
sending request to the
purple node and the purple
node like
this is a
pink link, the pink
link and the spot
and that she she is sending a
request to the purple node.
The purple node for what
this request to the orange node
and what the purple note that
is that he replaced
the reply address, which is
sent to her own address
at the reply address by
the address of the purple node.
We see that the orange node,
it's not doing this.
And this is why the link is
purple.
He does not touch
the reply address.
And so but that does
send the message not to
the orange node, but to
the purple node.
And in this way
we have one
we have from one
one node less.
And this path and
this way we can trade
anonymity for this efficiency.
So generally
it's another network.
It focuses on
the Internet so that there are no hidden
services available within Germany,
Germany, also known as Chavanel
Proxy or the map, and
has been research by the project.
So
and it's a mixed
base. ASEAN,
and
especially about you must provide
a model that and
there's on the one side a premium service
where you have to pay for it
for all the other networks,
it's for free,
like the usage of those
networks for free.
Or you can choose also
to have a free
access to journalism,
but that you only have to
relate to Hoppes and
Kaskade.
And for
the premium model, you would have three.
But and what is
different regarding the provider model is
that the operators
are known and that they are
approved by, by
and by the company.
Germany and Germany
has five thousand paying users.
So let's have a
look at John M.
John Newnam.
Use a few cascade's
and the path is predetermined.
So either you use
the Gray Kaskade, the Green Kaskade
or the Black Kaskade, and there's no
other option to
buy the sender, decide which
route he or
she wants to take like it would
be possible. And I topi and
an end to
end journalism has
to services and the info service,
which is providing the user with
some performance information about
the Cascades.
How many users you using
and this cascade,
how many benefits is still available.
And that's
the billing service.
And.
Yeah, and what
is special about the
is that
there the wall you see and
this is like for for example,
the Great Firewall of China
that you are
at, that somebody censors your connection
and you are not allowed to go
on your own to connect to John
Lennon.
And you see that there
above the blue dice.
And there is
and there are some black arrows.
And this
and the GUI of this
job application, you have the
option that you allow other
users to,
that you share your bed with other users
in case they are censored.
And so now
the.
And the
blue dice with
the arrows above its proxy
and the other use towards
the cascade and so that
they can avoid
that censorship,
so because it's
quite unique to to have
a payment service.
I have a look at this.
So you see.
And that Alice
needs to buy
some traffic and then
this information is provided to
add to the mix Cascade
Mix, Cascade checks,
the billing service, whether Alice had
paid and
the billing methods
like an anonymous Pasiphae card,
or you can send the cash
by me, but also some
not anonymous
forms like bank transfer as
possible, but might be not in
the interest of somebody who wants to
stay anonymous.
And yeah,
so let's compare
the services or
anonymity systems so
we can state that of these practical
anonymity systems, including
tor.
None of these protect
against a global passive observer.
But since the Snowden revelations that
we are aware, at least since the Snowden
revelations, that we are aware that
secret services cooperate
with each other.
So at least that this
somehow
a realistic
threat that
the access to global passive observer.
So.
Then we
saw that each HCN
has also some method
to resist internal, local
and active adversaries
to some extent,
and what
especially for Gounod and Freenet,
is that they additionally
provide the host with
plausible deniability in case
that they identified
compared to I to 2p and to their
if you operate a hidden service
and you identify it,
then yeah,
it's it's more you
don't have plausible deniability.
So.
Then we can also compare
by the use cases,
we see that
if you want to achieve anonymity
and legacy Internet, you can do
this better.
Journalism and patchily also by
top in
services
can be upper.
If you want to operate the hidden
service, you can do this with two.
I pay Freenet a unit,
then phone unit.
You have the option and that when
your unit and frenette
you can publish information and
go offline and never show up in the
network again.
And the information remains a
different case.
Like if you operate a hidden service
until I Tuppy, you
have to stay online to send those
information. But it's also changing
the tech service in this regard.
So and then
anonymous file sharing is
possible with I to pay Freenet
unit and you have
an patchily in.
But it's not
that they usually dislike it
so.
But for my impression,
I got the impression that it's
quite a popular application with an eye
to at least.
So then
let's compare the provider models
that we see.
And the provider model is
finally the question who do you trust
for Tooya?
You have volunteers
who operate a relay
for Torontonian.
You have like
a few relay
operators which has somehow
approved by John name.
But yeah,
and for I to be
Freenet and that you have
and the fact that
every which is participating
in the network is also
a provider to them for the network.
So and then
other properties where we
might compare usability
size of the anonymity set
and active community, and this
regret's certainly
to its considered
considerably better
than the other
alternatives we investigated.
So let's have a look at
some research work there
is on the one
of the sets,
for example, the next project
where they investigate the
options of zero effort, anonymity,
which might be achieved
by shuffling of
IP addresses.
And this assumes that you
trust your ISP, the
Internet service provider,
and that he might provide
you some anonymity.
And yeah,
then there
is some work going on, improving
and sharing the noon agenda.
Numerous at the moment, not
a real mixed network so
that they do know do not
shuffle their messages
of latency reasons.
So,
yeah, and the idea is to
have a real mix
net
then.
And if a free application
specific and only look at
the messages, there is
a vuvuzela
as a research project
which tries
to hide those messages and
use a lot of noise
for this to obscure the meta data.
And there is.
Yeah, and there you see that
the messages I send towards that drops.
And later they are
they are retrieved by,
for example, Bubp when else wants to
send it. And this approach actually
scales quite well with
an increase of the number of users.
So if you are interested in it, you might
have a look at it.
And then before today, there was
also talk about Lympics.
Lympics has been presented
this year.
So it's an
approach where they
use some covert traffic and.
Also mixed nut based,
and at least they aim
to resist powerful adversaries
such as global passive observers and
active attackers.
Yeah, but I think
that the yeah,
it's not an easy
task to achieve.
So and they have the security
goals of the receiver
and likability
and receive unthinkable
by a third party.
It's an online observability
so that nobody can identify
whether the Senate is online
or offline
and receive an observability.
So my conclusion
is that is good.
But there are certainly other options
which you might want to explore.
Then there is no practical
anonymity system out there
which actually resists
a global passive observer.
And
yeah, we want to achieve
anonymity.
This will not be possible without
security.
So
I think it's very much appreciated.
If you go ahead and test this system,
report back and send patches
to improve them.
And your participation
in these networks does not
only improve your own
personal privacy, but you
will increase the anonymity said,
and in this regard, also improve
the privacy of others.
So thank you.
Thank you for this talk.
So we have a good amount of time
left for questions so you can come
to the microphones if you have one.
So, yeah, I see
someone with microphone for.
So can I ask the question.
Thanks for your talk.
We've got one question for regarding
Gunite and Frien
Freenet. Yeah.
Or as far as I understood, it
is quite similar to IPTF s
in the respect that is
giving some some uncensored real data
which can be retrieved through the
network.
And as far as I understood, IPF s
that is achieved with a block chain
algorithm. How is it achieved in
the caching part and the other two
networks.
Yeah,
and OK,
we have a successful
request like
the request is forwarded
and finally the link No.9
there neighbor sent
this request to us and
said this information and
afterwards this information
is stored by the
nodes on the green line,
on the green path.
So the ductwork node
and every node
saving this information.
Does that answer your question or
not? Really.
Is it is it cached for
for eternity? Is a cache with a block
chain algorithm or the catch for a
certain time? And you said that the
provider of the information can go
offline and the information will still be
there. So there's a time limit or
and the limit of the cache
when the cache is full, then
then he deletes those messages,
which are the oldest like or
I have not been requested for a long
time.
Sorry. Can you please, if you're leaving
the room room, be a bit more quiet.
So everybody wants to focus
to focus on the questions.
Yes.
That question answered then
I would ask the signal angel,
if there's anything from the Internet.
Yes, there is, and
would you prefer it to be an avatar
for a hidden service if latency was not
a problem?
And that is
difficult, like.
Yeah, and
like the
different security assumptions and
it's difficult to decide which
system is more secure than
the other, certainly
Tooya is more actively developed
and more actively researched and more
actively tested.
So this
might be something which indicates
that it's reasonable to decide
to use tor about.
Yeah, maybe it also
depends on the specific services
and which should be operated.
But the No.
Yeah, OK,
so don't you people make someone
so Borgo,
of the solutions you presented how
well to this today scale or more
specifically, would it be feasible to run
all Internet traffic on top of Tor hidden
services? Right. To be and what
that actually make the Internet a better
place?
Mm hmm.
Yeah.
And we
can have a look at the provider model.
I would say, and that
requires volunteers to run the
relay to pay for
the traffic and this
that does not scale as well as
every which is joining
the network also.
Yeah, relaying traffic.
It depends on where the toy
can grow as fast
as to to
this scale that.
Well.
Yeah. I typifying that that may.
All right, we have microphone
three, I think, over there.
I was wondering, from what I understand,
Freenet and you act like some kind
of distributed store and
so senders are protected by the cash.
Is there any way of having some kind of
dynamic content in these kind of networks
or, you know, something which kind of
mixes both?
Dynamic contact is difficult, and
that is like a reason
to go to.
I took or four for these
hidden services like that.
You have static content, but
but there are some
like static websites,
like the free sites, how they're called
and Freenet.
Maybe this can fit
for this purpose, but not
a real dynamic content.
OK, I see one more
microphone one thank
you. I think you mentioned that all
networks are vulnerable to global passive
observer. Can you explain a little
more about this type of
vulnerability, this type of attack?
Yeah.
Uh, let's
say.
Well, actually, we
if we can observe all links
in the network
and if we observe for links
in the network, then we
know exactly
which network Sentenza
or which node sent the traffic to
the other.
And we if we
observe this over a long time,
then we can
drastically reduce anonymity
said because we see that
maybe the Ellis'
sending the message to the
first node and the first node,
maybe sending some messages to
two or three nodes.
And the next node is also sending
the messages to two or three node.
But over a long period
where we can
pretty well correlate this traffic
is as practical now or difficult
and practical for
global passive observer to
I don't know about their capabilities,
but like
for John Dunoon, where you have like
very few relays.
Yeah. Let's say that they have 20
relays or something like this.
And this is even if they
are in different
jurisdictions, it's actually
able for for Secret Service to observe
exactly the traffic of 20 relays.
So it's
certainly more difficult
if you have 70 nodes,
70000 nodes.
But yeah,
and for some networks,
it seems reasonable.
OK, the signal angel again, please,
and Rafi wants to know whether
you have looked into the rifle and
network by Adani, which
is currently still in a research project,
as far as he knows.
Did you get the question?
Because I couldn't hear it.
But can you read it again, please?
Yes. And sorry.
Rafi wants to know whether you have
looked into the rifle and on
and on and on the military network
bike. Not that need.
Yeah, we we looked into it
and I rifle.
It's a different approach
where they use
that disinhibits
dining, cryptography
now cryptograph and that's
and
yeah they are actually
because they use secure multiparty
computation and they can
resist. Enoteca, if
only one member of
the of the
of the relay for only one
relay is trustworthy,
then, then they can provide the
anonymity.
So yeah, this is also
certainly interesting.
And they also have another approach which
is quite verified.
Shuffle, where you also can
prove that a shuffle really
or that a mix
shuffle to the order
of the method not.
OK, then we have microphone one.
Hi, thanks for for the talk
as part of the research, did you
look at that and the
resiliency to
the resiliency to censorship?
I mean, in many places, many enterprises
using these tools is considered a
security risk.
So did you give
any attention to that as part of the
survey? Which one of them is more
resilient?
Not.
Yeah, OK, we
can have a look at it
like a peer to peer networks
there, and I would say that they are very
resilient then
because there are so many different
apps which are
different, which you connected, that it's
difficult for the center to censor
all those addresses.
And
for the center, it might even be
difficult to receive the informations
which are actually
involved in this peer to peer network
so that there's not a list of
all connecting
which are involved for
to
the information of
of the relays, but the data also
and so on, that also I
like the list of release.
It's public, but there are also
some secret
and some secret that they call the
bridges where you
can achieve the access
to it, to the network so that
it's also and
then new we looked at
it like there another user
is promising that information to
achieve senatorship resistance.
Yeah. And
thanks. Yeah.
So microphone for place.
Did you look at the encryption
algorithm of all this network
use and what's your analysis, please?
No, we we didn't
looked at all the details,
so.
Yeah, but we, we
looked like some
onion encryption or onion style
encryption.
Others only encrypt from hub
to hub. So yeah but
but we didn't looked into
specific specific encryption
ciphers or something like that.
I see the Internet has another question.
Yes, well, it's interesting
and interested in what do you think about
research in the field of onion routing
of a Web RTC in terms of
accessibility and possible spread?
He finds it quite interesting.
I think we need some clarification.
OK, can you please repeat the question?
Yes, and it's
about the research in the field
of Onion routing over to see
it because of the
question here are things
that this field is in terms
of accessibility and
possible spread. Quite an interesting
approach.
Actually, I didn't looked into it,
but I attended like a party
so that it's done within
the browser. Oh yeah,
actually no, I cannot answer
that question, so.
OK, then.
Microphone three.
Uh, hello. You my question is about
you said that they're all like
they can kind of defend themselves
against global passive provider, but how
do they scale the ability that you can be
found with the number of with
a number of contaminated notes?
Like which of those
four which of those networks to
watch is the max number of notes that can
be contaminated with you probably
being like with you being 50 percent
secure or something along those lines.
Mm
hmm.
Yeah.
OK, let's try
it that way. Um,
yeah, yeah, yeah.
OK, usually if you
have this set up
that the entry node
and the exit node, like if you know
that there are three nodes within
the router or within
the path and you know the
data entry node and the exit nodes
which you are using malicious
and they are cooperating with each other,
then it's
very, very difficult
to to have a traffic pattern
which does not
identify you.
And this would be
like
valid for for
for, um, tor and
and
so and for
the Peer-to-peer networks.
It depends on your neighbors.
Like if I took
the south node, but
but your your neighbors are
not malicious.
So the day is to protect
you.
And I took and
the assistance
and the length of the
tunnel is also not fixed.
Well they're not that specifically known
and each
can decide how long this tunnel should
be.
And then that's
quite difficult for for an
attacker to know that
this the entry point and that
besides him, it's the,
uh, the real entity
like besides him
allows for an entry guard
or for an entry node.
Uh, yeah.
It's it's more dangerous because
he knows that the PSM is
like the real person.
OK, last person, I think, is
that microphone one,
you talked about plausible deniability
of that and
Freenet can
can you say what you can deny and what
not, for example?
And you say that I part of the network.
Mm. Um.
Like, usually you
can deny that.
Mm hmm.
And laugh,
OK, in this case
and and Atika does
not know whether you are the last hope
and whether you really receive
this information or whether they
end up afterwards.
So if you send this information
to somebody, then he can deny.
No, I only propagated or
transmitted this information to
somebody else. And this is quite
plausible.
So and if you
have the information
and then actually
him, I would say, and
then that the
green note
does not know whether this
information was hosted
by the red node
or the blue note.
So I just know it's OK.
And this information was somewhere over
there and the network and is now coming
to me.
Then another thing which I
didn't mention that you
stole the information, as
I said, and
the information you store is encrypted
and you actually do not know what
is inside these files.
So you are storing information,
but you can deny that, you
know, that this specific
information.
So this is also something which
you can plausibly deny.
OK, I don't see any
more questions, do you have another one
or have another question?
You said none of these networks
provide
protection against
global passive observer
or I to be think
if you have this,
like, I totally bought it.
Where is no connection
to, you know, any attack against that?
Because face it can provide
a protection
against such attacks.
OK, to be bored, it's
like the email application.
OK, for
emails, it
might be easier to to provide this
because sometimes they only send
a single message and then
it can be possible.
But if, like, you have
a hidden service and need to be and
you are, you are able to
request some information from it and
this sending
the information to you, then
you can correlate
this information.
But for a single message, it's
sometimes more difficult.
Thank you.
OK, I think we have answered
all the questions I don't see anymore,
and that also fits well with time.
So thank you again for talk.