0 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:30,000 Dear viewer, these subtitles were generated by a machine via the service Trint and therefore are (very) buggy. If you are capable, please help us to create good quality subtitles: https://c3subtitles.de/talk/1299 Thanks! 1 00:00:18,580 --> 00:00:20,849 Our next speaker this evening 2 00:00:20,850 --> 00:00:23,069 is an artist and a composer, 3 00:00:23,070 --> 00:00:25,199 and she works at the interface of social, 4 00:00:25,200 --> 00:00:26,909 political and technological 5 00:00:26,910 --> 00:00:28,349 infrastructure. 6 00:00:28,350 --> 00:00:29,969 She's gonna talk to us about the 7 00:00:29,970 --> 00:00:32,039 potential of sound and how we 8 00:00:32,040 --> 00:00:34,109 can how it engages with 9 00:00:34,110 --> 00:00:35,519 the political questions. 10 00:00:35,520 --> 00:00:37,409 So please give a big round of applause to 11 00:00:37,410 --> 00:00:38,410 Jasmine. Go fund. 12 00:00:44,130 --> 00:00:45,089 Thank you. 13 00:00:45,090 --> 00:00:46,019 It's some. 14 00:00:46,020 --> 00:00:47,489 Can you hear me? 15 00:00:47,490 --> 00:00:48,599 Sorry. Oh, yes. 16 00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:49,949 Now I can hear me. 17 00:00:49,950 --> 00:00:52,019 It's an absolute pleasure to be 18 00:00:52,020 --> 00:00:54,269 here today. And I'm very 19 00:00:54,270 --> 00:00:56,249 impressed looking at around at how many 20 00:00:56,250 --> 00:00:58,499 people are sitting and waiting to listen 21 00:00:58,500 --> 00:01:00,809 to a presentation on a Saturday 22 00:01:00,810 --> 00:01:02,219 evening. 23 00:01:02,220 --> 00:01:04,878 This is indeed a special Congress, 24 00:01:04,879 --> 00:01:06,359 sir. Hi, my name is Jasmine. 25 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:07,829 Good Fund. 26 00:01:07,830 --> 00:01:09,899 I am an artist who works primarily with 27 00:01:09,900 --> 00:01:10,829 sound. 28 00:01:10,830 --> 00:01:13,469 I also make electronic music. 29 00:01:13,470 --> 00:01:15,659 And today I will be talking about 30 00:01:15,660 --> 00:01:16,999 one project. 31 00:01:17,000 --> 00:01:18,450 It's called Listening Back. 32 00:01:19,740 --> 00:01:22,199 It's an add on further Firefox 33 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:24,449 and Chrome browsers 34 00:01:24,450 --> 00:01:27,359 that translates cookies into sound 35 00:01:27,360 --> 00:01:29,090 while you browse online. 36 00:01:30,510 --> 00:01:31,680 Anyone can 37 00:01:33,540 --> 00:01:36,179 get a download and install a 38 00:01:36,180 --> 00:01:38,669 flyer for Firefox or 39 00:01:38,670 --> 00:01:40,229 via the Chrome store 40 00:01:41,460 --> 00:01:42,969 for the Chrome browser. 41 00:01:52,580 --> 00:01:54,729 And so the way that this works is 42 00:01:54,730 --> 00:01:57,429 that every time a cookie is 43 00:01:57,430 --> 00:01:59,589 inserted onto my computer or 44 00:01:59,590 --> 00:02:01,749 deleted from my computer or 45 00:02:01,750 --> 00:02:04,299 updated, a sound is triggered. 46 00:02:12,810 --> 00:02:14,789 And those sounds that you could hear just 47 00:02:14,790 --> 00:02:17,729 now were Google cookies. 48 00:02:17,730 --> 00:02:19,799 And it's interesting to note that the 49 00:02:19,800 --> 00:02:21,899 Google analytic cookie is 50 00:02:21,900 --> 00:02:24,299 actually the most common 51 00:02:24,300 --> 00:02:26,429 cookie across the entire World Wide 52 00:02:26,430 --> 00:02:29,879 Web and our personal computers. 53 00:02:29,880 --> 00:02:32,369 So I'm just going to load another page. 54 00:02:46,100 --> 00:02:48,229 So that kind of stuttering sound that 55 00:02:48,230 --> 00:02:49,939 you just heard and that you'll be hearing 56 00:02:49,940 --> 00:02:53,239 again during this presentation 57 00:02:53,240 --> 00:02:54,240 is actually 58 00:02:55,490 --> 00:02:56,490 the limit. 59 00:02:57,960 --> 00:03:00,389 Well, my system reaching 60 00:03:00,390 --> 00:03:02,159 its limit. And that's because. 61 00:03:03,260 --> 00:03:05,299 Browser add ons were never intended to 62 00:03:05,300 --> 00:03:07,429 process large amounts of sound. 63 00:03:07,430 --> 00:03:08,539 So when I was. 64 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:16,899 When I was in the development phase 65 00:03:16,900 --> 00:03:19,009 of this project, 66 00:03:19,010 --> 00:03:21,399 a lot of some Web sites were crashing 67 00:03:21,400 --> 00:03:23,859 the browser due to the sheer 68 00:03:23,860 --> 00:03:26,189 amount of. 69 00:03:26,190 --> 00:03:27,259 Kooky activity. 70 00:03:29,920 --> 00:03:32,139 Generating sound at one time, so I had 71 00:03:32,140 --> 00:03:34,689 to set a cap on how many cookies 72 00:03:34,690 --> 00:03:36,939 could trigger sound at once, 73 00:03:36,940 --> 00:03:39,430 and it's currently set to forty three. 74 00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:46,059 It's interesting to note that the 75 00:03:46,060 --> 00:03:48,549 Internet Engineering Task 76 00:03:48,550 --> 00:03:51,009 Force, which is the defacto 77 00:03:51,010 --> 00:03:53,259 standardization body 78 00:03:53,260 --> 00:03:55,719 for the Internet, has written 79 00:03:55,720 --> 00:03:57,850 a proposed standard for cookies. 80 00:03:59,200 --> 00:04:00,789 And actually this is a really interesting 81 00:04:00,790 --> 00:04:02,859 document. It's more than just a 82 00:04:02,860 --> 00:04:05,139 technical document and traces a five 83 00:04:05,140 --> 00:04:07,449 and a half year process in writing 84 00:04:07,450 --> 00:04:09,909 a standardization for a rapidly 85 00:04:09,910 --> 00:04:12,879 expanding tracking technology. 86 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:15,159 And in it, they suggest 87 00:04:15,160 --> 00:04:17,679 that browsers should be able to host 88 00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:19,898 at least 50 copies per domain 89 00:04:19,899 --> 00:04:22,179 and at least 3000 90 00:04:22,180 --> 00:04:23,619 cookies in total. 91 00:04:25,340 --> 00:04:28,039 So that's a lot of cookies 92 00:04:28,040 --> 00:04:29,089 and cookies. 93 00:04:29,090 --> 00:04:31,249 Actually, just one of many 94 00:04:31,250 --> 00:04:33,949 different online tracking technologies 95 00:04:33,950 --> 00:04:36,169 that I implemented through the technical 96 00:04:36,170 --> 00:04:38,480 protocol of the worldwide web. 97 00:04:39,890 --> 00:04:42,109 Personal data is thereby captured, 98 00:04:42,110 --> 00:04:44,959 collected, aggregated, compiled 99 00:04:44,960 --> 00:04:46,959 and sold. 100 00:04:46,960 --> 00:04:49,629 Such data can include 101 00:04:49,630 --> 00:04:51,819 IP address, type of computer 102 00:04:51,820 --> 00:04:53,889 or mobile phone operating 103 00:04:53,890 --> 00:04:56,199 system. The add ons we have installed 104 00:04:56,200 --> 00:04:57,579 our searches, our likes. 105 00:04:57,580 --> 00:04:59,589 The websites we visit, what we buy, what 106 00:04:59,590 --> 00:05:02,079 we watch and how long a curse 107 00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:03,609 lingers on a page. 108 00:05:04,630 --> 00:05:06,789 Some of the less known 109 00:05:06,790 --> 00:05:09,039 online surveillance technologies 110 00:05:09,040 --> 00:05:11,259 include Web bugs, Audio 111 00:05:11,260 --> 00:05:13,609 Bacon's Web, RTC, IP, Discover 112 00:05:13,610 --> 00:05:16,749 a third party, Hage TTP requests 113 00:05:16,750 --> 00:05:18,819 and device fingerprinting. 114 00:05:18,820 --> 00:05:21,279 The device fingerprinting method 115 00:05:21,280 --> 00:05:23,649 can be broken down into a further subset 116 00:05:23,650 --> 00:05:25,809 of tracking techniques, 117 00:05:25,810 --> 00:05:28,299 including canvas, browser, 118 00:05:28,300 --> 00:05:30,549 font, audio, context 119 00:05:30,550 --> 00:05:32,989 and battery API fingerprinting. 120 00:05:34,270 --> 00:05:37,149 But when I started this project, 121 00:05:37,150 --> 00:05:39,700 I had only ever heard of cookies. 122 00:05:41,340 --> 00:05:43,129 Because. 123 00:05:43,130 --> 00:05:45,229 Our access to the World Wide Web is 124 00:05:45,230 --> 00:05:47,449 visually mediated through screen 125 00:05:47,450 --> 00:05:49,239 devices. 126 00:05:49,240 --> 00:05:51,669 The Web browser, as an interface 127 00:05:51,670 --> 00:05:53,799 for the World Wide Web, mocks 128 00:05:53,800 --> 00:05:56,049 a point where technology becomes 129 00:05:56,050 --> 00:05:57,669 apparent to the user. 130 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:01,219 Online monitoring technology such as 131 00:06:01,220 --> 00:06:03,319 cookies largely obscured 132 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:05,419 from the user, making these systems 133 00:06:05,420 --> 00:06:08,239 difficult to approach, analyze 134 00:06:08,240 --> 00:06:09,290 and understand. 135 00:06:11,990 --> 00:06:14,219 By son of flying this largely 136 00:06:14,220 --> 00:06:16,199 invisible tracking technology. 137 00:06:16,200 --> 00:06:18,419 So that is by transforming the data 138 00:06:18,420 --> 00:06:20,549 generated by cookies into sound. 139 00:06:22,290 --> 00:06:24,419 I'm interested in Sound's ability 140 00:06:24,420 --> 00:06:27,389 to interrupt the visual surface 141 00:06:27,390 --> 00:06:29,699 and highlight a disconnect 142 00:06:29,700 --> 00:06:31,799 between the graphical interface of 143 00:06:31,800 --> 00:06:34,289 the worldwide web and the socio 144 00:06:34,290 --> 00:06:36,389 political implications of 145 00:06:36,390 --> 00:06:39,239 background algorithmic processes 146 00:06:39,240 --> 00:06:40,310 of data capture. 147 00:06:41,550 --> 00:06:44,279 So here Sound is functioning 148 00:06:44,280 --> 00:06:46,620 as a mediator of the invisible. 149 00:06:48,430 --> 00:06:50,529 By enabling the opportunity to listen 150 00:06:50,530 --> 00:06:52,869 back to otherwise in perceivable 151 00:06:52,870 --> 00:06:56,069 monitoring infrastructures, I ask 152 00:06:56,070 --> 00:06:58,359 what is the potential of sound as a means 153 00:06:58,360 --> 00:07:00,429 for a failing asymmetrical 154 00:07:00,430 --> 00:07:02,769 relationships of power inherent 155 00:07:02,770 --> 00:07:05,049 to surveillance societies? 156 00:07:05,050 --> 00:07:07,419 And how does it feel to be routinely 157 00:07:07,420 --> 00:07:08,420 monitored? 158 00:07:10,930 --> 00:07:13,119 When I use the word feel, I'm 159 00:07:13,120 --> 00:07:15,369 interested in how our understanding 160 00:07:15,370 --> 00:07:18,099 of data is affected by experiencing 161 00:07:18,100 --> 00:07:19,290 it through sound. 162 00:07:20,300 --> 00:07:22,399 How does a potentially emotional and 163 00:07:22,400 --> 00:07:25,069 bodily experience of data 164 00:07:25,070 --> 00:07:26,949 influence our understanding? 165 00:07:28,680 --> 00:07:30,649 So sound is a method of knowledge and 166 00:07:30,650 --> 00:07:32,059 thinking. 167 00:07:32,060 --> 00:07:34,639 Or to put it in another way. 168 00:07:34,640 --> 00:07:36,679 Knowledge and understanding through 169 00:07:36,680 --> 00:07:38,440 sensing experience. 170 00:07:42,200 --> 00:07:44,299 I'd like to credit the program that I 171 00:07:44,300 --> 00:07:46,279 collaborated with for this project. 172 00:07:46,280 --> 00:07:49,049 Max Braden and Brian MacLeod, 173 00:07:49,050 --> 00:07:50,389 who further helped me with some 174 00:07:50,390 --> 00:07:51,589 modifications. 175 00:07:52,590 --> 00:07:54,749 Anton MacIntyre, who along with Brian, 176 00:07:54,750 --> 00:07:57,309 helped me get it on to a demo 177 00:07:57,310 --> 00:07:59,159 itself for Firefox. 178 00:07:59,160 --> 00:08:00,629 So that actually just happened in the 179 00:08:00,630 --> 00:08:02,189 last couple of weeks, but it's been on 180 00:08:02,190 --> 00:08:04,050 the Chrome store for a little while. 181 00:08:05,390 --> 00:08:07,569 Mac suggested that we use the Tumbler 182 00:08:07,570 --> 00:08:09,070 Dock J.S. Library. 183 00:08:10,230 --> 00:08:12,449 For designing the sounds. 184 00:08:12,450 --> 00:08:14,279 So that's the library I used for 185 00:08:14,280 --> 00:08:15,989 programing, the sounds. 186 00:08:15,990 --> 00:08:18,419 And I just signed specific signature 187 00:08:18,420 --> 00:08:20,389 sounds for some of the most 188 00:08:21,440 --> 00:08:24,139 commonly used, all the largest 189 00:08:24,140 --> 00:08:26,419 web platforms such 190 00:08:26,420 --> 00:08:28,940 as Google, Facebook. 191 00:08:50,710 --> 00:08:51,760 I think you get the picture. 192 00:08:54,030 --> 00:08:56,129 Amazon, YouTube and 193 00:08:56,130 --> 00:08:58,559 some of the third party cookies that 194 00:08:58,560 --> 00:09:00,629 I found to be most commonly used across 195 00:09:00,630 --> 00:09:02,759 a lot of different websites, such 196 00:09:02,760 --> 00:09:04,320 as the one you can hear right now. 197 00:09:05,630 --> 00:09:07,429 Probably most of you know the difference 198 00:09:07,430 --> 00:09:10,659 between first and third party cookies. 199 00:09:10,660 --> 00:09:12,819 Because there definitely some way nerdy. 200 00:09:12,820 --> 00:09:14,649 Tokyo talks at this. 201 00:09:15,910 --> 00:09:17,429 Congress. 202 00:09:17,430 --> 00:09:18,649 But just in case. 203 00:09:21,970 --> 00:09:24,129 A first party cookie is any cookie 204 00:09:24,130 --> 00:09:26,049 that has the domain name of the Web site, 205 00:09:26,050 --> 00:09:27,939 your own. So for example, with The 206 00:09:27,940 --> 00:09:29,049 Guardian dot com. 207 00:09:29,050 --> 00:09:31,569 Any cookie that has and in my name 208 00:09:31,570 --> 00:09:33,729 got in dot com is a first party 209 00:09:33,730 --> 00:09:35,469 cookie and any cookie with any other 210 00:09:35,470 --> 00:09:37,599 domain name is a third party 211 00:09:37,600 --> 00:09:39,189 cookie. And that's what you can hear 212 00:09:39,190 --> 00:09:40,699 right now. 213 00:09:40,700 --> 00:09:42,219 It's a third party cookie that's 214 00:09:42,220 --> 00:09:45,369 constantly updating on my computer 215 00:09:45,370 --> 00:09:48,649 via the Guardian Web site 216 00:09:48,650 --> 00:09:50,049 that's called Chaotic. 217 00:09:50,050 --> 00:09:51,050 Stayed on that. 218 00:09:53,860 --> 00:09:55,689 It's used for targeting and advertising 219 00:09:55,690 --> 00:09:57,639 across five thousand nine hundred and 220 00:09:57,640 --> 00:10:00,589 twenty six different Web sites 221 00:10:00,590 --> 00:10:02,379 of the system in session cookies are 222 00:10:02,380 --> 00:10:04,539 another subset of cookies 223 00:10:04,540 --> 00:10:06,759 where the session cookie is deleted 224 00:10:06,760 --> 00:10:08,709 from your computer when you close the 225 00:10:08,710 --> 00:10:11,319 browser or log out of a session 226 00:10:11,320 --> 00:10:13,449 or close the tab, whereas persistent 227 00:10:13,450 --> 00:10:15,009 cookies are there for as long as they've 228 00:10:15,010 --> 00:10:17,739 been programed to be there for. 229 00:10:17,740 --> 00:10:19,620 Unless, of course, you plead your case. 230 00:10:20,770 --> 00:10:23,649 And so this can be anything from 231 00:10:23,650 --> 00:10:25,899 seconds to 232 00:10:25,900 --> 00:10:27,089 minutes to hours. 233 00:10:27,090 --> 00:10:29,499 Today is two months, two weeks. 234 00:10:29,500 --> 00:10:32,319 And here in the top 100 Web sites found 235 00:10:32,320 --> 00:10:34,779 using this cookie out of the 236 00:10:34,780 --> 00:10:37,029 five thousand nine hundred and twenty 237 00:10:37,030 --> 00:10:38,030 six. 238 00:10:38,740 --> 00:10:40,869 So far, interested in doing 239 00:10:40,870 --> 00:10:41,799 cookie research? 240 00:10:41,800 --> 00:10:44,499 I can actually recommend cookie PDA 241 00:10:44,500 --> 00:10:46,139 as quite a thorough database. 242 00:10:47,970 --> 00:10:50,039 Now, as I mentioned before, 243 00:10:50,040 --> 00:10:52,229 a sound is triggered whenever a cookie is 244 00:10:52,230 --> 00:10:54,749 inserted, deleted 245 00:10:54,750 --> 00:10:55,750 or updated. 246 00:10:57,090 --> 00:10:59,219 But not every time a cookie is read by 247 00:10:59,220 --> 00:11:01,619 the browser or Web site. 248 00:11:01,620 --> 00:11:03,599 So the data I had access to for this 249 00:11:03,600 --> 00:11:05,939 project was determined by the browsers 250 00:11:05,940 --> 00:11:06,940 API. 251 00:11:08,530 --> 00:11:10,269 That is what information Google or 252 00:11:10,270 --> 00:11:12,249 Mozilla provide to third party 253 00:11:12,250 --> 00:11:13,889 developers. 254 00:11:13,890 --> 00:11:16,109 So in this case, it's every 255 00:11:16,110 --> 00:11:18,029 time a cookie is inserted, deleted or 256 00:11:18,030 --> 00:11:20,309 updated, but not when a cookie is read 257 00:11:20,310 --> 00:11:22,620 by the browser or web server. 258 00:11:24,100 --> 00:11:26,269 And what was insightful to me was 259 00:11:26,270 --> 00:11:27,979 the extent to which certain technical 260 00:11:27,980 --> 00:11:30,049 processes are hidden even 261 00:11:30,050 --> 00:11:32,449 from tech savvy programmers, 262 00:11:32,450 --> 00:11:34,699 because these processes of online data 263 00:11:34,700 --> 00:11:37,189 extraction are in fact well kept 264 00:11:37,190 --> 00:11:38,290 business secrets. 265 00:11:39,960 --> 00:11:42,239 Max, who I collaborated with, found 266 00:11:42,240 --> 00:11:44,549 a way to hack into the Chrome API 267 00:11:44,550 --> 00:11:46,529 and access the data for how often a 268 00:11:46,530 --> 00:11:49,589 cookie is read by the browser. 269 00:11:49,590 --> 00:11:50,969 But since there is already an 270 00:11:50,970 --> 00:11:53,460 extraordinary amount of cookie activity. 271 00:11:54,680 --> 00:11:56,809 Just from each time the cookies inserted, 272 00:11:56,810 --> 00:11:59,209 deleted or updated, I decided 273 00:11:59,210 --> 00:12:01,359 not to use the data for 274 00:12:01,360 --> 00:12:03,709 when a cookie is being read 275 00:12:03,710 --> 00:12:05,599 because I also knew I wanted to be able 276 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:07,159 to make the listening back out on 277 00:12:07,160 --> 00:12:09,409 available for anyone to download 278 00:12:09,410 --> 00:12:10,609 by the Chrome store. 279 00:12:10,610 --> 00:12:11,610 On what? 280 00:12:12,680 --> 00:12:14,989 As it was important for me that anyone 281 00:12:14,990 --> 00:12:17,380 could have access to it if they desired. 282 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:23,689 Now, this project has consequently 283 00:12:23,690 --> 00:12:26,059 directed my attention to the history 284 00:12:26,060 --> 00:12:28,279 of the Internet cookies themselves. 285 00:12:29,300 --> 00:12:31,519 And from within this recent historical 286 00:12:31,520 --> 00:12:33,649 framework surfaces a 287 00:12:33,650 --> 00:12:35,989 direct link between the 288 00:12:35,990 --> 00:12:39,499 invention of cookies in 1994, 289 00:12:39,500 --> 00:12:41,869 the origins of automated online 290 00:12:41,870 --> 00:12:44,689 data collection, the commercialization 291 00:12:44,690 --> 00:12:47,329 of the worldwide web and the emergence 292 00:12:47,330 --> 00:12:49,399 of contemporary modes of surveillance 293 00:12:49,400 --> 00:12:50,400 capitalism. 294 00:12:51,490 --> 00:12:54,429 So surveillance capitalism 295 00:12:54,430 --> 00:12:56,050 is a term that's been. 296 00:13:01,970 --> 00:13:03,799 Is a term that's been recently popular, 297 00:13:03,800 --> 00:13:06,069 popularized by Shiv Sena, 298 00:13:06,070 --> 00:13:07,070 zoo boss. 299 00:13:16,160 --> 00:13:18,229 That was published at the beginning of 300 00:13:18,230 --> 00:13:20,359 this year, The Age 301 00:13:20,360 --> 00:13:21,940 of surveillance, capitalism. 302 00:13:24,520 --> 00:13:27,329 And embrace 303 00:13:27,330 --> 00:13:28,690 her extremely briefly. 304 00:13:30,790 --> 00:13:32,649 It refers to the online data burqa 305 00:13:32,650 --> 00:13:35,109 industry as headed by corporations 306 00:13:35,110 --> 00:13:37,089 such as Google. 307 00:13:37,090 --> 00:13:39,399 In this big industry, in this industry, 308 00:13:39,400 --> 00:13:41,859 big data is a surveillance asset 309 00:13:41,860 --> 00:13:43,929 and profits are derived from a 310 00:13:43,930 --> 00:13:46,059 unilateral surveillance of users of 311 00:13:46,060 --> 00:13:48,339 online platforms in which the aim 312 00:13:48,340 --> 00:13:50,649 is to modify human behavior, 313 00:13:50,650 --> 00:13:53,379 predict and control markets, 314 00:13:53,380 --> 00:13:54,380 which I think. 315 00:13:55,460 --> 00:13:57,999 Most of us are familiar with 316 00:13:58,000 --> 00:13:59,000 by now. 317 00:14:01,170 --> 00:14:03,409 And this image, which I love, 318 00:14:03,410 --> 00:14:05,599 I should credit, comes 319 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:08,379 from Internet of Ships, 320 00:14:08,380 --> 00:14:09,889 Twitter fame. 321 00:14:09,890 --> 00:14:12,139 So if you happen to be 322 00:14:12,140 --> 00:14:14,179 on Twitter, I can recommend following 323 00:14:14,180 --> 00:14:16,369 Internet of shit because it's not only 324 00:14:16,370 --> 00:14:18,230 hilarious, but very poignant. 325 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:21,589 And so another important condition to 326 00:14:21,590 --> 00:14:24,109 this culture of surveillance, capitalism 327 00:14:24,110 --> 00:14:26,179 is the agency of technology to 328 00:14:26,180 --> 00:14:28,489 monitor in real time, 329 00:14:28,490 --> 00:14:30,799 which provides an unprecedented, 330 00:14:30,800 --> 00:14:33,169 extraordinary infrastructure 331 00:14:33,170 --> 00:14:35,359 for radically distributed opportunities 332 00:14:35,360 --> 00:14:37,579 for observation, interpretation, 333 00:14:37,580 --> 00:14:39,739 communication, influence, 334 00:14:39,740 --> 00:14:42,079 prediction and ultimately 335 00:14:42,080 --> 00:14:43,080 control. 336 00:14:44,450 --> 00:14:46,669 Now, I believe that the technical 337 00:14:46,670 --> 00:14:49,189 and commercial origins of the online 338 00:14:49,190 --> 00:14:51,349 data broker industry lie 339 00:14:51,350 --> 00:14:53,029 with the invention of the cookie. 340 00:14:53,030 --> 00:14:54,559 In 1994. 341 00:14:55,680 --> 00:14:57,899 And at this time, the worldwide web 342 00:14:57,900 --> 00:15:00,019 was a stateless infrastructure. 343 00:15:01,410 --> 00:15:03,789 So Stateless is a computer engineering 344 00:15:03,790 --> 00:15:05,889 term used to describe 345 00:15:05,890 --> 00:15:08,109 the situation in which 346 00:15:08,110 --> 00:15:10,389 every time a Web site is visited, 347 00:15:10,390 --> 00:15:12,459 there is absolutely no recall 348 00:15:12,460 --> 00:15:14,829 of previous visits, preferences, 349 00:15:14,830 --> 00:15:16,909 logging information or use 350 00:15:16,910 --> 00:15:17,910 around a. 351 00:15:19,540 --> 00:15:21,399 Without a state mechanism to store 352 00:15:21,400 --> 00:15:23,829 records of browsing activity, 353 00:15:23,830 --> 00:15:26,289 online shopping as we know it today 354 00:15:26,290 --> 00:15:28,499 would not have been possible. 355 00:15:28,500 --> 00:15:30,009 And this is actually a very important 356 00:15:30,010 --> 00:15:31,989 point because this is where it all 357 00:15:31,990 --> 00:15:33,419 begins. 358 00:15:33,420 --> 00:15:35,639 So, of course, advertisers were tracking 359 00:15:35,640 --> 00:15:37,229 customers before the Web. 360 00:15:39,060 --> 00:15:41,969 But this is the origins of online 361 00:15:41,970 --> 00:15:44,129 tracking and automated. 362 00:15:48,770 --> 00:15:50,809 So online shopping before cookies would 363 00:15:50,810 --> 00:15:52,789 have been analogies to using a vending 364 00:15:52,790 --> 00:15:54,949 machine as you could only 365 00:15:54,950 --> 00:15:57,049 buy one product at a time and there would 366 00:15:57,050 --> 00:15:59,359 have been no automated feature to 367 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:01,640 remember your personal information. 368 00:16:02,780 --> 00:16:04,999 So a stateless web meant that every visit 369 00:16:05,000 --> 00:16:07,329 to a Web site was like the first 370 00:16:07,330 --> 00:16:09,439 and any commercial transaction would 371 00:16:09,440 --> 00:16:11,869 have to be handled from start to finish. 372 00:16:11,870 --> 00:16:13,879 In just one single session. 373 00:16:16,470 --> 00:16:18,779 Presented with this online condition 374 00:16:18,780 --> 00:16:21,029 of memory loss, Netscape 375 00:16:21,030 --> 00:16:24,309 Communications programmer. 376 00:16:24,310 --> 00:16:26,379 Live on to a developed 377 00:16:26,380 --> 00:16:29,499 state mechanism while working 378 00:16:29,500 --> 00:16:32,259 on a contra e-commerce 379 00:16:32,260 --> 00:16:34,270 application for 380 00:16:35,680 --> 00:16:37,989 North American telecom giant 381 00:16:37,990 --> 00:16:38,990 MCI. 382 00:16:43,370 --> 00:16:45,589 The seven million dollar contract was 383 00:16:45,590 --> 00:16:47,929 for a new shopping cart application 384 00:16:47,930 --> 00:16:49,280 for online stores. 385 00:16:50,330 --> 00:16:52,329 Developed together with John G. 386 00:16:52,330 --> 00:16:54,529 And Andrea over a six 387 00:16:54,530 --> 00:16:55,849 month period. 388 00:16:55,850 --> 00:16:58,159 So remember, the standardization process 389 00:16:58,160 --> 00:16:59,929 took five and a half years, whereas the 390 00:16:59,930 --> 00:17:02,119 development of the cookie itself was only 391 00:17:02,120 --> 00:17:03,120 six months. 392 00:17:04,290 --> 00:17:06,689 Until we name the state mechanism 393 00:17:06,690 --> 00:17:08,848 a cookie after a Unix 394 00:17:08,849 --> 00:17:11,429 protocol already in use code, magic 395 00:17:11,430 --> 00:17:12,430 cookie. 396 00:17:13,230 --> 00:17:15,429 And incidentally, there are various 397 00:17:15,430 --> 00:17:17,588 origins stories going around 398 00:17:17,589 --> 00:17:20,379 about the nine magic cookie. 399 00:17:20,380 --> 00:17:22,389 Probably the most famous one is that it 400 00:17:22,390 --> 00:17:25,549 was invented by CODIS in San Francisco 401 00:17:25,550 --> 00:17:27,909 who were working late into the night, 402 00:17:27,910 --> 00:17:29,249 as you do. 403 00:17:29,250 --> 00:17:31,359 And so they ordered and 404 00:17:31,360 --> 00:17:33,099 food from Chinatown. 405 00:17:33,100 --> 00:17:35,229 And with that came a fortune cookie. 406 00:17:35,230 --> 00:17:37,209 And apparently that's the namesake for 407 00:17:37,210 --> 00:17:38,739 the magic cookie. 408 00:17:38,740 --> 00:17:40,419 But most of these stories have been 409 00:17:40,420 --> 00:17:42,789 debunked, but did manage 410 00:17:42,790 --> 00:17:45,219 to trace it back to 1979. 411 00:17:45,220 --> 00:17:46,869 Unix programmers manual. 412 00:17:49,730 --> 00:17:52,309 And imagine cookie functions as an opaque 413 00:17:52,310 --> 00:17:54,469 identifier that is sent 414 00:17:54,470 --> 00:17:56,809 back and forth between different pieces 415 00:17:56,810 --> 00:17:58,570 of software unchanged. 416 00:18:00,120 --> 00:18:01,469 So I still don't know why it's called a 417 00:18:01,470 --> 00:18:02,879 magic cookie. 418 00:18:02,880 --> 00:18:05,039 And if anyone has any information 419 00:18:05,040 --> 00:18:06,959 about that, I would love to know. 420 00:18:08,780 --> 00:18:10,879 So similar to the magic cookie, the 421 00:18:10,880 --> 00:18:12,829 Internet cookie is defined by its 422 00:18:12,830 --> 00:18:13,830 invisibility. 423 00:18:14,810 --> 00:18:16,699 So remember, the magic cookie is an 424 00:18:16,700 --> 00:18:18,729 opaque identifier 425 00:18:20,240 --> 00:18:22,599 and the Internet cookie or hate 426 00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:25,519 mail cookie is a small reference file 427 00:18:25,520 --> 00:18:27,619 that is sent via a Web server 428 00:18:27,620 --> 00:18:29,599 to a browser and then placed by the 429 00:18:29,600 --> 00:18:32,240 browser on the user's computer. 430 00:18:44,870 --> 00:18:46,799 And every time the user loads the Web 431 00:18:46,800 --> 00:18:48,919 site, for example, the browser sends 432 00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:51,829 the cookie back to the server to notify 433 00:18:51,830 --> 00:18:53,479 the Web site. 434 00:18:53,480 --> 00:18:55,729 So Cookie is like a reference number or 435 00:18:55,730 --> 00:18:58,129 a day that travels between Web servers, 436 00:18:58,130 --> 00:19:00,800 Web browsers and personal computers. 437 00:19:01,990 --> 00:19:04,039 The Internet cookie allows Web service to 438 00:19:04,040 --> 00:19:06,469 identify users without disclosing 439 00:19:06,470 --> 00:19:08,629 what and how much information is 440 00:19:08,630 --> 00:19:10,429 being collected. 441 00:19:10,430 --> 00:19:12,589 Its content is therefore at the 442 00:19:12,590 --> 00:19:14,539 discretion of the Web server. 443 00:19:15,670 --> 00:19:17,769 Inherent to the technical protocol of 444 00:19:17,770 --> 00:19:20,409 the cookie is a lack of transparency 445 00:19:20,410 --> 00:19:22,419 that aligns knowledge and power in the 446 00:19:22,420 --> 00:19:23,920 hands of their creator. 447 00:19:25,900 --> 00:19:28,329 And importantly, the cookie provided 448 00:19:28,330 --> 00:19:30,399 a means to reliably implement 449 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:32,799 a virtual shopping cart. 450 00:19:32,800 --> 00:19:34,869 So cookies literally gave birth 451 00:19:34,870 --> 00:19:36,489 to the virtual shopping cart. 452 00:19:38,530 --> 00:19:40,639 And significantly, for the first time, 453 00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:43,549 a protocol for online automated 454 00:19:43,550 --> 00:19:44,550 data collection. 455 00:19:48,360 --> 00:19:50,459 Technically termed persistent client 456 00:19:50,460 --> 00:19:52,669 state object and loom on 457 00:19:52,670 --> 00:19:54,809 to a painting to denote as 458 00:19:54,810 --> 00:19:55,810 such. 459 00:20:04,000 --> 00:20:06,259 So, as you can see, invented them onto a 460 00:20:06,260 --> 00:20:07,959 current a sunny Facebook. 461 00:20:09,620 --> 00:20:11,839 Cookies transform the worldwide 462 00:20:11,840 --> 00:20:14,329 web from a system of discontinuous 463 00:20:14,330 --> 00:20:16,789 visits to a culture of persistence 464 00:20:16,790 --> 00:20:17,869 connectivity. 465 00:20:18,940 --> 00:20:21,169 Version No Point 9 Beta 466 00:20:21,170 --> 00:20:23,289 of Mistake Netscape was released 467 00:20:23,290 --> 00:20:26,799 on October 13th, 1994 468 00:20:26,800 --> 00:20:29,379 and supported state management. 469 00:20:29,380 --> 00:20:30,969 This was followed by the commercial 470 00:20:30,970 --> 00:20:33,249 release of the Netscape Navigator browser 471 00:20:33,250 --> 00:20:35,439 in 1995, which 472 00:20:35,440 --> 00:20:37,959 introduced cookies silently 473 00:20:37,960 --> 00:20:39,130 as a default setting. 474 00:20:40,570 --> 00:20:41,619 Not enough about you. 475 00:20:41,620 --> 00:20:44,409 I do remember the Netscape Navigator 476 00:20:44,410 --> 00:20:45,410 browser. 477 00:20:47,300 --> 00:20:49,429 And someone's put together 478 00:20:49,430 --> 00:20:50,430 this video. 479 00:21:00,230 --> 00:21:02,419 By the way, the longer a sound plays 480 00:21:02,420 --> 00:21:03,919 for it means the longer it's been 481 00:21:03,920 --> 00:21:06,299 programed to be on your computer. 482 00:21:08,510 --> 00:21:10,599 So it wasn't until nineteen ninety six 483 00:21:10,600 --> 00:21:13,479 that the privacy implications of cookies 484 00:21:13,480 --> 00:21:16,049 first became known to the public, 485 00:21:16,050 --> 00:21:16,989 and I should note here. 486 00:21:16,990 --> 00:21:18,249 This was very much due to the 487 00:21:18,250 --> 00:21:20,499 standardization process because 488 00:21:21,610 --> 00:21:23,229 they were raising concerns about the 489 00:21:23,230 --> 00:21:25,269 privacy implications, particularly of 490 00:21:25,270 --> 00:21:27,399 third party cookies. 491 00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:30,309 And this led to some newspaper articles 492 00:21:30,310 --> 00:21:32,679 such as the San Jose Mercury 493 00:21:32,680 --> 00:21:35,139 News headline Web Cookies, 494 00:21:35,140 --> 00:21:36,630 Maybe Spying on you. 495 00:21:39,090 --> 00:21:41,349 The extraction of user generated data 496 00:21:41,350 --> 00:21:43,599 in exchange for advertising revenue 497 00:21:43,600 --> 00:21:45,519 has subsequently developed into a 498 00:21:45,520 --> 00:21:46,449 business model. 499 00:21:46,450 --> 00:21:48,849 Key to the sustainability of the Internet 500 00:21:48,850 --> 00:21:49,850 platforms. 501 00:21:51,040 --> 00:21:53,189 But son of defying a largely 502 00:21:53,190 --> 00:21:55,209 invisible tracking technology. 503 00:21:55,210 --> 00:21:57,479 The listening back plugin critiques 504 00:21:57,480 --> 00:22:00,029 a lack of transparency inherent 505 00:22:00,030 --> 00:22:02,519 to online monitoring technologies 506 00:22:02,520 --> 00:22:04,619 and the broader context of opt 507 00:22:04,620 --> 00:22:07,349 in default cultures intrinsic 508 00:22:07,350 --> 00:22:09,389 to contemporary modes of online 509 00:22:09,390 --> 00:22:10,390 connectivity. 510 00:22:11,400 --> 00:22:13,979 So what I mean by default culture 511 00:22:13,980 --> 00:22:16,439 is, for example, with the browser 512 00:22:16,440 --> 00:22:17,969 the way to get in with the operating 513 00:22:17,970 --> 00:22:20,549 system, or perhaps you download it 514 00:22:20,550 --> 00:22:22,289 from the web and the first time you use 515 00:22:22,290 --> 00:22:24,389 it, you are by default 516 00:22:24,390 --> 00:22:26,549 opted in to being tracked 517 00:22:26,550 --> 00:22:27,990 by third party cookies. 518 00:22:29,120 --> 00:22:31,309 But every browser 519 00:22:31,310 --> 00:22:33,379 offers the option to block third 520 00:22:33,380 --> 00:22:34,979 party cookies. 521 00:22:34,980 --> 00:22:37,039 And this in no way affects 522 00:22:37,040 --> 00:22:39,979 the functionality of the World Wide Web. 523 00:22:39,980 --> 00:22:42,289 I found that not many people know about 524 00:22:42,290 --> 00:22:44,359 it. And also it's 525 00:22:44,360 --> 00:22:46,549 hidden down in a lot of sub menus. 526 00:22:47,630 --> 00:22:50,659 So, for example, with the Chrome browser 527 00:22:50,660 --> 00:22:52,160 you have to go to says. 528 00:22:54,090 --> 00:22:56,849 And then scroll down to 529 00:22:56,850 --> 00:22:58,949 advanced and 530 00:22:58,950 --> 00:23:01,859 then under privacy and security. 531 00:23:01,860 --> 00:23:04,139 It's inside settings 532 00:23:04,140 --> 00:23:06,289 and then cookies inside data. 533 00:23:06,290 --> 00:23:08,849 And he can block third party cookies. 534 00:23:08,850 --> 00:23:11,039 It states that some sites may not 535 00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:13,379 work properly, but I've never, ever 536 00:23:13,380 --> 00:23:14,380 had a problem. 537 00:23:16,110 --> 00:23:17,850 By blocking third party cookies. 538 00:23:23,060 --> 00:23:25,009 So you can hear how a lot of the ongoing 539 00:23:25,010 --> 00:23:27,559 sound is third party cookies. 540 00:23:27,560 --> 00:23:29,779 Typically most third party 541 00:23:29,780 --> 00:23:31,009 cookies are there when you load a 542 00:23:31,010 --> 00:23:32,010 package. 543 00:23:36,820 --> 00:23:38,889 And this is not always the 544 00:23:38,890 --> 00:23:41,019 case, but often the third party 545 00:23:41,020 --> 00:23:43,149 cookies are usually the 546 00:23:43,150 --> 00:23:44,169 regular ones. 547 00:23:45,410 --> 00:23:46,739 So I thought it was important. 548 00:23:48,910 --> 00:23:51,399 To be able to listen to the wind 549 00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:52,959 farm and hear the difference between 550 00:23:52,960 --> 00:23:54,519 third and third party cookies. 551 00:23:55,570 --> 00:23:56,570 So there is a. 552 00:23:57,750 --> 00:23:59,460 Interface that is plug in. 553 00:24:00,550 --> 00:24:03,039 And you can change the scale 554 00:24:03,040 --> 00:24:04,040 if you like. 555 00:24:15,880 --> 00:24:18,739 And then you can 10 said putting cookies. 556 00:24:18,740 --> 00:24:19,639 Up and down. 557 00:24:19,640 --> 00:24:22,069 So if you wanted to listen to 558 00:24:22,070 --> 00:24:23,990 the Web without third party cookies. 559 00:24:25,370 --> 00:24:27,939 We can turn it down and vise versa. 560 00:24:27,940 --> 00:24:29,829 So it's not blocking the cookies, it's 561 00:24:29,830 --> 00:24:31,959 just turning on the volume 562 00:24:31,960 --> 00:24:32,960 of the sound. 563 00:24:34,150 --> 00:24:36,519 And then here you can enter 564 00:24:36,520 --> 00:24:39,219 the domain name for a cookie 565 00:24:39,220 --> 00:24:41,319 and turn 566 00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:43,909 up and down or change the octave. 567 00:24:43,910 --> 00:24:46,190 So I could put out the log is. 568 00:24:58,430 --> 00:25:00,859 I've used a for life performance and 569 00:25:00,860 --> 00:25:01,860 installation. 570 00:25:05,390 --> 00:25:06,390 How am I doing? 571 00:25:10,050 --> 00:25:12,790 I can show you another couple of sides, 572 00:25:14,460 --> 00:25:16,589 because another on this side sees a lot 573 00:25:16,590 --> 00:25:18,180 of cookies are actually flying 574 00:25:19,470 --> 00:25:20,690 search engines. 575 00:25:21,830 --> 00:25:25,149 So she might even close 576 00:25:25,150 --> 00:25:26,150 the Guardian. 577 00:25:30,070 --> 00:25:32,650 So I made a special SFX. 578 00:25:46,260 --> 00:25:48,619 Which actually also has that same 579 00:25:48,620 --> 00:25:49,859 tiny cookie. 580 00:25:49,860 --> 00:25:50,860 I served on. 581 00:25:53,930 --> 00:25:55,819 And this one's quite fun to play around 582 00:25:55,820 --> 00:25:56,820 with. 583 00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:11,410 And then what if. 584 00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:48,920 By engaging. 585 00:26:49,840 --> 00:26:51,909 Mode of examination, his 586 00:26:51,910 --> 00:26:54,159 project asks what is the potential 587 00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:56,289 of a sound of sound as 588 00:26:56,290 --> 00:26:57,490 a tool for transport? 589 00:27:15,410 --> 00:27:17,889 And it has been a very entertaining talk. 590 00:27:17,890 --> 00:27:19,999 We have some type of questions from the 591 00:27:20,000 --> 00:27:21,309 questions you have through microphones 592 00:27:21,310 --> 00:27:22,770 here from the aisles. 593 00:27:24,490 --> 00:27:26,990 Feel free to approach and ask a question 594 00:27:28,500 --> 00:27:29,500 for number one. 595 00:27:30,220 --> 00:27:31,839 Thank you. Thank you for my views. 596 00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:33,759 I have question how you composed and 597 00:27:33,760 --> 00:27:36,179 decided on a week each week before which 598 00:27:36,180 --> 00:27:38,409 website and what cookie will 599 00:27:38,410 --> 00:27:39,410 sound. 600 00:27:40,210 --> 00:27:41,949 That's a very good question. 601 00:27:41,950 --> 00:27:43,629 I mean, in a way, a lot of it was sort of 602 00:27:43,630 --> 00:27:45,729 intuitive because I do 603 00:27:45,730 --> 00:27:47,859 work a lot with electronic 604 00:27:47,860 --> 00:27:48,849 sound and music. 605 00:27:48,850 --> 00:27:51,669 And so I just made sounds that I liked. 606 00:27:51,670 --> 00:27:53,889 But another deciding factor was, 607 00:27:53,890 --> 00:27:55,900 say, for this generic cookie sound 608 00:27:58,510 --> 00:28:00,669 because the cookie activity 609 00:28:00,670 --> 00:28:01,989 is so constant. 610 00:28:01,990 --> 00:28:04,149 I wanted to make a sound, but 611 00:28:04,150 --> 00:28:05,619 you didn't find two annoying and 612 00:28:05,620 --> 00:28:07,419 therefore turn it off immediately, 613 00:28:07,420 --> 00:28:09,219 because I think it's important to sort of 614 00:28:09,220 --> 00:28:10,749 engage with it for a while. 615 00:28:11,830 --> 00:28:15,119 So it's trying to find a balance between 616 00:28:15,120 --> 00:28:16,929 yet just to find a sound that you can 617 00:28:16,930 --> 00:28:19,089 listen to over 618 00:28:19,090 --> 00:28:20,090 and over. 619 00:28:21,550 --> 00:28:23,639 And then it was just 620 00:28:23,640 --> 00:28:26,229 it just made sense to make individual 621 00:28:26,230 --> 00:28:28,179 sounds for the main platforms because I 622 00:28:28,180 --> 00:28:30,279 knew everybody would be going 623 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:32,229 to those platforms. 624 00:28:32,230 --> 00:28:34,909 And I guess for the Amazon one, 625 00:28:34,910 --> 00:28:36,979 I did kind of try and make it a 626 00:28:36,980 --> 00:28:38,680 bit more scary than usual, 627 00:28:40,750 --> 00:28:42,729 especially because I've performed this 628 00:28:42,730 --> 00:28:44,079 sometimes, you know, on a P.A. 629 00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:46,539 system, in a club with a subwoofer. 630 00:28:46,540 --> 00:28:47,919 And then there's a lot of bass in that 631 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:50,650 sound that's quite overwhelming. 632 00:28:51,820 --> 00:28:53,709 And I guess the decision with 633 00:28:56,020 --> 00:28:57,969 I chose like for case that worked 634 00:28:57,970 --> 00:29:00,039 together. So, you know, no 635 00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:01,939 matter what you put it in or still be in 636 00:29:01,940 --> 00:29:03,729 tune except for that generic cookie 637 00:29:03,730 --> 00:29:06,679 sound, which you can't choose 638 00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:08,169 because that's fine. If you're listening 639 00:29:08,170 --> 00:29:10,569 to a lot of different data, it helps 640 00:29:10,570 --> 00:29:12,429 if it's in tune. 641 00:29:12,430 --> 00:29:14,349 Otherwise it can be really confusing to 642 00:29:14,350 --> 00:29:16,479 try and work out what sound 643 00:29:16,480 --> 00:29:18,699 belongs to what data. 644 00:29:19,750 --> 00:29:21,159 So no matter what you do, you're not 645 00:29:21,160 --> 00:29:22,269 going to. It's not going to. 646 00:29:22,270 --> 00:29:23,740 It's sort of going to be truthful 647 00:29:25,910 --> 00:29:27,670 for number two. 648 00:29:29,230 --> 00:29:31,089 Thanks for a wonderful presentation. 649 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:34,839 As you mentioned, there are lots of other 650 00:29:34,840 --> 00:29:37,059 forms of tracking techniques that can go 651 00:29:37,060 --> 00:29:38,160 on on a Web page, 652 00:29:39,430 --> 00:29:41,709 for example, JavaScript fingerprinting. 653 00:29:41,710 --> 00:29:43,419 Do you have any plans to roll out 654 00:29:43,420 --> 00:29:46,269 different and, you know, increasingly 655 00:29:46,270 --> 00:29:48,639 creative sounds for those kinds 656 00:29:48,640 --> 00:29:49,640 of practices? 657 00:29:50,470 --> 00:29:52,089 I think that would be a great idea, 658 00:29:52,090 --> 00:29:53,229 actually. 659 00:29:53,230 --> 00:29:54,230 Just sort of 660 00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:57,249 you'd have to try to add all the 661 00:29:57,250 --> 00:29:59,349 different tracking technologies. 662 00:29:59,350 --> 00:30:00,579 I mean, I think you'd have to have an 663 00:30:00,580 --> 00:30:02,709 interface where you could turn them off 664 00:30:02,710 --> 00:30:05,109 like the individual data sets, 665 00:30:05,110 --> 00:30:06,729 because otherwise it would just be way 666 00:30:06,730 --> 00:30:07,990 too much sound, 667 00:30:09,070 --> 00:30:10,899 which might be nice for a moment. 668 00:30:10,900 --> 00:30:12,699 But then if you want to sort of try and 669 00:30:12,700 --> 00:30:15,159 listen to how much say Web Bacon's 670 00:30:15,160 --> 00:30:17,950 a president or device fingerprinting, 671 00:30:21,850 --> 00:30:24,109 you don't have any actual plans. 672 00:30:24,110 --> 00:30:26,349 And if anyone wants to collaborate, 673 00:30:26,350 --> 00:30:28,779 I'd be happy to collaborate. 674 00:30:28,780 --> 00:30:30,669 But yeah, have thought about and I think 675 00:30:30,670 --> 00:30:32,140 that would be a nice idea. 676 00:30:34,940 --> 00:30:35,940 3. 677 00:30:36,910 --> 00:30:38,449 Yes. So thanks for the talk. 678 00:30:38,450 --> 00:30:39,489 It was great. 679 00:30:39,490 --> 00:30:41,769 I have a question that is related to the 680 00:30:41,770 --> 00:30:42,759 first one you got. 681 00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:45,159 Did you like Explorer 682 00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:46,889 trying to use some of the randomness that 683 00:30:46,890 --> 00:30:48,879 is in these cookies to make the sounds 684 00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:50,009 more unique? 685 00:30:50,010 --> 00:30:52,089 There were so so like all of these 686 00:30:52,090 --> 00:30:54,159 cookies contained a lot of like junk 687 00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:56,109 basically that is like unique to each 688 00:30:56,110 --> 00:30:57,699 person. Junk. 689 00:30:57,700 --> 00:30:58,869 Well, data, I guess. 690 00:31:00,070 --> 00:31:02,229 Did you try using tried to use any 691 00:31:02,230 --> 00:31:04,119 of that to like generate more unique 692 00:31:04,120 --> 00:31:05,559 sounds? 693 00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:07,629 Well, the data that I have access 694 00:31:07,630 --> 00:31:09,480 to. I mean, I can show you. 695 00:31:18,020 --> 00:31:19,640 So this background page 696 00:31:22,100 --> 00:31:24,559 shows you in a way what data 697 00:31:24,560 --> 00:31:25,819 I have access to, 698 00:31:27,100 --> 00:31:29,420 and so override is when it's updating 699 00:31:31,490 --> 00:31:33,199 or it's inserted or deleted. 700 00:31:33,200 --> 00:31:35,599 I actually focused so far 701 00:31:35,600 --> 00:31:37,869 on the different domain names. 702 00:31:37,870 --> 00:31:40,339 As for creating sounds 703 00:31:40,340 --> 00:31:42,439 and also then the length 704 00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:45,439 that a cookie is programed today 705 00:31:45,440 --> 00:31:47,089 on your computer, that also affects the 706 00:31:47,090 --> 00:31:47,989 length of the sound. 707 00:31:47,990 --> 00:31:50,329 But next I worked 708 00:31:50,330 --> 00:31:52,009 with was said that couldn't be longer 709 00:31:52,010 --> 00:31:53,869 than a couple of seconds just because of 710 00:31:53,870 --> 00:31:54,929 the CPSU. 711 00:31:54,930 --> 00:31:57,379 And like I was saying, 712 00:31:57,380 --> 00:31:59,689 the browser add ons not really meant 713 00:31:59,690 --> 00:32:02,479 for. I'm processing a lot of sound, 714 00:32:02,480 --> 00:32:04,129 but there's a lot of other information 715 00:32:04,130 --> 00:32:06,379 that you could signify, 716 00:32:06,380 --> 00:32:08,449 such as the date and time 717 00:32:08,450 --> 00:32:10,789 or if it's a session 718 00:32:10,790 --> 00:32:12,619 cookie or a persistent cookie. 719 00:32:13,850 --> 00:32:15,859 As you can see, it's really hard to know 720 00:32:15,860 --> 00:32:17,539 what. I don't know how well you can see 721 00:32:17,540 --> 00:32:19,700 it. It's really hard to decipher actually 722 00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,809 what a cookie is doing, 723 00:32:23,810 --> 00:32:25,189 which is part of this sort of lack of 724 00:32:25,190 --> 00:32:27,289 transparency. So even if you have access 725 00:32:27,290 --> 00:32:29,509 to this background page, 726 00:32:29,510 --> 00:32:31,939 which I guess we all do have access to, 727 00:32:31,940 --> 00:32:33,559 when you look at the devil, 728 00:32:35,270 --> 00:32:37,399 I mean, it's impossible 729 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:39,739 to understand what it means 730 00:32:39,740 --> 00:32:41,969 or I find it impossible to understand 731 00:32:41,970 --> 00:32:42,970 and what it mean. 732 00:32:44,340 --> 00:32:46,499 So this junk or noise that you're talking 733 00:32:46,500 --> 00:32:48,899 about. I'm not exactly sure 734 00:32:48,900 --> 00:32:50,699 what that is. 735 00:32:50,700 --> 00:32:52,469 Or if I would have access to apply the 736 00:32:52,470 --> 00:32:53,470 API, 737 00:32:54,900 --> 00:32:56,309 I was always thinking like just using, 738 00:32:56,310 --> 00:32:58,859 for example, the barbell gear, the what 739 00:32:58,860 --> 00:33:01,079 the like, the value of the barbell. 740 00:33:01,080 --> 00:33:03,329 I feel like ignoring whatever it's 741 00:33:03,330 --> 00:33:05,609 supposed to mean, just using it, 742 00:33:05,610 --> 00:33:08,039 using it to generate a basic idea. 743 00:33:08,040 --> 00:33:09,149 Yeah, that's something I could do. 744 00:33:09,150 --> 00:33:10,589 And then it would be more individual 745 00:33:10,590 --> 00:33:12,149 every sound. 746 00:33:12,150 --> 00:33:13,529 Yeah. That's a good idea. 747 00:33:13,530 --> 00:33:14,530 Yes. 748 00:33:14,730 --> 00:33:16,319 Like number two. 749 00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:17,789 Thanks. Thanks a lot for this beautiful 750 00:33:17,790 --> 00:33:19,409 talk. I was wondering, you have a 751 00:33:19,410 --> 00:33:21,779 favorite, musically speaking Web site, 752 00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:24,299 a favorite musically speaking. 753 00:33:24,300 --> 00:33:27,049 So, yeah. So like your website which 754 00:33:27,050 --> 00:33:29,519 remade itself or just 755 00:33:29,520 --> 00:33:30,749 generally music. 756 00:33:30,750 --> 00:33:32,969 So with your plug in, when 757 00:33:32,970 --> 00:33:34,709 you go to that website, it makes some 758 00:33:34,710 --> 00:33:35,629 beautiful sound. 759 00:33:35,630 --> 00:33:37,349 Oh, OK. 760 00:33:37,350 --> 00:33:38,999 I did quite like Expedia. 761 00:33:44,630 --> 00:33:45,630 Number one, 762 00:33:47,930 --> 00:33:49,999 I have maybe two questions or a 763 00:33:50,000 --> 00:33:52,309 suggestion and the question the first is 764 00:33:52,310 --> 00:33:54,739 I'd find it very interesting to 765 00:33:54,740 --> 00:33:57,879 make something similar which doesn't 766 00:33:57,880 --> 00:33:59,180 display or doesn't 767 00:34:01,050 --> 00:34:03,439 want your nice third party cookies, 768 00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:05,719 but a third party content in general. 769 00:34:05,720 --> 00:34:08,089 So scripts and images and everything 770 00:34:08,090 --> 00:34:10,129 else that's loaded from a third party 771 00:34:10,130 --> 00:34:11,130 website. 772 00:34:11,780 --> 00:34:13,969 And the question 773 00:34:15,040 --> 00:34:17,238 maybe just 774 00:34:17,239 --> 00:34:20,099 out of personal interest is which side 775 00:34:20,100 --> 00:34:22,009 have you found that has the most 776 00:34:22,010 --> 00:34:24,919 obnoxious, loudest and just longest 777 00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:26,269 sound created by that? 778 00:34:26,270 --> 00:34:27,270 I don't know. 779 00:34:27,949 --> 00:34:29,479 We'll start with the second question 780 00:34:29,480 --> 00:34:31,579 first. So when I was developing at 781 00:34:31,580 --> 00:34:33,919 one of the websites that was crashing, 782 00:34:33,920 --> 00:34:35,949 the browser was Vogue, actually. 783 00:34:38,570 --> 00:34:41,059 And I mean, 784 00:34:41,060 --> 00:34:43,158 for the first question, I just I mean, 785 00:34:43,159 --> 00:34:44,899 it was important for me that it was just 786 00:34:44,900 --> 00:34:47,209 a sign of occasion of the data. 787 00:34:47,210 --> 00:34:49,599 So not to have a visualization. 788 00:34:49,600 --> 00:34:51,649 So sorry. That was hard to formulate. 789 00:34:51,650 --> 00:34:54,589 I meant the same thing, 790 00:34:54,590 --> 00:34:57,080 but with third party content in general. 791 00:34:58,790 --> 00:35:00,439 So scripts that are loaded from other 792 00:35:00,440 --> 00:35:03,289 sites that these could also have a 793 00:35:03,290 --> 00:35:04,969 audio represents kind of like the other 794 00:35:04,970 --> 00:35:07,279 question, just like other tracking. 795 00:35:07,280 --> 00:35:08,929 Yeah. No, I think it would be great to 796 00:35:08,930 --> 00:35:10,359 develop it in that way. 797 00:35:10,360 --> 00:35:11,360 Yeah. 798 00:35:12,020 --> 00:35:13,339 I'll take a last question from microphone 799 00:35:13,340 --> 00:35:14,340 number two. 800 00:35:15,530 --> 00:35:17,599 I do think that when you scroll down the 801 00:35:17,600 --> 00:35:19,359 website, there was a lot of noise. 802 00:35:19,360 --> 00:35:20,839 Yeah. I don't have much technical 803 00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:22,969 background, but I was just wondering why 804 00:35:22,970 --> 00:35:25,219 there will be so many cookies 805 00:35:25,220 --> 00:35:27,539 loading up when you do such 806 00:35:27,540 --> 00:35:30,379 action. Well, it's hard to say. 807 00:35:30,380 --> 00:35:32,479 I mean, there's a few websites that do 808 00:35:32,480 --> 00:35:34,609 that. That what if dot com 1, which 809 00:35:34,610 --> 00:35:36,439 is a flight search engine, is one that 810 00:35:36,440 --> 00:35:37,440 does. 811 00:35:38,450 --> 00:35:39,769 And whether that is because they're 812 00:35:39,770 --> 00:35:41,989 tracking your every single move 813 00:35:41,990 --> 00:35:44,059 on the page or if it's 814 00:35:44,060 --> 00:35:46,279 just sometimes 815 00:35:46,280 --> 00:35:48,949 with some, which it probably is. 816 00:35:48,950 --> 00:35:50,719 I would say because I think I imagine 817 00:35:50,720 --> 00:35:51,979 they would generate a lot of their 818 00:35:51,980 --> 00:35:54,259 revenue from data 819 00:35:54,260 --> 00:35:55,489 and selling data. 820 00:35:57,380 --> 00:35:59,419 But sometimes you get Web sites like, 821 00:35:59,420 --> 00:36:00,420 say, 822 00:36:01,580 --> 00:36:03,679 Torture Ban, and that 823 00:36:03,680 --> 00:36:05,969 also has this constant cookie. 824 00:36:05,970 --> 00:36:08,059 And I don't think I mean, like I 825 00:36:08,060 --> 00:36:09,709 said, again, I can only speculate. 826 00:36:09,710 --> 00:36:11,359 I don't think it's necessarily because 827 00:36:11,360 --> 00:36:13,519 they're collecting so 828 00:36:13,520 --> 00:36:15,949 much data on you because I assume 829 00:36:15,950 --> 00:36:18,189 they're making money by selling tickets. 830 00:36:18,190 --> 00:36:20,299 But sometimes it's kind of 831 00:36:20,300 --> 00:36:22,249 I suppose not as someone who's a 832 00:36:22,250 --> 00:36:25,309 programmer, but a clumsy way of 833 00:36:25,310 --> 00:36:27,169 designing your sort of back end 834 00:36:27,170 --> 00:36:29,419 infrastructure because cookies 835 00:36:29,420 --> 00:36:31,879 aren't just used for tracking 836 00:36:31,880 --> 00:36:34,879 like they are a state mechanism. 837 00:36:34,880 --> 00:36:35,880 So 838 00:36:37,460 --> 00:36:39,579 the contents of that actually contents of 839 00:36:39,580 --> 00:36:42,169 that question, because I can't tell 840 00:36:42,170 --> 00:36:44,239 even if I like look back 841 00:36:44,240 --> 00:36:46,429 at this background page, which 842 00:36:46,430 --> 00:36:48,919 is as much information as I can get for 843 00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:50,899 what cookies are happening when I scroll. 844 00:36:50,900 --> 00:36:52,669 It doesn't make any sense to me. 845 00:36:56,530 --> 00:36:57,549 So that's all the time we have. 846 00:36:57,550 --> 00:36:59,239 Thanks again. It doesn't for great talk.